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ABSTRACT 
This thesis suggests that the pension systems in the advanced 
capitalist countries of Canada, Britain and the United States are on the 
verge of a crisis and that the problems associated with the marginalization 
and immiseration of the elderly, the universal and specific limitations of 
employer-based occupational pension plans and the underdevelopment of the 
state pension system are inherently and organically linked to the structure 
of private pension fund power. 
The impending pension crisis in these countries is explained by 
four converging structural considerations: first, the inadequate level of 
retirement income of the elderly; second, the increasing proportion of 
elderly in the population and the costs associated with an aging population; 
third, the general and particular limitations of the private pension system; 
fourth, under conditions of advanced capitalism, the corporate sector and 
state appropriating the occupational and state pension systems as a source 
of investment and social capital respectively to meet their finance 
requirements. 
The pension system now occupies a strategic position in advanced 
capitalist economies. The increasing economic power of pension funds is 
based on their role as financial intermediaries and institutional investors, 
with significant control over the economic surplus and reserve capital. The 
structure of pension fund power exhibits itself through formal and informal 
linkages to financial capital. The private pension system's investment and 
capital accumulation function has been transformed from a latent to a 
manifest function to supply the investment requirements of the economy 
and private sector. The private pension industry, characterized by a high 
degree of .. concentration and centralization of capital, increasingly 
facilitates the systemic fusion of the finance and industrial sectors of 
advanced capitalist economies. The symbiotic relationship between the 
corporate sector and private pension industry is identified as the primary 
economic and political obstacle to reforming and expanding the state 
pension system in the countries studied. 
It is concluded that the dynamic of the conflicting structural 
interests underlying the pension crisis may generate a heightened awareness 
of power and politics in capitalist countries by transcending the traditional 
limitations of economism and welfarism. The pension issue, both in the 
short and long-term, may generate increased social tension manifesting 
itself through intergenerational, sectoral, political and industrial relations 
conflict. This may result in increased politicization and progressive 
alternative economic strategies based on the pension system's investment 
and capital accumulation function. Public policy towards aging and pensions 
identifies personal problems and structural issues which may have 
significance in terms of power, politics, and social change in the future. 
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one's partner and family than for oneself. This was more than true for 
Marie-Claire' Pommez, my wife. " She brought an unfailing spirit of 
adventure, enthusiasm and co-operation to our year in Britain. She was a 
constant source of encouragement, support and strength. It was humbling, 
and perhaps ironic, that at a time when I was working in the field of aging 
and pensions, I should be able to watch our newly born twin daughters 
crawling about on the floor and starting to grow up. Life-cycle, indeed. 
Hopefully this thesis will contribute to a more secure old age for them. It 
was an exciting, and at times difficult, period for us all. It was our first 
experience as a family, and hopefully we are all the better for it. 
Marie-Claire realized how important this unique opportunity was for me to 
study and develop. Success, under unusual circumstances and in strange 
surroundings, was only possible as a result of her. It was Marie-Claire who 
understood that by Going Away we would be Coming Home. 
All errors of fact, interpretation or conceptualization are solely 
those of the author. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: 
TOWARDS A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PENSIONS 
"Much of modern social science has been a frequently 
unacknowledged debate with the work of Marx. " 
C. Wright Mills 
"The concrete analysis of the concrete situation. " 
V. I. Lenin 
1.1 Purpose of Study 
The objective of this study is to contribute a critical analysis of 
pensions policy using the approach of Marxist political economy. The 
method adopted here is to identify and explore the linkages and interaction 
between those socio-economic structures and forces which will affect the 
development of social policy towards aging and pensions over the next thirty 
to fifty, years in the advanced capitalist countries of Canada, Britain and the 
United States. 
Political economy, as one approach to the social sciences, adopts 
a macroscopic and dynamic perspective to the study of social phenomena. 
By identifying those determinant or conflicting forces and institutions, the 
analytic tools of political economy may be used to predict, and ultimately 
test, the direction of future events. Such an approach is adopted here to the 
study of public policy towards the state and occupational pensions systems. 
It is the juxtaposition and interaction of the various factors identified in this 
study which is analytically and politically important. 
1.2 Central Thesis 
The central thesis developed here is that the public and private 
pension systems in Canada, Britain and the United States are on the verge of 
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a crisis. The impending pension crisis is explained by four structurally 
determined considerations, or motor forces, which converge in the future: 
first, the inadequate level of retirement income of the elderly, resulting in 
their, economic immiseration and social marginalization; second, the 
increasing proportion of the elderly' in the population and the costs 
associated with supporting an aging population; third, the general and 
specific limitations of the employer-based occupational pension system; and 
fourth, the corporate sector and state appropriating the occupational and 
state pension systems as a source of investment and social capital 
respectively to meet their finance requirements. 
Conceptually, the aging of the population may be viewed-as being 
independent of the state' and occupational pension systems. That is, 
population' aging is an exogenous factor, which affects pension 
arrangements. The other three factors - the elderly's low level of 
retirement income, --the general and specific limitations of the private 
pension system, and the investment and capital accumulation function of the 
occupational pension system in supplying the investment requirements of the 
corporate sector - are all conceptualized as being intrinsic, or endogenously 
related to the employer-based occupational pension system which is based 
on the power of private pension funds. 
The institutional power of the private pension system is related to 
pension funds operating ý as financial intermediaries and institutional 
investors. Because private pensions funds as institutional investors are 
linked to the broader finance sector, -the structure of pension fund power 
exhibits itself through formal and informal linkages and arrangements. The 
private -pension industry is organically linked to the finance sector by 
economic structure and capitalist ideology. The private pension industry, 
characterized by a high degree of 'concentration and centralization of 
capital, increasingly facilitates the systemic fusion of the finance and 
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industrial sectors of advanced capitalist economies because of the role 
played by pension funds in channelling investment to the private sector. The 
private pension industry now occupies a position at the "commanding 
height' of the economy because of the structure of private pension fund 
power and its impact upon capital markets. The symbiotic relationship 
between the corporate sector and the private pension industry is identified 
as, the primary economic and political obstacle to reforming and expanding 
the state retirement income system in Canada, Britain and the United 
States. - 
The dynamic. and. logic of the conflicting, structural interests 
underlying-the pension, crisis may, as shall be demonstrated, result in a 
heightened awareness -of the nature of power and politics in capitalist 
countries by identifying "personal problems' as "public issues" which are 
structurally determined. The pension crisis may transcend the traditional 
limitations of economism and welfarism by raising issues related to power, 
politics and social change and may result in increased politicization and an 
opportunity to put forward : progressive alternative economic strategies 
based on the pension system's investment and capital accumulation function. 
State -and private pension arrangements as the subject of public 
policy ý are potentially explosive because they incorporate the key elements 
of political economy: power, capital accumulation, industrial relations, 
politics and social change. The pension issue is volatile because it 
simultaneously affects the interests of all key segments and institutions of 
society: the elderly, workers, unions, the industrial and finance sectors, and 
the state. The issues involved will have a profound impact in, the future 
upon social policy, capital formation, profit levels, collective bargaining and 
the economic : well-being of workers and the increasing proportion of the 
elderly. The political economy, of pensions identifies an important 
long-term social policy issue because it represents that historical 
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conjuncture where the interests of capital, labour and the state collide. The 
pension issue may become a major battleground, particularly in Canada, 
between the elderly, workers, unions, employers, and the state. Pensions 
and aging are integrally related and raise many important social policy and 
political issues. 
Because this study adopts the method of Marxist political 
economy, it is a work of synthesis. This study is not intended to be an 
institutional or legislative history of state and private pension plan 
arrangements. This is outlined in Appendix A which is a comparative 
chronology of retirement income arrangements and reform initiatives in 
Britain, Canada, and the United States. Nor is this work intended to be a 
primer on pension plan design. An overview of current state and 
occupational pension plan program features in the U. K., Canada and the U. S. 
is provided in Appendix B. Many excellent scholarly studies and technical 
texts on these subjects already exist.! Nothing is constructively served 
by covering old ground or pouring old wine into a new bottle. What is often 
required for intellectual advancement, and what is attempted in this study, 
is to view old information through a new paradigm2 in order to obtain new 
insights into social reality and the public policy issues of aging and 
pensions. As Mills suggested, "social research of any kind is advanced by 
ideas; it is only disciplined by fact. "3 
This is a comparative study of Canada, Britain and the United 
States as it relates to those institutions and forces which will affect the 
development of public policy towards pensions. The primary focus and 
emphasis is on the Canadian situation. British and American information is 
presented, as required, in order to compare and contrast the structures and 
forces examined in this study. Unlike the studies by Helco and 
Rimlinger, 4 which are retrospective comparative analyses of , social 
security history, this is a comparative prospective analysis. 
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1.3 Historical Background and Policy Context 
There are a number of reasons why a comparative transnational 
study of the political economy of pensions in Canada, Britain and the United 
States deserves serious investigation: social and intellectual history, 
geopolitics, and the current public policy reviews of the state and 
employer-based occupational pension systems. These similarities are 
examined here. 
1.3.1 Social and Intellectual History. All three countries studied 
share a similiar, although by no means identical, social security history 
based on a common social and intellectual history and philosophy of social 
welfare. The early craft unions in colonial Canada and America based many 
of their activities on the functions performed by the British friendly and 
provident societies. The early origins of occupational pension plans in 
Canada were modelled on developments in Britain. 
5 Agitation for the 
introduction of a state pension system in Canada drew much "inspiration" 
from the United Kingdom and "events in that country were of particular 
interest". 6 The non-contributory, means-tested old age pension was first 
introduced in Britain in 1908. Canada followed suit with its means-tested 
old age security (OAS) pension in 1927. 
As a result of the trauma of the Great Depression and World War 
II, Britain and the United States were both moving toward forms of the 
liberal welfare state as embodied in Roosevelt's New Deal reforms and 
? 
the Beveridge Report. 
8 "Thus events in both the countries which have 
most influenced Canada were moving to the acceptance of social security 
legislation"9 and served as a model for later Canadian initiatives. The 
United States introduced the earnings-related social security retirement 
system in 1935. Subsequently, Britain introduced an earnings-related state 
pension plan in 1959 (the Boyd-Carpenter Plan), while the Canada/Quebec 
Pension Plans were implemented in 1966. 
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Bliss has said that "the most important single document in the 
history of the welfare state in Canada" is Marsh's Report on Social Security 
of Canada published in 1943.10 Marsh may be viewed as the architect of 
the Canadian welfare state. Writing some twenty years after his report was 
issued, he said that his proposals 
were worked out quite independently, but the coupling 
of [the] Beveridge and Marsh reports led to some 
ill-informed allegations. The truth is that by 1941 
there was a common stock of ideas an1l principles 
available to those who knew the literature. 
One important factor generating "a common stock of idea' was that Marsh 
was a student of Sir William Beveridge at the London School of 
Economics. 12 Furthermore, with respect to subsequent post-war social 
security program initiatives, it is of some relevance that Beveridge in the 
U. K., Marsh in Canada, and Burns in the U. S., all served together on the 
same ILO reconstruction committee in London during the Second World 
War. 13 
Even allowing for the distinctive evolution of national social 
security traditions, it is clear that there has been a "common stock of idea' 
central to British, Canadian and American experience. These include 
certain similar features of program design, terminology, and the income tax 
regulations governing the state and employer-based occupational pension 
systems. The term "social security" was itself American, replacing the term 
"social welfare" previously used in Canada, and "social insurance" followed 
in Britain. Even today there is a close similarity between the new Inland 
Revenue Code in the U. K., Revenue Canada's Interpretation Bulletin and the 
American Internal Revenue Service's regulations governing occupational 
pension plans. The social security and private pension systems studied here 
all evolved from a common British origin, and have followed a roughly 
parallel course of development, while of course manifesting unique national 
characteristics. 
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1.3.2 Geopolitics. Canada has been linked to Britain and the 
United States by language, culture, politics and economic relations. 
Politically and economically, Canada was first a colony of Great Britain. In 
the mid-nineteenth. century there was steep investment in infrastructure, 
such as railroads, by British investors. - Political institutions, cultural 
background (the Quebec fact notwithstanding) and trading patterns all 
served to establish an east-west Anglo-Canadian link. - 
Beginning in the 1920s, American : transnational corporations 
penetrated Canada and expanded their influence. They brought with them 
their industrial relations practices, including occupational pension plan 
arrangements. American- social welfare and social work practices 
influenced Canadian developments during the 1930s and 1940s. 
14 In the 
post-World War II period the Canadian economy has become so influenced by 
American corporations that it is often characterized as being a dependent 
"branch plant" economy. Canadian economic affairs and culture are now 
dominated by the north-south relationship which affects all facets of life. 
Canada has been at the focal point of British and American socio-economic 
influences. -- 
1.3.3 Public Policy Reviews. Retirement income arrangements in 
Canada, Britain and the United States have been the subject of an intensive 
public policy review in recent years. Pension reform, particularly in 
Canada, is now viewed as a major issue of public policy and the 
environment surrounding this issue in all three countries is extremely 
dynamic and fluid. This reflects, in part, the similar problems found in each 
of these countries' pension systems. 
In Canada there has been a prolonged and intense public policy 
review, inaugurated when the Ontario Royal Commission on the Status of 
Pensions was created in April 1977. Since that time, no less than a dozen 
government, task force, Senate, Royal Commission and private research 
-8- 
reports have been issued with recommendations for the reform of the 
Canada/Quebec Pension Plans (C/QPP) and the private pension system. The 
federal government sponsored a highly publicized multi-partite National 
Pensions Conference on pension reform in March 1981. Pension reform was 
considered to be one of the federal Liberal government's highest ranking 
priorities in the social policy area. Subsequently, bilateral discussions took 
place between the federal and provincial governments. The February 1984 
Budget introduced a number of measures to reform the private pension 
system. With the election of a new Conservative government in the fall of 
1984, pension reform is yet to be consumated. 
The United States implemented the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act 1974 (ERISA) after a period of lengthy Congressional inquiry 
and public discussion., This was a massive omnibus piece of legislation, 
resulting for the first time in the uniform and systematic regulation of 
private - sector, -pension plans in the U. S. 
Subsequently, the Carter 
administration' in 1979 established the President's Commission on Pension 
Policy which reported in February 1981 with major recommendations for the 
strengthening of the social security system, and private pension plans. The 
Reagan administration implemented a number of the recommendations of 
the National Commission on Social Security Reform. 
In Britain in the post-war era there have been no less than three 
major reviews and overhauls of the state social security system. In addition, 
there have been three pieces of legislation implemented to regulate 
occupational pension schemes. The most far reaching reform measures were 
introduced in the Social Security Pensions Act 1975 (the Castle Plan). The 
Occupational Pensions Board in the intervening period has issued three 
major reports calling for further pension reform. Just prior to its defeat in 
1979, the Labour government issued a highly controversial white paper on 
the co-management of pension plans. The final report of the Wilson 
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Committee to Review the Functioning of Financial Institutions (1980) was 
an in-depth inquiry into the impact of pension funds, and other institutional 
investors, on capital markets. The 1985 green paper on the reform of social 
security, with its recommendation to eliminate the state earnings-related 
pension system (SERPS), and the subsequent white paper's proposal to 
introduce personal portable pensions (PPP), are indicative of the 
Conservative government's concern with pension'issues. 
The policy reviews of the public and private pension systems in 
each of these countries have not gone unnoticed by their respective 
counterparts. - In ' Canada, for example, the British system' of 
"contracting-out", where an occupational scheme can opt out of the state 
plan under certain conditions, - has received some interest and study. The 
U. S. President's Commission 'on Pension Policy recommendation for 
mandated private pension plan coverage has received some support from the 
Canadian private pension industry. The Anglo-Canadian-American link has 
created its own demonstration effect. 
The public policy reviews in each of these countries have revealed 
a 'series of similar issues: the inadequate retirement income of the elderly, 
the economics of an aging population, the universal and particularistic 
limitations of 'employer-based pension plans, the impact of private pension 
funds as institutional investors upon capital markets, and the'use of pensions 
for' economic development. These issues and their significance for power, 
politics and social change are the subject of this study. 
1.4 Analytical Framework 
The approach of Marxist political economy 
15 
attempts to 
analyze the interaction of various social phenomena and relate them to a 
particular mode of production and social formation according to the 
principles of historical and dialectical materialism. The methodology of 
political economy as applied here to pensions and aging attempts to 
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integrate such diverse subjects as the sociology. of aging, historical 
demography, social gerontology, the social history of aging, and the formal 
aspects of social security and pension plan design, administration, and 
investment management. 
In recent years virtually every institution and facet of capitalist 
society has been subjected to critical analysis: the state, income 
distribution, education, housing, health-care, role-typing, industrial 
relations, racism, and so forth. Whither state social security retirement 
systems and employer-based occupational pension plans? Why have 
progressive -social policy analysts not studied state--and private pension 
arrangements from a critical perspective? And why have pensions been- 
ignored in terms of radical economic analysis? A critique is as much 
concerned with the "silenced' of a theory, that is, what is not said, as with 
what is articulated.. ' The fact that the state and occupational -pension 
systems have not been analyzed, until very recently, 
16 from the 
perspective of -political economy rather than that of social 
history, 17 
ideology, l8 social work, 
19 
or social ' policy20 is peculiar, if not 
disturbing. The "silenced' are deafening. 
Here it is suggested that six reasons account for this traditional 
lack of concern with respect to. a critical economic analysis of the role, 
function and impact of the state and private pension systems. In the first 
instance, state and private pensions have traditionally been subsumed under 
the broad generic heading of "social welfare". The term "social welfare" is 
imprecisely defined, cutting across such fields as health, welfare, education, 
retirement income and so forth. Further confusion, results from the fact 
that "social welfare" programs are often described in terms of their value to 
individuals and sometimes in terms of their social functions. Difficulty also 
arises from the absence' of any standardized terminology: the terms "social 
security", "social services", "social welfare" and "social work" have no fixed 
meaning and are all too often used interchangeably and imprecisely. Since 
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pensions have been treated under these broad headings, they have not 
become a distinct, independent object of critical study. Thus one 
contemporary study of class and social policy, for example, completely 
circumvents any analysis of "the very important question of pensions" 
because of "insufficient space". 
21 Another recent study on the political 
economy of the welfare state relegates pensions to a footnote. 
22 
A second reason why -pensions have been ignored, perhaps 
understandably so, is that the technical subject matter seems to be complex 
and dull. This is compounded by an archane and often obscurantist technical 
jargon which is enough to deter even the best intentioned. While social 
activists in recent years seem to have been, able to master the technical 
subject matter of law and medicine, that of compound interest and present 
value seem to have escaped them. "Ir "- " 
A third reason why pensions and related issues have seemingly 
been ignored is because of "juvenocentricism": that is, those who are being 
trained in the various "helping professions" tend to be young. Being-old, and 
the problems associated with the elderly, are outside their personal frame of 
reference. It is not uncommon, for schools of social work, for example, to 
cancel courses in the sociology of aging or social gerontology as a result of a 
lack of interest on the part of young students. 
Fourth, social policy analysis has traditionally been concerned 
with the-level of benefits generated from the state and private pension 
systems, and their, adequacy, rather than probing deeper underlying issues. 
This is perhaps understandable given the humanistic origins of liberal and 
socialist ideology. But the emphasis on benefit adequacy has tended to 
obscure and limit any deeper analysis and understanding of -the, -economic 
relationships associated with pensions. Put another way,, the preoccupation 
with the adequacy of pension benefits has limited economic analysis and is a 
reflection of a deeper "economism". 
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A fifth and highly significant reason why state and private pension 
plans have not been subjected to serious analytical consideration is that they 
have been incorporated into broader based ideology and social philosophy. 
Adequate pension benefits have been equated with a "social right" to which 
all people are entitled based on "human need". Such notions as "social 
right", "social obligation', "human need" and "social justice" are moral 
considerations however, not analytical categories. Invoking such idealistic 
and subjective moral considerations has resulted in analytic mystification. 
To the extent that social welfare analysis has cloaked itself in such 
subjectivism has meant that it has not placed the study of pensions in 
established, analytical, economic categories. . 
Ideology has therefore 
obscured reality. 
Sixth and last, whether explicitly articulated or not, there has 
been an unintended convergence between liberal social welfare and Marxist 
analyses which tend to view pensions (state and private), and social security 
expenditures more generally, as a "free good'. That is, pensions are viewed 
as a consumption good which have no cost associated with them. Merely to 
suggest that the distributional aspects of "many social problems are 
primarily issues involving conflicts of economic interests between... various 
social . classes!, 
23 
may describe everything but analyzes nothing. The 
implicit assumption underlying many current analyses is that. pensions are a 
"free good' because they are a "social right". Economic calculus is rarely 
applied to what are perceived of as "rights". Such views are a, form of 
subjectivism because pensions are no longer related to a particular mode of 
production, or social formation, and the economic relations governing them. 
It is because the "laws of economic' seem to have been ignored that many 
commentators have implicitly viewed pensions as a "free good", requiring no 
further economic analysis with the tools of Marxist political economy. 
The laws of economics govern the allocation of resources in all 
societies - capitalist as well as socialist. In Marx's words, some laws, of 
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economics have "universal validity [and] are so self-evident that there is 
scarcely need ... 
for their special study"24 and "no natural laws can be 
done away with. What can change, in changing historical circumstances, is 
the form in which these laws operate. "25 The neo-classical economic 
model, including the law of supply and demand, and the allocative 
mechanism derived from budget constraints and production functions, are an 
integral part of classic Marxian political economy. As Sweezy has asserted, 
"the competitive supply-and-demand theory ... forms an integral, if 
sometimes unrecognized, part of the labor theory [of value]. "26 Shedding 
such subjective and idealistic notions as pensions being a "social right", or 'a 
"free good' based on "human need", allows economic analysis to proceed 
unfettered by ideological blinders. The study of pensions can thus be placed 
within the analytical categories of the labour theory of value, the 
reproduction of labour power and the circulation and accumulation of 
capital associated with the Marxian economic model. 
Traditional analyses of the role and function of the state and 
private pension systems have, until recently, been primarily concerned with 
analyzing the' manifest functions of the pension system. By situating 
pensions within the Marxian framework of economics and its analytical 
categories, it is possible to identify the underlying economic functions and 
relationships that the pension system fulfills under conditions of advanced 
capitalism. One of the economic functions of the state and private pension 
systems is to augment the capital accumulation -process in advanced 
capitalist societies. As a result of a complex interaction of factors, the 
latent capital accumulation function served by the pension system is now 
being qualitatively transformed into a manifest function. Pensions are an 
integral part of the broader socio-economic system and their economic 
functions must be critically analyzed as such. 
If the recent critical literature is any example, two tendencies 
can be identified with respect to the study of the state social welfare 
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system. 
27 In one instance, those who analyze "social welfare", including 
pensions, from the perspective of the legitimization and coercion functions 
of the state, exclude the capital accumulation function from their 
framework. Alternatively, where the capital accumulation function is made 
central to the analysis, the coercion and ideological functions associated 
with the pension system are excluded from the analysis. If the method of 
classic Marxist political economy has any relevance, -it is to synthesize and 
integrate different "leveld' of a complex, total social reality. This means 
integrating the social, cultural and economic dimensions of existence and 
laying-bare the "laws of motion" without resorting to a crude determinism 
or global abstractions which obscure a complex reality. 
The methodology of Marxist political economy as applied to 
pensions and aging assumes a new relevance with respect to the current 
public policy reviews in Canada and Britain, and that recently concluded in 
the United States. To use the method of political economy one critical 
sociologist noted, "that does not incorporate the reworked' and reanalyzed 
accomplishments of the various social sciences in the last half century is a 
form of sectarian fundamentalism. "28 A "theoretical analysis of the social 
totality requires the integration of `the various 'empirical' disciplines. "29 
Because the political economy of pensions, like the social sciences more 
generally, "has a dialectical 'character and contains both repressive and 
liberative dimensions , 
30 it suggests that only an integrated "social 
science approach... can 'offer new understanding of the aged, new solutions 
to their problems... and new definitions of their social role. "31 A 
balanced approach to the political economy of pensiobs must therefore 
incorporate ä critical economic- analysis of' pension arrangements and the 
object for which pensions ostensibly exist: the elderly. 
1.5 The Conjuncture: The Elderly, Aging, and Pensions 
"To be aware of the idea of social structure, " Mills wrote, "is to 
be capable of tracing... linkages among a great variety of milieux". 
32 It 
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is within this context that the political economy of pensions must be studied 
for it represents the conjuncture, or, intersection, between old age as a 
personal experience and the pension system as part of the broader 
socio-economic structure. 
The pension issue cannot be separated from considerations related 
to the social and cultural history of aging, 
33 
and the broader social and 
economic position of the elderly in our society. The history of the aged and 
aging is more than the formal institutional history of state ' and private 
pension arrangements and their evolution. 
34 To place the pension issue in 
its proper historical perspective requires that workers, social security 
administrators and social scientists confront what one social historian has 
called "the culture of aging". 
35 It has " been succinctly argued - that "old 
ageAs an age-old problem, and a distinct culture has surrounded it for 
centuries' and the "problems in dealing with old people go far deeper than 
14, the evils of capitalism; ... they lie deep 
In our cultural heritage. "36 Put 
simply, society's dominant attitudes towards the elderly have a cultural and 
social dimension. Like racism and -sexism, cultural attitudes towards the 
elderly and aging pre-date the advent of industrial capitalism. The cultural 
attitudes towards aging and the elderly carried over from pre-industrial 
formations is a classic example of what Marx meant when he said that "the 
tradition of all the generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the 
living. "37 
The history of aging suggests that there are a series of universal 
and persistent attitudes and problems experienced by the elderly. These 
cultural manifestations often have a dynamic of their own, relatively 
independent of social structure. Cultural attitudes are not a mere 
mechanical "epiphenomeon"38 or reflection, to use Marx's phrase, of the 
broader economic structure. As Engels forcefully stated, if the materialist 
conception of history is twisted so that 
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the economic element is the only determining one, he 
transforms it into a meaningless, abstract and absurd 
phrase... [The] various elements of the super- 
structure... also exercise their influence upon the 
course of the historical struggles and in many cases 
preponderate in determining theier9 form. There is an 
interaction of all these elements. 
Within the context of the history of aging it is interesting to 
observe that "older workers have received little attention from labour 
Much more is known historians, their fate lamented only in passing. , 
40 
about the history of women, childhood, ethnic groups and unions than the 
experience of older workers and how they perceive their reality. Recent 
research in labour and social history for the United States and Canada has, 
unfortunately, completely ignored the working class experience with aging 
and the reality surrounding it. 
41 The evidence which exists suggests that 
working class culture has had little veneration for the elderly. 
42 "To be 
old and poor, ' according to Fischer, "was certainly not to be venerated, but 
rather to be despised. "43 This lack of interest in the historical experience 
of the aged, and particularly elderly workers, is largely attributable to older 
people being used "to service the needs of larger and more powerful 
elements of the population. "44 As a result, "of all the silent groups yet 
uncovered by historians dealing with history 'from the bottom up', the 
elderly as a group... remain the most inarticulate. " 
5 
The cultural 'dimension of the political economy of pensions 
exhibits itself in the form of agism and gerontophobia. 
46 Agism, like 
sexism, is a prevailing and pervasive' social attitude. Like' sexism, agism is 
institutionalized and legitimized. Agism exists in' employment, retirement 
practices, social stereotypes, legislation, income distribution, and the 
generally negative social attitudes towards the aged. One study concluded 
that while there have been some modest advances made against racism and 
sexism in recent years, the relative 'status of' the elderly is declining and 
"age inequality appears to be getting substantially worse". 
47 
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The current inadequacies of 'the private and public pension 
systems are a reflection of the more general condition of the aged. The 
elderly in our society are deprived of status, authority and economic 
security. The aged lack adequate income, respect and purposefulness 
because of dominant negative social attitudes which are ascribed to aging 
and the elderly. 
48 Most people still hold Images and stereotypes of the 
elderly that existed earlier in the -century. 
49 Generally people do not 
consider the aged very active, alert, efficient, or contented. 
50 There is a 
tremendous discrepancy between'what old age is expected to be like and the 
actual experience of old people. - At a social level, the inadequacies of the 
pension system exist because our youth-oriented society does not value the 
elderly as people. 
51 
The socio-economic position of the elderly is not dissimilar to 
that of women and various ethnic minority groups. The elderly, like these 
other groups, are in general poor, vulnerable and victimized. This situtation 
may be changing, however, as the elderly, and these other strata, are now 
becoming increasingly articulate, organized and'vocal iwdefining their own 
interests and needs, as opposed to having them defined for them by other 
institutions with ulterior motives. 
52 
There, is a considerable difference between the retirement 
experience of an elderly slave'and that of a patrician, and that of an aged 
labourer and industrialist, as de Beauvoir reminds us in her classic history of 
aging. 
53 Recognizing the class basis for the difference in the aging 
experience, however, in no way-negates the general proposition that there 
are certain universal problems and attitudes experienced -by the elderly. 
The aging experience and the problems associated with it, both at the social 
and personal level, are dialectical in character in that they are universal and 
historically specific. This in many ways parallels the position of women. 
Both the elderly and women constitute a stratum within their respective 
social classes. 
54 "Older people share with each other their chronological 
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age, but factors more powerful than age, " one study concluded, "determine 
the conditions of their later years. "55 Fundamentally what is at issue are 
not just matters of economic analysis, or the social security, programs 
evolved by the capitalist welfare state, although these certainly are 
important, but our society's cultural attitudes towards the elderly and how 
these affect public policy. Underlying the pension issue is the quality of life 
experienced by the current and future elderly. The elderly are increasingly 
developing, their own life-style and are asserting their right to self-esteem, 
dignity, and.. above all, independence. In this regard an expanded public 
pension system is a crucially necessary, but not sufficient, condition to 
improve the position of the elderly. To improve the position of old people in 
advanced industrialized societies requires major attitudinal , and cultural 
changes, in addition to substantial reform of the pension system. 
Increasingly there is a risk, because pensions are viewed as an 
economic, problem, that. the elderly will be defined as a "burden", and a 
"problem" themselves. The aging of the population in industrialized 
countries, especially in Canada and the United States, with all its economic 
and social implications, suggests that the elderly may be perceived in the 
future as a "social problem" of the first magnitude. 
56 Because "old age 
has become, " as, de Beauvoir noted, "the object of a policy", 
57 if the 
elderly become a high profile "social problem" like the unemployed, unions, 
Blacks and the Quebecois, they, may become the target of less benign 
welfare state policies in the future. 
It is "mechanical reductionism"58 of the worst type to simplify 
the process of aging and the experience of the elderly to the cash nexus as 
represented by pension arrangements. The aged are more than the stagnant 
form of the industrial reserve army, 
59 
and social security expenditures 
are considerably more complex than only being a form of variable 
capital60 or "social wage". 
61 Limiting the current public policy review 
of pension arrangements solely to the issue of benefit adequacy perpetuates 
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a narrow view of the problems associated with aging and reinforces the 
elderly's status as a dependent social category. Money alone will not resolve 
the problems associated with old age. Such a view is the best form of 
liberalism, and the worst type of "economism". It is vulgar and simplistic 
because it ignores the totality of the social reality and the complex series of 
issues related to the elderly and aging. 
The history of aging may contain within it the-, potential for 
progressive social change because "an adequate policy for old age-has to 
be much more, than a policy for pensions. It has to be a policy which will 
help the elderly find a new way of life. "62 To question the quality and 
meaning of one's existence in old age is to begin to inquire about the purpose 
of one's entire life. The difficulties associated with old age for workers is 
nothing but a continuation of what has gone before, because the injury a 
worker "has suffered during the course of his life is... radical. The reason 
that the retired man is rendered hopeless by want of meaning, in his present 
is that the meaning of his existence has been stolen from him from the very 
beginning. "63 To be treated differently in old age therefore requires that 
a person be treated as a human being during his entire life. This being the 
case, "it is the whole system that is at issue and our claim cannot be 
otherwise than radical - change life itself. "64 A political economy of 
pensions which incorporates and is sensitive to the history of the aged and 
aging may become a liberative tool because it offers an analysis of the 
interrelationship between the individual and collective condition of the 
elderly and broader social institutions and structures. 
1.6 Plan of Study 
The plan of attack and organization is straightforward. Each 
chapter identifies and analyzes an element in the political economy of 
pensions and discusses the interrelationship between these elements. 
Chapters 2 through 5 examine those important socio-economic trends and 
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institutional arrangements underlying the pension issue: the economic 
position of the elderly, the economics of an aging population, the universal 
limitations of the private pension system and the specific inadequacies of 
pension arrangements under conditions of collective bargaining. 
Chapters 6 through 9 identify and examine those economic 
functions and structures associated with the operation of the pension system 
which have resulted in it assuming a strategic position in advanced capitalist 
economies: the pension system's saving, investment and capital 
accumulation function; the institutionalization of capital markets and 
investment; the structure and power of pension funds based on the 
concentration and centralization of capital and linkages to the broader 
finance sector, and the pension system's investment function facilitating the 
interpenetration and interdependence of financial and industrial capital into 
an unified nexus of corporate power. Expansion of the state pension system 
in advanced capitalist countries is opposed by the private pension industry 
and the corporate sector because it would result in reducing the level of 
investment flowing to the private sector and diminish the market share and 
profits of the private pension industry. As a result of this symbiotic 
relationship the underdevelopment of the public pension system and the 
impoverishment of the elderly are perpetuated. 
The main conclusion in Chapter 10 is that the pension system in 
Canada, Britain and the United States is on the point of a crisis because a 
series of conjunctural factors converge in the future for the reasons 
identified and analyzed in this study. The pension crisis may, in turn, result 
in the politicization of the pension issue. Because the pension system in 
capitalist economies occupies a strategic position it may, however, be used 
to develop progressive strategies for social change. Current and proposed 
macro-and-micro alternative investment strategies are reported and 
assessed. Through the investment function underlying the operation of the 
state and private pension systems it is possible to exercise control over the 
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industrial sector, investment and capital formation in the public interest. 
Progressive strategies for social change based on the pension system are 
examined from a Marxist perspective and are related to the issue of the 
transition from capitalism to socialism. 
1.7 A Note on Terminology and Sources 
The terminology associated with social security systems and 
employer-based pension plans often seems technical and obscurantist to the 
uninitiated layman. Every effort has been made here to reduce technical 
terminology and jargon to a minimum without doing injury to the subject. 
A transnational study invariably has a problem of comparable 
terminology. Although actuarial science has tended to standardize the 
usage of technical terms, each national social security and employer-based 
pension system has adopted a different nomenclature. To assist the reader a 
glossary of Canadian, British and American pension terms has been included 
as Appendix C. 
A number of key terms are used frequently throughout this study 
and require a brief explanation. As used here the terms "state" or "public" 
pension plan or system is used interchangeably to denote the national 
government sponsored "social security" or "social insurance" retirement 
income system for eligible contributors. The terms as used here refer only 
to retirement benefits. The terms "private" or "occupational" pension plan 
refer to employer-based pension plans at the level of the firm or industry 
regardless of whether they exist in the private or public sectors. Public 
sector pension plans are referred to as "public employee" pension plans to 
differentiate them from the state (public) pension system. The context in 
which the terms are used should be self-explanatory. 
An international study such as this must of necessity draw upon a 
wide variety of disparate sources. Every effort has been made to put all 
statistical data on a consistent and comparable basis. An inevitable 
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frustration is that government statistical sources when published are usually 
two years behind the reporting date for the information. Rather than 
constantly rework a ream of statistical information as writing commenced, 
some slightly dated material has been included if subsequent information 
revealed no significant change. In order to minimize reporting and 
conversion difficulties, all monetary figures are presented in national 
currency units unless otherwise indicated. 
i 
CHAPTER 2 
THE CONDITION OF THE ELDERLY: 
IMMISERATION AND MARGINALIZATION 
"A man's aging and his decline always takes place 
inside some given society: it is intimately related to 
the character of that society and ... the place that the 
individual in question occupies within it. In itself `the 
economic factor cannot be isolated from the social, 
political and ideological superstructures that contain 
it. " 
Simone de Beauvoir 
2.1 Introduction 
Aging is a socially defined process, individually experienced. The 
economic and social position of the elderly must accordingly be analyzed `in 
terms of both its universality and specificity. "Men make their own history, 
but they do not make it just as they please, " Marx wrote, ""but under 
circumstances "directly encountered, given and transmitted from the 
past. " 
1 The current social and economic position of the elderly in 
industrialized societies is a product-of the` historical process which preceded 
it. The position of older people in society is central to the study of the 
political economy of pensions because the elderly are the object of pension 
policy. 
Two topics are presented and developed in this chapter. First, the 
economic position of a significant proportion of elderly throughout history 
has relegated' them to a clearly identifiable lower stratum of society 
characterized by economic immiseration and social marginalization. ''There 
are both class=based and universal characteristics and problems associated 
with aging. While "one of the main functions of social class" in 
industrialized societies "has been to prepare a'differential response to 
aging" the "elderly have encountered special problems, as a' segment of the 
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population, for centuries. "2 There is no mechanical relationship between 
the position held by the elderly and the mode of production. Like racism 
and sexism, the elderly's insecure economic position and the negative social 
values ascribed to aging and older people pre-date the rise of industrial 
capitalism. 
3 Both high and popular culture have continuously disdained 
old age and the elderly. Pre-industrial France4 hardly venerated the old, 
and widely-held negative attitudes towards aging were clearly evidenced in 
the United States before capitalist industrialization took off. 
5 
Agism and, gerontophobia, 
6 
as negative social attitudes towards 
the elderly, are universal phenomena regardless of their present specific 
institutionalized and legitimized forms. While Marx analyzed the elderly as 
constituting the stagnant form, or Lazarus stratum, of the industrial reserve 
army along with the disabled, orphans and paupers, as a result of their 
peripheral attachment to the capitalist labour market, 
7 in general the 
"old have consistently been treated unkindly in Western culture", 
8 both in 
pre-industrial and industrialized societies. 
9 To attribute the position of 
the elderly solely to the capitalist mode of production, without recognizing 
the relatively independent cultural and social dimensions of aging is to 
engage in, to use Lukacs! formulation, an "un-and-anti-historical' analysis. 
"All history must be studied afresh, " Engels recognized, because "the 
conditions of existence of the different formations of society must be 
individually examined before the attempt is made to deduce from them 
the ... 
[cultural] notions corresponding to them. "10 For the, elderly, unlike 
Engels! Manchester working class, there has never been an idyllic paradise 
lost. 
11 There, has been no lost golden age for the elderly. The elderly 
have -always constituted and continue to be one of the poorest strata of 
society. 
The second proposition put forward is that the current economic 
position of a significant proportion of elderly in the advanced capitalist 
countries of Canada, Britain and the United States is generally one of 
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poverty and social dependency. The elderly's position in the modernization 
process has been the subject of considerable scholarly debate. The dominant 
"deterioration motif' has argued that "modernization has thus far tended to 
devalue old people and to reduce their status" 
12 
and economic position. 
But the more recent liberal gerontological literature claims that "we must 
not suppose that the sufferings of some of the aged, and the miseries of the 
minority... are a proper indication of the condition of old people generally 
in... society"13 because "a nationwide 'institutional approach... has helped 
to improve elderly people's overall financial situation. " 
14 Such assertions 
are an ideological reaffirmation of the liberal faith in the welfare state's 
incrementalism, 15 but are founded on statistical artifacts' rather than 
social facts. The empirical evidence presented here suggests that the 
current economic position of the elderly in Canada, Britain and the United 
States is characterized by widespread poverty. 'There is an historical 
continuity between the past and present economic position of the elderly. 
The contemporary `economic position of the elderly in these countries is a 
continuation of the historical process which has relegated the aged to the 
lower stratum of society. 
Aging occurs "within ° definite class relationships, " Corrigan and 
Leonard have suggested, therefore "we must first understand the structural 
determinants of working-class old age. "16 It is suggested here that the 
primary structural determinant is the economic position of the elderly. A 
corollary is that to the extent that the position of the elderly has improved, 
it is a result of government intervention through the creation and expansion 
of the welfare state and the public pension system rather than through 
private sector initiatives. 
2.2 The Historical Position of the Elderly " 
The elderly have occupied a precarious 'social and economic 
position as an inarticulate lower stratum of society throughout history. 
17 
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The condition of the elderly has been characterized by their continuous 
immiseration from at least the early nineteenth century to the present time. 
In British North America between 1815 and 1850 there is clear 
evidence-that outdoor labourers, immigrants, women, the very young, sick 
and old were impoverished, particularly in the winter. 
18 In Hamilton, 
Ontario, a rapidly industrializing centre in the early 1850s, the relationship 
between age and wealth corresponded roughly to the relationship between 
occupation and age. In the mid-1880s the City of Hamilton began to pay 
pensions to public employees, 
19 
who constituted the second largest 
occupational' group over the age of 60.19 While those over the age of 60 
represented only 6 per cent of the entire population of Hamilton, they 
accounted for 30, per cent of those who were poor. 
21 During the 1889 
Royal Commission hearings on the relations between capital and labour, an 
exchange between Chairman A. T. Freed' and Hamilton M. P. Alex McKay 
offers an interesting insight into the extent of poverty among the elderly. 
Q: Are those who are chronic applicants [for 
relief] such through illness, or physical 
disability, or mental disability or old age, or are 
they able-bodied people? 
A: Of those that go by the term "chronic 
applicant' a large proportion are old women 
and men, and who ýWy on account of old age, 
poverty and so [on]. 
While quantitative data is lacking, such information suggests that the 
elderly poor were a clearly identifiable social category during the period of 
early industrialization in Canada. 
In Britain, Booth's 1891 estimates designated nearly 39 per cent of 
those age 65 and over as paupers. 
23 The 1893 Royal Commission on 
destitution and old age reported that it was shocked by the "deplorable fact, 
that so large a proportion of the working classes are in old age in receipt of 
poor relief". 
24 Based on various government studies between 1890 and 
1906,15 to 20 per cent of the elderly were labelled as paupers. 
25 The Old 
Age Pension Act 1908, providing a non-contributory, means-tested benefit 
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of 5. shillings a week, was recognized at that time as being 2 shillings per 
week below the subsistence minimum. 
26 
Evidence to the Canadian House of Commons Special Committee 
on Old Age Pensions, convened between 1911 and 1913, gives a general 
impression of the extent of poverty among the elderly. The Salvation Army 
Commissioner for Canada testified, that poverty among the aged was 
widespread not only in the large urban centres, but : in smaller towns and 
villages as well. 
27 The superintendent of Children's Aid Societies for 
Ontario, reported that "there are thousands of worthy citizens... leading 
useful and respectable lives, who... live under the constant shadow of having, 
to spend their declining years in penury and abject dependence on 
others. "28 For the aged it was "a hopeless, heartless life". 
29 
In the. United States in 1910 at least 35 per cent of those over the 
age of 55 were below the elderly couple's family budget. 
30 During the 
1920s, at the height of American- prosperity, it has been estimated that 
anywhere from 40 to 67 per cent of all older Americans could not support 
themselves. 31 It was during this period that one reformer could say that, 
"old age, merely by that name, is a synonym for poverty". 
32 
While there is no specific information with respect to the 
economic position of the elderly in Canada during the 1920s their situation 
can be inferred from that of the general population. According to the 
Economic Council of Canada, "most Canadians of the 1920's would be found 
to have been living below that [poverty) line. "33 Recent in-depth studies 
of the working class in Montreal and Toronto confirm this conclusion. In 
Montreal in the early 1920s the average annual income for adult male 
workers in occupations which involved two-thirds of the city's labour force 
was 20 to 30 per cent below the federal Department of Labour's family 
budget. 34 The Toronto working class fared little better. Between 1902 
and 1917 the real average annual earnings for workers employed in the 
building trades and manufacturing declined by roughly 33 per cent; the 
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average annual earnings of blue-collar workers represented less than 64 per 
cent of what was required to support a family. 
35 It is not unreasonable 
to suggest that if times were difficult for the active labour force, there 
must have been extreme hardship among the elderly. 
Most of the social surveys conducted in Britain during the 1920s 
and 1930s, for example, the studies by Rowntree and Trout, all identified old 
age as one of the, major sources of poverty. Rowntree's 1936 study found 
that old age accounted for nearly 15 per cent of the incidence of all 
poverty. 
36 But this figure obscures how many of the elderly themselves 
were in dire straits. Stevenson's review of social conditions in the twenties 
and thirties reported that the London survey found 
that in the east end of London, as in the London 
area as a whole, poverty was still rife amongst the 
elderly. As the new survey observed, the pension 
for a single person was in itself insufficient to 
place them above the poverty line if they were 
living alone. The London survey found that in 
many cases the poverty of the elderly was 
associated. with bad housing conditions. For many 
the Poor Law Institution with its stigma as the 
'workhouse' was the final destination when 
incapacity and lack of support from relives 
prevented them from continuing on their own. 
The depression years undoubtedly compounded the economic difficulties 
associated with old age., 
During the Great Depression, or the "Dirty Thirtiel' as they have 
become known in Canada, age, sickness and fecundity "were the hallmarks 
of hopelessness. "38 Between, 1933 and 1936 about 12 = per cent of, the 
Canadian population received ' emergency relief, "while another 5 per cent 
were dependent upon existing programs such as charitable aid, mother's 
allowances and old age pensions. In the worst. year of the Depression`about 
20 per cent of the total population -. were public dependents. 
39 The 
non-contributory, means-tested old age security (OAS) pension, introduced 
in 1927 for those over the age of 70, was $20 a month. 
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While limited statistical information prevents a detailed analysis 
of the elderly's economic position during the depression years the elderly did 
speak and write of their circumstances. One woman from Calgary wrote to 
the Prime Minster of Canada, R. B. Bennett, in 1935, saying, "do please 
raise the Old Age Pension to at least thirty dollars per month. So many of 
your old friends... have really not enough to exist on. "40 A couple from 
Quebec would pleaded 
I am a Poor Woman 70 years old and I have a sick 
husband and he is 71 and not able to work and we have 
no one to keep us... Please send us a4 }ttle money to 
get some coal and flour for one Winter. 
A woman in Saskatchewan wrote that "my husband was 64 May 22nd last 
I 
was 64 Nov. 5th 1 year older than you are worked hard all our lives. And 
surely a little comfort should be coming to us now. "42 When the elderly 
did break their collective silence they revealed the terrible tragedy inflicted 
upon them. The Great Depression throughout the major industrialized 
countries not only created social chaos and human suffering, but also 
destroyed people's ability to save for retirement during their prime working 
years. 
The end of World War II signalled an unparalleled period of 
prolonged economic expansion and prosperity in capitalist nations. 
However, "sheltering behind the myths of expansion and affluence", de 
Beauvoir observed, society "treats the old as outcasts. "43 In the 
immediate aftermath of World War II nearly 38 per cent of the elderly in 
Britain were in receipt of supplementary benefits. According to Rowntree's 
1950 study, old age accounted for nearly 70 per cent of all people living in 
poverty. 44 By 1959 according to Titmuss, "it is possible to see two 
nations in old age? '. 
45 In the heady post-war period between 1951 and 
1965, according to the Economic Council of Canada, "the young, benefited 
more from economic growth... than the middle-aged and elderly. "46 In 
1951,84 per cent and in 1961,75 per cent of the elderly had an income of 
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less than $2,000 a year. In 1961 the medium income of the elderly was $960, 
resulting in nearly 54 per cent of the aged being in receipt of an annual 
income of less than $1,000 a year. 
47 
The 1960s heralded the 'rediscovery of poverty. The poor, 
including the elderly, became a major social policy concern for the liberal 
welfare state. In Britain, Townsend and Abel-Smith established on the basis 
of their 1960 study that approximately 18 per cent of households and 14 per 
cent of all people were living below the defined "national assistance" level. 
Nearly 35 per cent were living in households primarily dependent on 
pensions and another-23 per cent in households dependent on other state 
benefits. Townsend's massive 1968 survey of poverty ` in Britain (published 
ten years later) indicated, `depending upon the criteria, that 34 to 63 per 
cent of all the elderly, continued ' to live in poverty. 
48 A 1960 U. S. Senate 
report stated that "at least one-half 'of the aged ... cannot afford today 
decent housing, proper nutrition, adequate medical 'care... or necessary 
recreation. "49 The elderly were clearly identified as being among "the 
invisible poor". 50 Subsequently the elderly became a 'prime "target group" 
for the Johnson administration's "war on poverty". The 1966 report of the 
Senate Committee on Aging in Canada noted that " "without question the 
most serious problem encountered ... was the degree and extent of poverty 
which exists among older, ppeople. " 51 A study of low incomes in Canada 
confirmed that in 1969 in excess of 50 per cent of all unattached individuals 
and 30 per cent of all families, or nearly 40 per cent of all those over the 
age of 65, were below Statistics 'Canada's low income (poverty) 
cut-offs. 
52 The economic position of the elderly may represent one' of 
great social policy failures of the capitalist welfare state in the post-war 
period. 
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2.3 Public Policy Toward the Elderly: Ideological Principles 
The primary characteristic associated with a significant 
proportion of the elderly is poverty. This situation is explained by the 
inadequacies of income security arrangements and a dominant ideology 
which has guided the formulation of public policy towards the aged. It is the 
interplay between ideology and institutional arrangements which explains 
the historical and contemporary immiseration of the elderly. 
The subsistence principle ("social minimum" or "poverty line") and 
individual "thrift" or "saving' have been central, if not always explicit, 
ideological principles which have guided the development of state income 
security arrangements for the elderly. Both notions are British in origin and 
have affected social security philosophy and institutional arrangements in 
Canada and, to a lesser extent, the United States. The emphasis here is on 
Canada since this aspect of social security history is less well known and 
documented as compared with Britain and the United States. 
53 
2.3.1 The Subsistence Principle. The subsistence principle was 
first enunciated in the British Poor Laws and subsequently incorporated into 
the 1942 Beveridge 
, 
Report. Beveridge was quite clear that the 
responsibility of the welfare state was limited to the provision of a social 
minimum, while reaffirming the responsibility of the individual to engage in 
thrifty behaviour. He emphasized that "provision by compulsory insurance 
of a flat-rate... benefit up to subsistence level leaves untouched the 
freedom and responsiblity of the individual citizen in making supplementary 
provision for himself above that level. "54 "Nothing materially below the 
scales of benefit", he wrote, "can be justified on scientific grounds as 
adequate for human subsistence. "55 The "scientific ground' used to 
justify the subsistence principle. were Rowntree's 1937 minimum family 
budget and dietary requirements. 56 Those individuals who wished to rise 
above the social minimum would be required to undertake individual 
initiative and engage in thrifty savings behaviour. 
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From its inception, the state social security system in Canada was 
viewed as being only one of a number of sources of retirement income and 
was to provide only a minimum subsistence level, or floor benefit. Marsh 
stated that "the basic rate should be an amount sufficient for minimum 
maintenance... the rates which suggest themselves ... 
[are] the minimum 
assistance standards. "57 The 1966 Senate Special Committee on Aging 
reiterated that what was necessary "is a floor of income security to 
maintain 'self-reliance. 
58 - When the Canada/Quebec Pension Plans 
became effective on January 1,1966 the federal Minister of Health and 
Welfare, Judy LaMarsh, said that "the Canada Pension Plan... is designed to 
make available to all Canadians a satisfactory minimum standard of 
pensions... the proper role of government is to provide a floor. "59 Former 
federal Minister of Health and Welfare,, Marc Lalonde, asserted in 1973 that 
the universal old age security (OAS) pension and the earnings-related 
Canada/Quebec Pension Plans "were geared to ensure adequacy, " while 
occupational pension plans were "to provide whatever supplementary margin 
of comfort was desired. "60 In practice, however, "adequacy" is equated 
to the "poverty line" cut-offs as defined by Statistics Canada. 
2.3.2 Individual Savings. The view that individuals should provide 
for their old age through personal savings has played ' an important role in 
the development of welfare policies in capitalist nations in general, and the 
Anglo-American democracies in particular. 
61 This dominant ideological 
outlook has influenced British and Canadian, and to a "lesser extent 
American, social security arrangements. 
The development of pension arrangements was-marked by the 
Victorian expectation of saving, thrift and individual responsiblity. To 
engage in such behaviour was viewed as a prerequisite for workers becoming 
part of the "respectable working-class". The friendly societies of nineteenth 
century Britain which provided sickness, unemployment, death and 
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superannuation benefits was "traditionally the badge of the artisan". 
62 
For skilled workers, and a scattering of lower middle-class occupations, the 
friendly society movement "made its impact upon the developing conception 
of independence and respectability. "63 But few workers saved for 
retirement because of limited financial resources, and the concept of 
retirement had not yet emerged. A friendly society member worked until he 
died. 
64 In the Calvinist tradition, saving and thrift were considered- 
virtuous behaviour and a sign of success. The inability to save was viewed 
as a sign of personal failure, entitling-one only to a subsistence existence 
provided by the state. Thrifty behaviour and saving were equated with 
social "respectability" and served a social control function by promoting 
desired social behaviour. 
The 1889 Royal Commission on the Relations Between Capital and 
Labour in Canada provides considerable evidence that certain sections of 
the working class had some opportunity for saving and homeownership. It is 
equally evident, however, that workers did not engage in' saving for 
retirement as such. One rare insight into aging and saving behaviour is 
found in an exchange between Alex McKay, Hamilton M. P. and the 
Chairman of the Royal Commission, Mr. Freed. 
Q: Do you know of many working people in 
Hamilton who are able to accumulate means for 
their support in old age? 
A: I know of instances of people who have worked, 
and are now living comfortably without working. 
Q: [Are] Any of these common labourers? 
A: I think among the common labourers it is rare, 
though there are exceptional65ases where men 
seem to accumulate property. 
Property accumulation, and the attendant "property mobility", were part of 
the working class experience in the last half of the nineteenth century in 
North America. 
66 More speculatively, it might be suggested that there 
was a substitution effect between retirement savings and investment in 
property and home ownership. Investment *in property was tangible, while 
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saving for retirement required a long-time horizon based on a concept of 
retirement which had not yet evolved for the majority of workers. 
The social pressures for individual saving for retirement were so 
great that, at the turn of. the century, Canadian proponents of a 
non-contributory state pension were told that "a pension paid by the state 
would reward shiftlessness and profligacy" and "would thereby discourage 
thrift and initiative. "67 Subsequently, the Canadian Annuities Act 1908, 
introducing the, voluntary purchase of pensions from the government, was 
implemented as "a means of promoting thrift rather than... a type of social 
legislation or state aid. "68 
Associated with, the development and expansion of the welfare 
state in advanced industrialized countries in the post-war period was a 
transformation, in the conception of social welfare and the role of the state. 
The "residuar'_concept, based on the "protestant ethic", determined social 
policy up to the 1940s and placed reliance on private relief agencies and 
limited government intervention. In the aftermath of , 
the Great Depression 
and World War II, this gave way to the "institutionar' concept which 
inaugurated active state intervention to protect the individual against the 
exigencies of unemployment, sickness, death, disability and old age as a 
universal right of citizenship. 
69 
Despite the major transformation in the role of the state and 
social welfare policy, the legacy of the "residual" approach to income 
security arrangements for the elderly has continued to influence Canadian 
public policy to the present day. The Carter Commission on Tax Reform in 
1966 stated that 
it seems to be generally agreed that individuals should 
set aside a portion of their income in the working 
years to ensure an adequate command over goods and 
services in their retirement years. Such private 
provisions for retirement are thought to foster 
self-reliance id reduce the need for the state to 
provide relief. 
i 
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In 1973 the federal government concluded a major income security review 
by stating that "we believe ... Canadians hold the value of independence or 
self-dependence. They expect to meet their own needs through their own 
efforts, and they "expect others to do their best to do the same. "71 The 
historical legacy and ideology associated with the market ethos has served 
to legitimize limited government intervention in the social security field to 
provide only a minimum subsistence level of income replacement for the 
elderly. A representative of the Canadian, private pension industry recently 
justified this situation by saying that, "if we wipe out private pensions, we 
say goodbye to the traditional values of thrift and self-denial. "72 
The role of private saving by individuals to provide economic 
security against the universal risks of old age, disability, illness and so on is 
extremely limited. According to Statistics Canada, a worker at the average 
industrial wage, with two children, will only save 4.6 per cent of his net 
income for "security" (pensions, disability, life insurance, and so forth). 
Kreps summarized the role of individual savings for retirement income by 
stating that 
the role... played by private savings would appear to 
be a very limited one for families whose incomes 
during work life fall below the median... Even when 
the marginal propensity to save is quite high... savings 
adequate to maintain the ýtjrgeted 
level of 
consumption are not forthcoming. 
Only a collective pooling arrangement such as a social security system can 
effectively deal with this social reality. 
But an over emphasis on the role of ideology - the subsistence 
principle and individual thrift - to explain the welfare state's limited income 
maintenance, measures to improve the economic position of the elderly tends 
to obscure a much more fundamental set of structural and power 
relationships which are identified and elaborated upon. in Chapters 6 to 9. 
Subsistence. level retirement 
_ 
income from the state social security system 
effectively forces people to save for retirement, by relying on the private 
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pension system, or to live in poverty. Controlling a portion of the labour 
force's discretionary savings for its own purposes ensures that the private 
pension industry will remain viable. 'The corresponding underdevelopment of 
the state pension system not only ensures the existence of the private 
pension industry, but the continued immiseration of the elderly. 
2.4 Level of Retirement Income: Adequacy and Poverty 
To put the economic position of the elderly, the 
underdevelopment of the state social security system and the limitations of 
the private pension system into analytical perspective requires that the 
concepts of adequate retirement income and poverty be identified and 
defined. 
2.4.1 Criteria for Adequate Retirement Income. Four criteria 
have been developed to assess the adequacy of retirement income: 
4 
I. ' a level of retirement income which allows -a person to 
subsist by providing no more than the barest necessities of 
life; 
2. a level of income which keeps the elderly above the poverty 
line; '` 
3. provision for a level of income which permits an individual 
to live at the same level as other pensioners; and 
4. a level of income in the retirement period which allows a 
person to maintain the standard of living to which they have 
become accustomed prior to retirement. - 
Adequate retirement income is usually defined in terms of total income 
from all sources. Income from all sources, however, is ordinarily restricted 
to that income received from the state and occupational pension plans. 
Economists and social welfare administrators have tended to limit the 
definition of total income to these two sources rather than using-the broader 
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net wealth (or asset) concept, including services in-kind, because of 
conceptual, distributional and measurement problems. 
In recent years a consensus has emerged among economists, 
gerontologists, social security and pension plan administrators that the 
appropriate level of retirement income is that which maintains a person's 
pre-retirement standard of living. This is referred to as the "continuity of 
income" approach. Discussion of this question has centered around the level 
of pre-retirement income that is needed to prevent a sharp decline in living 
standards during retirement and the proportion of income that should come 
from public, private and individual sources. 
Schulz has noted that "the trend seems to be toward developing 
public and private pension systems which will permit the retired population 
to... maintain a level of living which approximates that which they enjoyed 
during their working years. "75 Hall in his famous report on the Canadian 
railways' pension plans concluded that "a desirable principle would seem to 
be that the combined pension should enable the retired worker to maintain 
his living standard. "76 Tilove has argued that "it seems appropriate to 
consider continuance of [full] net income as a reasonable"77 level for 
retirement income. A Toronto consulting actuary has defined the minimum 
retirement income standard as "that income which permits maintenance of 
an equivalent standard of living after retirement. " 
78 
It is generally 
agreed that in North America and Western Europe a one-earner couple at 
the average industrial wage (AIW or APW in Europe) requires in the order of 
70 per cent of the last full-time salary to maintain their pre-retirement 
standard of living. 
The "full maintenance" or "continuiuty of living standard" 
approach to defining an adequate retirement income is in reality based on a 
"net income" approach; that is, net income in the post-retirement period 
must be compared with net income in the pre-retirement period. Altered 
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expenditure patterns and a lower rate of taxation will result in a couple or 
individual requiring less than the pre-retirement gross income. The 
relationship between the retirement income equivalent to pre-retirement 
income is presented in Table 2.1. This evidence suggests that the average 
production worker (APW) must receive a total income from all sources in 
retirement equivalent to ' 70 per cent of gross pre-retirement income in 
order to maintain his standard of living. 
TABLE 2.1 
RETIREMENT INCOME EQUIVALENT TO 
PRERETIREMENT INCOME FOR A 
ONE EARNER COUPLE, 
ONTARIO. 1978 
'"' Pre-Retirement Per Cent 
Income Required on 
(Final Salary) Retirement 
$10,000 73.1 
20,000 61.2 
30,000 52.0 
40,000 '`48.3 
Source: Roy Chittick, Vice-President, T-A Associates, 
Pension Adequacy. A Summary of a workshop 
presentation to the Canadian Pension Conference 
Annual Meeting, Toronto, April 30th and May 1, 
1979, p. 2. 
2.4.2 Poverty-Line Criteria for Retirement Income. To assess 
the economic status of the elderly requires a standard of income 
adequacy. 
79 Two such criteria exist. The total net income replacement 
standard was outlined above. The second criterion is the low income cut-off 
approach ("poverty line" or "social minimum") developed by various 
government agencies such as Statistics Canada, the Economic Council of 
Canada, the Senate Committee on Poverty and the Metro-Toronto Social 
Planning Council. The "poverty line" concept measures both absolute and 
relative deprivation, or what Rowntree called "primary" and "secondary" 
poverty. 
-39- 
- "The exercise of drawing statistical poverty lines, " the Economic 
Council of, Canada has said, "while bound to be somewhat arbitrary, is 
necessary for good social planning. "80 Presently in Canada there are four 
poverty lines which have been constructed. The most commonly used 
poverty line is that -which has been established by Statistics Canada (an 
agency similar to the Central Statistical Office in the U. K. ). This is the 
lowest poverty line cut-off used by social planners. The Statistics Canada 
"poverty line" or low, income cut-offs were -originally based- on the 
assumption that "expenditures of 70 per cent or more of income on food, 
clothing and shelter by an individual or family indicates straitened 
circumstances. "81 The data used -to determine the low income cut-offs 
came from the 1959-Family Expenditure Survey., The low income limits 
were set for 1961 and in subsequent -years adjusted for increases in the 
consumer price index (CPO. The low -income cut-offs have since, been 
recalculated based on the 1969 Family Expenditure Survey and are annually 
updated by the consumer price index. Statistics Canada's low income 
cut-offs are now set at. income levels where family units on average spend 
62 per cent or more of- their income on food, - shelter and clothing. The 
levels are determined for families and urban centers of different' sizes. In 
1978, the year which will be used here for comparative purposes, the 
poverty line was set at $7,020 for an elderly couple, and $4,844 =for- an 
individual. 
In the United States a poverty line and a Bureau of Labour 
Statistics intermediate family budget have been established. 
82 
In Britain 
the -poverty level is generally defined as the supplementary benefits 
level. 83 It warrants repeating that all these poverty line measures are set 
at the minimum subsistence level. - 
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2.5 Welfare State Social Security Expenditures on the Elderly 
The current retirement income system is not generating an 
adequate level of total income for the elderly. This is a result of the 
relative underdevelopment of the state social security system and the 
limitations of the private pension system. A complex series of interactive 
factors have accounted historically for the expansion of welfare state 
expenditures. The key variables identified in the technical literature 
causally explaining the level of welfare state expenditures, in order of 
descending importance, include the age structure of the population and the 
proportion of elderly, the level and rate of economic development, the 
length of operation of the social security system, the level of per capita 
income, the level of unionization, the off ical ideology, the strength of the 
socialist movement, and the type of economic system. 
84 The historical 
interaction of these factors has resulted in the considerable variation found 
in national social security systems. 
Old age pensions are the welfare state's largest social security 
expenditure. 
85 State expenditures on retirement payments (including 
invalidity and survivors' benefits) as a proportion of total social security 
expenditures and as a percentage of gross domestic product (GNP) are 
presented in Table 2.2. In most industrialized countries state pension 
benefits account for 50 to 70 per cent of all social security expenditures and 
10 to 17 per cent of GNP. Caution must be exercised in interpreting the 
data to ensure that they are on a comparable basis since retirement 
payments as a proportion of total social security expenditures are a function 
of the number of recipients, the level of benefits, the maturity of the 
pension system and the type of funding. 
86 
In general there is a close relationship between the level of state 
old age pension benefits and the proportion of the elderly in the 
population. 
87 This relationship is outlined in Table 2.3 for selected 
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TABLE 2.3 
RELATIONSHý1 BETWEEN 
STATE OLD AGE BENEFITS AND AGE COMPOSITION, 
SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1975-1977 
Country 
Austria 
Sweden 
West Germany. 
Belgium 
U. K. 
France 
Netherlands 
U. S. 
Canada 
Proportion of Population 
Age 65 and Over, 1975 
15.1% 
14.9 
14.3 
14.2 
13.6 
13.3 
10.7 
10.4 
8.7 
State Old Age 
Pension Benefits as a 
Proportion of GDP, 1977 
11.5% 
16.5 
11.8 
7.7 
12.5 
9.8 
13.4 
8.6 
4.1 
Note: 1. The relationship between state expenditures on old age 
pensions and the proportion of elderly in the population has a 
correlation coefficient (r) of 0.6, suggesting a moderate, but 
not necessarily causal, relationship. 
2. Including old age, death and survivor's benefits. 
Sources: Harry Weitz, The Foreign Experience with Income Maintenance for 
the Elderly (Rull; a, 
i9T9), Taole 2-1, p. 6 and the International Labour 
Organization, The Cost of Social Security, 1975-1977 (Geneva: 
ILO, 1981), p-. 
countries. The technical literature on the subject indicates that there is a 
more robust statistical correlation based on time-series data$$ than is 
apparent using the cross-sectional information presented in Table 2.3. The 
latter is reported for the purpose of illustration. 
To assess the adequacy of retirement income for the current 
elderly requires that the level of total income generated from the state and 
private pension systems be reviewed. By ascertaining the level of income 
generated from each of these sources, it becomes possible to determine the 
income replacement rate in the retirement period and to compare it with 
the adequacy standard. The policy goal of most state social security 
systems is to provide an income replacement rate of 40 to 50 per cent of 
pre-retirement income. 
89 The current ILO Convention calls for a 45 per 
cent income replacement rate under state pension plans. 
90 
Table 2.4 compares the income replacement rate provided for 
under state social security pension arrangements in selected Western 
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TABLE 2.4 
INCOME REPLACEMENT RATES 
FOR 
SOCIAL SECURITY OLD AGE RETIREMENT BENEFITS, 
SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1975 
Replacement Ratio 
As a Percentage of 
E i 2 ' Final Year s arn ngs 
Countryl Individual Couple 
1. Italy 67 67 
2. Sweden 59 76 
3. Austria 54 54 
4. West Germany 50 50 
5. France 46 65 
6. Norway 41 55 
7. Canada 39 57 
8. Netherlands 38 54 
9. United States 38 57 
10. Switzerland 36 53 
11. Denmark 29 43 
12. United Kingdom 26 39 
Notes: 1. Countries are arranged in descending order based on the 
replacement rate for a. single worker. 
2. For a male at the average industrial wage in manufacturing. 
Source: Retabulated from Leif Haanes-Olsen, "Earnings - Replacement 
Rate of Old-Age Benefits, 1965-75. Selected Countries", U. S. 
Social Security Bulletin, Vol. 41 (January 1978), p. 4. 
European countries and North America. By international standards, the 
benefit levels currently provided by the American, British and Canadian 
public retirement systems are quite low. State retirement benefits for 
individuals in Britain and the U. S. rank in the bottom quartile of the 
countries surveyed, while Canada is near the median. 
91 For a couple, the 
United States and Canada provide median benefits, while those in the U. K. 
rank last. 
What is of significance is the total combined replacement rate 
generated from the state and private pension systems. Table 2.5 identifies 
the total combined income replacement rate for . selected countries where 
complete information was available. A number of points should be noted. 
First, and most important, retirement income flowing from the public 
pension system accounts for 60 to 90 per cent of the total income 
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replacement ratio in the case of individuals and 65 to 95 per cent for retired 
couples. It is the state pension system which is the primary source of 
pension income for the elderly; less than 35 per cent of all people in these 
countries receive income from an occupational pension plan. This situation 
is a result of the limitations of the private pension system, particularly the 
lack of universal coverage, poor vesting (preservation) standards and 
portability (transferrability) arrangements which are dealt with in Chapter 
4. The income replacement rate under the state pension therefore 
constitutes the major source of retirement income for the elderly. 
A second consideration is the difference in the income 
replacement levels between Western European and North American 
countries. While social security retirement income accounts for 70 to 90 
per cent of the total income replacement ratio in Western Europe for 
individuals and couples, in Britain and North America only 50 to 80 per cent 
is provided. The Anglo-American countries tend to record below average 
levels of retirement income by international standards. 
92 
A third point to be made is that the total income replacement 
ratio for individuals is in most instances below the 70 per cent income 
adequacy level cited earlier, while the situation for an elderly couple more 
nearly conforms to this adequacy standard. This situation particularly 
affects elderly single women. The relative underdevelopment of the state 
social security retirement system and the limitations of the private pension 
system have resulted in the immiseration of the current elderly. 
2 .6 The Current 
Position of the Elderly 
Poverty among the elderly is a well documented fact confirmed 
by any number of government and scholarly studies. 
93 Here two separate 
but interrelated issues are analyzed:, first, the . extent of poverty among 
the 
current elderly; and second, the sources of retirement income. 
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2.6.1 Poverty and the Elderly. Poverty is both a relative and 
absolute condition. The current economic situation of the elderly must be 
compared with that, of the active labour force in order to establish their 
relative position in society and assessed against a somewhat arbitrary 
criterion, such as the poverty line standard, to determine absolute 
deprivation. 
Poverty increases with age. The elderly's income is substantially 
below the income of others in society. 
94 
, 
In Canada, for example, the 
median income of the elderly was only 45 per cent of that for all Canadians 
in 1979, despite the fact that the median income of the elderly has 
increased over the past decade. 
95 
. 
The information presented in Table 2.6 
suggests that over the . past 
decade the elderly in Canada have actually 
experienced a deterioration in their standard of living relative to the 
actively employed labour force. Between 1970 and 1979 the income of 
pensioners as a percentage of average employee income declined from 51 to 
45 per cent. 
TABLE 2.6 
COMPARISON OF 
AVERAGE INCOME OF PENSIONERS AND EMPLOYIEES 
BASED ON REVENUE CANADA TAX R ETURNS, 
1970 - 1979 
Pensioners' Income as Averse Income a% of Average Income 
Year elens ers ma oyees of Employees 
1970 $ 2,929 $ 5,018 51 
1971 3,042 6,089 50 
1972 2,875 6,791 42 
1973 3,188 7,477 43 
1974 3,556 8,614 41 
1975 4,025 9,891 41 
1976 4,517 11.199 40 
1977 5,000 12,166 41 
1978 5,591 12,963 43 
1979 6,336 14,037 45 
Note: I1. - For all returns including taxable and non-taxable returns. 
Source: Derived from Revenue Canada. Taxation Statistics - Analyzing 
ble 3, p. 31. 
Publishing 
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The elderly experience a sharp decline in their economic position 
relative to the 'overall population upon retirement. 
96 This drop in 
post-retirement income is, interestingly, most severe for middle-income 
earners. 'According ° to the Task Force on Retirement - Income Policy, 
"between one-third' and one-half of those now of working age and with 
incomes in the middle ranges are likely to encounter significant reductions 
in their living standards in retirement: 197 According to Statistics 
Canada, in 1978,43 per cent of all the elderly were below the poverty line 
cut-offs, 
98 
and nearly 55 per cent of the-elderly were in receipt of the 
full or partial income-tested Guaranteed Income Supplement 
(GIS)99(similar to' the supplementary benefit in Britain). The extent of 
poverty among the aged has received considerable attention in the United 
States. 100 The conventional wisdom promoted by the liberal 
gerontological literature in the United States' suggests that the proportion of 
people age 65 and over living in poverty has declined from 35 per cent in 
1959 to 14 per cent in 1977.101 
The significant difference in the extent of poverty reported 
among the elderly in Canada and the United States is of some interest and 
must be analyzed. In Canada 43 per cent of 
ä1l the elderly are below the 
"poverty line", as compared to 'önly 14 per cent in the United States. This 
difference, as shall be explained, is more apparent than real. In the United 
States there are in reality'two "poverty lines". What is of importance is the 
absolute levels at which these two "poverty lines" are set. The "official" 
poverty line in the U. S. in 1977 was set at $2,917 for non-farm unattached 
individuals and $3,665 for non-farm couples. Since the 1971 White House 
Conference on Aging, however, the Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS) 
intermediate retired couples budget- has been endorsed as the appropriate 
poverty line cut-off standard; for unattached individuals the standard is 75 
per cent of the couples budget. 
102 In 1978 the BLS intermediate budget 
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for a couple was $7,846 and for an individual $5,884,103 or nearly double 
the "official" poverty line. ý What should be noted is that the 1978 U. S. BLS 
intermediate retired couples budget nearly corresponds to the 1978 
Statistics Canada poverty line of $7,020 for an elderly couple and $4,844 for 
an unattached individual. Therefore, in order to assess the extent of 
poverty among the elderly in the U. S., and to compare it with Canada, 
requires a realistic and comparable standard of adequacy. This suggests 
that the relevant poverty line criteria are the U. S. BLS intermediate budget 
and the Statistics Canada low income cut-off. 
Table 2.7 reports the extent of poverty among the elderly in the 
U. S. and Canada based on the comparable poverty line standards. - Placing 
U. S. and Canadian data on a roughly comparable basis indicates that nearly 
61 per cent of 'all the elderly in the United States live in poverty as 
compared with 43 per cent in Canada. The proportion of poor-aged in the 
United States is significantly greater than recognized by those relying on 
the "official' poverty line. 
104 
A 
TABLE 2.7 
COMPARISON OF THOSE AGE 65 AND OVER 
IN POVERTY, U. S. AND CANADA, 1978 
Country Unattached Individuals Couples Total 
Canadal 60.7% 27.4% 43.3% 
U. S. 75.0 38.0 60.5 
Statistics Canada 
Poverty Line $4,844 ; 7,020 
BLS Intermediate Budget: $5,884 $7,846 
Note: 1. For cities with 500,000 or more residents. Nearly 80, 
per cent of Canada's population is concentrated in 8 
cities. 
Sources: Calculated from Statistics Canada, Income Distribution 
by Size in Canada, 1978 (Ottawa: Minister pp and 
Services, e 9, p. 61 and Elizabeth L. Meier 
and Cynthia C. Dittmar, Income of the Retired: Levels 
and Sources. A Working pe pa 
Presiclent's Commission on Pension Policy (Washington, 
D. C.: PCPP, October 1980), Table 27, pp. 79-81. 
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"The majority" of the elderly in Britain, according to Age 
Concern, "are living below, on, or just over the poverty level. ", 
05 The 
1975 Family Expenditure Survey (FES) indicated that 37 to 78 per cent of 
the elderly were living in, or, on the margin of poverty. This corresponds to 
Townsend's 1968 data. 106 In addition, it is estimated that another 10 to 
50 per cent of pensioners live in households which have an income below the 
supplementary level because they are not claiming benefits. 
107 As 
Townsend put it, "the problem of poverty in old age is massive and (its) 
continuing cannot be doubted. " 
108 
The data in Table 2.8 indicates that on average 54 per cent of the 
elderly in the advanced capitalist countries of Canada, Britain and the 
United States currently live in poverty. The elderly's poverty line existence 
is nothing new. It is 'a perpetuation of their historical position in society. 
TABLE 2.8 
COMPARISON OF THE PROPORTION 
OF ELDERLY LIVING IN POVERTY, 
U. S., CANADA, AND BRITAIN, 1975 AND 1978 
Percentage of 
Elderly Living 
Country in Poverty 
U. S. 60.51 
Canada 43.52 
Britain 36.6 - 77.83 
Notes: 1. Based on BLS intermediate budget for 1978. 
2. Statistics Canada low income cut-off for 1978. 
3. The lower range figure represents the proportion of 
elderly below the 1975 supplementary benefit level. 
The upper range figure is calculated on the basis of 
-Peter Townsend's "state's standard of poverty" where 
the net disposable income of the income unit is below 
140 per cent of the supplementary benefits. 
Sources: Statistics Canada, Income Distribution by Size in 
Canada, 1978 (Otta ices 
9, p. 61; Elizabeth L. Meier and Cynthia 
Dittmar, Income of the Retired: Levels and Sources. A 
Working Paper preparea For Me FresiaeliVs n on 
Pension Policy (Washington, D. C.: PCPP, 1980), Table 27, 
pp. 79-81; Age Concern England, Profiles of the Elderly, 
Vol. 1 (Surrey: Age Concern England, ae, p- 
21 and Peter Townsend, Poverty in the United Kingdom: A 
Survey of Household Resources 
(Harmonaswortn; engu oo ,, note, p. 798.7 
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From around 1850 to World War II, 15 to 67 per cent of the elderly lived in 
poverty presently 37 to 78 per cent of the elderly live in poverty. Table 2.9 
presents a longitudinal comparison of the proportion of elderly living in 
poverty in the three countries under study. 
2.6.2 Sources of Retirement Income. It has been established that 
a significant proportion of the current elderly are poor. The reasons for this 
situation remain to be determined. An analysis of the composition of the 
elderly's income by source, as outlined in Table 2.10, allows us to determine 
the structural reasons for the elderly's economic position. 
In the advanced industrialized countries of Britain, Canada, and 
the United States, retirement income from the state social security 
retirement system accounts for 40 to 52 per cent of all post-retirement 
income for the elderly. Of some interest is the fact that in a country such 
as Canada, the universal flat-rate old age pension (demogrant) accounts for 
75 per cent of all pension income (from all sources). 
109 In an almost 
exclusively earnings-related state pension system such as in the U. S., the 
high proportion of income generated is a reflection of the social security 
system's maturity. The flat-rate Old Age Security (OAS) pension in Canada, 
as a demogrant or universal benefit, results in a higher income replacement 
rate for those in the lower income categories and a lower ratio for those in 
the higher income groups. An earnings-related state pension system such as 
the Canada/Quebec Pension Plans or the U. S. social security retirement 
system yields a progressively higher replacement ratio for those in the upper 
income groups up to the earnings ceiling, and tails off thereafter. 
110 
Counterposed to the income generated from the state pension 
system is the income provided by employer-sponsored occupational pension 
plans and annuities. The private pension system is responsible for 
generating only 12 to 15 per cent of all the income of the elderly. The low 
proportion of the elderly's retirement income attributable to occupational 
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pension plans is a result of the limitations of the private pension system, 
particularly limited coverage, inadequate vesting (preservation) and 
portability (transferability) provisions and the lack of inflation-proofing. In 
these countries 67 to 74 per cent of the elderly received no income 
whatsoever - from an ., employer-based, occupational pension plan. 
III 
Between 1978-79, . for those fortunate enough to be in receipt of 
occupational pension plan payments, the level of income was quite low: 
$3,930 in Canada, $3,585 in the U. S. and $2,590 (L 1,040) in Britain. 
112 In 
the United States and Britain, income from the private pension system 
ranked last as a major source of retirement income for the elderly. The 
Canadian National Department of Health and Welfare concluded that "large 
proportions of the aged will continue to receive little or no private, pension 
income in`the future. "' 13 
The second most common source of income for the elderly is 
employment earnings. , In these countries employment income accounts for 
11 to 26 per cent of income in : the retirement,,, period. The variations 
between countries in the level of employment income received is a result of 
varying labour force participation rates, retirement tests for receipt of 
social security benefits, the tax-back (claw-back) rate for income earned in 
the retirement period, and the absolute level of retirement income 
necessitating continued employment. Employment income is directly 
related to socio-economic category, 
114 
probably reflecting not only social 
background and job satisfaction, but the greater decline in post-retirement 
income for middle-income earners. 
Investment income is the third most important source of 
retirement income for the elderly. The relatively high ranking of 
y F-. 
investment income as a source of retirement income is deceptive, however, 
since what is of importance is the distribution and level of investment 
income, reflecting the marginal propensity to save based on "life chances". 
-54- 
Receipt of investment income is directly related to socio-economic 
class. 
115 In Canada, despite the extremely high level of aggregate 
savings, 
116 56 per cent of all individuals and 33 per cent of all couples in 
1975 over the age of 65 received no investment income. Moreover, 77 per 
cent of those aged 65. and over who were in receipt of investment income 
received , less than $890 (1: 397) a- year. 
117 In the United States in the 
mid-1970s only 36 per cent of the elderly reported personal savings as a 
source of retirement income, while another 19 per cent were in receipt of 
investment income. 118 Median liquid assets held (savings, stocks, and 
bonds were only $2,794.119 The U. S. President's Commission on Pension 
Policy, concluded, simply that "it appears from the available data that 
'savings' is not now, a- strong leg of the three-legged stool of retirement 
income. "120 Thus, the ideology of individual responsiblity for thrift and 
saving for retirement income is at considerable variance with the social 
reality. Individual saving for retirement is insignificant. 
While some commentators have suggested that the traditional 
purpose of "social , 
security is to fulfil what is in effect .a residual 
function... or at the most filling the gaps in the... private sectoc", 
121 
the 
evidence presented here suggests the opposite conclusion. It is the state 
retirement income system which is the primary source of income 
maintenance for the elderly, with income from the private pension system 
and individual savings playing a residual role. This would suggest that in 
order to ameliorate the immiseration of the current and future elderly will 
require an increased level of public expenditure through an expanded state 
social security retirement system. 
2.7 Implications of the Condition of the Elderly 
The economic condition of the current elderly in Canada, Britain 
and the United States, can 
. 
be briefly summarized as follows. In 
industrialized societies the elderly have constituted a constant stratum of 
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the poor. The primary characteristic associated with old age is poverty. On 
average 54 per cent of all people over the age of 65 currently live in poverty 
in Canada, Britain and the U. S4 nearly two-thirds of unattached elderly 
persons live in poverty; more than a quarter of elderly family units live 
below the' poverty lines a greater proportion of elderly women than men live 
in poverty. The proportion of elderly living in poverty increases with age. 
Over 50 per cent of people "aged 65 and over in Canada receive full or 
partial income-tested Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS) payments; nearly 
30 of the elderly in the U. K. receive supplementary benefits; and 10 per cent 
of the elderly receive the Supplementary Security Income (SSI) benefit in 
the U. S., while another 10 per cent` are eligible. Nearly half of all the 
income of elderly persons is generated from the state retirement income 
system. 
A number of general implications can be drawn from the condition 
of the elderly. 'First, the economic position of the elderly compounds their 
isolation and segregation from the broader community122 as a result of 
the "culture of aging". The "culture of aging" in advanced industrialized 
countries has increasingly resulted in the situation'where 
the elderly have come to live increasingly in a separate 
world. Changes in housing patterns have acted to 
weaken ties across the generations. Changes in health 
standards have concentrated relatively more of the total 
burden of ill-health on the elderly. The elderly are 
separate too in their experience of mental as well as 
physical ill health. There are differences in living 
standards... Changes in society have accentuated the 
differences in outlook and piration which arise from 
the natural course of aging. " 
While a new and positive "culture of aging" emphasizing an independent 
lifestyle for the elderly has emerged in recent years, this is premised upon 
an adequate level of retirement income. 
Second, the primary characteristic associated with a considerable 
proportion of the elderly is poverty. Old people experience a structural 
position which has resulted in their having "drifted to the very bottom of the 
-56- 
financial structure in society. "124 The distribution of income among the 
elderly, whether measured 'in terms of wages, assets, or retirement benefits, 
Talley and Burkhauser concluded, "has a greater variance than any *other age 
group, indicating that differences in relative income position are greatest 
within the oldest group. " 125 Under contemporary conditions this suggests 
that 
the most fundamental.. -., problems experienced by older 
people are linked to the maldistribution of power, 
income, and wealth in society, as well as to class, racial, 
and sexual stratifications that are perpetuated and 
legitimized through... market relations. These are not 
only126 
inforced, but [are] exacerbated, during old 
While the new gerontological- 'literature invokes Browning's optimistic 
passage - "Grow old along with-me'. The' best is yet ' to be" - the current 
reality for the elderly in these advanced capitalist societies is more aptly 
captured by the pathos of the Beatles' lament: "Will you need me, will you 
feed me, when Pm 64". 
Third, income from the state social security system is the primary 
source of income for the elderly. As a result of the limitations of the 
private pension system, income from occupational pension plans and limited 
personal savings play a residual role in the provision of retirement income. 
Fourth, this suggests that' the public pension system must be 
expanded in order to improve the economic position of the elderly. In 1981 
the minimum guaranteed retirement income floor in Canada from the Old 
Age Security (OAS) pension and the Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS) 
was below the poverty line for individuals, and only marginally above the 
low income cut-off for couples 
l27 
. 
The elderly's need for economic security, necessitating an 
increased level of public expenditure, may however conflict in the future 
with the interests of the actively employed labour force and the corporate 
sector. This results from the work force's attempt to maintain their current 
consumption and the corporate sector's drive to reduce labour costs, by 
-57- 
minimizing payroll deductions and expenditures such as those associated 
with social security contributions. This is elaborated upon in the next 
chapter. Furthermore, as is argued in Chapter 6, the corporate sector's 
control over and acquisition of investment capital through the private 
pension system would be curtailed if the state pension system was expanded. 
Fifth, adequate retirement income is, a necessary, but not 
sufficient, condition to improve. the quality of life for the elderly. While it 
remains true that the elderly have historically been collectively 
inarticulate, this passivity may be coming to an end because "the aging 
population, with its increasing political power will not tolerate indefinitely a 
life of poverty in retirement. " 
128 The Gray Panthers in the United 
States, and various active pensioner organizations in the U. K. and Canada, 
attest to the increased political activism among the elderly. 
Sixth, as one recent study concluded, even if the poverty-line was 
raised to maintain the relationship between median incomes and the low 
income cut-offs "incomes would not rise fast enough to cause any 
substantial decline in the percentage of old people who are considered to be 
poor. " 
129 The continued poverty among the elderly is a major concern for 
public policy because "the number of people over 65 is growing and will 
continue to grow until well into the next century" creating "the prospect of 
major increases in the numbers of poverty-stricken old people. 
130 
In summary, the structurally determined economic interests of 
the increasing number of elderly for an adequate retirement income may 
conflict with those of the active labour force and the corporate sector. 
Furthermore, if there is no fundamental change in the economic position of 
the elderly in the future, more poor-aged will result because of the 
impending demographic transition. 
} 
CHAPTER 3 
THE DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION 
AND THE 
ECONOMICS OF POPULATION AGING 
"When, examining a given country from the, standpoint 
of political economy, we begin with its 
population... The sphere of economy with 
population ... forms the basis and the object of the 
whole social process of production. " 
Karl Marx 
3.1 Introduction 
Demography is fundamental to understanding the material 
conditions of a society. Demography has played an important, and 
sometimes decisive, role in economic history. 
l Demography however has 
generally been ignored by contemporary Marxist political economy, despite 
Marx's earlier concern with the subject. 
2 Political economy's 
circumvention of demography and its implications is peculiar for a tradition 
which bases itself on a materialist analysis of a concrete situation. Its 
traditional aversion to the study of demography can be traced and largely 
understood as a reaction to the determinism associated with the Malthusian 
"trap"3 and its more modern neo-Malthusian variants. 
4 Recognizing the 
critical importance of demography, however, is not the same thing as 
suggesting that it is mechanically determinant. While demographic 
projections and trends sometimes have a futuristic quality about them, it 
remains true as Sweezy reminds us that "if population has been important in 
!5 the past, it will be no -less so in the future. ' 
The population in advanced industrialized ý societies is getting 
older. 
6 The aging of the population in- countries such as Canada, Britain 
and the United States will have profound 'ramifications with respect, to the , 
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economics of aging, pension arrangements, social policy, politics, and 
cultural attitudes towards the elderly.? The proportion of the elderly in 
the population is of considerable significance. The increasing number and 
proportion of the elderly in society will require an increased level of public 
expenditure to support them. The importance of population aging, 
in 
conjunction with the economic position of the elderly outlined in the 
previous chapter, is that there will be a new and significantly larger 
generation of elderly poor in the future' unless there is major reform of 
retirement income 'arrangements. 
The aging of the population will have important repercussions on 
such macro-economic considerations as the type of funding and level of 
contributions necessary to finance the public pension system in the future. 
It will affect the level of taxation required of the actively employed labour 
force to support elderly dependents and the allocation and mix of social 
resources devoted to the aged. "If there is one source of welfare spending 
that is most powerful -a single proximate cause, " Wilensky concluded in his 
exhaustive study of welfare state 'expenditures, "it is the proportion of old 
people in the population. "8 The economics of an aging population may 
also generate an aged-based politics - that is, demographic politics9 - and 
a shift from the values of a youth oriented society to those of a "mature" 
society. 
10 
3.2 Historical Background: Demography and Pension Programming 
The demographic transition and the aging of populations is a 
necessary accompaniment of the modernization process (industrialization 
and urbanization) if society is to generate an economic surplus. 
11 The 
first demographic transition associated with the industrial revolution saw 
the transition from a high birth/death rate to a low birth/death rate 
pattern. The long-term trends and fluctuations with respect to the 
interrelationship between birth (fertility), death (mortality), longevity, and 
-60- 
net immigration rates determine population growth, stability and age 
distribution. Declining birth rates combined with increased life expectancy 
in industrialized countries-has meant that there has been a growth in both 
the number and the proportion of older-people-in the population. In the 
future there will be a relative decline in the labour force in relation to the 
older age cohort as a result of these trends. I- 
The second and impending demographic transition'isa matter of 
magnitude rather than of process. Demographic aging may be defined as 
either the process, that is the increase in the 
proportion of elderly persons, or the results of the 
process, that is the existence of a large proportion of 
elderly persons. The threshold of aging, namely the 
level beyond which a population can be described as 
old, may be situtled at 7 or 8 per cent of inhabitants 
aged 65 or older. 
It is a fact that since 1950 -virtually all Western European countries, Canada 
and the United States have come to exceed this "threshold" and are referred 
to here as aging societies because -of this trend towards population 
aging. 
13 Currently in North America and Western Europe, 10 to 15 per 
cent of the population is age 65 or over. 
14 All projections' point to 
increasing proportions and numbers of older persons in the future. ' 
North American demographic patterns have tended in the past to 
follow European trends with some time lag. After World War II, however, 
the demographic histories of the two continents markedly diverged. 15 
After World War 11 there was a "baby boom", followed by a "baby bust". 
While the "baby boom" in most Western European countries only lasted about 
-five years, in North America it spanned the period from 1945 to 1960 and 
was accompanied by a doubling of the birth - rate. " The reasons for' the 
difference between North American and European experience, as well as for 
the resumption of the long-term decline in birth rates, have been the subject 
of considerable scholarly speculation and controversy. 
16 
The birth of the "baby boom" generation has had a considerable 
economic and cultural impact on North American and Western European 
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life. Some commentators have referred to the "baby boom" cohort as the 
"mega-generation", the "big generation" or simply the "tidal wave". 
17 Its 
impact has had far-reaching effects which have influenced all aspects of 
contemporary life. The "baby boom" generation has had a critical impact on 
the education and health-care systems, labour and housing markets, and 
student politics, as well as influencing tastes in music, hairstyles and dress. , 
The aging of the "baby boom", generation is as: important as its 
birth. Compounding the sheer numbers, and concurrent with them, is the 
increasing tendency toward improved longevity and the continued decline in 
birth rates. As a result of the dramatic decline in population growth rates 
in advanced industrialized countries, which are now approaching t the zero 
level, there has been a general aging of the population. As the "baby boom", 
generation moves through and become "baby boom oldies", their robust 
numbers, combined with increased longevity, will create a bulge in the older, 
population which will peak in North America between the years 2011 and 
2031 when they retire. 
In pre-and-early industrialized societies, when the population was 
dominated by younger age groups, support of the elderly, was primarily a 
family or individual responsibility.. In advanced industrialized countries, as a 
result of a complex historical and institutional process, responsibility for the 
non-working or dependent elderly tends to fall on the state and the actively 
employed labour force. This raises the question of whether society or the 
employed population will be able, or willing, to support the increased 
number and proportion of the elderly in the population in. the future and 
provide them with an adequate level of retirement income. The aging of the 
population therefore has serious social, economic and political implications 
which will impact on retirement income arrangements and the quality of life 
for the elderly. 
The significance and implications of population aging were not 
lost on the architects of the American, British and Canadian social security 
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systems. In the United States, when the social security system was first 
being put into place in 1935, Harry Hopkins, a member of the President's 
Committee on Economic Security, " understood that "there are going to be 
twice as many old people thirty years from now" and realized that the "old 
age thing is a bad curve. " 
IS For political reasons the economics of an 
aging population were ignored at that time, but some forty-five years later 
the tax-based U. S. social security system is in a chronic deficit position. In 
Britain, according to Titmuss, "much of the... anxiety about the effects of 
an 'aging' population can be traced back to the- Beveridge Report. " 19 
While history has shown that the White Paper upon which Beveridge based 
his population projections overstated the situation, it is apparent that the 
implications of an aging society were of concern at that time. Marsh 
observed in 1943 that because "the birth rate in Canada is declining steadily, 
it will not be difficult to see that the problem of provision for old age will 
become one of increasing importance in future years. "20 
If the implications of an ' aging society were of concern to the 
founders ' of the modern welfare state, they are of no less importance to 
current social security programming. 'The U. S. President's Commission on 
Pension Policy, for example, pointedly concluded that 
as the population of the country matures severe 
strains will be placed on our already overburdened 
retirement income system. The inequities and 
inadequacies of the present retirement income system 
will become more critical as more people retire and 
the active work force to support them [relatively] 
shrinks. 21 
Similar policy conclusions have also been advanced for Canada in a number 
of studies, 
22 and the issue has been raised as being relevant to 
Britain. 
23 
3.3 Demographic Trends: The Case of Canada 
Throughout the course of this century, the proportion of the aged 
in Canada is expected to grow at an accelerated rate. In 1981,9.4 per cent 
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of the Canadian population was over the age of sixty-five. This will 
increase to 12 to 15 per cent of the population by the year 2011 when the 
"baby boom" generation begins to retire and will subsequently rise to 17 to 
25 per cent in 2031 when the shift in age composition will peak. These 
projections are, outlined in Table 3.1. The proportion of elderly in the 
Canadian population over the next 30 to 50 years is therefore projected to 
increase by 200 to 300 per cent. 
While some commentors have suggested that population trends in 
Canada only lag those of Western Europe by some twenty years, 
24 it is 
interesting to note that in Sweden, viewed as the prototype of an aging 
society by many demographers, the -proportion of the elderly in the 
population peaked at 16 per cent. This compares with modal range 
projections for Canada of 20 to 24 per cent of the population being over the 
age of sixty-five in 2031. In this regard the Economic Council of Canada 
noted that "by the second decade of the coming century this country will 
experience the same high levels of aging as now exist in Europe; by 2031 it 
will surpass them. "25 
A useful summary indicator for population aging is the median age 
of the population. Table 3.2 outlines the past and projected median age of 
the Canadian population. As will be noted, it has continuously increased, 
with the exception of the temporary reversal caused by the "baby boom", 
and will continue to do so during the remainder of the twentieth century and 
halfway through the `next. In 1981 the median age was nearly 30 years and 
will rise to 42 years in 2031 when the "baby boom" peaks, after. which the 
median age begins to decline. 
Demographers and economists divide the population for analytic 
purposes into dependent and non-dependent categories of people. The total 
dependent category is defined as youth (or young) dependents plus elderly (or 
aged) dependents. One of the characteristics associated with an- aging 
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TABLE 3.1 
PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION AGE 65 AND OVER, 
CANADA, 1971 - 2071, COMPARISON OF POPULATION PROJECTIONS 
STATISTICS CANADAI ECONOMIC COUNCIL OF CANADA2 ROMANIUC3 FOOT4 
YEAR P-I P-III P-O1 P-05 P-06 P-10 P-I P-II P-V PVI 
1971 n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 8.1 8.1 8.1 8.1 n. a. 
1981 9.4 9.4 9.4 9.5 9.5 9.6 9.4 9.3 9.3 9.2 9.7 
1991 10.7 11.0 10.7 11.3 11.0 11.6 11.3 10.9 11.1 10.7 11.4 
2001 11.2 11.9 11.5 12.7 12.0 13.2 13.1 12.4 12.7 12.1 12.3 
2011 11.8 12.9 12.4 14.4 13.1 15.2 14.9 13.9 14.5 13.5 13.5 
2021 13.6 16.4 15.4 19.1 16.2 20.0 19.2 17.4 18.6 17.0 16.6 
2031 16.9 20.2 18.3 24.2 19.2 25.3 23.5 20.8 22.7 20.2 20.9 
2041 n. a. n. a. 17.5 25.2 18.6 26.6 23.3 20.3 22.6 19.8 20.8 
2051 n. a. n. a. 17.6 25.2 18.7 26.7 23.3 20.6 22.6 20.1 20.7 
2061 n. a. n; a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 23.6 20.7 22.9 20.3 n. a. 
2071 n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 23.3 20.5 232.7 20.1 n. a. 
Notes: 1. Demographic assumptions as follows: P-I constant mortality, Increase in 
fertility net replacement level of 2.1, high migration of 100,000 per 
year; P-III constant mortality, decline In fertility to 1.7, "medium 
migration of 75,000 per year. 
2. Demographic assumptions as follows: 
P-01 Medium mortality, fertility, immigration 
P-05 Medium mortality, low fertility, medium Immigration 
P-06 Low mortality, medium fertility, medium Immigration 
P-10 Low mortality, low fertility, medium immigration 
3. Demographic assumptions as follows: 
P-I Mortality increasing to 76.7 years for males and 84.5 for females by 
2000. Low fertility of 1.9. low migration of 60,000 per year. 
P-II Same mortality as in P-I, net replacement level of 2.13, low 
migration of 60,000 per year. 
P-V Same mortality as in P-I, low fertility of 1.9, high migration of 
100,000 per year. 
P-VI Same mortality as in P-I, net replacement level of 2.13, high 
migration of 100,000 per year. 
4. Assumptions based on no change from current demographic trends. 
Sources: Statistics Canada, Population Projections for Canada and The Provinces 1976 
- 2001 (Ottawa: Minister o, 
-p. 29,, 21,131,215,255,466 and 468; Frank T. Denton, Christine H. Feaver, 
and Byron G. Spencer, The Future Population and Labour Force of Canada: 
Projections to the Yea . Study A prepared e LConomic Council of 
na u pp ana rvices Canada. 1980), p. 29 and Table 5-4, p. 32; 
A. Romaniuc, "Potentials for Population Growth in Canada", A Population 
Policy for Canada?, The Conservation Council of Ontario an 
of Canada (Toronto: CCO and FPF, 1974), Table II, p. 15 
and Dav d K. Foot, Canada's Population Outlook: Demographic Futures and 
Economic Challenges tuzzawa: ana ns urc nom o cy, 2), 
3-9, TWT assumptions in Table 3-1, p. 86. 
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TABLE 3.2 
HISTORICAL AND PROJECTED1 
MEDIAN AGE 
OF 
CANADIAN POPULATION, 1901 - 2051 
MEDIAN AGE. 
CENSUS YEAR (YEARS) 
Historical 
1901 22.7 
1911 23.8 
1921 24.0 
1931 24.8 
1941 27.1 
1951 27.7 
1961 26.3 
1971 26.2 
1981 29.5 
Projected 
1991 33.0 
2001 36.9 
2011 39.3 
2021 40.5 
2031 42.0 
2041 42.4 
2051 42.0 
Note: 1. Assumptions based, on no change from current demographic trends. 
Source: David K. Foot, Canada's Population Outlook: Futures and Economic 
Challenges (Ottawa: a Policy, 
io) la61e 1-7. p. 23 and Table 3-9, p. 106. 
population is the decreasing proportion of 'young and the increasing 
proportion of elderly. It is the compositional shift within the total 
dependent category, that is between young and old dependents, and the costs 
associated with each, which is crucial in terms of public expenditures on and 
income security programming for the elderly. 
The historical and projected trends with respect to the, total, 
youth and elderly dependent categories is presented in Table 3.3. A series 
of key trends become evident. The long-term total dependency category as 
a proportion of the population remained within a relatively stable range 
during the twentieth century until 1971. Historically, there has been a 
secular decline in the proportion of the young and a long-term increase in 
the percentage of the elderly which has resulted in a fairly stable total 
dependency ratio. Until now, in other words, the increasing proportion of 
elderly in the population has generally been offset by the decreasing 
proportion of young. 
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TABLE 3.3 
HISTORICAL AND PROJECTED TOTAL, 
YOUTH AND ELDERLY DEPENDENT CATEGORIES 
AS A PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION, 
CANADA, 1901-2051 
(1) (2) Total Depen$ent 
Youth 2 Elderly ' Category Census Year Dependents Dependents (1+2) 
Historical 
1901 34.4 5.0 39.4 
1911 32.9 4.7 37.6 
1921 34.4 4.8 39.2 
1931 31.6 5.6 37.2 
1941 27.8 6.7 34.5 
1951 30.3 7.8 38.1 
1961 33.9 7.6 41.5 
1971 29.6 8.1 37.7 
Projectedl 
1981 22.5 9.7 32.2 
1991 21.4 11.4 32.8 
2001 19.4 12.3 31.7 
2011 17.4. 13.5 _ 
30.9 
2021 17.2 16.6 33.8 
2031 16.4 20.9 37.2 
2041 16.2 20.8 36.9 
2051 16.4 20.7 37.1 
Notes: I. Based on no change from current demograph ic trends. 
2. Defined as those under 14 years of age. 
3. Defined as those over the age of 65. 
4. Those aged 0 to 14 plus those 65 and over divided by total 
population. 
Source: David K. Foo 
and Economic 
oll 
P. 129. 
Population Outlook: Demographic Futures 
awa. an 
p. 9. Table 3-9, p. 106. Table 4-1, 
Beginning in the early 1980$ a number of significant trends 
reverse themselves with far-reaching consequences. Between 1981 and 2011 
the decline in the proportion of young is 'greater than the increase in the 
proportion of elderly. This is reflected in the decline of the total 
dependency category as a result of the "baby boom" having swelled the size 
of the working age population. After 2011, however, the total dependent 
category begins to increase. This reflects the greater increase in the 
number and proportion of elderly relative to the decline in the proportion of 
youth dependents because of continued low birth rates. Between 1981 and 
2031, when the demographic shift peaks, youth dependents will decline by 
6.1 percentage points, whereas elderly dependents will increase by 11.2 
percentage points. The total numerical dependency proportion will 
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therefore increase by ` some 5.5 percentage points, reflecting the 
compositional shift in the non-working (or dependent) population. 
It has been suggested that the dramatic increase in elderly 
dependents (11.2'percentage points or 115.5 per cent, representing 20 to 24 
per cent of the total population) is of no major consequence since it will be 
offset by a declining youth dependency ratio, resulting in no significant net 
increase in total public expenditures. This conclusion has been put forward 
in various analyses, including the Croll Special Senate Committee on 
Retirement Age Policies. It argued that "despite certain pessimistic 
predictions that have been made about the projected aging of the Canadian 
population, the outlook for the future can be considered bright" because "the 
cost of supporting a growing older population should be offset by the savings 
from the reduced expenditures on a' declining young- dependent 
population. "26 
Such an optimistic conclusion is based on an incomplete analysis 
and a series -of unwarranted technical and political assumptions. The 
questionable assumptions are the following: equating the absolute numerical 
dependency ratio with an expenditure dependency, index, an implicit 
assumption that the costs associated with supporting an elderly dependent 
are the same as for a young dependent, and a hidden technical assumption 
that public, expenditure on young and elderly dependents is held constant 
into the future. 
An analysis based solely on absolute numerical dependency ratios, 
as in Table 3.3, is of limited value because it ignores the implications of the 
higher ý relative per capita cost, such as state retirement benefits and health 
care, of maintaining an elderly dependent associated with the increasing 
proportion of older people -in the population. To gauge fully the economic 
implications of an aging society requires that the level of public 
expenditures associated with each dependent category (youth and elderly) be 
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established since the future costs of these programs can be anticipated to 
reflect their numbers in the population. Based on U. S. and Canadian studies 
it has been established that the per capita cost for an elderly dependent is 
2.5-3.0 times greater than for a young dependent; the available evidence for 
Britain suggests a similar conclusion. 
27 In terms of public expenditures it 
is relatively more expensive to support an elderly person than a young one. 
The future cost of each dependent category can be related to its 
changing proportion in the population by constructing what Foot has called 
an Expenditure Dependency Index. 
28 This is a weighted dependency ratio 
where the weights reflect the per capita public expenditures of servicing the 
youth and elderly dependent categories. Table 3.4 reports the change in the 
total Expenditure Dependency Index, with benefits held constant, based on 
the increase in the proportion of the elderly in the population. Between 
1981 and 2031, when the "baby boom" retires, the Expenditure Dependency 
Index rises, depending on the assumption used, from 47 to 65 per cent. What 
is significant in terms of economic impact and social policy is that these 
total dependency expenditure levels are the highest ever recorded. 
In assessing the implications of an aging society at the 
demographic peak in 2031, the Economic Council of Canada estimated that 
the cost of public expenditures on retirement income programs alone will 
increase from the current 4 per cent of gross national product (GNP) to 12 
to 17 per cent of GNP, depending on benefit levels and demographic 
assumptions. 
29 "Since support costs are much greater for the old than the 
young, " the ECC report notes, "total dependency costs are likely to continue 
to increase; they may even accelerate. "30 The increased proportion of 
the relatively more costly elderly is projected to more than offset the 
decreased proportion of the relatively less costly young and will result in 
increased pressures on government expenditures. 
31 
The claim that the rising cost associated with an increasing 
proportion of the elderly in the population will be offset by the declining 
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TABLE 3.4 
HISTORICAL AND PROJECTED 
EXPENDITURE DEPENDENCY RATIO, 1 
CANADA, 1901-2051 
Expenditure Dependency Index2 
(1919=1.0) 
Census Year W=2W=3 
Historical 
1901 1.17 1.07 
1911 1.08 0.98 
1921 1.15 1.05 
1931 1.08 1.00 
1941 1.00 0.95 
1951 1.18 1.13 
1961 1.34 1.27 
1971 1.17 1.13 
Projected3 
1981 0.98 0.99 
1991 1.05 1.08 
2001 1.03 1.08 
2011 1.02 1.09 
2021 1.24 1.35 
2031 1.47 1.64 
2041 1.46 1.62 
2051 1.46 1.63 
Notes: 1. This is a weighted dependency ratio, where the weights 
reflect the relative costs of servicing the different 
age groups in the population. 
2. W denotes the'relative cost of servicing the elderly (those 65 and over) compared to the young (ages 0 to 
17). Thus Wa2 denotes that the per capita cost for 
an elderly dependent is twice that of a young 
dependent and where W-3 the cost of an elderly 
person is three times that of a young dependent. The 
estimate for W2 is based on a Canadian study by Linda 
McDonald, "Changing Population and the Impact on 
Government Age - Specific Expenditures", an 
unpublished study prepared for the Federal Treasury 
Board Secretariat, Ottawa, 1977. The value for W3 1s 
based on an American study by R. Clark and J. 
Spengler, "Changing Demography and Dependency Costs: 
The Implications of New Dependency Ratios and Their 
Composition", Aging and Income: Programs and Prospects 
for the Elderly* ea. Daroarl Herzog Inew MR; Human 
Science Press, 978), pp. 55-89. It must be noted and 
emphasized that W Is held constant throughout the 
projection horizon. This means that expenditures are 
assumed to be held constant both retrospectively and 
in terms of future cost projections. 
3. Based on a no change scenario with respect to 
fertility and mortality assumptions. 
Source: David K. Foot, Canada's Population Outlook: Demographic 
Futures and Econ mc uia eng 
Mystiruze for Economic Policy. 1982), Tables 4-4 and 4-5, 
pp. 138-139, and pp. 136-137. 
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proportion of young dependents is also highly questionable because of a 
critical and usually unidentified underlying assumption in this formulation. 
The Expenditure Dependency Index analysis is based on the static ceteris 
paribus assumption that per capita public expenditures on young and old 
dependents are constant in the future as they affect cost projections. 
32 
This is an unrealistic, if not unwarranted, assumption. In the first instance 
such an assumption is at variance with the economic needs of the elderly as 
established in Chapter 2. Second, in a fluid policy environment where it is 
anticipated, for example, that retirement income payments from the state 
pension system will increase, this static assumption underestimates the 
public expenditures associated with an aging population. 
Some rough orders of magnitude, based on existent empirical 
research, have established cost estimates' associated with a rising elderly 
dependent category. For example, to improve the benefit formula under the 
Canada/Quebec Pension Plans, from the present 25 to 40 per cent of the 
average industrial wage, would result in a 125 per cent increase in pension 
costs as a percentage- of total output. 
33 
" Hospital expenditures, as 
estimated by Statistics Canada, could rise by as much as 109 per cent (in 
constant dollars) by the year 2031, primarily as a result of the increasing 
number of older people. 
34 In Britain the average cost of care and 
treatment of an elderly person currently is seven times that of a person of 
working age. 
35 In the U. S., the Senate Special Committee on Aging 
estimates that the elderly's share of the Federal budget will increase from 
26 per cent in 1981 to 63 per cent by 2025.36 The point is that the 
"constant expenditure" assumption incorporated into the Expenditure 
Dependency Index analysis, reflecting the compositional change in the total 
dependency ratio, is unrealistic. The weight of evidence suggests that the 
costs associated with an. aging population will, in all likelihood, be 
considerably greater than anticipated. 
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The relevant consideration with respect to demographic trends as 
they affect the economics and political demography'of an aging population 
is the number of non-earners in the population who must be supported by the 
active labour force. Table 3.5 outlines the pension ratio and the inverse 
pension ratio. The significance of these proxies is that they indicate, in 
somewhat different ways, the relationship between the increasing proportion 
of elderly and the , 
relatively declining labour force required to support them 
in the future. The pension ratio is the elderly category as a percentage of 
the labour force; . the 
inverse pension ratio is the number of labour force 
members per elderly person. From 1981 to 2031, the elderly as a proportion 
of the active labour force dramatically increases from 14.3 to 33.2 per 
cent. Thus the elderly category more than doubles in size in relation to the 
labour force supporting it. The significance of the increasing proportion of 
TABLE 3.5 
HISTORICAL AND PROJECTED 
PENSION RATIO AND INVERSE RATIO, 
CANADA, 1901-2051 
Census Pension Inverse 
Year Ratio 1 Pension Ratio2 
Historical 
1901 8.3 12.0 
1911 7.5 13.4 
1921 7.9 12.7 
1931 8.8 11.3 
1941 10.2 9.8 
1951 12.5 8.0 
1961 13.1 7.7 
1971 13.0 7.7 
Projected 
1981 14.3 7.0 
1991 17.0 5.9 
2001 18.1 5.5 
2011 19.5 5.1 
2021 25.9 3.9 
2031 33.2 3.0 
2041 32.9.3.0 
2051 32.9 3.0 
Notes: 1. Number of persons aged 65 years and over divided by the 
number of persons aged 15 to 64 years. 
2. Inverse of pension ratio. indicating the ratio of labour 
force members per elderly dependent. 
Source: David K. Foot, Canada's Population Outlook: Demographic Futures 
and Economic Challenges tuizawa: Canadian institute Tor conom c 
Policy, 1982). Table 7-1, p. 219, Projection 1, current trends. 
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elderly in Canadian society is further illustrated by the fact that there are 
presently 7 employed persons for each retired person; by the year 2031 there 
will only be 3 workers for each elderly dependent. 
The aging of the population and the demographic shifts and trends 
outlined here will have an important impact on the economics of aging and 
politics because there will be an increasing "burden" on the working age 
population in order to support an increasing proportion of elderly. This is 
because, 
the relatively larger proportion of the elderly will lead 
to an increase in public expenditures, and hence to 
[an]... increased tax burden on... the reduced portion 
of those of working age. 
This increasing tax burden on those of working 
age, especially in an aging population, is also predicted 
[because]... in general, this group bears the greatest 
share of the costs of and recei eis the least share of 
the benefits from public service. 
These intergenerational and sectoral transfers are all the more politically 
volatile under a tax-based state social security system and during periods of 
slow real economic growth. 
From a social policy perspective, it has been suggested that 
resources must be transferred from the young to the elderly if the 
increasing needs of the aged are to be met without increasing the tax burden 
on the employed. 
38 Whether such a transfer can in fact be achieved is 
highly problematic because of the rigidity of the capitalist state's 
budget39 and the resistance of vested interest groups. This suggests that 
there will be "a substantial increase in the tax burden on the working 
population to support the senior members of the population in the 
future., 40 
The aging of the population has clear intergenerational and 
sectoral implications. Higher direct taxation, or payroll tax deductions 
(contributions), to finance the tax-based state pension system to support the 
elderly reduces the current consumption of the 'actively employed labour 
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force and increases labour costs for the corporate sector. Therefore, the 
economic needs of the increasing proportion of elderly will conflict with the 
desire of the active labour force to preserve its standard of living and the 
cost minimization behaviour of the corporate sector. As a result of 
population aging, the opposing economic interests of the elderly, the active 
labour force and corporate sector may generate increased intergenerational 
and sectoral tension and conflict in the future. 
3.4 Comparative Demographic Trends: Canada, U. S., and Britain 
Population aging is a reality in advanced industrialized countries 
such as Canada, Britain and the United States. Many of the problems 
associated with the aging of the population are likely to be similar: an 
increasing proportion of the elderly in the population, a rising median age, a 
compositional shift within the total dependent category, increasing public 
expenditure on the aged and arelative decline in the labour force to support 
the increasing number of elderly. The following analysis briefly compares 
and contrasts the demographic trends which will affect the operation of the 
pension system in each of these countries. 
Historically, North America has had a young age structure, while 
Western European countries have exhibited old population pyramids. 
Currently Western Europe is in a stable state with 10 to 12 per cent of the 
population over the age of 65. This trend is expected to continue until 
roughly 1990 when at that time the median age of the population will 
gradually begin to increase until 16 to 18 per cent of the population will be 
over the age of 65.41 In North America, in the early 1980s, 9 to 11 per 
cent of the population is elderly. This is rapidly and continuously increasing. 
By the year 2030,20 to 25 per cent of all people will be over the age of 65 
in North America. 
Table 3.6 reports the proportion of the population in Canada, 
Britain and the U. S. over retirement age between 1970 and 2051. The 
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demographic trends in Canada and the United States are substantially 
similar, while those in Britain diverge from this pattern. 
Over the next fifty years both the United States and Canada are 
projected to have in excess of 20 per cent of their population over the age 
of 65. Based on current demographic trends, the U. S. is expected to have a 
somewhat larger elderly population than Canada in the future. Differences 
in demographic history account for these variations. Canadian fertility and 
birth rates have been higher than in the U. S., only converging in the late 
1960s. 
42 After World War II both countries experienced a similar jump in 
fertility rates that peaked in the late 1950s. At the height of the "baby 
boom", the Canadian fertility rate was 3.9, while that in the U. S. was 3.8. 
However, in the 1950s the number of births rose more sharply in Canada 
than in the U. S. In Canada in the mid-1950s there were 28 births per 1,000, 
compared with a high of 25 in the United States. 
43 Since that time the 
fertility rate has dropped dramatically in both countries. 
The marginally greater proportion of elderly in the United States 
as compared with Canada, despite a higher birth and lower death rate in the 
later, is attributable to the higher rate of immigration in Canada and the 
somewhat lower fertility rate assumption used for the U. S. in these 
projections. 
44 This has resulted in a higher net rate of population 
increase in Canada, marginally reducing the proportion of elderly in the 
population. 
In Britain nearly 18 -per cent of the population, was over 
retirement age in 1980. Britain therefore already has an elderly population 
which is 65 to 80 per cent greater than in Canada and the U. S. respectively. 
This large elderly cohort in Britain, compared with the U. S. and Canada, was 
the result of the large increase in births around 1920. Unlike Canada and 
the United States, which experienced one long period of high birth rates 
between 1945 and 1960, Britain in fact has gone, through two distinct high 
birth rate periods: 1941 to 1947 and 1955 to 1964.45 This discontinuity in 
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high birth rates will be correspondingly mirrored by the number of elderly 
dependents some 65 years in the future. Those in the short "baby boom" 
(1941 to 1947) will retire in the first decade of the next century and will 
represent nearly 17 per cent of the total population. The first wave of the 
second, and larger, British "baby boom" will constitute 17 to 19 per cent of 
the population around 2020, depending upon the demographic assumptions 
used. 
46 
There are a number of characteristics differentiating North 
American and British population structures in the short and long-term. 
First, while Britain already has a higher proportion of elderly than does 
Canada and the United States, in the long-term the proportion of elderly in 
all of these countries will be nearly similar. Second, there is an important 
difference in the rate of increase in the number and proportion of elderly in 
these countries. The proportion of elderly in the U. K. has levelled off and 
will only incrementally increase by 7 to 14 per cent over the next 50 years, 
while in North America the proportion of elderly will increase by nearly 150 
to 200 per cent over the same time period. Third, by the year 2030 when 
the "baby boom" generation retires, the elderly population in Canada and the 
United States will exceed that of Britain, with the demographic pressures 
being the most pronounced in the U. S. 
The critical demographic future for Britain after 2020 is not 
known with any certainty. The U. K. statistical services have been reluctant 
to project that far. The second "baby boom" (1955-1964) is already in the 
labour force, however, the size of the future labour force to support it can 
only be tentatively projected because of the uncertainty surrounding the 
important, and sensitive, fertility rate assumption used in these forecasts. 
On the basis of the medium fertility rate assumption used by the U. K. 
Office of Population Censuses and Survey's, a "baby boomlet" is forecast 
between. 1980 and 2000. Since 1963 fertility rates in Britain have dropped 
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precipitously as they have in all other industrialized countries; 
47 
the low 
fertility assumption, therefore, may be more realistic. The fertility 
assumption which is used is of considerable importance since it will estimate 
the size of the labour force which will have to support the elderly in the 
future. 
Table 3.7 presents two sets of data for Canada, Britain and the 
United States: the elderly as a proportion of the actively employed labour 
force (pension ratio) and the inverse pension ratio (labour force to elderly). 
In the United States and Canada the elderly as a proportion of the labour 
force continuously rises over the next half century peaking in 2030 at 33.2 
per cent in Canada and 39.0 per cent in 2040 for the U. S. The trends in 
Britain are somewhat more moderate, depending on the fertility assumption 
used. Based on the more realistic low fertility projection, however, the 
elderly will be in the order of 30 per cent of the labour force. This roughly 
corresponds to the pension ratio around 1990, which had been affected by 
the earlier high 1920 birth rate and subsequent low fertility during the 
depression years. However, if low fertility is projected into the future, it 
may be expected that the proportion of the elderly in the total U. K. 
population, and the elderly as a proportion of the labour force, will increase 
after 2020 and will more nearly resemble the anticipated North American 
trends. This analysis suggests that demographic pressures will be relatively 
more actute in the U. S. and Canada, and more moderate in the U. K. 
While the general trend towards an aging society is evidenced in 
all these countries, and will generate similar pressures, even in Britain 
which already has a large elderly population, the specific forms of political 
resistance to supporting an increasingly aged population may be different in 
each case. This does not nullify, however, the general proposition that the 
economic interests of the elderly are at variance with those of the active 
labour force and business sector. 
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This situation is a consequence of the differences in the level of 
current contributions required to support the state social security 
retirement system in each of these countries. In Britain and the United 
States the state pension system is tax-based (payroll deductions), referred to 
technically as pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) financing, where each generation 
pays for the cohort which preceeds it. The Canada Pension Plan (CPP) is on 
a PAYGO basis, while the Quebec Pension Plan (QPP) is partially funded. 
Pension systems based on PAYGO financing are highly sensitive to 
demographic changes: as the proportion of elderly increases, the necessary 
level of contributions required to pay retirement benefits goes up. This 
would suggest that intergenerational tensions, and political resistance to 
increasing public expenditures and social security contributions to support 
the elderly, might be greater in the United States and Canada, where there 
is a more dramatic rate of increase in the proportion of the elderly, 
compared with the case of Britain, where the proportion of elderly has 
stabilized and will only marginally increase in the future. 
In the United States total contributions to the social security 
retirement system are currently 13.8 per cent (split between employee and 
employer) of eligible earnings. By 1990 total contributions will rise to 15.4 
per cent with further substantial increases necessary in the future to 
accommodate the aging population. The existence of the well publicized 
"Proposition 13" mentality and the periodically threatened reduction in 
social security benefits is concrete evidence that the upper limit of political 
tolerance may have already been reached in terms of supporting the elderly. 
The political dynamic in Britain may be expected to be 
comparable to that in the U. S. Despite the fact that Britain's elderly 
dependent category is relatively stable, total contributions to National 
Insurance for retirmenet benefits are 13.5 per cent of income to the upper 
earnings limit (the 16.0 per cent contribution figure frequently cited 
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includes other items such as maternity and redundancy benefits). According 
to a study by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), the level of taxation in Britain is one of the highest in Western 
Europe. 48 In 1980 for a one earner family at the average production 
worker's salary level, Britain ranked fourth of all Western European 
countries in terms of income tax paid as a percentage of gross earnings; 
Britain ranked tenth out of sixteen OECD countries with respect to 
disposable income as a percentage of gross earnings. 
49 Increasing the 
level of public expenditures to provide an adequate retirement income on 
behalf of the elderly would therefore require even higher levels of direct 
taxation or payroll tax deductions than presently exist. "One implication of 
the increasing ratio of elderly to ... 
[those] working, " W roe noted, "is that if 
the standard of living of the elderly is growing in line with earnings, an 
increasing proportion of each [active] workers earnings is required to 
50support 
them. " Britain may already be at the upper limit of political 
tolerance, and social resources, as evidenced by the fact that the method of 
indexation for state retirement income payments has been adjusted from the 
earnings to the price index. 
In Canada political resistance to supporting an aging population is 
also likely to grow, but for. quite different reasons. Total contributions to 
the Canada/Quebec Pension Plans (C/QPPs) are currently 3.6 per cent (split 
between employee and employer).. This is the lowest level of contributions 
to a social security system in any industrialized country. To maintain 
current benefit levels will require that contributions be increased from 3.6 
to 8 to 10 per cent. To double benefits, in order to bring them up to 
comparable international standards, would require an increase in total 
contributions from 3.6 to 16.0 per cent. Unlike the U. S. and Britain, where 
resistance to further social security contribution increases may exist 
because contribution levels are already high, in Canada there may be 
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political resistance because they presently are low and will require a major 
increase in the near future. Any increase from a low to high level of state 
pension contributions represents a reduction in the standard of living for the 
active labour force and an increase in the corporate sector's labour costs. 
As a result of a massive government deficit, the June 1982 Budget limited 
the indexation of the tax-based Old Age Security (OAS) pension to 6 per 
cent, half of the increase in the cost of living at that time. This is further 
indication of the political volatility of the trade-off between the economic 
needs of the elderly (expenditures) and an increased level of taxation 
(revenue) on the work force. 
While the underlying dynamic in each of these national cases is 
somewhat different, the problems associated with the aging of the 
population are basically the same as a result of the economic interests of 
the elderly being opposed to those of the active labour force and business 
community. Social-policy and politics will be accordingly affected by the 
change in age composition. 
3.5 The Demographics of Politics and The Politics of Aging 
The politics of aging will be a concomitant of the demographic 
transition. The rebellious "baby boom" generation of the 1960s will be the 
elderly of the future. Age-based politics are likely to take at least two 
forms: first, a profound difference in intergenerational expectations; and 
second, the political mobilization of the elderly into age-based 
organizations. The elderly like other historically "inarticulate" stratum of 
the labour force in advanced industrial countries - Blacks, the Quebecois and 
women - are now beginning to organize and assert themselves. This political 
dimension will have long-term implications for pensions policy. 
3.5.1 Intergenerational Expectations. A series of comprehensive 
surveys in Canada, Britain and the United States between 1975 and 1985 
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have established that the current and future elderly have fundamentally 
different attitudes and expectations with respect to retirement income 
adequacy, pension arrangements, and the willingness to pay for improved 
benefits. 51 These different expectations may' generate their own set of 
social tensions and political problems in the future, especially as they affect 
the large "baby boom" cohort which will retire in the next century. 
A number of important intergenerational differences emerge. 
Significantly, 60 per cent of the elderly in the U. S. and 40 to 85 per cent of 
the aged in Canada perceive their current economic situation as 
adequate, 
52 despite the reported incidence of poverty among the elderly. 
Nearly 75 per cent of the "baby boom" generation, however, view the 
elderly's current level of retirement income as inadequate and have 
considerably greater expectations as to what constitutes an "adequate" 
retirement income. 
53 This divergence of views is readily explained in 
terms of the different life-cycle experience of each age cohort. The 
current eldery, it can be argued, have internalized the trauma of the 
depression years-and World War II and are marked by an "invisible scar"54 
which has served to diminish or limit their expectations, whereas the future 
elderly, that is the "baby boom" generation, have had their expectations 
inflated by. a generally bouyant and prosperous post-war economy. 
This sharp intergenerational difference' with respect to retirement 
income expectations is also reflected by the fact that more than 80 per cent 
of the "baby boom" generation in Canada and the U. S. expect to maintain 
their pre-retirement standard of living, 
55 
contrary to the reality 
experienced by the current elderly. In Canada 45 per cent of the "baby 
boom" cohort expect a total income replacement rate on retirement of 50 to 
80 per cent; in Britain, 60 per cent want a replacement rate of 75 per cent 
or more. 
56 Furthermore, nearly 70 per cent of the "baby boom" 
generation in the U. S. and 50 per cent in Canada expect to receive income 
from the private pension system. 
57 This is at variance with the reality 
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which suggests that no more than 25 per cent of the labour force, or 50 per 
cent of occupational pension plan members, will receive income from this 
source. It also ignores dependence on the state pension system as the 
primary source of retirement income. Over 90 per cent of the "baby boom" 
generation, however, are of the view that an "adequate" retirement income 
should be "guaranteed" as a right. 
. If the "baby boom" generation 
has considerably higher 
expectations of retirement income adequacy than does the current 
generation of elderly, are they willing to pay the necessary level of taxes or 
pension contributions? And are the younger generation who will have to 
support them prepared to accept this "dependency burden"? According to 
American survey data, only 48 per cent of those between age 18 and 39 are 
currently prepared to raise social security taxes. 
58 In Britain, 53 per cent 
of people between age ". 16 and 34 are prepared to pay additional pension 
contributions, but only by 25 to 74p per week. 
59 Survey data in Canada 
indicate that only 49 per cent of all people, 51 per cent of the "baby boom" 
cohort and 46 per cent-of blue-collar workers-are willing to pay increased 
contributions to the state pension plan. And only 30 per cent of these are 
prepared to pay as much as an additional 2 per cent towards the current low 
level of C/QPP contributions. 
60 This information suggests that while the 
"baby boom" generation has "great expectations', they have a limited 
willingness to pay for them. 
With respect to the generation aged 16 to 24 - that is, those who 
will be required to support the "baby boom" cohort in the future - recent 
Canadian surveys found them characterized by "defeated hopes", "security 
consciouness", and "social conservatism". 
61 More than 80 per cent of the 
16 to 24 year old group are of the view that people should rely more on 
"individual initiative" than on government and nearly 85 per cent agreed 
that the current budget deficit is "unfair". 
62 This is the cohort which will 
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be required to support the large generation of "baby boom" elderly in the 
future. The "dependency burden" associated with an aging population is at 
variance with the "security consciouness" and "individualism" of the 
generation required to support the increasing proportion of the aged because 
it would result in a reduction of their current consumption. 
The point to be made, in brief, is that the "baby boom" 
generation's "expectations exceed the reality"63 with respect to 
retirement income adequacy. These expectations conflict with their limited 
willingness, or ability, to pay additional pension contributions or reduce 
benefits accordingly. Furthermore, the willingness of future generations to 
honour the "intergenerational contract" with respect to pensions, based on 
this survey data, is at best tenuous. The difference in intergenerational 
expectations and attitudes, and the ability of the pension system to satisfy 
those. expectations, may well be the "long fuse" to the "population bomb". 
The unwillingness of the future elderly and young to pay increased social 
security contributions may frustrate the "baby boom" generation's 
aspirations and create a new and larger generation of poor-old dependent on 
tax-based ' "safety net' programs. This may - stimulate the political 
mobilization of the elderly. 
3.5.2 Age-based Politics and Organizations. The second 
manifestation of the politics of aging may witness the political mobilization 
of the elderly into age-based organizations. 
64 From an historical 
perspective the political behaviour of the elderly may be understood in 
terms of Simmel's theory of conflict which postulates that suppression of 
conflict results in either apathy and withdrawal or that alternative forms of 
conflict will exhibit themselves. 
65 The historical passivity of the elderly 
is suggestive of the former mode of accomodation. The rise of 
age-homogeneous groups and politics in recent years may be viewed as a 
response to the increasingly unstable structional position which the elderly 
-85- 
experience in terms of their role, status and economic positions in advanced 
industrial societies. 
66 Age-based organizations are the vehicle through 
which the elderly will define and express their vested interests. 
In the United States, England and Canada between 1900 and 1930 
there was only sporadic and unsustained activity by retired groups. 
67 
Political activity undertaken by the elderly to advance their own interests 
did not. surface in any serious way until the 1930s. In the United States 
during the years of the depression two grass roots movements of the elderly 
appeared: Upton Sinclair's EPIC (End Poverty in California) program and the 
Townsend Movement advocating that all people over age sixty receive a 
monthly, pension of, $200.68 With Townsend claiming 5 million supporters 
and at least sixty sympathetic congressmen in 1935, "to defuse such public 
clamor, the federal government clearly had to enact some sort of 
program. "69 The result was the Social Security Act ý 1935. In Britain, "the 
old were to become organized and articulate for the first time by the end of 
the thirties. "70 There was considerable. TUC and Labour Party agitation 
for better pensions during this period. ý The' forerunner of the influential 
National Federation of Old Age Pensions Association was founded in 1938. 
Political activity among the elderly in Canada during the 1930s was 
forestalled by the introduction of the Old Age Security (OAS) pension in 
1927; however, the first provincal organization of o1d, age - pensioners was 
formed in 1932.1 
The potential for organized political activity among the elderly 
has been recognized for some time and has often been viewed with 
suspicion. During the 1950s, for example, there was a fear that the "failure 
to integrate [the] ever-growing numbers of older people in American 
society" would "heighten opportunities for political deviancy. "72 Within 
the context of Simmel's theory of conflict, it is probably more accurate to 
suggest that the emergence of age-based politics is an overt manifestation 
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of suppressed conflict which is now surfacing as the elderly become a 
significantly larger proportion of the polity. 
The extent to which the elderly have organized themselves in 
recent years is indicative of this situation. The politics of aging is rapidly 
becoming a reality. In the United States in 1984 the four major elderly and 
pensioners' organizations represented nearly 75 per cent of those over the 
age of 65 and in Canada 31 per cent of the elderly. 
73 In Britain, however, 
the proportion is much lower. Organizations such as the Amercian 
Association of Retired Persons and the Gray Panthers in the U. S. and the 
National Federation of Old Age Pensions Associations in Britain have 
increasingly engaged in and oriented themselves towards political and 
lobbying activities. In addition, some associations such as the Canadian 
Council of Retirees, the U. S. National Council of Senior Citizens and the 
British Pensioners and Trade Union Action Committee have developed links 
to organized labour. 
There is strength in numbers. The elderly will have political 
clout, both organizationally and electorally. In this regard so-called liberal, 
"pluralistic" democracies are particularly vulnerable to vested interest 
group politics. Politicians are increasingly aware of, and sensitive to, the 
elderly and the politics of aging. For example, William Davis, the former 
Conservative Premier of Ontario, noted that "the retirement income issue 
will take hold, and become a fundamental element of the politics of this 
country over, the next few years. "74 The "gray lobby" in the U. S. has been 
recognized as a political force since the mid-1960s. In Canada, when the 
"baby boom" retires in 2011, the elderly will account for 20 per cent of all 
eligible voters and will represent in the order of 30 per cent of all people 
who participate in elections. In the United States those 65 and over will 
represent 30 per cent of the voting-age population by 2000 and an even 
larger proportion of those who exercise the franchise. 
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While some suggest that an aging population will be a 
conservatizing political influence, 
75 it may be argued that the elderly 
may be a force for progressive social change. Contrary to the conventional 
wisdom, there is, no mechanical relationshp between aging and 
conservatism. 
76 While the elderly may be more "conservative" than the 
young at any moment in time, studies indicate that people become more 
"liberal" over their life time and that "the political orientations of older 
people 'are not peculiar... and are very-. much in the mainstream 
of ... political opinion. "77 Other studies 
have established that the closer a 
political issue is to an individual, the more age has a significant affect upon 
the attitude towards that issue. 
78 Therefore, age related issues such as 
pensions may have broader political repercussions as the population ages. 
Another important consideration is that studies indicate that the 
political behaviour of those in the "baby boom" cohort, that is 'the future 
elderly, is highly volatile. This is compounded by a` diminution of traditional 
party loyalties and an increase 'in "cross-over" voting patterns. 
79 In the 
United' States, for example, over one-third of "baby boomers" consider 
themselves to be political, "independents! '. 
so This suggests that the 
electorate is increasingly issue oriented and interested in "ends' rather than 
"means". 
The foregoing, in broad contour, suggests that the increasing 
proportion of elderly in the future, particularly in the U. S. and Canada, will 
'become politically more cohesive and mobilized' as a response to issues 
which affect them personally, such as pension related matters. This is not 
to say that the politics of aging will be without its class contradictions, as 
evidenced by the women's - movement. 
The economic interests and 
expectations of 'the future elderly, an increasingly, large, - volatile and 
`organized proportion of the population, however, may conflict with the 
"security consciousness" and "social conservatism" of that young age cohort 
"} 
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required to support them under current retirement income arrangements. 
This suggests that heightened intergenerational tensions may become a 
reality as the demographic future unfolds. 
3.6 Implications of an Aging Population 
Population aging, accompanied by declining fertility, decreased 
mortality and greater longevity, has significant implications for the 
economics of aging, retirement income arrangements, politics, and social 
policy towards the elderly. Those implications can be summarized as 
follows. 
Asa result of declining fertility and improved longevity there will 
be a significantly greater number and proportion of elderly in the population 
in the United States and Canada. While the proportion of elderly in Britain 
will be roughly comparable with that in North America, the rate of increase 
in the number of elderly will be significantly greater in Canada and the 
United States. The state and private pension systems will have a larger 
group of elderly dependents to support in. the future as a result of increased 
longevity, particularly single women and the very old (those over 75). 
The "baby boom", generation is already. in the labour force. A 
state pension system ordinarily requires 30 to . 
40 years to mature (unless 
there is a phase-in of benefits).. This suggests that the necessary social 
planning, particularly in the case of Canada, must be initiated in the 
near-term in order to cope effectively with the long-term demographic 
situation which is inexorably unfolding. In Canada this would require an 
increase in the income replacement rate under the state pesnion plan. A 
delay in reforming retirement income arrangements will result in a new and 
larger generation of elderly poor being created in the future because of the 
demographic transition. In Britain the existing state earnings-related 
pension system (SERFS) was designed to mature in 1998. This coincides with 
the retirement of the "baby boom" generation at the turn of the century. 
The implementation of the recent recommendation of the Fowler green 
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paper on the reform of social security (June 1985) to eliminate SERPS 
would, however, deprive this large cohort of elderly of a major source of 
retirement income, thereby creating a new "generation of poor-aged. In 
terms of formulating public policy, strategic forward planning requires 
social security programming to be synchronized with the underlying 
demographic trends. - 
Total 'dependency costs (youth plus elderly categories) will rise 
significantly, reflecting the compositional shift towards an aging population, 
because it costs 2.5 to 3 times more-to support an elderly dependent than a 
young one. If certain categories of expenditures such as state retirement 
income payments and' health care costs increase, the level of public 
expenditures associated with an aging population' will be significantly 
greater than expected and probably will not be -offset as a result of a 
declining youth dependency ratio, economies of scale or productivity. 
An increased proportion of elderly in the population, and 
continuing low fertility, will mean that there will be a'relative decline in 
the size of labour force to support the increasingly large elderly category. 
The elderly as an increasing proportion of the labour force may place a 
"dependency burden" on the 'actively employed as a result of' increased 
direct taxation and payroll deductions to support them. This may generate 
heightened intergenerational and sectoral tensions since' increased public 
expenditures on behalf of the elderly dependent population will result in 
reduced current consumption for the active labour force and increased 
labour costs for the corporate sector. While the resultant tensions will 
undoubtedly take different forms, the social pressures and economic 
problems associated with an aging population can be expected to be similar 
in all these countries. Population aging has significant implications for such 
important macro-economic considerations as the type of funding 
arrangement, the level of contributions necessary to support the state 
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pension system, and the investment and use of the social security 
investment fund. 
The economics of aging and the politics of demography associated 
with population aging in the advanced industrialized countries of the United 
States, Canada and Britain lead to three central conclusions. First, there is 
a cost associated with the increasing proportion of the elderly in the 
population which may be significantly greater than expected. Second, there 
is a divergence of economic interests between the elderly, the active labour 
force and the business sector because increased public expenditures for the 
aged, given existing institutional arrangements, result in reduced current 
consumption for the work force and increased labour costs for the corporate 
sector. Third, the aging of the population coupled with the immiseration of 
the elderly suggests that unless there is major reform of retirement income 
arrangements, a new and larger generation of elderly poor will be created in 
the future. 
Demography as an element in the political economy of pensions 
will have an important affect on public policy and social security 
programming in the future. Demographic trends and their implications are 
now sufficiently predictable and critical that they can' no longer be, ignored. 
In the final analysis the pension issue is really nothing more than a concrete 
manifestation of ' the more universal problem - of old 'age. ° Increasingly, 
however, one pressing problem has created a commonality'of interest among 
the elderly - pensions. 
CHAPTER 4 
THE UNIVERSAL LIMITATIONS 
OF THE PRIVATE PENSION SYSTEM 
"Rapid and unceasing change and the uncertainties of 
a working lifetime make individual planning for 
security essentially unrealistic. Economic security 
now depends on social or collective arrangements. " 
Robert Tilove 
There are "private troubles and public issues". 
C. Wright Mills 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters have established that a significant 
proportion of the elderly in Canada, Britain and the United States is poor, 
and because of population aging in the future there is the prospect of a 
larger generation of elderly poor. They also demonstrated that in these 
countries the state pension system is the major source of retirement income 
for the elderly, accounting for 40 to 52 percent of all income. Compared 
with this, the employer-based private pension system generates only 12 to 
15 per cent of the elderly's retirement income; 68 to 74 per cent of the 
current elderly receive no income from the private pension system. The 
elderly's need for economic security, it was suggested, conflicts with the 
corporate sector's costa minimization behaviour and the active labour force's 
desire to maintain its current consumption by minimizing public 
expenditures such as social security contributions on behalf of the elderly. 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe and analyze in some 
detail the universal limitations of the private pension system. These 
limitations explain the employer-based occupational pension system's 
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marginal role in the provision of retirement income for the elderly. The 
limitations of the occupational pension system, concurrent with the 
underdevelopment of the state retirement income system as outlined in 
Chapter 2.5, are the fundamental reasons for the elderly's current 
impoverishment. 
During the course of the exhaustive public policy review of the 
retirement income system in Canada, any number of government studies 
have concluded that the private pension system is a, failure.! The federal 
Department of Health and Welfare, for example, stated that 
the failure of the retirment income system lies largely 
with the private employer-sponsored pension system. 
The major shortcomings of the retirement 
income system are easy to summarize. Most basic is 
the lack of coverage by private pension plans, in 
conjunction with a lack of portability and of 
immediate vesting; few private pension plans index 
either pensions in pay or deferred pensions; and finally, 
few survivors have private pensions in their own right. -- 
These observations suggest that large 
proportions of the aged will continue to', cpceive 
little or no private pension income in the future. 
The Honourable Monique Begin, former federal Minister of Health and 
Welfare in Canada, pointedly noted that "the failure of the private pension 
plans has been the great disappointment in social programs in the 70's, ' 
because "private pensions are NOT doing the job Canadians expect them to 
do. " 3 
In assessing the operation and social utility of the private pension 
system, the following evaluation criteria are commonly used: coverage, 
vesting (preservation), portability (transferability), inflation-proofing and 
income adequacy. This chapter is organized around these universal 
limitations. The deficiencies of the private pension system, - namely limited 
coverage, poor vesting (preservation) standards, inadequate portability 
(transferability) arrangements, and the lack of post-retirement indexation - 
are universal features common to the employer-based occupational pension 
system in Canada, Britain and the United States. These inadequacies are 
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interactive and impact upon one another, limiting the efficiency and 
cost-effectiveness of the private pension system as a delivery mechanism 
for retirement income. 
4.2 Limited Occupational Pension Plan Coverage 
One of the critical factors, explaining the inadequate level of 
retirement income generated from the employer-sponsored private pension 
system, necessitating reliance upon the state social security retirement 
system including tax-based "safety net" programs, is the limited, selective 
and uneven distribution of occupational pension plan coverage. Only 
priviledged groups within the labour force have been successful in achieving 
private pension plan coverage, reflecting the stratification of the capitalist 
labour market. 
4 
1 
Employer-based pension plan coverage varies significantly 
according to income, occupation, industry, sector of the economy, size of 
enterprise, geographic location, degree of , unionization, labour force 
attachment and sex. Most commonly excluded from occupational pension 
plan coverage are those earning below the average industrial wage, 
employees in small or labour intensive firms or industries, part-time and 
mobile employees, women, non-unionized employees and non-earners. In 
general, the distribution of 'occupational pension plan coverage corresponds 
to the configuration of the labour force in primary and secondary labour 
markets. The following reviews and analyzes- the most important 
characteristics of occupational pension plan coverage. 
4.2.1 Introduction of Private Pension Plans. An historical 
overview of occupational pension plan coverage indicates the limited extent 
to which the private employer-based pension system has been an effective 
means of ensuring retirement income for the labour force. Employer-based 
pensions in Britain, Canada and the United States were first introduced by 
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the railroads, banks, insurance companies, public utilities, and only later in 
the capital intensive oligopolistic manufacturing sector. A similar 
evolutionary pattern emerges in all three countries. 
5 The early origins of 
occupational pension plan coverage corresponds to the development of the 
modern bureaucratic state (central and sub-central) and the transformation 
to industrial capitalism with its large scale units of production, economies 
of scale, capital intensive investment and oligopolistic market structure. 
The introduction of occupational pension plans in Britain, Canada and the 
United States is outlined in Table 4.1. 
Occupational pension plan coverage in Canada can be constructed 
and traced from various sources. 
6 Studies undertaken by the National 
Employment Commission (1937), a Queen's University Industrial Relations 
Survey (1938) and the first Dominion Bureau of Statistics survey of pension 
and welfare plans in industry (1947), all provide an insight into the early 
evolution of private pension plan coverage. The introduction of employer- 
based industrial pension plans in Canada between 1900 and 1947 is reported 
in Table 4.2. 
The existence of occupational pension plans in Canada at the turn 
of the century was limited. Canadian developments were influenced by 
British example in the public sector and American events in the private 
sector.? American corporate "welfare capitalism" as a managerialist 
ideology and strategy in the oligopolistic sectors of the economy in the late 
1800s and early 1900s included the unilateral introduction of 
non-contributory, employer-sponsored and controlled pension plans. In 
Canada the number of occupational pension plans in the private sector did 
not significantly increase until the 1910-1919 period, coinciding with early 
American corporate penetration ' of the Canadian market. 
8 According to 
the Queen's University study, Canadian pension developments "were either 
the result of the direct extensions to Canadian subsidiaries, or of the 
indirect influence of United States plans in the same industries. "9 -- 
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TABLE 4.2 
INDUSTRIAL PENSION PLANS 
BY YEAR ESTABLISHED, 
ALL INDUSTRIES, CANADA, 1900-1947 
Date Established No. of Plans % of Plans 
Before 1900 7 0.2 
1900-1909 59 1.7 
1910-1919 172 4.8 
1920-1929 369 10.4 
1930-1939 465 13.1 
1940-1947 2,340 66.0 
Not Stated 133 3.8 
Total 3,545 100.0 
Source: Retabulated and calculated from the Dominion Bureau of 
Statistics, Survey of Welfare Plans in Industry 1947 
(Ottawa: Queen ,, p. 2 
The prolonged business boom of the 1920s witnessed the expansion 
of "welfare capitalism" 'and the "pension movement". 
10 Between 1910 and 
1929 the number of employer-sponsored pension plans in Canada tripled. 
Examples of American firms which introduced private pension plans into 
their Canadian operations included International Harvester (1908), Swift & 
Co. (1915), Bell Telephone (1919), Imperial Oil (1925) and Goodyear Tire and 
Rubber Company (1929). Occupational pension plans in North America 
during the 1920s became a permanent feature of liberal corporate industrial 
relations policy, both as an ideology and as part of a union substitution 
strategy. 
' Employer-sponsored pension plans became a means of 
promoting labour market stability, improving efficiency, strengthing loyalty 
to the firm and undermining unions. Occupational pension plans fulfilled an 
important "role as an ideological and economic control mechanism within 
the labour market. " 12 
It was World War II which signalled the expansion of the private 
pension system. This growth is explained by three factors. First, during the 
war employee benefits, including pensions and vacations, were exempt from 
wage controls in Canada, Britain and the U. S. In all three countries 
government encouraged employers and unions to introduce pension plans in 
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lieu of direct monetary compensation on the grounds that they were 
non-inflationary. Second, income tax act regulations were clarified or 
amended so that private pension plan costs could be deducted as legitimate 
business expenses by corporations, thereby encouraging the introduction of 
employer-based pension plans. Third, in the immediate 'post-war period, 
unions for the first time seriously negotiated the introduction of 
occupational pension plans. Nearly two-thirds of all occupational pension 
plans in Canada were implemented between 1940 and 1947. Examples of 
pension plans introduced in this period include Weston's (1946), Great Lakes 
Paper (1947), Dominion Bridge (1947), Eaton's (1948), Coca Cola (1949), 
General Motors and Ford (1950). World War II, 'and the immediate post-war 
period, mark a watershed in the introduction of private pension plans and 
the expansion of coverage. 
4.2.2. Private Pension Plan Coverage. To assess the private 
pension system as a source of retirement income requires that pension plan 
membership or coverage, rather than the number of plans, be determined. 
In order to facilitate this analysis, and place it in perspective, an historical 
time-series of private occupational pension plan coverage in Canada and the 
United States has been constructed and related to the total and 
non-agricultural labour force. For Britain, where background information is 
more complete, the data has been adapted to place it on a comparable 
basis. Summary Table 4.3 presents a transnational comparison of 
occupational pension plan coverage for Canada, Britain and the U. S. from 
1929 to 1980. Detailed statistical work is presented in Appendices D 1-3. It 
should be noted that these historical time-series are constructed from 
disparate sources and should be interpreted with some caution. The 
evidence presented in Table 4.3 strongly suggests thatG the employer-based 
occupational pension system in these countries has provided only limited 
coverage for the delivery of retirement income for the majority of the 
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TABLE 4.3 
SUMMARY COMPARISON 
OF 
EMPLOYER-SPONSORED OCCUPATIONAL PENSION PLAN COVERAGE AS A 
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL AND NON-AGRICULTURAL LABOUR FORCE, 
CANADA, U. S., AND BRITAIN, 1929-1980 
Employees Covered by 
Employees Covered by Occupational Pension Plans 
Occupational Pension Plans as a% of Non-Agricultural 
as a% of Total Labour Force Labour Force 
Year Canada U. S. U. K. Canada U. S. U. K. 
1929 - 9.7 - - 12.9 - 1936 - - 12.9 - - 14.1 
1938 7.6 11.3 - 16.3 17.9 - 1947 16.8 19.4 - 21.7 23.8 - 
1950 - 21.6 - - 26.3 - 1953 - - 28.9 - - 30.1 
1955 - 30.3 - - 36.7 - 1956 - - 36.0 - - 37.2 
1960 28.1 36.5 31.6 43.6 - 
1963 - - 47.0 - - 48.5 1965 33.8 40.5 35.9 46.9 
1967 - 51.3 - - 52.4 
1977 33.7 41.9 35.9 48.1 - 1971 - - 47.8 - - 48.7 
1975 - 45.4 44.0 - 47.7 
1976 36.8 - - 41.9 53.6 - 
1979 45.7 44.7 51.0 49.6 
1980 39.8 - - 44.6 - - 
Notes: See Appendices D 1-3 
Sources: Retabulated from Appendices D 1-3 
labour force. The general pattern of 'coverage is similar, while exhibiting 
some national differences. ' The broad contours are outlined here. 
Before World War II less than 13 per cent of the total labour force 
in these countries was covered by an employer-sponsored occupational 
pension plan. Coverage was highly concentrated in a number of capital 
intensive industries such as public utilities, railroads and heavy industry. 
One study of pension plan coverage in the late 1930s concluded that 
"industrial retirement plans will probably never be extended to the majority 
of employeel' and "they cannot be regarded as an alternative to an inclusive 
state-operated plan. "13 ',, 
These time-series data confirm that the most dramatic increase 
in occupational pension plan coverage occurred in the post-World War II 
period. Between 1947 and 1960 private pension 'plan coverage nearly 
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doubled in Canada and the United States, and tripled in the U. K, but 
employer-sponsored pension plans covered only one-third of the total labour 
force. The increase in pension plan coverage was most marked in the 
private sector in the U. S. and Britain, while public sector coverage surged in 
Canada. . 
Between 1960 and 1970 there were modest advances in pension 
plan coverage in the U. S. and Canada. Britain experienced a period of rapid 
expansion between 1956, and 1967 when the number of employees covered 
increased from 8 to 12 million. Pension plan coverage in the United States 
and Canada was boosted by: the dramatic, increase in public-- sector 
unionization. From the end v of the Second World- War to . 1970 total 
employer-based pension plan coverage doubled in absolute terms. 
Nevertheless, occupational pension plan coverage represented only. 34 per 
cent of the total labour force in Canada, 42 per cent in the U. S., and 48 per 
cent in Britain. 
During the 1970s, the rate of, growth in occupational pension plan 
coverage declined in all these countries, suggesting that the upper limit of 
coverage under a voluntary employer-based pension system may have been 
reached. The U. S. President's Commission on Pension, Policy noted that "the 
low rate of increase since 1960 raises doubts as to whether there will be 
substantial voluntary gains in the future. " 
14 In Canada between 1978 and 
1980 private pension plan coverage as a proportion of labour force remained 
static. 15 The case' of Britain is interesting, - if not unique. 
Employer-sponsored pension plan coverage peaked in 1967 and has declined 
in absolute terms since that time. - Total occupational pension scheme 
coverage decreased by nearly 13 per, cent, while -coverage in the private 
sector declined by 25 per cent. 
Currently less than half of the total labour force in these 
advanced capitalist countries is covered by an employer-sponsored 
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occupational pension plan. - Private pension industry representatives and 
some government agencies, such as Statistics Canada, have argued that the 
labour force concept (definition) used in such a measurement should be 
adjusted to reflect more accurately the extent of private pension plan 
coverage. Rather than use the broader total or non-agricultural labour 
force definition to measure coverage, they contend that it would be more 
appropriate to utilize the narrower full-time, employed paid worker 
statistical base which would exclude the unemployed, the self-employed, 
part-time employees, and non-paid family workers; as well, those under 25 
and over 65 would be excluded from this calculation. 
16 This results in 
increasing occupational pension plan coverage in Canada from 40 to 54 per 
cent of the labour force. What is to happen to the remaining 46 per cent of 
this more narrowly defined labour force target group is not explained. 
Such methodological rationalizations are dubious and a number of 
criticisms can be levelled against such an approach. In the first instance, 
the need for retirement income among the retired population is universal; 
that is, everyone reaching "normar' retirement age has a need for income. 
, -Therefore, 
the appropriate target group for the provision of retirement 
income is the entire retired population, not just a stratum of it. Second, 
using the category of "paid worker' in the labour force and relating it to 
private pension plan coverage is a tautological formulation because it serves 
to reinforce the notion that pension plan coverage should be selective rather 
than universal. Third, by using a narrowly defined labour force concept and 
measuring successively smaller target groups merely defines away the 
problem of limited pension plan coverage. While there are valid reasons why 
labour economists and statisticians use alternative labour force definitions, 
it is questionable whether such an exercise has any particular relevance for 
social policy in this instance. 
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In the post-war period, while there has been moderate absolute 
and relative growth in occupational pension plan coverage, the primary 
determinants of this growth have been the overall increase in the labour 
force, the expansion of the public sector, increased unionization and the 
contraction of the agricultural sector. The central issue remains, namely, 
that the majority of the labour force, particularly in the private sector, is 
not covered by an employer-based pension plan. 
u -.. 
4.2.3 Concentration of Pension Plan Coverage. Occupational 
pension plan coverage is highly concentrated, both in the private and public 
sectors, and is closely related to the size of enterprise. The concentration 
of employer-based pension plan coverage is related to the organization of 
capital and the labour process in large-scale establishments in the private 
sector and bureaucracies in the state sector. The concentration and 
centralization of occupational pension plan coverage mirrors the more 
general tendency under advanced capitalism towards the centralization and 
concentration of capital in the private sector and the expansion of the 
bureaucratic state. 
Pension plan coverage has always been highly concentrated. In 
the United States during the first quarter of the century, half of all workers 
covered by an occupational pension plan were employed by 13 corporations; 
40 per cent were employed by the railroads and one-third were covered by 
the pension plans of 4 major corporations: U. S. Steel, American Telephone 
and Telegraph and the Pennsylvania and New York railroads. 
17 In Canada 
in 1938,17 industrial pension plans accounted for 63 per cent of all pension 
plan coverage. 
18 Until World War II nearly one-third of all pension plan 
members were employed by the two railroads. 
19 In the late 1940s, 5 per 
cent of all industrial pension plans (excluding railroads). accounted for 61 per 
cent of total pension plan coverage. 
20 
In the post-war period private 
pension' plan coverage has become even more concentrated. In x 1960 in the 
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Canadian'case, 1.4 per cent of all pension plans accounted for 68.8 per cent 
of all 'plan members. By 1980 the same proportion of plans accounted for 
nearly 75 per cent of all members. 
21 While the number of large plans 
increased from 129 in 1960 to 277 in 1980, this was primarily a result of the 
introduction of multi-employer pension plans in the public and private 
sectors. 
Public sector pension plan coverage is'more concentrated than in 
the private sector. In 1980 in Canada the 15 largest public employee 
pension plans covered nearly 75 per cent of all members as compared with 
the 30 largest private sector plans which accounted for only 33 per cent of 
all coverage. This is because "the public sector consists of some of the 
largest plans in the country notably those' for "federal employees... crown 
corporations and provincial employee&'22 and large multi-employer public 
employee plans. The concentration of pension plan membership in the public 
sector is a reflection of the growth and consolidated of the capitalist state 
at all levels in the post-war era. 
A corollary is that there is a direct relationship between 
occupational pension plan coverage and the size of enterprise. This explains 
the concentration of pension plan coverage. In the United States the 
proportion of workers covered ranged from- 34- per cent for, those in 
establishments with less than 100 workers to 81 per cent for firms with 500 
or more employees. Only 42 per cent of all firms in Britain with less than 
100 employees had a pension scheme, as compared to 98 per cent of all 
enterprises with 1,000 or more workers. A similar pattern exists in 
22 Canada. 
4.2.4 Pension Plan Coverage by Sector.. Total occupational 
pension plan coverage as a proportion of labour force, previously indicated 
in Table 4.3, is misleading because such aggregate statistics obscure and 
disguise the uneven distribution of coverage. Total coverage statistics must 
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be analyzed by sector and industry in order to assess more completely the 
limited nature of employer-based pension plan coverage. 
While less than half of, the total labour force is covered by an 
occupational pension plan, there is a significant difference by sector of the 
economy. A comparison of employer-sponsored occupational pension plan 
coverage in the public and private sectors is outlined in Table 4.4. In the 
public sector 75 to 93 per cent of the paid labour force is-covered by an 
occupational pension scheme as compared with only 35 to 47 per cent in the 
private sector. Pension plan coverage is 2 to 3 times greater in the public 
sector than in the private sector. 
TABLE 4.4 
COMPARISON OF OCCUPATIONAL 
PENSION PLAN COVERAGE 
AS A PERCENTAGE OF 
PAID LABOUR FORCE, 1 
BY SECTOR, 
CANADA, U. S., AND U. K., 1975-1979 
Total Paid 
Country Public Sector Private Sector Labour Force 
Canada2 92.6 34.5 48.3 
U. S. 3 88.05 47.0 54.5 
U. K. 4 75.2 39.4 50.9 
Notes: 1. Including armed forces. 
2.1978. 
3.1975. 
4.1979. 
5. Including Federal, 
-state 
and local retirement systems. 
Sources: Information supplied to the author by the Pensions 
Section, Statistics Canada, January 13,1981 and the 
U. S. National Social Security Reform Commission 
May 17,1982; also the Government Actuary, Occupational 
Pension Schemes 1979 - Sixth Survey (London: RMS0, 
ae2.1, p. 5 
The use of global pension plan coverage statistics obscures the 
limited extent of occupational pension plan coverage, particularly in the 
private sector. The high level of public sector pension plan coverage 
inflates the average total coverage figures reported, thus making the 
situation appear more respectable. For the private sector labour force, 
occupational pension plan coverage is especially limited. - 
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4.2.5 Pension Plan Coverage by Industry. Employer-based 
pension plan coverage varies widely by industry within the private sector. In 
general, pension plan coverage tends - to be relatively high in capital 
intensive, high wage, unionized, oligopolistic industries such as mining, 
petro-chemicals and manufacturing. Conversely, coverage is low in poorly 
paid, - non-unionized, labour intensive industries characterized by either a 
competitive product market, or where there are a high proportion of women 
such as in -community, business and personal services. The uneven 
distribution of employer-sponsored pension plan ý coverage by industry is 
presented in Table 4.5. A similar variation in pension scheme membership 
by industry is found in the _ý U. S. and Britain. Coverage- under an 
24 
occupational pension plan is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to 
ensure. receipt of retirement income from an employer-sponsored pension 
plan. 
TABLE 4.5 
PROPORTION OF PAID WORKERS 
IN THE LABOUR FORCE COVERED BY PENSION PLANS, 
BY INDUSTRY, CANADA, 1978 
Industry 
Public Administration 
Mines, quarries, oil wells 
Transportation and Communication 
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Finance, Insurance and Estate 
Community, Businesses and Personal, Service 
Trade 
Agriculture 
Percentage of 
Paid Workers Covered 
by Pension Plans 
98.0 
67.6 
50.5 
50.2 
47.9 
37.0 
24.5 
15.8 
0.7 
Source: Statistics Canada, Pension Plans in Canada, 1978 (Ottawa: 
Minister of Industry, Irade ,, Text Table IV, p. 18. 
4.3 Inadequate Vesting Standards 
The interaction between occupational pension plan coverage, 
labour market mobility, vesting (preservation) standards and portability 
-106- 
(transferability) arrangements determines whether employees will actually 
receive an employer-based pension. A fundamental distinction must be 
made between pension plan coverage and actual receipt of pension benefits 
at retirement. The divergence between pension plan coverage and actual 
receipt of benefits represents lost retirement income (technically referred 
to as "lapse" or "slippage") to members of the private pension system. 
Vesting is defined by Canadian authorities as "the employee's 
right to all or part of the employer contributions paid on his behalf, on 
termination of employment before retirement, usually in the form of a 
deferred pension payable at normal retirement age. "25 Britain's 
Government Actuary defines preservation (vesting) simply as "a pension the 
right to which is preserved until retirement age is reached although the 
member has left employment in respect of which the pension is 
payable. "26 Vesting is contingent upon an employee satisfying an age 
and/or service requirement and usually takes three forms: immediate full, 
deferred full or deferred graduated vesting. 
There is a close relationship between vesting standards and 
portability arrangements. The interrelationship between the vesting and 
portability of pension entitlements is made clear in a standard text which 
notes that there has been, 
criticism in some quarters over the lack of 
"portability" or, more accurately, the lack of pension 
"preservation" for terminating employees. The 
problem was that employees who changed jobs usually 
lost their pensions because of inadequate vesting 
provisions... This... meant that [occupational] pension 
plans were much less effective than they appeared to 
be, for many employees who had been in several 
compan pension plans received, in fact, little or 
nothing. ' 
Vesting requirements in an employer-based pension plan are the crucial link 
between plan coverage and actual receipt of pension benefits at retirement. 
While a person may have pension plan 'coverage, unless the vesting 
requirements are satisfied, he will not be entitled to a deferred pension if he 
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changes employment prior to retirement. Rigorous vesting standards and 
the portability of pension entitlements between employers are necessary to 
ensure actual receipt of pension benefits. 
4.3.1 Barriers to Adequate Vesting. Inadequate vesting standards 
in the private pension system are explained by a number of factors. Labour 
market mobility and length of employment with the same employer are the 
crucial determinants with respect to acquiring a right to a non-forfeitable 
or deferred vested pension at retirement. High labour market mobility, in 
conjunction with restrictive vesting provisions, has resulted in many 
employees losing pension benefits. According to a background study 
prepared for the Federal Task Force on Retirement Income Policy, most 
Canadians will change jobs on average six times during their life; 
2$ 
furthermore, mobility rates have increased in recent years. 
29 
Interestingly, an Economic Council of Canada study found that labour 
market mobility for those over age 45 was not appreciably different than for 
those age 25 or over. 
30 The fragmentation of the labour market, coupled 
with labour market mobility, mitigates against most people ever satisfying 
the existent statutory vesting requirements for pension benefits. A 
considerable body of literature confirms that receipt of a pension is directly 
related to length of employment with the same employer. 
31 The 
Economic Council of Canada concluded that "the longer the vesting period, 
the more likely a worker will end up with benefits far below the maximum 
available to employees who do not change jobs. "32 
The legal basis for vesting or preservation of pension benefits is 
the deferred wage doctrine. 
33 One pension authority has acknowledged 
that 
the concept that pensions should be a form of deferred 
pay has generally prevailed over the idea that they 
should be a bonus or gratuity for service. The concept 
of pensions as deferrej4pay calls for early vesting, if 
not immediate vesting. 
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Current minimum legislative standards, however, neither recognize the 
reality of high labour market mobility nor the need for early vesting. In 
Canada the most common legislative standard provides for what is known as 
the "45 and 10" rule, despite recent improvements in some provincial 
jurisdictions, 35 which means that a person must satisfy both an age and 
service requirement to be entitled to a vested deferred pension at 
retirement. Under the statutory "45 and 10" rule, a person must be age 45 
and have worked for the same employer for at least 10 years in order to 
qualify for a deferred benefit. In Britain the preservation rule provided for 
by legislation is age 26 and 5 years service; in the United States three 
alternative vesting schedules are permitted. 
36 
The economic and actuarial considerations 'underlying a defined 
benefit pension plan are of some significance since this is the most 
prevalent type of pension scheme. The lick of rigorous vesting standards 
has the effect of lowering the total cost of the pension scheme to the plan 
sponsor "while providing the same level of benefits to those plan members 
who remain. The result is that employees who sever their employment 
relationship before vesting (early leavers) subsidize the pensions of those 
who remain. This reduces an employer's pension costs. Employee turnover, 
which generates this subsidy (referred to as the "fall-in"), is used as an 
actuarial assumption in the calculation to arrive at the cost of a defined 
benefit pension plan. 
37 It may be true, as Bernstein argues, that "the 
losses of the many provide the funds with which the payoff is made to the 
lucky few- just as at any honest race track, "38 However, as a matter of 
public policy we are entitled to ask what are the odds of being a winner. 
Inadequate vesting requirements force those covered by the employer- based 
private pension system to gamble on receiving their retirement income. It 
might be suggested that economic security in old age is far too important to 
be left to chance, especially if the race is fixed. 
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Another economic function performed by inadequate vesting 
standards is to compensate a firm for employee labour market mobility. 
Such an analysis can be placed within the framework of human capital 
theory associated with the work of Becker, Mincer and Oi. 39 If an 
employee terminates his employment prior to being vested, the employer 
contribution on his behalf is returned to the firm or credited to the pension 
fund against future employer contributions. This lowers the total cost of 
the pension scheme to the plan sponsor. In theory this would also allow 
higher benefits to be paid at a fixed cost to those who remain. This, 
however, is not standard practice. In a highly mobile capitalist labour 
market poor vesting requirements in occupational pension plans effectively 
serve as a form of insurance against the loss incurred by a firm for 
recruiting and training an employee who terminates. 
In addition to economic purposes, 'inadequate vesting 'provisions 
also serve a social control and labour discipline function. According to 
Kincaid, the employer "sees pension rights as a useful adjunct to 
discipline. "40 Restrictions' on pension rights and other social security 
programs (i. e., social welfare) serve a social control function either for the 
individual employer or by the state on his behalf by limiting eligibility for 
benefits. Historically the receipt of an employer-sponsored pension was not 
a contractual right established through the employment relationship. A 
pension was paid at an employer's discretion to an employee for "good and 
faithful service". Early industrial pension plans were, according to'Lubove, 
"first and foremost a technique of labour control. This helps to explain the 
indifference... to vesting employees with legal rights. "41 During the 
famous 1919 Winnipeg general strike, for example, federal Minister of 
Labour Gideon Robertson issued the following threat to postal workers: 
Unless they returned to 'work... signed agreements 
never to support a sympathetic strike and severed 
their relations with the Winnipeg Trades and Labour 
Council, they would be discharged at once with the 
loss of pension rights. 42 
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In Britain a director of Pilkington's candidly commented that the 
supplementary [pension] fund controlled and 
contributed to by the company... was useful in the 
[1926] general strike. Benefits were automatically 
forefeited but men were regstated with one shilling 
per week less pension rights. 
Situatiöns such as this prompted Brandeis to'condemn occupational pension 
plans as a "form of strike insurance", which rob the worker of "his remaining 
industrial liberty". 44 
The lack 'of adequate vesting provisions have therefore served a 
variety of economic, ' ideological and social control functions. The 
complexities and implications of inadequate vesting standards are examined 
more fully in the following section and, in turn, are related to the problem 
of portability. 
4.3.2 Legislative Background. Legislation establishing an 
employee's legal right on termination to a non-forfeitable deferred pension 
at retirement was only recently introduced in Canada, Britain and, the 
United States. Vested deferred pensions, based on an age and/or service 
requirement, which protect an employee's accrued pension, were not a 
legislative requirement in Canada until the passage of the Ontario Pension 
Benefits Act 1965. Other jurisdictions subsequently followed suited. 
45 In 
the United Kingdom it was not until the Social Security Act 1973 that 
preserved (deferred) pensions for "early leavers" were guaranteed in law; the 
U. S. Employee Retirement Income Security Act 1974 for the first time 
introduced statutory vesting provisions in the private sector. The right of a 
plan member to an irrevocable pension on termination of employment, based 
on employer and employee contributions (in the case of a contributory plan), 
is thus relatively recent. There are no legislative requirements concerning 
the portability or transferability of pension entitlements between employers. 
A longitudinal comparison of the proportion of occupational 
pension plans in the U. S., U. K. and Canada between 1938 and 1980 without 
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vesting provisions is outlined in Table 4.6. A number of considerations may 
be noted. Prior to the introduction of regulatory legislation in these 
countries, nearly 30 to 90 per cent of all pension plans had no provision 
whatsoever for vested deferred pensions. This effectively meant that any 
employee terminating employment prior to retirement would lose his 
pension entitlement. The data would suggest as well that there has been a 
considerable difference in the evolution of vesting standards in the U. S. and 
U. K. in one instance, and Canada in another. This is explained by the 
different attitude towards government regulation of business activity in 
each of these countries. The subsequent introduction of statutory vesting 
standards in the mid-1960s and 1970s has resulted in considerable 
improvement in vesting requirements in occupational pension plans. 
Gauging the adequacy of vesting provisions in terms of pension plans, 
however, is misleading since the relevant criterion is the proportion of 
employees who have satisfied these requirements. The most recent 
information indicates that even after legislative intervention in the U. S. 
(1974) and U. K. (1973), 52 and 25 per cent of pension plan members 
respectively were still not vested, particularly in the private sector. 
The implications of inadequate vesting standards, particularly in 
the case of the U. K. and the U. S., will not become evident until some 30 to 
50 years in the future when benefits from occupational pension schemes fail 
to materialize because employees never satisfied these vesting 
requirements. This consideration is especially relevant for the U. K. and 
U. S., where as late as the early 1970s, 66 to 90 per cent of all pension plans 
did not have any vesting provision. The data suggest that the biggest 
"pension losers" will be the large "baby-boom" generation who will suffer a 
loss of retirement income from the private pension system. A corollary is 
that this cohort of future elderly will have to rely on tax-based state 
retirement income programs as a result of this limitation of the . private 
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pension system, thus exacerbating the fiscal cost associated with an aging 
population.. Even in an ideal world with immediate vesting, however, there 
would be a loss of retirement income to occupational pension plan members 
because of limited portability (transferability) arrangements and the 
inadequacy of deferred vested pensions. 
4.3.3 Deferred Vested Pensions. Improvements in statutory 
vesting standards are only a partial solution to the problem of the 
preservation of pension entitlements, because the value of a deferred vested 
pension depends upon three factors: the preserved value of the deferred 
benefit from the time of termination of employment to receipt of the 
benefit at retirement age, length of service to accrue pension credits, and 
final salary or earnings at the time of retirement. The interaction of these 
factors, concurrent with inadequate portability arrangements, limits the 
viability of deferred (preserved) pensions as a source of retirement income. 
In the first instance, especially in the case of Canada and the 
U. S., the value of deferred vested pensions paid by occupational pension 
plans at the time of termination are not upgraded or revalued in accordance 
with either the price or earnings index during the deferral period. An 
individual who severs his employment has the value of his deferred pension 
eroded over the long-term, both in absolute and relative terms, as a result 
of increases in inflation and the gross national product. In Britain, 
preserved benefits in schemes which have "contracted-out" of the state 
pension plan must be revalued up to the guaranteed minimum pension 
(GMP). 46 Such a revaluation is not required of schemes which remain 
"contracted-in" to the state earnings-related plan or benefits that are in 
excess of the GMP for plans which "contract-out". Therefore, a mobile 
worker, even if covered by an occupational pension plan, and successfully 
vested, could in theory receive as many as six separate deferred partial 
pensions, all of which would be eroded by inflation over the pre-retirement 
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deferral period. This would result in limited retirement income actually 
being received. 
Second, even if there were rigorous statutory vesting standards, 
without the full portability (transferability) of pension entitlements the sum 
of two deferred vested pensions for a person is not the same as that which 
would have been generated with the same years of service had that person 
remained with the same employer until retirement age. With pension 
arithemetic, the whole is not equal to the sum of the parts because a 
deferred vested pension, under a defined benefit pension plan, is calculated 
on the basis of the number of years of service times the salary of the person 
at the time of termination, rather than on the basis of the salary at 
retirement. A person taking a deferred vested pension foregoes any 
increase in salary between termination and retirement, thereby reducing the 
salary base upon which the pension is calculated. 
The illustration presented in 'Table 4.7 demonstrates the 
limitations associated with deferred vested (preserved) pensions under 
current private pension system arrangements. As a result of the 
interrelationship between the length of service to accrue pension benefits 
and the lower salary on termination when vested, two people with the same 
total pensionable service would have a difference, of 47 per cent in their 
pension benefit at the time of retirement. According to a 1981. U. K. 
Occupational Pensions Board study, "early leavere' who change jobs receive 
a pension which is 40 to 60 per cent less, depending upon the assumptions 
used, than a "stayer" even if the total years of pensionable employment 
were the same. 
47 For "early leavers" the problem is compounded by the 
erosion of the vested pension over the deferral period as a result of inflation. 
This example also serves to emphasize, as well, the need for 
portability arrangements between employers. The interrelationship between 
inadequate vesting provisions and limited portability arrangements results in 
-115- 
TABLE 4.7 
COMPARISON OF PENSION BENEFIT 
RECEIVED BY AN EARLY LEAVER AND STAYER 
UNDER A DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION PLAN' 
PROVIDING A DEFERRED VESTED BENEFIT, CANADA, 1978 
Employment Unit Credit Years Pension 
Pattern (Accrual Rate/Yr. ) x of Service x Salary = Benefit 
Worker A 
Individual 
remains in 
service of 
same employer. 2% x 35 years x $57,6442, = $40,351 
Worker B 
Individual 
changes 
employment 
at age 45 2% x 15 years x $14,9003 
(4,4704 vested5) 
2% x 20 years x $57,6442 = $23,058 
Total $27,528 
Notes: 1. In a defined benefit pension plan the benefit is equal to the 
accrual rate x years of service x salary. 
Assumptions: Entrance age 30 and works for 35 years. 
Salary at age 45 is the 1978 average industrial wage 
of $14,900. 
Salary at age 65 is $57,644. 
Salary increase assumption of 7 per cent a year, 
based on Department of National Revenue and the 
Ontario Pension Commission's regulation of a maximum 
1 percentage point spread on a maximum 6 per cent 
interest rate assumption, then in existence. 
2. Final salary at time of retirement. 
3. Salary at time of termination with deferred vested pension. 
4. Deferred benefit not revalued or increased to either the price or 
earnings index. 
5. Assuming the "45 and 10" rule. 
a significant number of small partial deferred pensions being generated from 
the private pension system. A consequence of inadequate vesting-standards 
is the low "take-up" rate for full benefits received by occupational pension 
plan members. This "leakage" from the private pension system represents 
lost retirement income to plan members. - 
4.3.4 Receipt of Occup ational Pension Benefits. What is of 
significance from a social policy perspective in terms of assessing the 
private pension system is the level and distribution of actual pension 
benefits received by plan members. Determining the "take-up" rate - that 
is, the proportion of actual pension benefit receipients to occupational 
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pension plan members - is ' one way to evaluate the social utility of the 
private pension plan system as a delivery mechanism for retirement 
income. The best available evidence suggests that there is a low "take-up" 
rate and a high level of "leakage" from the private pension system. The 
significance of - this is that a. high , proportion of those covered by an 
occupational pension plan never in fact receive a pension at retirement. 
This is directly attributable to the current poor vesting requirements and 
limited portability arrangements "associated with the employer-based private 
pension system. 
Studies for the United States, Britain, and Canada between 1944 
and 1977 have established that only 10 to 54 per cent of those covered by an 
occupational pension plan ever received a retirement benefit. 
48 To date, 
remedial legislative intervention would appear to have had only a modest 
effect. After the passage of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
1974 the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Pension Rights Centre 
estimated that only 33 to 45 per cent of all occupational pension plan 
members would ever receive a retirement benefit.. As late as 1979 only 48 
per cent of all full-time employees in private sector pension plans in the 
U. S. had acquired vested pension rights. 
49 In Britain, Altmann's 
quantitative study, 
'based 
on Family Expenditure Survey (FES) data, 
determined that in the period between 1970 and 1975 the mean probability 
of receipt of an occupational pension plan benefit for men aged 65 and over 
was only 54 per cent. 
50 In Canada, a 1973 study undertaken by the Regie 
des Rentes du Quebec, (Quebec Pension Board) found that only 3.1 per cent 
of all private pension plan "leavers' would have satisfied the statutory "45 
and 10" vesting rule. A 1977 Health and Welfare Canada survey determined 
that only 53 per cent of male and 28 per cent of female pension plan 
members ever actually received a retirement benefit. All of these studies 
indicated a strong positive relationship between length of employment with 
the same employer and actual receipt of pension benefits at retirement. 
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These data confirm that there is a low "take-up" rate for benefits 
by occupational pension plan members. Conversely, there is a high level of 
"leakage", or lost benefits, from the private pension system. Limited 
employer-based pension plan coverage, coupled with inadequate vesting 
requirements, 'explains the low proportion of retirement income received by 
the elderly from the private pension system. 
4.3.5 Relationship between Coverage, Vesting and Benefits. The 
proportion of those over retirement age who have actually received a 
retirement pension from the private pension system, given current 
arrangements, is limited. The data reported in Table 4.8 indicates that in 
Canada in 1979 only 38 per cent of the current elderly were in receipt of 
occupational pension plan benefits. The increase in the proportion of those 
in receipt of pension benefits between 1972 and 1979 reflects the growth of 
employer-sponsored pension plan coverage in the preceding thirty-five year 
TABLE 4.8 
PRIVATE PENSION PLAN RECIPIENT$, 1 
AS A PERCENTAGE OF ELDERLY, 
CANADA, 1969 AND 1972-1979 
Private Pension Plan 
Private Pension No. Age 65 
(000)3 dO 
Recipients 
% f Eld l Year Plan Receipients ver an as a o er y 
1969 392,525 1,671 '23.5 
1972 552,504 1,801 30.7 
1973 614,986 1,858 33.1 
1974 672,027 1,915 35.1 
1975 699,711 1,972 35.5 
1976 738,229" 2,029 35.4 
1977 759,096 2,086 36.4 
1978 813,922 2,143 37.9 
1979 828,993 2,200 37.7 
Notes: 1. Total of all pension benefits (reti rement, disability 
and survivors ) paid, including full and partial 
retirement benefits. 2. Those over ag e 65. 
3. Extrapolated between census years. 
Source s: Statistics Cana da, Social Security, National Programs" 
1978 (Ottawa: 
A T 19781 bl 
Minister ce. 
174 P sion Pla St C s ti ti d , , a e p. ; a cs a s en n na a, in Canada, 1980 (Ottawa, Minister of Suppl 
, Table XXX, p. 98 and information supplied to the author by Statistics Canada,. Pension 
Section, July 1 982. 
-118- 
period, and does not necessarily imply that there has been an improvement 
in the "take-up" rate for benefits. Indeed, the levelling off of occupational 
pension plan membership in recent years, as previously noted, would suggest 
that the proportion of elderly in receipt of employer-sponsored pension plan 
benefits may not significantly increase in the future. 
There are strong reasons to believe that occupational pension plan 
receipients as a proportion of the elderly, however, are statistically over 
reported. First, the number of pensions paid, = as reported by Statistics 
Canada, include all pension benefits- retirement, disability and 
survivors. 51 More complete data for the U. S. and U. K. indicate that only 
20 and 32 per cent respectively of the current elderly, are in receipt of 
retirement (partial or -full) benefits from--the private- pension system. 
Second, current, vesting provisions coupled with high labour market mobility 
result in a large number of small partial deferred pensions being paid out, 
rather than robust full pensions. 
52 The data with respect to the number 
of pension benefit receipients in Canada does not differentiate between full 
or partial pensions paid out or received. This results in a further statistical 
overstatement of the total number of pension receipients, since each may be 
receiving a number of small partial deferred pensions. 
Inadequate vesting standards, and the problems associated --with 
partial deferred, pensions, are compounded by - the lack of portability, or 
transferability, of pension entitlements; between employers. This further 
reduces the effectiveness of the private pension system. 
tF. 
4.4 Limited Portability Arrangements 
Vesting and portability of pension entitlements are integrally 
related. The vesting problem is in the final analysis a portability or 
transferability problem. Portability is another form of vesting since it 
ensures the necessary continuity of service required to qualify for a 
deferred vested pension upon retirement. According to the Federal Task 
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Force on Retirement Income Policy, as little as 49 per cent of a person's 
working years would count towards pensionable service given current labour 
market mobility and the "45 and 10" vesting rule in most jurisdictions. 
53 
One recent technical study based on computer simulations concluded that 
"vesting, which takes the form of a deferred pension, is much less 
effective... than is full portability, which allows pension credits to be 
transferred from one private plan to another. '"54 
If a person changes employment several times before retirement, 
and is unable to make transfers of either pension contributions or benefits 
when vested, he will be forced to collect pension payments from several 
different pension plans at retirement. This explains the large number of 
partial deferred pensions, rather than full pensions, generated by the private 
pension system. More importantly, without the transferability of pension 
entitlements a person may not remain on any one job long enough to satisfy 
the vesting requirements in order to benefit from the contributions made on 
his behalf by an employer. Indeed, it is entirely possible, given labour 
market mobility, that a person might be covered by a pension plan on every 
job and never qualify (vest) for a deferred pension. This is because the lack 
of portability breaks the continuity of service necessary to satisfy the 
vesting requirements. 
55 Even if he should satisfy the vesting 
requirements for a deferred pension on successive jobs, however, the 
retirement income accruing from different private pension plans would not 
be as great as that generated from one occupational pension plan, as 
previously shown in Table 4.7, and would be eroded by inflation until 
retirement age. 
Portability allows the transfer of either pension contributions or 
benefits under a defined benefit plan, from the pension fund of one employer 
to the fund of another in respect of an employee whose employment is 
terminated with the first and finds employment with the second. This is 
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transferability in a literal sense. While transferability arrangements are 
relatively common in the public and para-public sectors in Britain, Canada 
and the U. S., portability between pension plans in the private sector is quite 
rare. This is because, while portability in theory can be arranged between 
different employer-sponsored pension plans, there are numerous technical 
difficulties arising from the valuation of contributions or benefits, differing 
benefit formulas, contribution levels, actuarial assumptions and funding 
ratios between "importing" and "exporting" pension plans. To resolve the 
portability problem would require either a central pension agency under 
public or private sector control to facilitate transferability, or improved 
vesting standards coupled with the indexation (preservation) of deferred 
pensions. 
The current lack of portability arrangements compounds the 
problems associated with inadequate vesting requirements and limited 
occupational pension plan coverage. The combined interaction of these 
factors helps to explain why such a low proportion of the elderly's income is 
derived from the private pension system. Remedial action to ameliorate 
these problems would not in itself, however, be sufficient to provide 
economic security for the elderly because the income generated from the 
private pension system is eroded by inflation in the retirement period. 
4.5 The Erosion of Retirement Income 
Inflation hurts those on fixed incomes such as pensioners. 
Pensioners are caught in a fixed income-price spiral squeeze. ,A necessary 
condition for, maintaining an adequate level of retirement income is the 
preservation of real purchasing power in the retirement period. 
Post-retirement income must be increased to offset inflation in order to 
maintain its real value. Such arrangements under state and occupational 
pension plans are referred to as "indexation", "escalation" or 
"inflation-proofing". The lack of inflation-proofing for employer-based 
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occupational pension plans, particularly in the private sector, has become all 
the more apparent because of the prolonged period of inflation experienced 
in North America and Western Europe during the 1970s. 
4.5.1 The Problem. In Canada between 1971 and 1981 the average 
annual inflation rate was 7.8 per cent, ranging from a low of 2.9 per cent in 
1971 to a high of 12.5 per cent in 1981.56 The United States and Britain 
have experienced similar, and often higher, levels of inflation. Such a long 
term inflationary, climate has serious ramifications on the operation and 
solvency of occupational pension plans, as well as for the economic position 
of the elderly. 
The inflation rate of the past decade has seriously eroded the 
value of occupational pension plan benefits, both those in pay and deferred 
(vested) pensions. At a constant inflation rate of 8 per cent a-year, the 
average retired person will see the purchasing power of his or her 
occupational pension eroded by. 65 to 75 per cent respectively during the 
57 
retirement period. By way of example, the average annual private 
pension paid in Canada in 1970 was $1,734. By 1981 it was worth only $732, 
or 58 per cent of its original value.. For a young person with a deferred 
vested pension payable at age 65, its value at retirement may be virtually 
zero. Inflation has similarly resulted in a deterioration of the, economic 
position of those covered by occupational pension schemes in Britain. 
58 In 
economic and human terms it is the elderly who are the most vulnerable to 
inflation. Inflation compounds the elderly's economic impoverishment and 
social marginalization. 
4.5.2 Pensioner Indices and Expenditure Patterns. Industrial 
nations in the late 1950s began to adjust social security retirement programs 
by indexing benefit levels to changes in price or wage movements. 
59 This 
raised the issue of which index was most appropriate for inflation-proofing 
-122- 
pensions, or whether a Pensioners Index should be, constructed to reflect the 
special expenditure patterns of the elderly. 
In Canada, for example, it has been argued that the "Consumer 
Price Index is not the right measure for indexing pensions' because "the 
basket of goods and services on which the C. P. I. is based does not represent 
typical expenditures of [those] over 65: '60 Private pension industry 
representatives in Canada have promoted the construction of a special 
pensioner's index in an attempt to justify the partial rather than the full 
indexation of retirement benefits 
61 Presently only the Federal Republic 
of Germany and Britain have a special consumer price index for retired 
persons. In Britain, however, this index is not used to adjust state social 
security benefits for inflation. 
62 Currently neither the Canadian nor U. S. 
governments have published an official Pensioner's Index. The evidence for 
the U. K. between 1962 and 1968 indicates that the Pensioner's Index rose 
nearly 4 percentage points more than did the general price index; 
63 
between 1970 and 1980 there was less than I percentage point 
difference. 64 In the United States empirical studies indicate that 
between 1970 and 1977 "'prices' for the aged increased 3% to 4% faster than 
the CPI"65 because inflation had a disproportionate effect on those items 
which are weighted heavily in the elderly's budget. 
The elderly spend considerably more on basic necessities such as 
food, fuel and housing than do general households, and marginally more on 
services. The impact of these different expenditure' patterns is dependent 
on both the rate of price increase and the absolute price level. In recent 
years the major expenditure components of 'pensioner household budgets 
have experienced above average price increases. The elderly's expenditure 
patterns, based on U. S. and British data, differ considerably from those of 
the general population. It does not follow, - however, -that their pecuniary 
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needs are any less as is asserted by some representatives of the private 
pension industry. 66 
Generally consumption patterns are established on the basis of a 
budget constraint. Expenditure patterns reflect the allocation of income 
within a given finite budget. The elderly cannot negotiate wage increases 
they cannot 'raise the prices of their goods and services. Their maintain 
alternative is to cut costs, that is reduce their standard of living. The 
budget constraint faced by the elderly results in a substitution effect within 
their budget from non-essentials to basics, such as margerine Ifor butter or 
fuel and housing for durable goods and amenities. Inflation reinforces the 
substitution effect because it is precisely those heavily weighted basic 
components of the elderly's budget such as food, fuel, housing and services 
which have experienced the most rapid rate of. price increase in recent 
years. The indexation of state and occupational pension plan benefits, is 
necessary, therefore, to . maintain the elderly's standard of 
living in -an 
inflationary climate. 
4.5.3 Indexation of Occupational Pension Plans. The private 
pension system, provides only limited protection against inflation. As is 
reported in Table 4.9,40 to 87 per cent of all occupational pension plan 
members in Britain, Canada and the U. S. have no automatic indexation of 
post-retirement pension benefits to offset inflation. Only 6 to 21 per cent 
of all plan members have automatic escalation to cover the full increase in 
the consumer price index. The lack of formal indexation provisions, 
particularly in the private sector, reflects the reluctance of employers to 
assume an open-ended financial commitment to protect their former 
employees from inflation. 
The automatic indexation of post-retirement pension benefits is 
far more common in the public sector than in private industry. In Canada 65 
per cent of public employee pension plan members are covered by full or 
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TABLE 4.9 
INDEXED 
PENSION PLANS 
BY MEMBERS COVERED, 
CANADA, U. K., AND U. S., 1977 - 1980 
Automatic % of Members Covered 
Indexation Provision Canada U. K. U. S. 
Full Indexing to 
Consumer Price Index 21.1 - 5.9 
Partial Indexing 10.4 60.0 7.3 
No Indexing 68.5 40.0 86.8 
Sources: Statistics Canada, Pension Plans in Canada, 1980 
(Ottawa: Minister OT Supply and Services , 1982), Text Table XXV, p. 58; Government Actuary, Occupational 
Pension Schemes, 1979 - Sixth Survey (London. #NSO, 
1981). IaDle 10.1. p. So . survey by Hay-Huggins cited in Robert Myers, Indexation of Pension 
and Other Benefits (Homewood, Ill.: 
le 13, p. 123. 
partial indexing, compared ' with only 5 per cent of private sector plan 
members. 
67 While only 7 per cent of U. S. private sector pension plans had 
automatic cost of living adjustments, the Federal civil service and half of 
all state and local retirement systems index, post-retirement benefits. 
68 
Pensions in Britain were adjusted for inflation as early as , 
1803. This was 
subsequently formalized in the Pensions (Increase) Act 1920 covering the 
entire ' public sector, with the exception of ` nationalized industry. 
69 
, In 
Britain in 1979,85 per cent of all public sector pension plan members'-were 
covered by the Pension (Increase) -Acts, while less than 25 per cent of 
private sector plan members had automatic indexation arrangements. 
70 
An uniquely British approach to inflation-proofing 'pension 
benefits was introduced under the Social Security Pensions Act 1975. Where 
an employer-based occupational pension scheme "contracts-out" of the state 
earnings-related pension system, government assumes the open-ended 
commitment to -index- (preserve) deferred and retirement pensions. Under 
the 1975 legislation, the state social security system assumed the cost of 
indexing the guaranteed minimum pension (GMP) for "contracted-out" plans, 
up to the level of the earnings-related state plan. Any, pension benefit in 
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excess of the GMP is not indexed. 
71 What this means Is that private 
corporations have externalized the cost of post-retirement indexation to the 
state, ` thereby creating a socialized cost of production borne by those who 
have remained in the earnings-related state plan and tax-paying workers not 
covered-by an occupational pension scheme. The -state, inflation-proofing 
"contracted-out" schemes has resulted in' a considerable tax loss to the 
central government. 
The private sector in these countries has chosen to rely on 
discretionary periodic increases to retirement benefits as a way in which to 
limit the open-ended liability' and cost associated with inflation-proofing. 
While the number " of private sector occupational pension plans making 
periodic adjustments for inflation has increased in recent -years these 
adjustments in most instances, however, have only offset "a portion of the 
increase in the cost of living to pensioners. In Canada'and Britain, for 
example, two-thirds of all private sector plans have made ad hoc payments 
covering at least 50 per cent of the increase in inflation, 
72 
as compared 
with 31 per cent of ' plans in the U. S. 
73 Periodic adjustments, as distinct 
from automatic indexation, provide only a limited and partially effective 
mechanism to protect the elderly's standard of ý living because they are 
discretionary. For a corporation, such payments are 'made from current 
operating expenditures, thus avoiding the advanced funding often associated 
with automatic indexation. Periodic adjustments are a known cost while 
automatic indexation represents an open-ended liability inasmuch as the 
actual rate of inflation is only known with certainty after the fact. 
The private pension system's limited inflation-proofing of 
retirement benefits stands in marked contrast to that provided for under 
state social security retirement arrangements. Most state social security 
retirement systems index benefits. In 1975 a total of 33 countries had some 
form of benefit escalation, most using the price index, some the general 
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wage index and -others the minimum wage. 
74 Basic pension benefits 
provided by the state retirement system in Canada, Britain and the United 
States are all indexed to the Consumer (or Retail) Price Index. 
Indexation to the Consumer Price Index (CPI or Retail Price 
Index) maintains the absolute purchasing power of state retirement benefits, 
and the elderly's standard of living, but it does not allow older people to 
share in any increase in national wealth. Therefore the relative value of 
these benefits is not protected and the elderly's standard of living declines 
in relation to the employed labour force.. Indexation to the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) maintains absolute purchasing power, but escalation to the 
average industrial wage (AIW) is necessary in order to maintain the elderly's 
relative economic position75 compared with that of the, active labour 
force. Politically, . the indexation of social security retirement benefits to 
increases in the, average industrial wage has the effect of linking the 
elderly's fortunes to those of the actively employed labour force. This tends 
to prevent the exacerbation of sectional Interests between the actively 
employed and pensioners. 
The International Labour Organization in assessing the indexation 
features of state social security retirement programs noted that 
market economy countries have found that the impact 
of inflation and... remedies can differ between... 
pension systems operating under state social security 
programmes and usually financed on a pay-as-you-go 
basis and ... occupational pensions... 
Lwhichl commonly 
are funded schemes, so that they are vulnerable to a 
rate of it lation higher than the yield from - 
investments. 
This has meant that state retirement income systems have been used for the 
difficult parts of social security programming such as income adequacy and 
inflation-proofing, while the employer-based private pension system has 
played a residual role. 
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4.5.4 The Politics of Indexation. In Canada and Britain there has 
been a similar response by government to singling out the indexation 
features of state and public employee pension plans as a major issue to be 
dealt with as a result of the current international recession. The 
international social -security crisis in advanced capitalist countries77 is 
merely a reflection of the deeper underlying international economic crisis 
which has generated a similar ' neo-conservative monetarist response in 
terms of "crisis management". 
The indexation' of public employee pension arrangements has 
provoked a vitriolic attack by the corporate sector and the private pension 
industry in Canada and Britain. In Canada, as a result of pressure from the 
private pension industry and its lobby group, the National Citizens! 
Coalition, the federal Liberal government was forced in 1978 to commission 
an independent review of the indexed federal civil service pension. 
78 
Some four years later a major reduction in the civil service pension plan's 
indexation feature was implemented. A similar review was carried out in 
1980 by. Britain's Conservative government. 
79 It remains a fact, however, 
that in most industrialized countries public employee pension plans remain 
indexed, 80 although they have been subjected to severe political pressures 
in recent years. The indexation of state social security retirement benefits 
has come under similar pressure. In Canada the federal Liberal government 
in 1982 temporarily limited the inflation-proofing of the flat-rate old age 
security pension (OAS), and Britain's Conservative government altered the 
formula indexing state retirement benefits. The Reagan administration in 
the U. S. has threatened at various times to reduce or eliminate the 
indexation feature of social security retirement benefits. 
The private pension industry was forced to strike out against the 
example of state and public sector pension plan indexation because it served 
as a "demonstration effect" for private sector workers, as well as raising the 
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expectations of pensioners. In addition, the lack of private sector 
indexation forced a more general critical evaluation of employer-based 
pension plans and the private pension system. The private pension industry 
in these countries proceeded by deliberately cultivating the politics of envy 
between private and public sector workers. It did so in the hope of 
exacerbating the sectional differences between public and private sector 
employees, and to create a public backlash or. "taxpayers revolt". The 
private sector's and pension industry's attack on inflation-proofing of 
retirement benefits has centered on cost considerations. 
4.5.5 Micro vs. Macro Cost of Indexation. The indexation of post 
retirement pension income is a fundamental issue of public policy. Central 
to this debate are the cost estimates associated with indexation. There is a 
very real difference between the way in which actuaries and economists 
conceptualize the cost of employer-sponsored pension indexation. Some 
actuarial consultants have suggested that inflation-proofing has "staggering" 
cost implications, 
81 increasing the cost of the scheme by as much as 8 per 
cent for every I per cent of additional pension income. 
82 Economists 
tend to view pension indexation as having a neutral cost impact. The 
alternative cost estimates for the indexation of post-retirement benefits are 
a result of different types of analyses. Actuaries use a micro-economic 
analysis to arrive at their cost estimates, while economists bring a 
macro-economic perspective to the subject. 
Actuaries who represent the interests of their corporate clients 
must of necessity be interested in the economic position of the firm, 
particularly as it relates to the advanced funding requirements of pension 
plans. There are, from an actuary's point of view, especially in the private 
sector, essentially two considerations. First, what, if any, liabilities will 
accure to the pension plan and individual firm as a result of " indexation? 
This is a crucial concern because in an inflationary environment, where the 
-129- 
real rate of return on investment to the pension fund is less than the 
inflation rate, the plan sponsor in the case of a defined benefit plan is 
required to make up the shortfall with additional contributions to guarantee 
the solvency of the plan. Second, from a micro-economic perspective, what 
are the effects of indexation costs on the cash flow and profit position of 
the firm? For the individual firm the short-term profit horizon forces it to 
view funding requirements as a paramount concern. It is the cash outlay 
today, rather than its relationship to macro-economic"' indicators in the 
future, which will affect its immediate profit position. ' It' may be argued, 
however, that under conditions of monopoly capitalism associated with the 
giant corporation as described by Baran and Sweezy, 83 where the large 
firm is stable over the long run as a result oligopolistic market conditions 
and "profit-targeting", that the cost associated with indexation would be. 
incorporated into targeted profit levels. Profit margins would then be 
adjusted accordingly to absorb the cost of pension indexation over the 
long-term. 
Economists in general bring a macro-economic perspective to the 
issue. The cost associated with the indexation of pension benefits is 
affected at the macro-economic level over the long-term by increases in 
inflation, productivity and economic growth. The indexation of pension 
benefits at the macro-economic level involves a change in the allocation of 
resources rather than an increased allocation as such. ' The - Economic 
Council of Canada summarized the major flaw `of actuarial cost estimates 
for pension indexation by stating that, 
some of the doom-and-gloom predictions about the 
repercussions of indexation derive from a failure to 
make proper comparisons; they project pensions in 
inflated (future) dollars while projecting GNP in terms 
of today's prices. 
Preserving the real purchasing power of 
retirement pensions... will not "bankrupt" the 
Canadian economy. No more real resources are 
required for price-indexed pensions in an inflationary 
environment than for unindexed pensions in a 
non-inflationary environment. 84 
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Based on this macro-economic approach, some economists have estimated 
that over the next fifty years only an additional 0.5 per cent of gross 
national product (GNP) would be required to provide for the full indexation 
of all pension benefits. 
85 
In the real world, however, the macro-and-micro- economic levels 
are interrelated and cannot be isolated from one another., This is because, 
the indexation of pension benefits does present 
problems for... firms; inflation pushes up benefit 
liabilities and pushes down the value of pension fund 
investment. 
Industry looks at it from the viewpoint of 
individual pension plan sponsors, who fear that pension 
costs ry... adversely affect their competitive 
position. 
The different cost estimates for pension indexation resulting from a micro 
or macro-economic perspective offers a classic example of what Baran 
meant when he identified capitalism's primary contradiction as being 
between "micro-sense and macro-madness'. 
87 The operation of capitalist 
economies are interpenetrated by and interdependent on corporate 
behaviour. Conversely, corporate behaviour is bounded by the operation and 
imperatives of a capitalist economy. As a result there are structural 
limitations preventing an individual private sector firm from 
inflation-proofing retirement benefits. 
4.5.6 The Limits to Indexation. In terms of the functioning of the 
private pension system and the indexation of retirement benefits, the 
micro-economics of the firm are related to the macro-economic structure 
of capitalism through financial markets. It is the operation of the capital 
market which imposes the ultimate external constraint on the individual 
corporation's ability to inflation-proof pension benefits at the 
micro-economic level. 
The ability of private sector pension plans to provide 
inflation-proofing is related to the real rate of return that can be earned by 
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private pension funds. This exogenous constraint imposed by the broader 
macro-economy poses three portfolio management alternatives for the 
individual private sector pension plan sponsor with respect to indexing 
benefits. Those alternatives can be summarized, as follows 
1. If the rate of return on investment adequately reflects the 
rate of inflation, private pension plans can afford to pay 
indexed pension benefits. 
2. To the extent that the rate of return only partially reflects 
the rate of inflation, the pension fund ., can only afford to 
partially index pensions. 
3. Where the rate of return on investment is zero or less than 
the rate of inflation, the pension fund cannot afford the 
indexation of pensions. 
It is the real rate of return (the nominal rate of return adjusted for 
inflation) to the pension fund which serves as the primary structural 
limitation to the indexation of pension benefits for private sector 
corporations. 
Over the past two decades pension fund investment performance 
has at best been inauspicious. In Canada between 1961 and 1975 the real 
average annual rate of return on investment for all trusteed (non-insured) 
occupational pension plans was 0.72 per cent; 
88 during the late 1970s 
pension funds were earning a real rate of return of -2.88 per cent. 
89 
British pension fund investment performance, has fared little better. 
Between 1965 and 1975 the real annual rate of return averaged. 0.6 per 
cent. 90 A 1980 survey bluntly stated that "there seems little doubt that 
practically every pension fund is now operating on a negative rate of return, 
and has been doing so for some years. "91 For defined benefit pension 
plans 'in an inflationary environment, poor investment performance has 
resulted in shortfalls (unfunded liabilities and experience deficiencies) 
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requiring additional cash-flow contributions by corporate plan sponsors. 
Money purchase (defined contribution) pension plans have performed 
little 
better. The collapse of the equity market in the early 1970s meant that 
stocks were no longer the hedge against inflation they were once touted to 
be. Poor investment performance, where the real rate of return has been 
equal to or below the inflation rate, has simultaneously meant that the cost 
of pension arrangements has increased for corporate plan sponsors and has 
limited their ability to inflation-proof benefits for pensioners. 
In order for occupational pension plans to insulate the real value 
of their members' benefits from inflation and remain actuarially sound 
would require that pension plans have "access to an asset whose real return 
is unaffected by inflation. "92 Such an asset does not exist. The inability 
of the private pension system to protect the absolute and relative standard 
of living of pensioners is systemically limited and unsolvable as long as the 
indexation of post-retirement income remains tied to the real rate of return 
on investment, instead of wage or price movements. 
4.6 Implications of the Private Pension System's Limitations 
The universal limitations of the employer-based private pension 
system in Canada, Britain and the United States are limited coverage, 
inadequate vesting (preservation) standards, restricted portability 
(transferability) arrangements, and the lack of inflation-proofing for 
retirement benefits. These limitations are mutually interactive and explain 
the low proportion of income derived by the current elderly from the private 
pension 'system. This in turn necessitates the elderly's reliance upon the 
state pension system and tax-based "safety net" programs. The inadequacies 
of the occupational pension system will have important repercussions as well 
for the future elderly., 
The universal limitations of the private pension system in Canada, 
Britain and the U. S. can be summarized as follows. Currently only 40 to 50 
-133- 
per cent of the total labour force is covered by an employer-sponsored 
occupational pension plan; 48 to 55 per cent of the paid labour force is 
covered by a private pension plan. The private pension system is 
characterized by limited, selective and uneven coverage reflecting the 
stratification of the work force in the capitalist labour market. 
93 
Pension plan coverage through the private pension system is related to and 
limited by the structure of the capitalist labour market, the organization of 
production, and the work process. There are significant variations with 
respect to employer-sponsored pension plan coverage according to income, 
occupation, ' industry, size of enterprise, labour force attachment and 
sex. 
94 Coverage is highly concentrated in large enterprises and 
bureaucratic organizations and is unevenly distributed between the private 
and public sectors. Occupational pension plan coverage is particularly 
limited in the private sector. 
Vesting requirements are the crucial link between occupational 
pension plan coverage and actual receipt of pension benefits at retirement. 
Vesting establishes an employee's irrevocable right to a deferred pension 
upon termination at retirement age. Inadequate vesting standards fulfill a 
number of economic and social functions including the reduction of pension 
and labour costs, and historically have served to reinforce labour discipline. 
The best available information suggests that inadequate vesting 
requirements, compounded by labour market mobility, have resulted in only 
10 to' 54 per cent of occupational pension plan members actually having 
received pension benefits upon retirement. This would indicate that there is 
a low "take-up" rate for employer-sponsored pension benefits by plan 
members, resulting in a considerable amount of "leakage" from the private 
pension system in the form of lost retirement income for those covered. 
Current vesting standards, particularly in Canada and the United States, do 
not take into account the reality of high labour market mobility. Vesting 
-134- 
provisions in the U. S. and U. K., prior to legislative intervention in the 
mid-1970s, were especially inadequate with 66 and 90 per cent of all 
employer-based pension plans respectively having no vesting requirements 
whatsoever. 
, The structural and technical problems associated with vesting 
standards and limited portability (transferability) arrangements, and the 
interaction between them, has resulted in lost benefits from the private 
pension system. The systemic barriers to adequate vesting standards and 
portability arrangements are intrinsic to the capitalist' labour market with 
its attendant mobility and the "anarchy of production" between competing 
units of capital- in product markets. Improved vesting (preservation) 
standards by themselves, without some type of central registry to facilitate 
portability (transferability) between employers, are insufficient due to the 
problems associated with deferred vested pensions on termination. 
Conversely, resolution of the portability problem would, however, solve the 
vesting issue because it would maintain the necessary continuity of service 
to establish entitlement to pension benefits. Full portability of pension 
entitlements is difficult to achieve, however, because of technical problems 
and the systemic barriers associated with the capitalist labour and product 
markets. As a result of the interaction between limited occupational 
pension plan coverage, inadequate vesting standards and portability 
arrangements, only 20 to 38 per cent of the elderly are currently receiving 
full or partial retirement benefits from the private pension system in these 
countries. 95 - 
Inflation significantly erodes occupational pension benefits in the 
post-retirement period as well as the value of deferred pensions. Currently 
only 6 to 21 per cent of all, occupational pension plan members have their 
benefits automatically indexed to the full increase in inflation. Indexation 
features- are especially deficient in the private sector, despite periodic 
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discretionary adjustments. In the private sector the automatic indexation of 
pension benefits represent an open-ended cost and liability to the corporate 
plan sponsor. The ability of private sector plan sponsors to inflation-proof 
deferred and retirement pensions is limited by the micro-economics of the 
firm and the relationship between the real rate of return on investment to 
the pension fund and the inflation rate externally imposed by the 
macro-economy. 
The universal limitations of the private pension system are 
central to the political economy of pensions. Based on the preceding 
analysis a number of implications can be identified. First, the inadequacies 
of occupational pension plans explain the low. proportion of income received 
by the current elderly from the private pension system. A corollary is that 
the deficiencies of the private pension system, in conjunction with the 
underdevelopment of the state retirement income system, have resulted in 
the economic immiseration and social marginalization of the elderly. 
Second, the limitations of employer-sponsored pension plans will 
have a major impact upon the large "baby boom" cohort of future elderly. 
To the extent that existent private pension arrangements are incapable of 
generating adequate retirement income for the total labour force it will 
mean that the future elderly will have to rely on the state pension system. 
The limitations of employer-based pension plans will not become apparent 
for another 30 to 50 years until a new and larger generation of elderly poor 
is created due to the aging of the population. Because of demographic 
aging, reliance upon the state retirement system may produce 
intergenerational and intersectoral fiscal tensions. 
A third, and important, implication is that as a result of these 
universal limitations the private pension system is not an efficient and 
cost-effective delivery, system for retirement income. The disadvantages of 
the private pension system must be compared with the advantages of the 
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public pension system. In Canada, Britain and the United States the state 
retirement income system's program features include: universal coverage 
for all wage and salary earners, immediate vesting, total portability of 
pension credits and the full indexation of benefits to the consumer price 
index. 
Fourth, under normal circumstances it requires 30 to 40 years for 
a pension system to mature, therefore, reform of both the public and private 
pension systems is required in the near term so as to be synchronized with 
the retirement of the "baby boom" generation. The failure to undertake 
pension reform in the short-term will result in limiting the available policy 
options in the long run. Reform of the private and/or state pension systems 
will impose additional costs upon the corporate sector and active labour 
force. The cost of pension reform, given existent socio-economic 
arrangements, may be expected to generate sectoral and sectional strains 
between and among the various pension actors - the elderly, state, corporate 
sector and unionized labour force - as each pursues it structurally 
determined interests. 
Fifth and last, the limitations of the private pension system have 
generated the politics of pension reform. This has evoked a highly polarized 
public policy debate with respect to the inadequacies of the private pension 
system. Reform of the employer-based occupational pension system may to 
some extent redress the current deficiencies identified in this chapter as 
they affect the future elderly, however, this will depend upon the realpolitik 
and success of pension reform in the short-term. Unless resolved in the 
near-term, the pension issue will become more politically volatile as the 
structural pressures increase and converge in the future. 
The elements of the political economy of pensions identified and 
analyzed thus far have included the impoverishment of the elderly, the 
economics of an aging population, and the limitations of the private pension 
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system. The universal limitations of employer-sponsored occupational 
pension plans affect the entire labour force. The specific limitations of the 
private pension system under conditions of collective bargaining, however, 
are of special importance and concern due to the impact upon cost, power 
and equity issues which affect the stability of the industrial relations system. 
CHAPTER 5 
THE LIMITATIONS 
OF THE PRIVATE PENSION SYSTEM 
UNDER CONDITIONS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
"Social security is not ... marginal to the main 
interests of the union... but is one of their most 
important fields of action. " 
Tony Lynes 
5.1 Introduction 
The universal limitations of the private pension system - limited 
coverge, inadequate vesting and transferability provisions and the lack of 
inflation-proofing - have been examined. In this chapter the limitations of 
the private pension system as they manifest themselves under conditions of 
collective bargaining are identified and investigated. Previously, the 
economic condition of the elderly, population aging and the general 
inadequacies of employer-based occupational pension plans were described 
as important elements of the political economy of pensions. Here the 
relationship between the industrial relations system and the political 
economy of pensions is established and analyzed. The central theme 
developed in this chapter is that the problems associated with the private 
pension system in Britain, Canada and the United States under conditions of 
collective bargaining will serve to heighten tensions in an already strained 
industrial relations system. The pension problem will have a destabilizing 
influence upon collective bargaining arrangements in the future because it 
impacts upon cost, power and equity issues. These considerations are 
central to any industrial relations system. 
The specific problems associated with the operation of the private 
employer-based occupational pension system under conditions of collective 
-139- 
bargaining manifest themselves through issues which structurally impact 
upon and undermine the stability of the industrial relations system. These 
factors are identified as follows: first, increasing total pension costs, 
especially those associated with the occupational pension system; second, a 
set of power related issues, particularly the absence of a bargaining agent's 
legal right to negotiate pensions, receive pension plan information and 
bargain post-retirement benefits; third, an equity issue arising from the lack 
of a mandatory benefit adjudication (grievance and arbitration) procedure to 
resolve disputes between pension plan members or beneficiaries and 
trustees; and fourth, the co-management of pensions under collective 
bargaining as a catalyst or "flash point" within the industrial relations 
system because issues related to control over pension capital, cost and 
equity converge into a "critical mass" in term of power relationships. 
5.2 Historical Background 
"The fringe benefit movement [was] basically a management 
movement, " according to Allen, and "unions took what they could get and 
made the best of it. 
" Prior to World War II the form and limits of 
welfare benefits were decided upon by management without negotiation or 
consultation with trade unions. Consequently, unions in North America, for 
ideological and organizational reasons, had a strong antipathy towards 
employer-sponsored welfare benefits and occupational pension plans. 
2 
Between 1870 and 1920, business unionism in North America established its 
hegemony, with the resultant bureaucratization of the labour 
movement. 
3 The ascendancy of industrial unionism in the 1940s witnessed 
the rise of labour leaders as the "new men of power". 
4 The expansion of 
the modern union as a welfare institution in the post-war period was a 
manifestation of this "social unionism" and increased the internal 
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rationalization and specialization of union functions as a response to a more 
complex bargaining environment. 
5 
From an historical perspective the introduction of employer 
sponsored welfare benefits served a series of interrelated ideological, 
organizational and labour market functions for the corporate sector. While 
there was no single historical cause for the introduction of employee 
benefits, certain common lines of development can be traced. Employee 
benefit programs served a multiplicity of purposes, including attracting a 
labour supply and reducing labour turnover, serving as an investment in 
human capital by improving the morale of the labour force, improving 
productivity and efficiency by rationalizing the human element in the work 
process, promoting loyalty , to the firm, preventing or forestalling 
unionization, preventing government intervention with respect to 
compulsory social insurance, maximizing the tax position of certain benefits 
by increasing non-taxable compensation to employees, minimizing the cost 
per, unit of benefit through group arrangements thereby compensating for 
imperfect individual knowledge of insurance markets, and creating a 
favourable corporate public relations image. 
Pensions assisted in promoting these general corporate 
objectives. Occupational pension plans were specifically introduced to 
remove elderly persons, who were generally viewed as "inefficient", from 
the production processes of modern industry and to eliminate patronage in 
the civil service; open channels of promotion for younger employees; 
compensate employers for recruitment and training costs should a worker 
terminate; and served as a social control function by making receipt * of 
pension benefits contingent upon "good and faithful service". Historically, 
employers attempted to maximize their control over welfare plans by 
making such payments discretionary. Conversely, workers and unions have 
attempted to minimize management control, viewing such benefits as being 
earned. 
-141- 
Employee benefits came to the fore as a subject of collective 
bargaining after World War II for a number of reasons. In the first instance, 
during World War II the "fringe benefit movement" was part of the wartime 
wage control program in Britain, Canada and the U. S. Employers were 
allowed, and encouraged, to substitute employee benefits such as paid 
vacations and occupational pensions for direct monetary compensation. 
Second, fringe benefits were permitted income tax deductibility status as a 
legitimate business expense. This served as an inducement to introduce 
employee benefit plans. Third, the 1949 U. S. National Labour Relations 
Board Inland Steel decision, and subsequent court decisions, deemed welfare 
and pension plans to be wages and therefore an appropriate and mandatory 
subject for collective bargaining. 
6 This served as a demonstration effect 
for Canadian employers who were often unionized by the same American 
based "international" union. Fourth, in the immediate post-war rounds of 
negotiations in the U. S., labour unions for the first time spearheaded a drive 
to negotiate health, welfare and retirement programs. Unions such as the 
United Mine Workers of America (UMWA), the United Auto Workers (UAW) 
and the United Steel Workers of America (USWA) became innovators in the 
field. Union negotiated employee benefit programs and occupational 
pension plans became new and important issues for collective bargaining. 
"The pressure for extending the range of subjects dealt' with by collective 
agreements" in the post-war period, according to Flanders, came "almost 
exclusively from the trade unions. "7 Union negotiated employee benefit 
or welfare plans have generally evolved, according to Barbarino and Allen, 
in three phases: recogniton of need and introduction of a program; improved 
benefit levels; and a broadening of coverage and eligibility. 
The expansion of the employee benefit package in the post-war 
period has significant implications for social policy and labour 
organizations. In the first instance, the development of the negotiated 
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employee benefit package has created a dual allocative mechanism for the 
provision of income security against universal and employment-related 
risks. An underdeveloped "distanced" social security system exists for the 
majority of wage and salary earners at the state level, while a 
"non-distanced' mechanism - the negotiated employee benefit package - has 
evolved for unionized' workers, particularly in the oligopolistic sectors, at 
the plant or industry level. 
8 The modern union as a welfare institution 
therefore engages in a "micro-social function"9 as an organization on 
behalf of its membership at the shop floor level through collective 
bargaining, ' while the labour confederation or national union nominally 
serves a "macro-social function" at the state level on behalf of all workers 
based on its lobbying and political activities. 
10 
The "non-distanced" employee benefit package introduced and 
expanded through collective bargaining at the plant or industry level is a 
response to the inadequacies of the "distanced' social security system at the 
state level. Trade unions under capitalism in general "have largely achieved 
at the level of the firm ... for their own members social policies they have 
failed to achieve for all workers through political struggle at the level' of 
the state. "" As one pragmatic American trade union leader put it, 
"unions decided that they would attempt through bargaining to win for their 
members what they were unable to convince government to provide for all 
its citizens. " 
!2 Under conditions of collective bargaining, particularly in 
North America, employee benefit plans now constitute a "system of private 
social security" 
13 
or a "corporate social security system", 
14 
which is 
either a substitute for or a supplement to the state social security system. 
From a social policy perspective, however, the distributional impact of the 
dual public-private social security system generates and reinforces sectional 
interests between the unionized and non-unionized labour force as a result 
of the uneven allocation and level of benefits. 
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5.3 Benefit Maximization vs. Cost Minimization: Conflicting Imperatives 
Workers have developed a collective "security" or "protectivism" 
response, to use Barbash's formulation, as a reaction to the modern 
corporation's "cost discipline" behaviour. 
15 For labour organizations this 
"security" response has included the regulation of conditions of employment 
such as wages, as well as income maintenance protection against the 
universal and employment-related risks of sickness, disability, maternity, 
unemployment,, death and old age. Modern unions with their organizational 
imperatives16, act as a welfare institution17 fulfilling a social security 
function through collective bargaining to satisfy their membership's need for 
economic security. By maximizing their social security function, unions are 
in opposition to the cost, minimization/prof it maximization behaviour of the 
corporate sector. The -expansion of employee 
benefit programs in the 
post-war period has both broadened the, scope of collective bargaining and 
increased the importance of the modern union's social security function. 
Unions in the future will be forced to engage in intensified distributive and 
intra-organizational bargaining 
18 
with respect to pension related issues. 
The term "fringe benefit", broadly defined, now includes 
negotiated as well as voluntary employee benefit programs to which an 
employer contributes on behalf of an employee; in addition, the cost of any 
legally required payment made by an employer is also included as a "fringe" 
benefit cost. The older term "fringe benefit", implying a gratuity based on 
"good and faithful service", has now been replaced by the more modern 
designations "supplementary wage provision", "related wage practices", 
"social charges", "welfare plans" or "employee benefit plans", suggesting an 
earned benefit based on the deferred wage doctrine. The term "employee 
benefit plan" is used here. The more contemporary terms signify that 
employee benefit plans are no longer "fringe", but are now central to the 
collective bargaining process in terms of complexity, cost and importance. 
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In recent years under conditions of collective bargaining, as a 
result of the expansion of the employee benefit package and the associated 
cost, many sophisticated employers have adopted a total compensation 
approach to the negotiation of labour costs. This has meant that "the 
pattern of, package deals are based on the total value of labour 
renumeration, wages and fringes having become interchangeable 
costs. " 
19 As a result of the ' total compensation approach to labour costs, 
where total compensation is equal to employee benefits plus wages, unions 
have been able to exerta positive influence on the level (amount) and 
distribution (mix) of labour compensation between salary and employee 
benefits, and within the employee benefit package. 
20 Employee benefit 
and occupational pension plans under conditions of collective bargaining are 
now incorporated into a firm's wage and salary structure and its long-run 
profit prospective. The cost associated with employee benefit programs, 
including employer-sponsored -occupational pension plans, has increased 
dramatically in the past thirty years under conditions of collective 
bargaining. 
5.4 The Cost of Employee Benefits 
A number of significant characteristics and relationships are 
associated with employee benefits. These are summarized from the 
technical literature as follows. 
21 The incidence and cost of employee 
benefit plans is higher in capital intensive, oligopolistic sectors of the 
economy than -in the labour intensive, competitive sector, the cost and 
frequency of employee benefits is related to firm size and are positively 
related to wage and salary levels; there is a direct correlation between the 
profitablity of an industry and its expenditure on employee benefits; the 
higher the profit per employee the higher the employee benefit expenditure 
per employee, the ratio of employee benefits to total compensation is 
greater in unionized firms than in non-unionized firms; the stronger a union 
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the greater the expenditure by a firm on employee benefits, the 
skilled-nonskilled total compensation differential exceeds the 
skilled-nonskilled wage differential; and the decertification of unions (in the 
U. S. ) is inversely related to the ratio of employee benefits to compensation 
in unionized firms. The evidence regarding the level and distribution of 
employee benefits generally confirms the dual labour market theory which 
postulates that there is a "primary" labour market comprised of high paid, 
unionized workers in capital intensive, oligopolistic industries and a 
"secondary" labour market characterized by low paid, non-unionized workers 
in labour intensive, competitive sectors. 
In order to determine the dramatic acceleration of employee 
benefit plan costs as a percentage of employer's gross payroll in Canada, 
Britain and the U. S. an historical time-series has been constructed for the 
period between 1953 and 1978. This information is presented in Table 5.1. 
The data for the United States and Canada are fully comparable, covering 
employees in all industries. In Britain, however, where "the cost of benefits 
to employers... are hard to assess, since most firms do not ... cost their 
benefit schemes", 
22 the time-series was constructed from disparate 
sources for the manufacturing sector (manual and clerical). Therefore, the 
comparative trends outlined here must be viewed only as an approximation. 
In the United States, Canada and Britain the cost associated with 
employee benefit plans increased from an average 19 per cent of gross 
payroll in 1953 to 34 per cent in 1978. In general, one-third of gross payroll 
expenditure is now spent on employee benefits. The proportion of payroll 
devoted to employee benefits is expected to increase well into the 
1980s. 23 Between 1953 and 1978 the expenditure on employee benefits as 
a proportion of gross payroll increased by 73 per cent in the U. S., 115 per 
cent in Canada, and by 170 per cent in Britain. The absolute annual per 
capita expenditure on employee benefits between 1957 and 1978 increased in 
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TABLE 5.1 
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PROGRAMS 
AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS PAYROLL, 
CANADA, U. S., AND U. K., 
SELECTED YEARS, 1953 TO 1978 
Year Canada U. S. 2 U. K. 
1953 15.11 21.6 (E) 103 
1957 16.4 23.4 - 
1959 22.2 24.5 14.44 
1961 24.3 25.8 - 
1963 26.2 26.8 - 
1965 25.2 27.0 
1967 27.8 29.0 13.65 
1969 29.1 30.8 - 
1971 29.0 32.8 21.1 
1973 28.1 34.8 23.7 (26.56,7) 
1975/76 31.1 37.4 26.45 
1977/78 32.4 40.5 27.06 (36.06,7) 
Percentage 
Increase 114.6% 73.1% 170-260% 
1953-1973/78 
Notes: 1. Between 1953/54 and 1969/70 includes the Old Age Security 
Tax (O. A. S. T) which was eliminated in 1971 and put on a 
general revenue basis after that date. 
2. The data in this time-series is based on an on-going 
sub-sample of 159 large firms from the U. S. Chamber of 
Commerce's survey of 858 companies. Because of sample bias 
this has resulted in a somewhat higher figure being reported 
here than is the case with the other information in the 
Chamber of Commerce's survey. 
3.1955 for five S. I. C. manufacturing industries. 
4. For manual workers only. 
5. For all manufacturing industries. 
6. Unweighted average for manual and non-manual employees. 
7. There would seem to be a reporting discrepancy between the 
lower figure cited in the popularized booklet published by 
the Royal Commission on the Distribution of Income and 
Wealth, An A to Z of Income and Wealth (London: HMSO, 1980), 
Table L, p. 15 and e higher gure based on the empirical 
data found in Lord Diamond, Royal Commission on the 
Distribution of Income and Wealth. Report No. a Fifth 
'report on e Standing Reference (London: HMSO, October 
1979), Figure 9.2, p. 131. 
Sources: Thorne Riddell Associates Ltd., Em lo ee Benefits Costs in 
Canada 1977/78 (Toronto: Thorne e Associates ., 1978), Table J, pp. 12-13; Chamber of Commerce of the United 
States, Employee Benefits 1978 (Washington, D. C.: Chamber of 
Commerce, IWO) ae 19, p. i. For Britain this 
time-series was constructed from the Ministry of Labour 
Gazette, August 1957, pp. 277-280; G. L. Reid and James 
altes, The Cost of Fringe Benefits for Manual Workers in 
British Industry', British Journal of Industrial Relations, 
Vol. I, No. 3 (196 , Table 7, p. 5; R. I. Haw eswor , Fringe Benefits in British Indust 111911), " British Journal of 
Industrial Relations, Vol. XV No. ae1, p. 
Jane moon-man-, -The Effectiveness of Fringe Benefits in 
Industry (Epping Essex: Gower res s, or amon , oa ommission on the Distribution of Income and Wealth. " 
epor o. ts Firth report on the an ng Reference (London: 
HMSO October 1979) Figure 9.2, p. 131; The Royal 
Commission on the Distribution of Income and WealthL, 
-p`. -T5- 
and 
An A to 
Z of Income and Wealth (London: HMSO, 1980), Table 
a our Costs n 1975", Department of Labour Gazette, 
September 1977, Table 6, pp. 9-10. 
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the U. S. by 455 per cent and by 616 per cent in Canada. According to 
Statistics Canada, in 1978, total expenditure for welfare and benefit plans 
by unionized firms was 94 per cent greater than for non-union 
employers. 
24 This increased expenditure reflects both a broadening and a 
deepening of the employee benefit package, particularly under conditions of 
collective bargaining. Today employee benefit plans are no longer "fringe", 
they are big money. 
5.4.1 Distributive Bargaining and Benefit Costs. For labour 
unions the expansion of their "micro-social' welfare function has generated 
tensions within the framework of distributive and intra-organizational 
bargaining. Increasing employee benefit costs affect the level and 
distribution of total compensation between salary and benefits. Distributive 
bargaining is central to the labour-management power relationship in 
capitalist societies. 
In the United States and Canada between 1959 and 1978 employee 
benefit costs were 2.2 and 1.3 times greater respectively than the increase 
in the average industrial wage (AIW). Benefit costs have increased at a 
faster rate than wages. It is not unreasonable to expect that management 
will resist any future expansion of employee benefit costs in order to 
contain total labour costs, particularly in periods of slow economic growth. 
A consequence of distributive bargaining is that while employee 
benefits result in an increased total compensation package for workers, this 
often comes at the expense of a corresponding reduction in direct monetary 
income. The expansion of the employee benefit package relatively reduces 
the current consumption (take-home pay) of workers, regardless of whether 
these are contributory or non-contributory programs. This means that there 
is still pressure on wages from workers, despite the utility of employee 
benefit plans and the increased value of the total compensation package. 
This trade-off is exacerbated in periods of inflation and slow economic 
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growth. Therefore, there is the prospect of continued pressure from 
workers and unions for an expansion of the employee benefit package and 
wage increases., In the future the welfare maximzation behaviour of unions 
will increasingly conflict with the cost minimization imperative of the 
corporate sector. This will sharpen the already inherent tensions associated 
with distributive bargaining. 
5.4.2 Intra-Organizational Bargaining and Benefit Costs. The 
increasing strain on labour-management relations induced by rising 
employee benefit and pension costs is compounded by the modern union's 
intra-organizational (internal) bargaining and its own organizational 
imperatives. Internal -bargaining refers to the reconciliation of diverse 
sectional interests, or competing claims, within the labour force represented 
by the union: skilled and less skilled, married and single, men and women, 
young and old, employed and retired, and so forth. The union as a welfare 
institution must engage in intra-organizational bargaining regarding the cost 
of employee benefit plans as it affects two crucial issues: first, the level 
and distribution of total compensation between salary and benefit plans; and 
second, the mix of programs within the employee benefit package. These 
issues have a different affect upon 'the various segments of a union's 
diversified membership, depending upon economic status, demographic 
characteristics (such as age, sex and marital status) and the state of the 
economy. 
The union as an organization mediates the conflicting sectional 
claims of its membership through internal bargaining. Distributionally, for 
example, young workers have a propensity to place an emphasis on direct 
monetary compensation, while older workers place a priority on deferred 
compensation such as improved pensions. Women tend to assign a priority to 
wage increases rather than negotiating employee benefits. Married men 
generally favor a balance between direct and indirect compensation. The 
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mix within the employee benefit package is also subject to competing claims 
and intra-organizational bargaining. For example, young married workers 
(in North America) are usually interested in life, health and disability 
insurance, whereas older workers are concerned about pensions; older 
workers, women and single men place a low priority on dental plans, while 
married men approve of their implemenation. It falls to the union to resolve 
these internal distributional issues between the sectional interests. 
Nevertheless unions have placed employee benefit programs high on their 
list of bargaining priorities in recent years. 
5.4.3 Union's Organizational Imperatives and Benefit Plans. The 
final consideration bringing unions into conflict with the cost minimization 
behaviour of the private sector with respect to the pension issue are the 
institutional imperatives of unions as organizations. Unions like any other 
organization have their own goals and imperatives. The institutional 
imperatives of unions include organizational survival; growth; sovereignty; 
job regulation; prestige, and maximization of membership, average wage 
rates, the wage bill, employment and their membership's social welfare. 
The expansion of employee benefits, including occupational pension plans, 
under conditions of collective bargaining in the post-war period has served 
to promote, either directly or indirectly, a number of these purposes. 
Nineteenth century unions in Britain and the United States 
realized that friendly benefits and union-sponsored welfare programs served 
the purpose of stabilizing the labour organization by attracting and holding 
members by promoting a sense of loyalty to the union. 
25 The negotiation 
of welfare and pension plans by industrial unions in North America after 
World War II served a similar purpose. Innovative employee benefit and 
welfare programs served to enhance the prestige of industrial unions with 
the public. Benefit plans advanced the welfare of the membership and were 
identified with the union. The negotiation of costly and complex welfare 
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and pension plans furthered the union's organizational imperative for 
institutional survival and growth. The negotiation of these welfare 
programs symbolized the reluctant acceptance by management of the 
permanence of the union and a commitment to a long-term collective 
bargaining relationship. In a hostile environment this provided unions with 
institutional security. 
Collectively bargained health and welfare plans have also served 
as an impetus for bureaucratization and the specialization of internal union 
functions. A number of major American unions - for example, the United 
Mine Workers, United Auto Workers, United Steel Workers and Teamsters - 
established social security or welfare departments and employed the 
necessary technical staff. In Britain in the early 1970s, with the renewed 
interest in occupational pension schemes, the Transport and General 
Workers' Union and the General and Municipal Workers' Union pursued a 
similar course. In addition, negotiated or union-sponsored welfare plans 
have enhanced the power and prestige of the union leader. The 
technicalities of employee benefit and pension plan arrangements have 
forced the union leader "to , 
acquire specialized knowledge' and skill' with 
the result that "his power has been increased by the greater complexity of 
[the] problems which have to be resolved in determining union policy. "26 
The union leader claims credit for "delivering the goods", to "his" members. 
In the most fundamental sense, under conditions of collective 
bargaining, unions as organizations have acquired an institutional vested 
interest in the maintenance and expansion of negotiated welfare and pension 
arrangements. This is suggested by the significantly increased proportion of 
gross payroll devoted to employee benefits and the greater cost associated 
with such arrangements under conditions of collective bargaining in the 
post-war period. The modern union's organizational imperatives, coupled 
with its benefit maximization approach to distributive bargaining, conflicts 
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with the cost minimization behaviour of the corporate sector. The 
collective bargaining relationship as it relates to pension arrangements will 
become more strained as the underlying cost pressures increase. 
5.5 The Cost of Pensions 
Pension arrangements represent the single most important 
non-wage expenditure within the total compensation package and are the 
largest monetary item within the employee benefit package. 
27 The cost 
associated with the employer-sponsored occupational pension system has 
increased considerably' in the past thirty years and has exceeded the growth 
of wages. The total cost of pension arrangements and those associated with 
occupational pension plans under conditions of collective bargaining are 
significantly greater than for non-union firms. 
A number, of factors, including inflation, poor investment 
performance, actuarial deficiencies and unfunded liabilities, the aging of the 
labour force, slower labour force growth and the cost of pension reform will 
all contribute to escalating the cost per unit of pension benefit and 
increasing the cost of employer-sponsored occupational pension plans as a 
proportion of gross payroll. In addition, the cost of state pension 
arrangements over the long term will increase as a result of population 
aging and improved benefit levels. Rising total pension costs will require 
increased corporate and individual contributions. The increasing cost 
associated with the private -occupational pension system will necessitate 
increased contributions by plan sponsors to maintain the solvency of the 
plan, as well as higher contributions by workers. This will result in higher 
labour costs for employers and a reduction in employee's current 
consumption, with corresponding pressure on wages by workers to maintain 
their standard of living. 
Because of the strong correlation between unionization and 
occupational pension plan coverage, with unionized workers being the 
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largest and most concentrated group covered by the private pension system, 
unions may be in a position to resist higher pension contributions and a 
reduction in their member's standard of living. Similarly, it may be 
expected that the corporate sector will resist the imposition of increased 
pension costs in order to protect profit margins. A potential exists that 
unions will be brought into conflict with the corporate sector, the state, and 
possibly their own members,. over the issue of pension costs. The pension 
issue in the long run may, therefore have a destabilizing impact on collective 
bargaining relationships and the industrial relations system. 
5.5.1 The Preeminence of Pension Costs. Total pension costs - 
public and private - are the largest component within the employee benefit 
package, and are the most costly non-wage related expenditure as a 
proportion of gross payroll. 
28 Table 5.2 outlines total pension costs as a 
proportion of gross payroll and in relation to total employee benefit costs. 
Employer contributions to the state and occupational pension plans when 
considered as separate items within the total compensation package lag 
behind expenditures on vacations in Canada and Britain and rank first in the 
TABLE 5.2 
TOTAL PENSION COSTS 
AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS PAYROLL 
AND IN RELATION TO TOTAL EMPLOYEE BENEFIT COSTS, 
BRITAIN, U. S., AND CANADA, 1975 - 1980 
Employee 
. 
Pension Costs 
Pension Costs as a% Benefits as as a% of 
of Gross Payroll aS of Employee 
Count ccupa ona ae oFaT Gross Payroll Benefit Costs 
Britain3 4.7,8.11 12.8 27.0 47.0 
U. S. 5.6 5.6 11.2 40.5 27.7 
Canada5 5.2 1.2 
(2.7-3.32) 
6.4 
(7.9-8. 
33.1 
52) 
19.3 
(24-262) 
Notes: 1. National Insurance, inclusive of all programs. 
2. Estimated on the basis of an increase to the required full-cost 
contribution rate, with no corresponding decline in contributions to 
occupational pension plans. 
3.1975; 4.1978; 5.1979/80. 
Sources: Department of Labour Gazette, September, 1977, Table 6, P. 10; Chamber of 
Commerce. Employee Benefits 1978 (Washington, D. C.: Chamber of Commerce, 
1978) Table ZZ 31 , p. and Thorne Stevenson and Kellogg, Em Employee Benefit Plans in 
g* 
1979/80 [Toronto: Thorne, Stevenson 
Kellogg, Table 7, p. zz. 
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United States. However, when total pension costs (public plus private plans) 
are treated as one component, they assume the preeminent position as the 
leading non-wage gross payroll expenditure and the largest component 
within the employee benefit package. Total pension costs as a percentage 
of gross payroll were 6.4 per cent in Canada, 11.2 per cent in the U. S. and 
nearly 13 percent in Britain. Total pension costs therefore represented 19 
per cent of all employee benefit costs in Canada, 28 per cent in the U. S., 
and 47 per cent in Britain. 
Total pension costs, as these data suggest, are an important 
component within the total compensation package and have a significant 
impact on an employees gross payroll expenditure. This is particularly the 
case in Britain and the United States. The relatively modest order of 
magnitude in Canada is attributable to the inordinately low level of 
contributions to the state pension plan by international standards. Any 
increase in either state or occupational pension plan contributions will result 
in an increase in total pension costs. An increase in total pension costs in 
excess of wage growth will, in . 
turn, result in the expansion of the employee 
benefit, package in relation to total compensation or gross payroll. 
Supplementary labour costs (employee benefits including pensions) will 
therefore increase relative to direct monetary compensation. This squarely 
poses the issue of distributive bargaining between labour and management 
and intra-organizational bargaining among sectional interests within the 
union. 
The cost of the employer-based occupational pension system is 
the primary component of total pension costs. The information in Table 5.2 
indicates that occupational pension scheme costs represented 36 per cent of 
total pension costs in the U. K., 50, per cent in the U. S., and 81 per cent in 
Canada. Occupational pension plan costs have generally increased in the 
post-war period. Employer-sponsored -occupational pension plan costs as a 
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percentage of gross payroll and annual expenditure per employee are 
outlined in Table5.3 for Canada where complete information is available. 
Between '1953 and 1980 the annual per capita expenditure by employers for 
occupational pension plans increased by nearly 611 per cent. In this same 
period occupational pension plan costs as a percentage of gross payroll 
increased by 30 per cent. Occupational pension plan costs exceeded wage 
growth by 77 per cent. 
TABLE 5.3. 
EMPLOYER OCCUPATIONAL 
PENSION PLAN COSTS, CANADA, 1953.1980 
1 
Annual Cost 
Year Io r ros Pa y-F-51 I er o ee 
1953 4.0% $137 
1957 3.9 167 
1959 3.6 182 
1961 4.3 216 
1963 4.4 230 
1965 3.6 191 
1967 3.2 . 210 1969 3.3`` 242 
1971 3.8 332 
1973 3.8 392 
1975/76 4.2 552 
1977/78 4.6 750 
1979/80, - 5.2"_ 974 - 
% Increase in Pension 
Costs, 1953-1979/80 30.0 610.9 
Note: "1. Employer contributions including payments towards, 
unfunded liabilities and experience deficiencies where 
applicable. 
Source: Information supplied courtesy of Thorne, Stevenson and 
Kellogg. Employee Benefit Costs in Canada (Toronto: 
Thorne, evenson Kellogg, var ous years). 
In Canada between 1953 and 1980 a, number of important 
relationships have been established within the total compensation package, 
namely, that the rate of growth in annual per capita . occupational pension 
plan costs has exceeded the increase in wages and total compensation; 
however, the rate of growth for . total employee benefit package 
expenditures, and for benefits net of pensions, has been greater than the 
increase in occupational pension plan costs. 
29 The broadening and 
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deepening of total employee benefit expenditures relative to pensions 
explains the deceptively moderate increase in occupational pension plan cost 
as a percentage of gross payroll, despite the substantial increase in per 
capita cost. ' There'are good reasons to believe, however, that total pension 
costs will increase in the future necessitating higher contributions from both 
employers and employees. 4ý 
5.5.2 The Escalation of Future Pension Costs. There are at least 
six reasons why the cost of occupational pension plans will escalate in the 
future. First, inflation over the past decade has had an adverse impact on 
the operation of the private pension system and will affect future pension 
costs. In Canada, for example, per capita expenditure on occupational 
pension plans by employers nearly tripled between 1971 and 1980; between 
1975 and 1980 the cost roughly doubled (Table 5.3). In Britain company 
outlay on contributory pension schemes jumped from 7.7 to 12.0 per cent of 
payroll between 1975 and 1978.30 Inflation increases the salary base upon 
which retirement benefits are calculated. This impact is particularly severe 
in the case of final average earnings pension plans, resulting in what is 
termed the "linebacker" or "three martini effect", necessitating increased 
company contributions. An inflation rate in excess of conservative actuarial 
salary and rate of return assumptions plays havoc with pension plan funding 
and stable contribution rates. 
Second, poor pension fund investment performance, compounded 
in part by inflation, has required additional contributions by corporate plan 
sponsors to cover shortfalls in the plan. The real average annual rate of 
return on investment for trusteed pension plans in Canada averaged 0.72 per 
cent between 1961 and 1975, and was running at -2.88 per cent in the late 
3 1970s. In Britain the average annual real rate of return on pension funds 
between 1965 and 1975 was 0.6 per cent. 
22 Pension fund investment 
performance generally lags the stock market. 
33 This situation is 
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compounded býy inflation which makes a significant positive rate of return on 
investment to the pension plan more difficult to achieve. Poor pension fund 
investment performance will accentuate the pressures for higher 
occupational pension plan contributions. 
A third, consideration -in the post-war period, particularly under 
conditions of collective bargaining, is" the considerable improvement in the 
level- and types of benefits provided for under employer-sponsored 
occupational pension plans. 'The inclusion of past service credits, improved 
early retirement, provisions such as "30 and out",, the upgrading from a 
career to a final average earnings retirement benefit formula and ad hoc 
post-retirement inflation-proofing are, examples - of costly pension plan 
improvements. In 'Canada employer- contributions to pension plans for 
current service benefits increased by 353 percent between 1969 and 1979, 
reflecting rising wage' rates, improved benefits and more rigorous funding 
requirements. 
34 In Britain "more than half of those schemes which 
increased ordinary contributions' between 1975 and 1977 "did so because of 
an increase in benefit levels" while nearly "40% of schemes which paid 
special contributions did so as a provision for pension increases. "35 , 
A fourth, and important factor, is the dramatic increase in 
actuarial (experience) 'deficiencies and unfunded liabilities for occupational 
pension plans as a result of rising salaries, poor investment performance, 
improved benefits and the divergence between conservative actuarial wage 
and interest, (investment) -assumptions and actual expereince. This has 
resulted in many pension plans having liabilities which exceed the assets to 
pay for accrued pension benefits, especially in the United States and to a 
lesser extent in Canada. This requires substantial additional contributions 
from corporate plan sponsors to cover the shortfall to maintain the solvency 
of the pension scheme. Actuarial deficiencies' and unfunded liabilities are 
amortized - that is, carried forward and written off over 15 years in Canada 
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and usually 40 years in the U. S. - and hence by definition, are a long-term 
problem. For private sector plan sponsors actuarial deficiencies and 
unfunded liabilities are particularly acute because they adversely affect a 
corporation's cash flow position and serve as a drag on future profits. 
In Canada-this situation, while not as severe as that experienced 
in the United States, is nevertheless of considerable concern. In 1977 nearly 
70 per cent of all major, corporate pension plans were in a deficit position. 
"The rate . of change 
in the dollar magnitude of unfunded past service 
liabilities and experience deficiencies, " according to the Financial 
Executives . 
Institute of Canada, , 
"continues to grow at an alarming 
pace. "36 - Between 1969 and 1979 unfunded liabilities and experience 
deficiencies in the private sector increased by some 555 per cent and from 
nearly 20 to 30 per cent of occupational pension plan contributions. 
37 
By 
1980 total actuarial liabilities represented 38 per cent of shareholders 
equity, and were 34 per cent of three year average pre-tax income. 
38 In 
recent years the absolute magnitude of unfunded liabilities and actuarial 
deficiencies has not appreciably improved, and have been kept in check in 
relation to accounting ratios only as a result of an increase in the equity and 
earnings base of corporations. 
39 
In . the, . 
United States the unfunded liabilities of 
employer-sponsored occupational pension plans have reached alarming 
proportions in recent years. Unfunded pension liabilities for 10 of the top 
100 U. S. - corporations listed in the Fortune,. 500 in the late 1970s were 
equivalent to one-quarter to one-third of the net worth of the company, and 
in some cases even more. 
40 For seven of those companies unfunded 
pension liabilities exceeded the value of the company's stock. A subsequent 
survey of 1,644 large U. S. industrial and service companies confirmed these 
findings. 
41 For major corporations such as Westinghouse, LTV, Western 
Union, Bethlehem Steel, International Harvester, GM, Uniroyal and Chrylser 
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unfunded pension liabilities ranged from 35 to 278 per cent of net worth. 
Among large U. S. corporations as a group, contributions to pension funds are 
now equivalent to 20 per cent of pre-tax earnings - double the amount of a 
decade ago - and "that proportion, ' according to business sources, "is bound 
to increase further. "42 These are no longer corporations with a pension 
plan, but are`an unfunded liability with a company. The unfunded liabilities 
and actuarial deficiencies of occupational pension' plans are built into the 
long-term debt structure of a corporation and affect its cash flow and profit 
position, thus requiring 'increased contributions in the future. Higher 
pension costs in the future, however, will exert downward pressure on wages 
and profits, unleäs'the compensation package is squeezed elsewhere. This 
poses structural contradictions within the framework of distributive and 
intra-organizational bargaining. 
A fifth reason underlying the long-run pressure for increased 
occupational 'pension plan costs is population aging. The aging of the labour 
force is a concomitant of an aging population, with a rising median age as 
discussed in Chapter 3.3. A corollary to the general aging of the labour 
force is the reduced proportion of young and the increased proportion of 
elderly. 
43 Labour force growth in Canada will decline ' from the 3.1 per 
cent a year experienced in the 1966-1979 period to 0.5 per cent per annum 
by 2011.44 By definition, a consequence of an aging labour force and Ia 
declining rate of labour force growth will be an increasing cost per unit of 
pension benefit. This will generate increased occupational pension plan 
costs as a result of the larger proportion 'of older workers in the labour 
force. The generally increasing cost per unit of pension benefit, while 
varying by industry and employer, ' is a long-term structural pressure 
increasing the level of occupational pension plan 'contributions required of 
employers and employees. 
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The aging of the labour force, and union members more generally, 
may augur a shift in bargaining priorities by unions. It is well established 
that interest in pensions and retirement related matters increases 
significantly after age 45. In some occupational jurisdictions this shift in 
priorities may in fact already be occurring. 
45 The new emphasis and 
priority on improved occupational pension arrangements by the increasing 
proportion of older union members will, in one instance, conflict with the 
importance placed on direct monetary compensation by young workers and, 
at the' same time, will force older workers to confront the "trade-off" 
between direct and deferred compensation. It is problematic whether older 
workers will be prepared to "trade" money today for pensions tomorrow. To 
fulfill its social security function and organizational imperatives the union 
may be forced into a conflict with one or the other generational factions of 
its membership to resolve this conflict. ' 
The sixth, and final, factor contributing to increased contribution 
levels for the private and public pension systems is the cost of pension 
reform. Pension reform will almost inevitably impose higher contribution 
levels on employers and employees, resulting in reduced profit margins for 
corporations and a reduction in current consumption for workers. It is 
extremely difficult to specify the micro 'and macro-economic adjustment 
processes and consequences of pension reform proposals because these are 
invariably predicated upon certain assumptions about economic behaviour. 
However, when, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 1974 was 
enacted in the United States, it increased employer-sponsored pension plan 
costs by an estimated 5 to 10 per - cent. 
46 The 1983 Parliamentary Task 
Force on Pension Reform in Canada estimated the cost of its- private 
pension reform "package" to be in the order of an additional 1.5 to 2 per 
cent of payroll. 
47 This does not, however, take into account increased 
C/QPP contributions for current and/or improved benefits. 
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Compounding the increasing cost of the employer-sponsored 
occupational pension system is the cost of reforming the state pension 
system. The long run contribution rate for the Canada/Quebec Pension 
Plans for current benefits must be, increased from the present total 
contribution rate of 3.6 per cent to 8 to 10 per cent, shared equally between 
employers and employees, over the next 40 to 50 years. Coupled with some 
minor improvements the long-term total contribution rate would be in the 
order of 9 to 11 per cent, or some 150 to 206 per cent greater than the 
current contribution level. 
48 However, if the income replacement rate 
for the C/QPP was increased from the present 25 to 50 per cent, so as to 
conform to international standards, it would require a total (full-cost) 
contribution rate of roughly 16 per cent, or nearly 345 per cent above the 
current contribution level. While the specific method used to phase-in the 
higher contribution rates may somewhat moderate the cost impact, it 
nevertheless remains , true that employers and workers in Canada will be 
faced with increasing contributions to the state pension system over the 
next 40 to 50 years. Contributions to the U. S. social security retirement 
system, shared equally between employers and employees, have continuously 
risen over the past 23 years from a *total of 3.0 per cent in 1960 to 13.8 per 
cent in 1983. It is estimated that total contributions will have to increase 
to at least 15.3 per cent by 1990 to offset the chronic deficit experienced by 
the social security fund. Significantly, the National Commission on Social 
Security conveniently avoided making a recommendation regarding the 
required level of social security contributions in the period after 1990 when 
the "baby boom" generation retires. 
49 It is not unreasonable to surmise, 
however, that the rapidly rising proportion of 
i 
elderly in the population, 
compounded by pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) financing, will necessitate 
significantly increased contribution rates in the future. Similar pressures 
may affect the U. K. state earnings-related retirement system. 
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The prospect is for increasing total pension costs and 
contributions - private and public - in the future. This will affect both 
labour and management in terms of distributive and intra-organizational 
bargaining. Pension costs under conditions of F collective bargaining, 
however, assume a particular significance because of their magnitude. 
5.5.3 Pension Costs Under Collective Bargaining. Under 
conditions of collective bargaining, total and employer-sponsored 
occupational pension costs are significantly greater than for non-unionized 
employers. In Canada the expenditure on welfare and health plans, total 
pension costs, and occupational pensions is nearly 94,115 and 179 per cent 
greater respectively for unionized firms than for non-union companies as is 
reported in Table 5.4. These data indicate that union's have been successful 
TABLE 5.4 
COMPARISON OF TOTAL EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION, 
EXPENDITURE FOR WELFARE AND HEALTH PLANS 
AND PENSION COSTS FOR 
UNION AND NON-UNION WAGE-EARNERS, 
CANADA, 1978 
Differential of 
Employers With at Union Over 
Least 100 Employees Non-Union 
Pay Item non on- non Employees 
Total Employee 
Compensation $16,977 $12,323 37.8% 
Expenditure for Welfare 
and Health Plans 1,742 898 93.9 
Total Pensions 815 380 114.5 
Occupational 650 233 178.9 
State 165 147 12.2 
Life & Health 
Insurance 364 152 139.5 
Workers' Compensation 298 165 80.6 
Unemployment Insurance 216 187 15.5 
Other 49 15 226.7 
Note: 1. Statistics Canada classifies vacation pay. paid 
holidays and sick leave as "Expenditure for paid 
absence' and are not included here. 
Source: Retabulated and calculated from Statistics Canada, 
Employee Compensation in Canada All Industries 1978 
(Ot way minister of Supply an Services, , Text Table X, p. 27. 
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in advancing the social welfare and retirement income needs of their 
members compared with other sections of the labour force. 
Under conditions of collective bargaining the relative rank order 
of pension costs and their absolute magnitude is of considerable 
significance. This preeminence will be magnified in the future as pension 
costs increase as was analyzed' in section 5.5.2. As one business 
representative was to state, "pension costs are simply part of the total cost 
of doing business. "50 Therefore pension costs are subject to 
management's cost discipline and minimization behaviour. The magnitude of 
pension expenditures' and their increasing cost suggest that they will be of 
prime concern within the distributive collective bargaining framework 
between labour and management. As pension costs escalate in the future an 
attempt probably will be made by management to cut or restrain other 
components within the compensation package. It has been established, 
however, that once introduced, employee benefit costs are more rigid than 
wages as part of' the compensation structure. 
51 This poses a direct 
"trade-off', or conflict, between monetary and non-monetary items within 
the compensation package which must be resolved through the collective 
bargaining process. Management's cost minimization behaviour is then in, 
direct opposition to the union's organizational imperative and the 
maximization of its social welfare function, as well as an aging union 
membership with its increased priority for retirement income. Pension 
costs under conditions of collective bargaining may therefore become one of 
the most contentious issues in the future because it will accentuate the 
structural contradictions inherent in the industrial relations system. 
5.5.4 Unions and Pension Coverage. Union members are the 
largest and most concentrated group covered by the private pension system. 
Increasing occupational pension plan costs which reduce their standard of 
living is likely to be of particular relevance to them. The strong positive 
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relationship between unionization and occupational pension plan coverage 
suggests that unions may be in a position to exert considerable institutional 
power to protect the interests of their members. In Canada 81 per cent of 
all trade union members are covered by an employer-sponsored occupational 
pension plan, compared with 78 per cent in the U. S. and 52 per cent in 
Britain. Trade union members therefore represent on average nearly 50 per 
cent of all occupational pension plan members in these countries. These 
data are outlined in Table 5.5. In general, there is a strong positive 
correlation between the level of unionization (unionization ratio) and 
occupational pension plan coverage, particularly at the, industry level. 
Table 5.6 presents a transnational comparison of the relationship between 
unionization and occupational pension plan coverage at the industry level 
based on 'standard statistical tests. For Canada and Britain there is a 
significant correlation coefficient (r), indicating a strong statistical 
association, and robust coefficients of determination (r2), suggesting a 
firm causal relationship. In the United States, however, there is only a 
moderate statistical correlation and a weak causal relationship between 
pension plan coverage and the level of unionization. 
There are a number of political, collective bargaining and 
institutional implications regarding the propensity of unionized workers to 
be covered by an occupational pension plan as it relates to the increasing 
cost associated with the private pension system. Politically, trade unionists 
are one of the primary groups affected by the universal and particularistic 
limitations of the private pension system. An important corollary is that 
trade unionists, by virtue of their concentrated membership in the private 
pension system, are potentially in a position to act as a catalyst for 
progressive change. Under conditions of collective bargaining the increasing 
cost associated with the private pension system suggests that all trade 
unionists, young and old alike, are affected. Increasing occupational pension 
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plan costs will, therefore affect the most organized and concentrated group 
within the private pension system. 
- The institutional response by unions and workers may take three 
possible forms. . First, unionized workers, who represent the largest 
proportion-of occupational pension plan members, are potentially in a 
position -to offer organized resistance to increasing pension costs -which 
affect their standard of . living. Second, increasing pension costs have a 
destabilizing effect upon distributive bargaining between labour . and 
management. Resistance from an organized and, concentrated group of 
pension plan members to rising pension costs reinforces this instability. 
Third, increasing pension costs may provoke a combative response from 
unions and workers. 
In this regard =it is interesting to note that in the U. S. in 1949 
employee benefits accounted for over 25 per cent of all strike idleness. 
52 
Members of unions have been known to reject contracts because of the 
inclusion or exclusion of employee benefits. 
53 In North America two 
important strikes were fought over pensions: the long 1970 United Auto 
Workers (UAW) strike against General Motors to establish the "30 and out" 
early retirement pension54 and the bitter 1979 United Steel Workers 
(Canadian region) -strike against the giant 
Inco Corporation to achieve the 
same objective. In Britain, during a period of income, policies in 1974, 
employee benefit disputes accounted for nearly 7 per cent of all pay 
disputes. 55 In the United States in the mid-1970s wages and benefits 
accounted for nearly one-quarter of all work stoppages. In 1981 one-quarter 
of all person-days lost due to strikes in Canada were as result of benefit and 
wage disputes, including the 69-day City of Moose Jaw, Saskatchewan, 
municipal worker strike over pensions. 
56 Pension improvements were the 
major issue during the 110 day lockout of municipal employees in Bathurst, 
New Brunswick, in 1983-1984.. Recent strikes in France and Sweden were 
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fuelled by the dissatisfaction of young workers with higher pension 
contributions. Pensions under conditions of collective bargaining, as 
indicated by these examples, can become a disruptive issue within the 
industrial relations system. 
The structural dynamic outlined in the preceding analysis suggests 
that accelerating pension costs in the future, because of the impact on 
distributive bargaining between labour and capital, are likely , 
to have an 
increasingly destablizing affect on the industrial relations system. 
Occupational pension plans under conditions of collective bargaining also 
impact on a series of power issues which have a similar effect. 
5.6 Power Issues: The Right to Control 
Collective bargaining within the formal framework of the 
industrial relations system is primarily concerned with the distribution of 
monetary compensation and power between labour and capital. This 
generates forces for conflict as well as for accommodation. Power cements 
the industrial relations system and collective bargaining relationships 
together. Power within the collective bargaining relationship relates to and 
signifies the ability or inability of one party to impose its will on the other. 
Conversely, power is the ability or inability of one party to resist. Under 
conditions of collective bargaining in a capitalist political economy, power 
is the ability or "right" of management or labour to control conditions of 
employment. The power to control therefore manifests itself through 
specific bargaining issues. 
Power, inequality and ideology, as Hyman and Brough argue, are 
57 
closely interconnected. The inequality of power between unions and 
management with respect to occupational pension plans under conditions of 
collective bargaining has generated manifest and latent tensions which may 
further disrupt the industrial relations system in the future. Here certain 
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limitations of the private' pension system are identified and examined as 
they relate to the collective bargaining power relationship. The power 
issues dealt with here are all associated in one form or another with the 
scope of collective bargaining and the ability of the union to carry out its 
social security function. Power issues in general, including those 
specifically associated' with occupational pension plans, go to the heart of 
the modern union's organizational imperatives and the distribution of power 
within the collective' bargaining relationship. 
5.6.1 Negotiability and Recognition: The Scope of Bargaining. 
The right of a union to negotiate pension arrangements as a condition of 
employment is a fundamental issue related to the recognition of the union in 
law as a representative of the individual trade union pension plan member. 
These issues are of particular relevance to the highly legalistic North 
American industrial relations. system. 
Since the ruling of the U. S. National Labour Relations Board in 
the 1949 Inland Steel case, pensions were deemed to be wages, and hence an 
appropriate and mandatory subject for collective bargaining. Failure to 
negotiate pension arrangements is deemed to be "bad faith bargaining" and 
an "unfair labour, practice". In Canada, however, whether pensions in the 
private sector are a mandatory subject for negotiations is a gray area of the 
labour law. There are in Canada no labour board, grievance arbitration or 
court cases ruling that pensions are a mandatory subject for negotiations. 
The distinction between U. S. and Canadian jurisprudence turns on whether 
pensions are deemed to be "deferred wage'. U. S. jurisprudence clearly 
recognizes the deferred wage doctine; however, Canadian labour law is 
silent on _the 
subject. 
58 Effectively this means that, management in the 
private sector, is under no compulsion to negotiate pension arrangements. In 
the public sector, pensions are often excluded by legislation from the scope 
of negotiable issues. This has the effect of narrowing the scope of 
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collective bargaining in both the private and public sectors. A consequence 
of this situation is that unions in Canada must rely on their bargaining 
strength - power - to deal with pension matters. Such an approach results in 
making the pension issue all that more volatile in the future, particularly 
with an aging labour force. 
A related problem is the latent conflict in Canada between the 
pension and labour relations legislation as it pertains to the recognition of 
unions to deal with pension matters. Pension legislation only recognizes the 
individual employee-employer relationship, but does not recognize the 
collective union-employer relationship existent under labour law. The 
failure of the various jurisdictions' Pension Benefits Act with respect to 
recognizing a bona fide bargaining agent as the legal representative or 
agent acting on behalf of individual employees stems from the earlier 
paternalistic attitude when a pension was a "gratuity", and hence a private 
matter between the individual employee and employer. Under conditions of 
collective bargaining, however, group rights are generally recognized as 
superseding individual rights. In law, the union has the legal right to 
represent individual employees in matters pertaining to labour relations such 
as pensions. It is the union, not the individual, which negotiates pension 
arrangements. The union, in law, however, also has certain obligations with 
which it must comply such as the duty of "fair representation", or financial 
disclosure to individuals concerning health and welfare plans, for example, 
under section 76(a)(3) of the Ontario Labour Relations Act. 
The tension arises in as much as the pension legislation 
completely circumvents the union, while the union is accountable to 
individual members under the labour relations legislation. Thus the union 
has the responsibility to represent, or act on behalf of, the individual 
regarding labour relations matters such as pensions, but has no independent 
rights or powers to carry out its obligations. This situation has serious 
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members. There is no legal requirement for them to do so. Most pension 
plans in Canada are deemed to be an unilateral management right, shrouded 
in secrecy, so neither unions nor employees are entitled to receive 
information about them. Many employers administer the pension fund, even 
if it is a'-contributory plan,. as if it were their own feudal fiefdom. 
According to one survey, fewer than 20 per cent of all pension plans in 
Canada provided members with a summary of investments and only 12 per 
cent of-plans supplied information regarding the actuarial position of the 
plan. 
59 Under conditions of "collective bargaining, the reality of the 
situation is that many employers refuse to even supply the union with such 
rudimentary information as the plan text, or trust document. In Ontario in 
1976, - for example, - one major -public sector employer with 60,000 pension 
plan members refused to file -a copy of the plan text with the union for 
review. -<<- 
In most : jurisdictions under the Pension Benefits Act, with the 
notable exception of Manitoba and Quebec, pension plan administrators are 
only required to issue a popularized informational brochure to employees, 
who are restricted to making extracts of the plan at the offices of -the 
pension authority. 
60 Furthermore, an employee is not entitled to a 
pension statement except on termination of employment or membership in 
the plan. The current, legislation in most jurisdictions makes no provision 
for a union representing employees to acquire pension plan information 
directly and independently except as "authorized in writing" from -a plan 
member. 
61 During the many hearings dealing with pension reform in 
Canada in recent years, one of the most frequently cited frustrations and 
complaints made by trade union representatives is the lack of disclosure and 
the inaccessability of information., concerning negotiated 
employer-sponsored pension plans. The disclosure of pension plan 
information . is a minimum requirement for intelligent and informed 
-173- 
collective bargaining. The lack of disclosure concerning pension plan 
information by employers mirrors an antiquated paternalism and reflects an 
arrogance based on the unilateral exercise of power. 
The situation in Canada stands in marked contrast to that which 
has evolved in the United States -and Britain. As early as 1942 the U. S. 
National Labour Relations Board, ruled, and various court decisions upheld, 
that an employer must furnish the union with all the information necessary 
for bargaining on pension matters. 
62 
- The Welfare and Pension Plans 
Disclosure Act 1958 required the public filing of pension plan information. 
These provisions were subsequently incorporated into and broadened under 
the Employee, Retirement Income Security Act 1974. In Britain, -disclosure 
of pension scheme information to plan members was a result of early 
legislative intervention. 63 The Occupational Pensions Board report upon 
which the Labour government based its 1976 white paper, broadened the 
thrust by recommending that unions receive all pertinent information and 
complete disclosure of pension scheme activities. 
64 "Occupational 
pension schemes exist for the benefit of their members, " the white paper 
noted, and "members of a scheme ought to be given all the information 
necessary., 
65 Significantly, the legislation would have provided that 
"independent recognized trade unions with members in a scheme will have 
the same right to information... as the members themselves", 66 thus 
avoiding the quandry that exists in Canada. Despite the fact that the 
legislation was never enacted it nevertheless had a very real "threat 
effect'. This has resulted in the voluntary disclosure of pension plan 
information by employers. 
67 An official of the Trades Union Congress 
(TUC) concluded that the contemplated legislation had "some effect". 
68 
A representative of the Transport and General Workerß Union (TGWU) 
reported that they generally had "no trouble getting costing and actuarial 
reviews" and that "investment data is available" as well. 
69 The Head of 
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the Pensions and Social Services Department of the General and Municipal 
Workers' Union (GMWU) summed up the situation in an interview by saying 
that there was no longer a "real problem". 
7° 
The lack of disclosure of pension plan information in Canada is 
viewed by organized labour as a general limitation of the-private pension 
system. In this sense it is perceived as a public policy issue. Under 
conditions of collective' bargaining, however, it is viewed as a very real 
problem which inhibits unions from effectively doing their job and advancing 
the welfare of their membership. The issue 'is viewed as an institutional 
challenge to the union. Underlying this issue, perhaps above all else, is a 
sense of inequity and injustice. This makes pension plan information 
disclosure a volatile issue within the collective bargaining arena. 
5.6.3 Post-Retirement Negotiations. The rapid inflation of the 
1970s has eroded the fixed income of former union members who have 
retired. This has placed North American unions in a contradictory situation 
in that they are caught between the demands of their actively employed 
members and retired former members, in one instance, and are limited with 
respect to their scope of action by the current interpretation of labour law 
in another. 
In North America, decisions by the U. S. National Labour 
Relations Board (1966) and Supreme Court (1971), 
71 
and the British 
Columbia Labour Relations Board (1977) 
72 in Canada, have ruled that a 
union can only legally represent and negotiate on behalf of actively 
employed employees of an employer. Because a union has no legal right to 
represent its retired former members, the negotiation of post-retirement 
adjustments has been deemed a permissive, rather than a mandatory, subject 
for collective bargaining. This has meant in practice that improved 
post-retirement benefits can only be negotiated by the mutual consent of 
the parties to a collective agreement. Only a few unions such as the United 
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Auto Workers (UAW), United Steel Workers (USWA) and the International 
Woodworkers of America (IWA) have been successful in this regard. While 
bargaining on behalf of retired members is possible under Britain's 
voluntaristic industrial relations system, the General and Municipal Workers' 
Union reports "no real progress in concrete terms, " because the cost 
associated with post-retirement- improvements "is part of the total 
package: "73 
This situation creates a dilemma for unions in terms of 
distributive and intra-organizational bargaining. Pressures force unions to 
"trade-off' pension gains against more immediate monetary concerns. 
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This exacerbates the not, so. latent sectional (intra-class) tension between 
actively employed union members and retired members. It is interesting to 
note in this regard that while, the U. S. Supreme Court held that retirees do 
not share a community, of interest with actively employed union ý members, 
the B. C. Labour Relations Board arrived at the opposite conclusion. 
Deeming the negotiation of post-retirement adjustments a permissive 
subject for collective bargaining results in compounding this tension because 
retired union members are becoming better organized and more vocal within 
their unions. 
Unions in North America. and Britain have attempted to provide 
for some of the retirement . needs , of their 
former members, including 
low-cost housing, health clinics, senior citizens' homes and retired workers' 
chapters. In North America the United Auto Workers (UAW), International 
Association of Machinists (IAM), International Ladies Garment Workers' 
Union (ILGWU) and the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE) are 
examples of unions which have established retired workers' locals. In Britain 
union practices vary. In the giant Transport and General Workers' Union 
(TGWU), former members are organized into, a T&G Retired Members' 
Association. While they have no formal representation on bargaining 
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committees, 'their - views are' made - known through the Association. 
According to one source the 'T&G' are very strong on pensioners! ', 
75 
as is 
Jack Jones the former head "of the TGWU. 
76 
As a result of inflation, internal political pressures and their own 
organizational imperatives, unions are under increasing compulsion to 
negotiate post-retirement adjustments for their retired former members. 
Because of legal precedent k in North America and the voluntaristic 
negotiating framework " in Britain, however, unions must rely on their 
bargaining strength to force employers to deal with this issue. An aging 
labour force, and an uncertain inflationary climate in the future, may propel 
labour and management towards each other. The power issues' associated 
with pensions under conditions of bargaining - the negotiability of pensions, 
union, recognition, disclosure of information, and post-retirement 
adjustments - are all related to the union's scope of collective bargaining 
and its ability to effectively control conditions of employment. Equity is 
similarly related to the distribution of power under conditions of collective 
bargaining. 
5.7 Equity: The Adjudication of Pension Disputes 
Management's control over occupational pension plans, as a result 
of the inequitable distribution of power under conditions of collective 
bargaining, becomes an equity issue as it affects the administration of the 
pension plan. Few occupational pension plans in Canada or Britain have a 
formal procedure whereby a dispute between a plan member or beneficiary 
and the plan administrators or trustees for benefit claims can be resolved. 
Most occupational pension plans, even those which are negotiated and 
contributory, explicitly state that the decisions of management-appointed 
plan - administrators are "final i and binding". - Simply, most 
employer-sponsored pension plans do not 'have an appeals procedure to 
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challenge or redress administrative decisions concerning the determination 
of retirement, survivors' and disability (invalidity) benefits. An employee, 
or beneficiary, is thus denied administrative review and natural justice. 
While an individual may choose civil litigation to resolve a dispute, it is a 
lengthy and costly process. ,.. 
. 
The. purpose of a grievance and adjudication (arbitration) 
procedure for pension and other employee benefit plan disputes is the same 
as for any other matter falling within the scope of a legally binding 
collective agreement, that is, to interpret and administer. the collective 
agreement. Two distinct approaches to employee benefit plan adjudication 
have developed. First, the pension plan is "incorporated by reference" into 
the collective agreement. The normal grievance and arbitration procedure 
in the collective agreement is then used . to resolve any pension plan or 
employee benefit dispute in precisely the same way as it would be used for 
any other issue falling within the scope of the agreement. This, is the 
approach which has been used in heavy industry. in North America. The 
second method is to include an adjudication procedure in the pension plan's 
trust deed. This latter procedure is most commonly used in the United 
States. 
The need for an adjudication procedure to protect the rights and 
benefits of all pension plan members was recognized and Introduced in the 
U. S. Employee Retirement Income Security Act 1974 which stipulated that 
all private pensions and welfare plans must establish a procedure to "afford 
a reasonable opportunity. to any participant , whose claim for benef its has 
been denied for a full and fair review... of the decision denying, this claim. " 
U. S. Department of Labour Regulation 2560.2 implementing section 1133 of 
ERISA provides that a "claims procedure which is established and 
maintained pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement and... includes 
provision for binding arbitration of an appeal... will be deemed a reasonable 
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claim procedure. " For those occupational pension plans in the United States 
which do not have a formal adjudication procedure, the International 
Foundation of Employee Benefits and the American Arbitration Association 
have developed a set of rules and procedures. 
77 In Britain, where 
grievance arbitration is relatively undeveloped compared to the highly 
legalistic North American industrial relations system, the Trades Union 
Congress (TUC) has endorsed pension plan adjudication noting that, 
problems are bound to arise concerning the ... 
[pension] 
scheme, and a formal procedure must be established to 
deal with any that cannot be sorted out... The most 
satisfactory method woyi be to refer the matter to 
independent arbitration. 
While some unions such as the TGWU have used ad hoc pension plan 
adjudication in the past, this has been the exception. 
The private pension system in order to remain viable must be 
perceived by occupational pension plan members as being equitable and 
responsive to their needs. The public pension system, and other social 
welfare programs, in most countries have an appeals procedure to challenge 
administrative decisions. An adjudication procedure, in one form or 
another, exists within most collective bargaining arrangements with respect 
to other conditions of employment. The administrative inequities of the 
private pension system, such as the lack of an appeals procedure, are 
fundamentally related to the maldistribution of power between labour and 
management under existent collective bargaining arrangements. 
The limitations of the private pension system under conditions of 
collective bargaining as represented by cost, power and equity issues inject, 
albeit for different reasons, a destabilizing and volatile element into the 
industrial relations system. Many of the structural pressures underlying 
these issues will increase in the future. Matters related to cost, power, 
equity and control, however, converge into one potentially explosive issue - 
the co-management of pensions. 
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5.8 Flashpoint: The Co-Management of Pensions 
The co-management of occupational pensions under collective 
bargaining poses important issues related to the unilateral management and 
control of pension arrangements: control over pension assets, investment 
strategy, - portfolio composition, structures 
for co-management, the fusion 
between pension fund and corporate management, the nature of the union 
social security function and the democratization of the workplace. Within 
the formal industrial relations system, the co-management of pensions under 
collective bargaining contains within it a contradictory potential for either 
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conflict or incorporation. 
The co-management of occupational pension plans is 
fundamentally a power issue under conditions of collective bargaining as it 
relates to the enormous concentration of assets under the control of the 
private pension industry and dominant financial institutions. This is dealt 
with in Chapter 8. It is suggested that the corporate sector will resist any 
serious co-management of pensions with unions for two reasons. First, the 
co-management of pension- funds represents an encroachment on 
management's unilateral right to control occupational pension plans. In 
effect, co-management of pensions represents a broadening of the scope of 
collective bargaining and a widening of concurrent powers, resulting in a 
redistribution of power within the bargaining relationship. Second, the 
co-management of pensions places a limitation on the unilateral right of 
organized capital to direct private investment. Pension funds have a 
considerable impact on the operation of capital markets as will be 
demonstrated in Chapter 7. The co-management of pensions - 
administrative operation and investment management - is of concern to all 
of organized capital because pension funds are financial intermediaries and 
institutional investors linking the finance and industrial sectors of the 
economy. This is dealt with in Chapters 6 and 9. Therefore, the 
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co-management of pensions affects the general interests of all capital, as 
well as being a specific issue under conditions of collective bargaining. 
5.8.1 Unilateral Management Control of Pensions. Unions and 
workers in Canada, Britain and the United States have virtually no 
involvement with or control over the administration or investment decisions 
affecting employer-sponsored occupational pension plans. The anatomy of 
control has been described as follows 
financial control has been delegated by ... employers to 
the banker-trustee [trust companies in Canada], which 
exercise considerable power in capital markets as a 
result. The employer controls the ... operation of the 
plan... in [some] cases in accordance with a basic 
agreement... with a union. The employee himself, 
without his union, has little or nothing to say$$bout the 
pension which is financed out of his earnings. 
While "the beneficiary of a"pension is the true owner of the property, " one 
banker wryly noted, "he can't act as an owner - so he has a lot of people 
acting on his behalf. "81 The pension beneficiary - plan member-is-in the 
hands of his pension guardians-the employer, plan trustees, the state, and 
occassionally his union. According to Harbrecht, "beneficiaries are the 
group who have the least influence upon the formulation of pension trust 
policy. "82 
Unions in reality exert little influence, or control over 
occupational pension plans. Employers retain ultimate and effective 
unilateral control. In, Canada in 1979 only 7 per cent of all collective 
agreements covering 11 per cent of employees had any arrangement for 
joint union-management control of the occupational pension plan. 
83 
Only 
a few private ' sector unions, -such as the construction trades, have jointly 
trusteed pension plans. A number of large public sector plans, however, 
have a joint labour-management pension committee which acts in a 
consultative capacity. Section 302 was added to the 1947 U. S. Taft-Hartley 
Act to specifically prohibit unions. from obtaining exclusive power over 
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multi-employer pension plans. According to one U. S. study in the 
mid-1950s, about four-fifths of all employees were in pension plans where 
the employer had ultimate control. 
84 A subsequent 1973 Ü. S. Department 
of Labor survey found that only 9 per cent of all pension plans covering 30 
per cent of members in bargaining units of over 500 employees had joint 
union-management administration of the pension plan. 
85 In Britain there 
has been a consultative tradition in the public sector based on the Whitley 
Councils since World War I. This was extended to nationalized industry, 
such as the National Coil Board, British Rail and the British Steel 
Corporation after World War II. Only 18 per cent Of all pension scheme 
members in the public sector, however, are in a plan where there is a joint 
management committee, and -a mere 10 per cent are covered by "such an 
arrangement in the private sector. 
86 According to the National 
Association of Pension Fund survey (1978) only 2 per cent of all scheme 
trustees are nominated by an independant trade union, 12 per cent are 
elected by plan members, ' and 74 per cent are nominated by 'the 
employer. 
87 These data indicate that there is little effective 
involvement or control by unions of occupational pension plan administration 
or investment management. 
The primary objective of an occupational pension plan should be 
to ensure that 'the pension is adequately funded, that workers' equity in the 
plan is protected and that workers receive the maximum retirement income 
possible given the prudent management of the fund. The goal of adequate 
retirement income is contingent upon the extent to which these conditions 
are fulfilled. Under conditions of collective bargaining the co-management 
of pensions is'a way of ensuring that these conditions are met. 
The reasons' for the co-management of pensions may I be' 
summarized as follows. 
88 - First, money in pension ' plans, whether 
contributory or non-contributory, belongs to workers. It is "part of their 
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compensation within the deferred wage doctrine. The United Auto Workers 
as early. as 1949 and the American Federation of Labor (AFL) in the 
mid-1950s took the position that there should be equal labour-management 
representation of trusteed pension plans based on the deferred wage 
doctrine. 89 The deferred wage theory involves "the issue of who shall 
control the operations of the pension program, " because "it becomes the 
legitimate concern of the. worker to see that his expectancy is safeguarded 
and preserved. "90 _ 
A second consideration is that there are reasons to believe that 
many pension funds administered by employers are not managed in the best 
interests of employees, but rather are an indirect source of profit for the 
firm, that is, private sector occupational pension plans are managed in 
accordance with the "profit-center" , theory, of management, where each 
operation of a corporation is required to show a profit. The pension fund is 
treated as a mutual fund (with a surplus or deficit net asset value) that 
results in lower pension contributions, for the firm if the rate of return is 
good and higher contributions if performance is poor. In Britain 
"self-dealing" or "auto-financing", that is, where a pension fund holds a 
disproportionate quantity of the plan sponsors financial securities is all too 
common. Pension funds have been used as well, to promote or inhibit 
corporate acquisitions and take-overs such as the Unilever pension fund's 
backing of Sprey Investment's diversified activities in the early 1970s or 
Grumman Aircraft's use of its pension fund to thrwart a 1981 take-over bid 
by LTV. Public sector pension funds are known to be a "dumping ground" for 
low interest bonds and are characterized by a high debt-low equity asset 
mix ratio, resulting in a lack of portfolio diversification. The Toronto 
Police Benefit Fund and the giant Ontario. Municipal Employee Retirement 
System (OMERS) in the late 1960s are examples of these practices. In 
addition, public sector pension plans engage in extensive "self-dealing", that 
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is, buying their own government bonds to finance current government 
expenditures; reciprocal "bond swaps" between state and local retirement 
systems in the U. S. are a common practice. "Churning" public and private 
sector pension- funds by investment managers, that is, unnecessary 
transactions to generate brokerage commissions is an all too frequent 
practice. 
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Third, unless employees are protected by a union in a 
co-management arrangement there is no assurance that their pension rights 
and entitlements will be safeguarded. The co-management of pensions 
establishes a system of cheques and balances within the pension program. 
The union can then act in a "watch dog" capacity with respect to pension 
plan administration regarding such equity issues as pension plan disclosure 
and adjudication, as previously examined. In addition, the union can oversee 
and influence such cost related issues as investment management and 
performance measurement, commissions, actuarial 
assumptions and funding 
levels. It is known, for example, that aI percentage point difference in the 
rate of return on investment can result in a 15 to 20 per cent difference in 
employer contributions or retirement benefits to employees. The 
co-management of pensions has positive features, as McNulty has 
concluded, with respect to the security of pension benefits. 
92 
The fourth reason for the co-management of pension is that it 
serves a democratizing and educational function. The co-management of 
pensions represents the extension of political democracy to the work place. 
Co-management of pensions, like collective bargaining more generally, 
restricts the scope and exercise of unilateral management rights. The 
educational process would be enhanced if workers could turn to union 
representatives among themselves who were knowledgeable and involved 
with the administration and planning of occupational pension arrangements 
and were familiar with its technical aspects. Union involvement in the 
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management of occupational pension plans therefore has clear implications 
for power, cost and equity under conditions of collective bargaining. 
5.8.2 The State and Co-Management of Pensions. In recent years 
in Britain and Canada the co-management of occupational pensions has been 
advanced as part of a broader industrial relations strategy. The initial 
impetus in Britain came from The Social Security Pensions Act 1975, which 
required management to "consult' with unions in respect of occupational 
pension schemes "contracting-out" from the state plan. Subsequently the 
Labour government in 1976 issued its white paper on Occupational Pension 
Schemes - The Role of Members in the Running of Schemes, which 
recommended the co-management of pensions in the private sector through 
legislated, compulsory union-management committees, 'with'' equal 
representation from both parties. 
93 The white paper took the position 
that "workers want to play their part, in accordance with modem ideas of 
industrial democracy" and because pensions represent the "deferred pay of 
the ý workers concerned" occupational pension schemes should not "exclude 
independent trade unions from the administration of the scheme. "94 The 
legislation subsequently died. 
In Canada there have been two federal government initiatives, or 
"trial balloons", regarding the co-management of pension funds. The first 
occasion was in 1973 when the Minister of Urban Affairs urged unions to 
press for a stronger voice in pension fund investment policies to channel 
money into housing. 
95 Subsequently, the federal Minister of Labour in a 
June 1977 speech to the International Pension Conference advocated the 
joint trusteeship of occupational pension plans saying'that "there has been 
quite a lot of interest in the idea of joint participation by labour and 
management in' corporate decision-making... Along these lines we are 
looking at the case for joint employer-employee trusteeship of private 
pension plans. ' 
96 
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The motivation and ideological legitimization advanced by 
government in Britain and Canada for the co-management of pensions, 
however, was quite different. The Labour government couched its advocacy 
in the Fabian tradition stating that "the proposals... are to be seen... in the 
context of the government's wider commitment to... extending employee 
participation. "97 In, Canada the co-management -of pensions was viewed 
as a pragmatic "crisis management' technique and part of integrative 
bargaining ' which "should be promoted as a way of reducing confrontation 
over pension issues at the bargaining table. "98 
5.8.3 Corporate Sector and Co-Management of Pensions. The 
corporate sector in Britain and Canada have responded in a similar manner 
to government initiatives and pressures from organized labour regarding the 
co-management of pensions. In Britain the Labour government's white paper 
came under vigorous attack from the private pension industry and business 
community. The National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF), 
representing major corporate pension plans stated that "many funds are 
angry at the prospect of trade union officials... having a major say in the 
investment of funds, while non-union members of the scheme would have no 
representation. "99 Speaking , 
on behalf. of the private sector the 
Confederation of British Industry (CBI) predicted grave and dire 
consequences because 
moves to give trade unions control of pension funds 
are as dangerous to Britain as schemes to nationalize 
banks and insurance companies... the pension fund 
proposals... give, _,, unions power to dominate the financial scene. 
Both the NAPF and CBI countered with proposals for employee, rather than 
union, participation on pension boards based on a voluntaristic 
(non-statutory) approach. Canadian employers have been receptive to the 
idea of the co-management of pensions. According to one survey, 75 per 
cent of management representatives indicated that corporate pension plans 
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should be jointly managed, compared with only 20 per cent who felt that the 
plan should be unilaterally controlled. Significantly, however, 71 per cent of 
corporate spokesman indicated that there should be "employee 
representatives apart from uniond', while only 19 per cent approved of 
employee representation through unions. 
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Two central concerns are evidenced by the corporate sector 
regarding the co-management of pensions. First, there is recognition of the 
size and importance of private pension funds and the implications of union 
involvement. While management is ready to "compromise" on pension plan 
administration, it is not prepared in general to entertain union involvement 
with respect to pension fund investment management. The right. to control 
and direct investment decisions, and the capital involved, is viewed as an 
absolute unilateral management right. Second,, management is prepared to 
accept employee representation only to the-extent that it is not backed by 
the institutional power of an independent trade union. The private sector's 
approach to the co-management, of pensions is essentially integrative or 
incorporationist in nature, that is, allowing unions to have participation but 
no power. 
5.8.4 Unions and Co-Management of Pensions. Labour centrals or 
confederations in Britain, Canada and the United States, and their largest 
affiliates, have promoted the co-management of pensions with increasing 
aggressiveness in recent years. Labour's advocacy of an independent trade 
union role, including equal representation and power sharing, in all matters 
related to pension plan management - administrative and investment - will 
collide with management's integrative approach. This will transform the 
co-management of pensions into a power issue under conditions of collective 
bargaining. 
The policy of the British Trades Union Congress (TUC) is that "the 
scheme should be run jointly by the employers and the employees through 
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their trade unions... so that ... union representatives can prevent action 
being taken against the interests of the membe rs. "102 Major TUC 
affiliates such as the Transport and the General Workers! Union (TGWU), the 
General and Municipal Workers' Union (GMWU), the Association of 
Scientific, Technical and Management Staffs (ASTMS), and the Association 
of Professional, Executive, Clerical and Computer Staffs (APEX) are all 
increasingly turning their attention to the real sources of power `within the 
pension machinery = namely, the trustee and investment committees. They 
contemptuously dismiss any interest in advisory committees which are 
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described as "toothless wonders". The GMWU has the, most aggressive 
and articulate pension policy which states that "we must ... establish 
pensions as an area of _ collective bargaining" and must "work towards an 
adequate number of employee representatives on pension fund management 
boards. " The GMWU "will not countenance any attempt to limit the 
activities of member. trustees to a secondary role" and demands that 
"occaptional pension schemes should, be jointly managed. " 
104 The TGWU 
and GMWU have scored breakthroughs in their bargaining relationship with 
Ford, ICL, Thorne, ICI and Pilkington's on this issue. 
The Canadian Labour, Congress (CLC)4 advocated employee 
participation in the administration of occupational pension plans as early as 
1975 and pressed this position before the Ontario Royal Commission on the 
Status of Pensions (1977). This position was reaffirmed at its 1978 
convention. 
105 The Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE), 'the 
largest union in the country, passed a 1977 convention resolution advocating 
"a program to' challenge the assumed right of the employer to unilaterally 
administer the pension funds derived from employee... contributions., 
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Resolutions were again passed at its 1983 and 1985 conventions on the 
subject. The United Steel Workers (Canadian region) in 1979 endorsed "the 
joint administration of pension plans, 'including the investment of pension 
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funds. " 107 The recent - public policy review of retirement 
income 
arrangements in Canada, however, has only dealt with this issue in a cursory 
fashion. In the U. S., the American Federation of Labour-Congress of 
Industrial Organizations 
I 
(AFL-CIO), United Auto Workers (UAW), United 
Steel Workers (USWA), and the International Association of Machinists (IAM) 
have all endorsed alternative social investment strategies. 
108 The 
co-management of pensions is now on the collective bargaining agenda in 
Britain, Canada and-the United States. 
5.8.5 Incorporation vs. Conflict. There are contradictory forces 
associated with the co-management of pensions under collective bargaining. 
These opposing tendencies may result in either conflict or incorporation. 
Structural pressures, however, will force unions to become increasingly 
more involved in the co-management of pensions. The co-management of 
pensions represents a direct assault upon and an encroachment into the area 
of unilateral management prerogatives. A parallel can be drawn between 
wage determination under collective bargaining and the co-management of 
pensions because 
employers see it as their right to control wages of all 
kind. Unions are allowed to negotiate levels but they 
cannot control wage[s]... employees therefore have as 
little right to control investment of the 
superannuation fund l85 they have to control other 
terms and conditions. 
The co-management of pensions therefore constitutes a general challenge to 
management's rights. , 
Management will. resist the demand for the co-management of 
pensions for three reasons. First, to allow unions either control or 
meaningful participation over pension fund capital and investment 
decision-making would be tantamount to relinguishing private direction and 
control of investment by organized capital. Second, the concentration and 
size of pension funds and their relationship to capital markets is of concern 
-189- 
to the broader finance sector and all of organized capital. The 
co-management of pension funds strikes at the heart of capitalism because 
it calls into question who should control capital and in whose interest 
investment decisions are made. Third, to the extent that pension funds are 
managed in accordance with the "profit-center" theory in the private sector 
or are used for current operating revenue in the public sector suggests that 
corporations and government will resist joint pension management in the 
same way that they would generally resist union participation in corporate 
planning or decision-making. 
The underlying economic logic is such, however, that unions may 
be driven to pursue the co-management of pensions as a political demand 
and strategy, particularly in the private sector. Unions may be forced to 
challenge management's right to manage in order to ensure the security of 
pension benefits. This is because the payment of occupational pension plan 
benefits in the final analysis is linked to the financial position and solvency 
of the corporation. As the President of the Institute of Actuaries (Britain) 
observed, 
what is crucial is the ability of the employer to fulfill 
his obligations and to increase his contributions 
whenever necessary. Solvency is therefore 
... inextricly bound up with the resources of the 
employer. 
This is of particular relevance to the majority of unions which have defined 
benefit pension plans. In periods of high inflation, negative real rates of 
return on pension fund investment, increasing unfunded pension liabilities, 
unemployment and corporate mergers, if there is an investment short-fall in 
a defined benefit plan, the employer is required to make additional 
contributions to maintain the solvency of the pension plan. This suggests 
that workers and unions most not ' only be interested in pension fund 
management and investment performance, but as well must be concerned 
with the general management of the firm or industry to ensure that they are 
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financially viable in order to maintain the solvency of the occupational 
pension plan. To maintain the security of pension benefits may therefore 
require broader union involvement in corporate affairs. For unions the issue 
of pension fund management may become integrated and fused with 
concerns related to the broader management of the corporation. Thus the 
co-management of pensions as a narrow collective bargaining issue may be 
transformed into a broader political demand for industrial democracy. 
The demand by unions for the co-management of pensions is 
progressive at this particular historical juncture, according to Ward, because 
"pensions have been treated paternalistically and controlled exclusively by 
managements. Member participation is an actual extension of power, and it 
cannot be argued that it is an illusion. ""' The extent to which trade 
unions aggressively pursue the co-management of pensions as a collective 
bargaining objective will ultimately require unions to transform this demand 
into a political strategy. The underlying economic dynamic which requires 
unions to be concerned with pension fund management and investment 
decision-making, will also require them to become concerned and involved 
with the functions of corporate management in order to protect the security 
of negotiated pension benefits. The co-management of pensions identifies 
many fundamental power and economic relationships, as well as challenging 
important vested interests. For these reasons it is a volatile issue under 
conditions of collective bargaining. 
5.9 Implications of the Private Pension System's Limitations Under 
Conditions of Collective Bargaining 
The issues of cost, power, equity and co-management as 
limitations of the private pension system under conditions of collective 
bargaining have far reaching implications over the long-term for the 
stability of collective bargaining relationships and the industrial relations 
system in Canada, Britain and the U. S. The industrial relations system is 
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linked to the political economy of pensions through the negotiation of 
pension arrangements by unions. A corollary is that 52 to 81 per cent of all 
trade union members in Britain, Canada and the United States are covered 
by an employer-sponsored occupational pension plan, representing 45 to 60 
per cent of all private pension system members. The specific limitations of 
the private pension system under conditions of collective bargaining, 
therefore, affect the interests of an organized and concentrated section of 
the labour force. 
The implications of the collective bargaining related limitations 
of the private pension system are briefly reviewed and summarized as 
follows. The cost of 'employee benefits and employer-sponsored 
occupational pension plans have increased significantly in the post-war 
period. Employee benefit costs now represent on average one-third of gross 
payroll in these countries. Total pension costs 'for the private and public 
pension systems are the single largest and most costly employer expenditure 
within the total compensation package, representing nearly 7 to 13 per cent 
of gross payroll and 20 to 47 per cent' of total employee benefit costs, 
depending upon the country. The cost associated with occupational pension 
plans and employee benefits has 
considerably exceeded wage growth in the 
past thirty years. Under' conditions of collective bargaining, expenditures on 
employee benefits and occupational pensions are significantly greater'than 
for non-unionized firms. There are strong reasons which suggest that 
employers and workers will be faced by increasing total pension 
contributions and costs in the future. Those reasons include inflation, poor 
investment performance, improved benefit levels, mounting unfunded 
pension liabilities, population aging and the cost of private and public sector 
pension reform. ' 
The significance of increasing pensions costs is that under 
conditions of collective bargaining a total compensation costing approach is 
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used with respect to labour remuneration, wages and employee benefit costs 
being interchangeable given finite resources. This has implications for 
distributive, bargaining between labour and management and for internal 
bargaining . within the union. 
In the -first instance, increasing pension costs 
conflict with corporate cost minimization behaviour and reduces current 
consumption (take-home pay) for workers. Rising pension costs generate a 
downward pressure on both profit margins and real wages. To the extent 
that unions attempt- to maximize. their social, welfare function by 
"shifting-back" the increased. cost of pensions to corporations so as to 
protect the standard of living of their membership, this will conflict with 
management's cost discipline,. imperative. Second, management's total 
compensation approach to collective bargaining imposes resource allocation 
decisions upon the, union, in particular the level and distribution of 
compensation between salary and employee benefits, including occupational 
pensions, and the distribution of welfare program costs within the employee 
benefit package. This already existent tension within the bargaining 
relationship is sharpened as a result of employee benefit and pension costs 
exceeding the growth in wages and the expanding employee benefit package 
being rigid within the compensation structure. For the union, increasing 
total pension costs exacerbate the "trade-off" between direct (monetary) 
and indirect (deferred) compensation, since an increase in one results in a 
corresponding reduction in the other within a total compensation costing 
framework. 
There are implications as well for the union as an institution and 
for intra-organizational bargaining. The union must reconcile the different 
generational priorities of its members: direct monetary compensation for 
today's young workers and deferred compensation in the form of pension 
improvements for the increasing proportion of older workers. While the 
aging of the labour force may result in a shift in bargaining priorities, thus 
-193- 
decreasing this internal union tension, there is no indication that the 
unionized labour force will be prepared to reduce its current consumption 
and standard of living for deferred compensation in the future. The aging 
labour force with its increased concern for retirement income may demand 
both increased wages ` and improved pensions. As a' result of increasing 
pension costs, unions as welfare institutions with their own 'organizational 
imperatives may come into conflict with the corporate sector over the level 
and distribution of total 'compensation, with the state over rising public 
pension plan' contributions, and possibly their own membership as union 
leaders attempt "to protect the members from themselves". 
Power, equity and ideology ` are interrelated in the industrial 
relations system. 'The unilateral control of occupational pension *plans by 
employers' is a reflection' of this imbalance in 'the distribution' of power 
between labour and management under conditions of collective bargaining. 
Such matters as the absence of the formal right by - unions to ' negotiate 
pension arrangements, the lack of disclosure about pension plan information, 
legal restrictions with respect to negotiating post-retirement improvements, 
and the lack of an appeals procedure are all power issues under current 
collective bargaining arrangements. These issues restrict the scope of 
collective bargaining, reduce the effectiveness of the union as a, welfare 
institution, and challenge' the organizational imperatives and power of the 
union. These latent issues' will become more evident, and potentially 
disruptive, as 'the labour force ages and the pension issue becomes more 
central to collective bargaining in the future. 
The co-management of pensions may become 'the flashpoint for 
the private pension system under conditions of collective bargaining because 
issues related to power, control, cost and equity converge. The 
co-management of pensions as a bargaining' issue identifies and: impinges 
upon a number of crucial power and economic relationships in a capitalist 
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political economy - namely, unilateral management rights, the private 
control and direction of pension fund capital and investment 
decision-making, and the relationship between the private pension system, 
capital markets and the broader finance sector. Unions in Britain, Canada 
and the United States have in recent, years raised and pursued the 
co-management of pensions as a bargaining issue with increasing vigour. 
Unions will be required to sustain their interest in the co-management of 
pensions in order to ensure maximum retirement income for their members 
and the security of pension benefits. The aggressive pursuit of this issue by 
unions will- inevitably bring unions into conflict with the industrial and 
finance sectors as their vested interests are challenged. In turn, to guard 
the security of pension benefits may force unions to become more interested 
in corporate management so as to - protect the solvency of negotiated 
occupational pension plans. The co-management of pensions as a narrow 
collective bargaining issue may therefore evolve into a broader political 
demand and strategy for industrial democracy. 
Each of the specific limitations of the private pension system 
examined under conditions of collective bargaining has its own logic, or 
dynamic, which introduces an element of instability into the industrial 
relations system as a result of the way in which it impacts upon distributive 
bargaining between labour and capital and intra-organizational bargaining 
within the modern union. In general, the underlying structural pressures 
associated with most of these issues will be intensified in the future. 
Increasing pension costs and the power issues related to the co-management 
of pensions will be of particular importance as long-term considerations. 
The separate pension issues identified here are interactive. When combined 
with one another they may constitute a volatile "critical mass" of issues 
triggering a chain reaction, further heightening tensions in an already 
strained industrial relations system in advanced capitalist countries. 
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The universal and particularistic limitations of the private pension 
system, and the corresponding underdevelopment of the state pension 
system, resulting in the impoverishment and marginalization of the elderly, 
are ultimately related to a series of economic and power relationships based 
on the organization and imperatives of a capitalist economy. Under 
conditions of advanced capitalism, the private pension system's investment 
and capital accumulation function has been transformed from a latent to a 
manifest function so as to generate macro-economic investment and to 
supply investment capital to the corporate sector and social capital for the 
state to meet their respective finance requirements. The limitations of the 
private pension system in the final analysis are related to the role 
performed by pensions funds as institutional investors in the capital market, 
the power of private pension funds, and the private pension system's 
relationship to the corporate sector under conditions of advanced 
capitalism. These subjects are examined in the forthcoming chapters. 
CHAPTER 6 
THE PENSION SYSTEM 
SAVING, INVESTMENT AND CAPITAL ACCUMULATION FUNCTION 
"It is always the direct relation of the owners of the 
means of production to the direct producers which 
reveal the ... hidden foundation of the entire social 
structure ... The form of this relation ... corresponds 
to a definite stage in the development of labor and 
its social productivity. This does not prevent the 
same economic basis from showing infinite variations 
and gradations in its appearance even though its 
principal conditions are ... the same. " 
Karl Marx 
6.1 Introduction 
"Some institutions shape modern society, " Mills observed, "others 
adapt to it. "' In the post-war era institutional investors have increasingly 
influenced the course of economic events. Institutional investors, including 
pension funds, now occupy the "commanding heights" of the economy. In the 
future institutional investors and pension funds will exhibit an even more 
pronounced impact upon economic affairs. The economic function, 
structure and power associated with the private pension system under 
advanced capitalism are central to the political economy of pensions. These 
subjects are examined in Chapters 6 to 9. Because capital is the heart of 
capitalism, the private pension system is now integral to the functioning of 
that economic system and must be critically analysed. 
The central purpose of this chapter is to identify and investigate 
the private and public pension system's, manifest saving, investment and 
capital accumulation function under advanced capitalism. This is the 
pension system's functional locus of power. The, methodology followed in 
this chapter is to trace the stream of personal and gross savings channelled 
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through the pension system into gross and net investment for the economy. 
Under advanced capitalism there has been an institutionalization and 
socialization of retirement savings through the pension system, broadly 
defined, to supply the investment requirements of the macro-economy. 
A related topic is the transformation of the private pension 
4n 
system's saving, investment and capital accumulation function from a latent 
to a manifest function under advanced capitalism so as to channel 
investment capital to the private sector and social capital to the capitalist 
state. The private pension system's capital accumulation function is 
important not only for the private pension industry, but is critical for all of 
organized capital. This is because the private pension system's impact on 
saving, investment and capital accumulation affects the broad general 
interests of both financial and industrial capital. The overt economic 
function of the private pension system under conditions of advanced 
capitalism is to organize and channel investment capital to the corporate 
sector. As a result of the symbiotic relationship between the private 
pension system and the corporate sector, the direction and mode of pension 
reform is of considerable significance because it affects an important 
source of investment capital for the private sector. The increased 
appropriation of the discretionary savings of workers by the private pension 
industry as a source of investment capital for the corporate sector has been 
a protracted historical process. 
6.2 Historical Background: From Latent to Manifest Capital Accumulation 
Function 
The transformation of the private pension system's saving, 
investment and capital accumulation function. from a latent. to a manifest, 
or explicit, function under conditions of advanced capitalism mirrors the 
evolution of capitalist economies and the changing historical requirements 
of the corporate sector. The private pension industry in Britain, Canada and 
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the United States has exhibited a continuous and pronounced hostility to the 
expansion of the state social security system. The reasons for this 
antipathy, however, have changed as the relationship between the pension 
system and the capital accumulation process has become more explicit. 
In Britain between 1910, and 1911 the Combine, an association of 
life insurance companies lead by the gigantic Prudential Life, mounted a 
concerted campaign against. the health sections of the National Insurance 
Act 1911.2 According to Yeo' "it was up to then the most aggressive 
parliamentary - lobby mounted by capital. "3 The commercial insurance 
lobby's "enemy was not the state, but the originally designated operators of 
the national insurance plan, the British friendly societies. At that time it 
was private, not government, competition they sought to destroy. "4 The 
earlier proposed state-run contributory pension was opposed, as well, by the 
provident and friendly societies because it was viewed as a competitor for 
the savings of the working class. 
5 In general "despite earlier labour 
sentiment on the subject, private insurance outside the state system was 
left untrammeled. "6 
In the United States at the beginning of the century, according to 
Lubove, "a large number of private vested interests", such as Fredrick 
Hoffman of the Prudential Life Insurance Company (U. S. ), " viewed 
government sponsored social insurance arrangements "as a threat to their 
survival. "- Many industrial employers argued that a government pension 
program would restrict the role of the private pension system. 
8 
Suggestions that the United States emulate `a number of 'Western European 
countries and enact old-age assistance legislation met with considerable 
opposition. The U. S. Congress rejected bills introduced in 1909,1911 and 
1913.9 During the -1920s "the main reason for the failure" of the' social 
insurance movement "was the effective opposition inspired by business 
organizations" such as the Chamber of Commerce and the National 
Association of Manufacturers at the state level. 10 
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Public pensions -in Canada, according to Bryden, "were 
unmistakably stamped with the market ethos" as a result of the influence of 
the private pension industry. 
ll Opposition to -the introduction of an 
universal state retirement pension in Canada at the turn of the century 
resulted in the voluntary Annuity Act 1908 because the insurance industry 
"viewed government competition with disfavor. "12 The introduction of. 
the means-tested, flat-rate Old Age Survivors (OAS) pension was delayed 
until 1927, and was not made universal until 1952. Neither the 1951 Old Age 
Security Act nor the Old Age Assistance Act "was intended as a complete 
pension, but instead formed... a subsistence supplement. " 
13 The private 
pension industry- opposed the introduction of the earnings-related 
Canada/Quebec Pension Plans (C/QPPs) and tried "to block public-invasion 
of the contributory field" because of "the threat... which... was -posed for 
the ... sale of annuities and private pension plans. 
" 14 
The economic insecurity experienced by Canada's elderly is a 
result of the universal limitations of the private pension system and the 
underdevelopment of the public pension system. The reason for the current 
underdevelopment of the state pension system in Canada was made clear by 
the former federal Minister of Health and Welfare, the Honourable Monique 
Begin, when she candidly stated that "the Canada Pension Plan was designed 
in the 60's... for the very purpose of leaving the private sector the scope 
that it needed. " 
15 The private pension industry has been allowed to 
operate, by the welfare state so that it could retain its market share and 
protect its profits. The. underdevelopment of the public -pension system 
ensures the continued existence of the private pension industry. This not 
only reflects. the capitalist state's ideological bias, 
16 but, more 
fundamentally, mirrors the broader structural imperatives of a capitalist 
economy for saving, investment and capital accumulation. - 
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6.3 The Pension System's Manifest Capital Accumulation Function: Overview 
The role of the institutional investor in the United States and 
Britain has received considerable attention and study, but, little is known 
about the functioning and behaviour of institutional investors in Canada and 
their impact on the economy. 
17 The immense economic power 
concentrated in institutional investors, including pension funds, ultimately 
resides in their role as financial intermediaries and their ability to meet the 
investment requirements of the economy and the private profit-making 
corporate sector. 
The role of institutional investors and pension funds, as part of 
the finance sector, and their control over savings and the direction of 
investment is of considerable Importance for public policy as it relates to 
the reform of the retirement income system. The Government of 
Saskatchewan in its 1981 brief to the National Pensions Conference noted, 
for example, that pension 
funds are now sufficiently large to raise concerns 
regarding their impact on the efficient functioning of 
capital markets, and their effects on economic growth 
and development. 
Moreover, pension fund assets are largely 
controlled by relatively few actors -a small number of 
large, independent pension plans, the major trust 
companies, and the main insurance companies. This 
concentration of control, with its overlap to other 
major institutional investors - trust and insurance 
companies - reinforces concerns regarding the public 
policy implications of the growing power of Canada 
pension funds. 18 
The economic power of pension funds and the private pension system is 
substantial, as shall be demonstrated, and is certain to increase in the future. 
The private pension system fulfills a role, not only in the provision 
of retirement income, but is now a primary source of investment to augment 
private sector capital accumulation. Institutional investors and pension 
funds have assumed their preeminent position and economic power because 
they have acquired "the organized concentration of control over the 
'economic surplus'. " 
19 According to Clement 
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control over decisions about reallocating these funds 
gives those in command great power. By mobilizing 
the capital of others, the financial elite is the central 
node intermediating between accumulation and 
investment. It does not use its own capital; on the 
contrary, its specialty is gathering together the 
reserves of [workers] through such devices as pension 
funds, savings accounts, life insurance policies and 
other devices to centralize the control of reserve 
capital. This is the enormous power concentrated at 
the top of the institutions in the hands of the 
economic elite. 
The reserve capital channelled through financial intermediaries and 
institutional investors is of increasing importance to the corporate sector. 
In Britain, according to the Radcliffe Report, insurance companies and 
pension funds now "constitute by far the largest single source of new 
capital. "21 The role played by pension funds in supplying the finance 
requirements of the private sector is increasingly perceived and recognized 
by the business community. According to one major Canadian trust 
company, for example, "pension assets are an integral part of our 
socio-economic system and contribute substantially to... capital 
formation. "22 
The increasing economic power of pension funds is based on their 
pivotal role as financial intermediaries and institutional investors, with 
significant control over the economic surplus and reserve capital. In a 
capitalist economy the function of institutional investors, including pension 
funds, is to channel personal savings into investment for private sector 
capital accumulation and profits. Private pension funds as financial 
intermediaries and institutional investors therefore serve a crucial role in 
the circulation and reproduction model associated with a capitalist 
economy: saving, investment, capital accumulation and profits. 
6.4 The Savings Function 
Institutional investors, and pension funds as ,a "region" within the 
finance sector, are mobilizers of capital, linking savers and investors in the 
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economy. Banks, trust companies, life insurance companies and pension 
funds as financial intermediaries and institutional investors accumulate the 
savings of ordinary citizens into vast pools of money which are channeled as 
investment to the industrial and finance sectors of the economy. 
The economic and social implications of the private and state 
pension systems are of major consequence with respect to savings behaviour, 
investment, economic growth, the functioning of financial institutions, and 
the operation of capital markets. The private pension system has become 
"one of the principal means for channelling peoples' savings into industrial 
and commercial investment... and ... into securities to help finance public 
expenditure. "23 Saving and, investment through the pension system, 
broadly defined, becomes capital in the course of the macro-economic 
circulation and reproduction process. For workers, however, occupational 
pensions constitute no more than a form of forced savings, or at best a 
"deferred wage", because these funds are never used as their capital. 
24 
The economic power of pension funds is based on its control over 
savings or reserve capital. To establish the growing importance of the 
private pension system in supplying the investment and finance requirements 
of the private and public sectors, it is necessary to determine the sources, 
magnitude and extent of control over the savings available for investment 
purposes. 
In Canada between 1954-1956 and 1975-1977 personal saving as a 
proportion of gross saving increased significantly, while corporate saving 
declined (Table 6.1). Corporate saving, (retained earnings plus depreciation 
allowances) peaked in the mid-1970s and has steadily declined since that 
time. Concurrently, there has been a long-run decline in corporate 
liquidity. 
25 This has forced corporations to seek external sources of 
financing by the sale of stock (new or primary market equity issues), 
long-term debt (bond and mortgages) and short-term debt instruments (bank 
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TABLE 6.1 
COMPOSITION OF GROSS SAVING 
AS A PROPORTION OF GNP, 
BY SOURCE, CANADA, 
THREE-YEAR AVERAGES, 1954-1956 AND 1975-1977 
Sources 
of Gross Saving 
Personal Saving 
Corporate Saving 
Government Saving 
Foreign Saving - 
% of GNP 
1954-56 1975-77 
30.5 43.7 
45.1 41.0 
13.4 5.1 
10.8 10.6 
Percentage Change 
+43.3 
-9.1 
-61.9 
-1.9 
Source: ' Economic Council of Canada, One In Three: Pensions for Canadians to 
2030 (Hull: Canadian Government Publishing Centre, 19/9), table b--T. 
p. IR. 
loans, commercial paper and, so or. - This combination of events has placed 
the corporate sector under increasing strain to satisfy, its finance 
requirements. On this subject the Economic Council of Canada was to state 
that , 
since 1960, there has been a rise in the importance of 
savings by the personal and unincorporated business 
sector and ýa concomitant decline in they relative 
importance of corporate savings. The corporate 
sector has... been the largest user of funds and has 
consistently relied on the savings of the other sectors, 
notably on personal savings, in the, form of bonds, 
insurance and pension plans, and personal holdings of 
money. With rising inflation and the consequent drain 
on corporate liquidi2t', the magnitude of these 
borrowings has grown. 
Personal saving provided through institutional channels has increasingly been 
substituted for the relative decline in corporate saving for investment 
purposes. "Private pension plans, " according to the Economic Council of 
Canada, "will remain an important source of savings as the number of 
contributors grow and as more employees put larger amounts of current 
income aside. "27 The magnitude of and control over personal saving by 
institutional investors and pension, funds is therefore of considerable 
economic and social significance. 
To determine 
. the extent of the private pension system's control 
over the increasing proportion of personal saving (Table 6.1), it is necessary 
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to establish the relationship between net pension saving (contributions plus 
investment income minus benefits and administrative costs) and total 
personal saving, and net, pension saving and gross saving in the economy. 
The savings of the many in the personal sector become investment for the 
private sector. Financial intermediaries and institutional investors, such as 
pension funds, , 
link the personal to the corporate sector in terms of saving 
and investment behaviour. 
In order to facilitate this analysis a comparative time-series has 
been constructed for Canada, Britain and the United, States between 1960 
and 1980. Table 6.2 reports net private, public and total (private plus 
public) pension fund saving as. a proportion, of total personal saving. This 
indicator establishes the proportion of. total personal saving controlled by 
pension funds.. The method used here-is the "identified savinge' approach, 
rather than the "residual", approach. 
28. Imperfect information has 
required the use of somewhat different definitions of private pension saving 
in each of these countries. As well, personal retirement savings vehicles 
such as Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) . 
in the U. S. and Registered 
Retirement Savings Plans (RRSPs) in Canada are excluded. Pension saving 
is treated as "contractuar' (or compulsory) rather than as "discretionary" 
savings. For this reason it was deemed more appropriate to relate net 
pension saving to total personal saving rather than to personal disposable 
income. Table 6.3 presents net private, public and total (private and public) 
pension fund saving as a proportion of gross saving. This identifies the 
magnitude and importance of. net pension saving as a component of gross 
saving for investment. Background work for Tables 6.2 and 6.3 is presented 
in Appendix E. 
6.4.1 Pension Saving in Relation to Personal' Saving. Pension 
saving is a 'major component of personal savings and is increasingly 
channelled to the private sector for investment. The proportion of total 
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personal saving channelled through and controlled by the private and public 
pension systems is reported in Table 6.2. In this regard, the following may 
be noted with respect to net pension saving as a component of total personal 
saving. 
First, net pension saving under the domination of the private 
pension system is a significant component of total personal saving. For 
Canada and Britain, where complete- information is available, net private 
pension saving in 1980 represented 46 and 37 per cent of total personal 
saving respectively. This means that nearly one-third to one-half of all 
personal saving in these countries is channelled through and controlled by 
the private pension system. Between 1960 and 1980, in the case of Canada, 
net private pension saving increased from nearly 30 to 46 per cent of total 
personal saving, or by some 58 per cent. This is generally consistent with 
expanded occupational pension plan coverage and increasing employer and 
employee contributions during this period. In Britain, the relatively lower 
and fluctuating level of net private pension saving is most likely explained in 
terms of the absolute decline and stagnation in occupational pension scheme 
membership after 1967. 
Second, net pension saving from the public pension system 
constitutes a moderate proportion of total personal saving. In Canada, after 
the Canada/Quebec Pension Plans were introduced in 1966, net public 
pension saving represented 22 to 33 per cent of total personal saving. After 
1975, however, net public pension saving declined and has remained within a 
stable range. Public pension saving in Canada is now in the order of 15 per 
cent of total personal saving. The relative decline in net public pension 
saving as a percentage of total personal saving in recent years is explained 
on the basis of the inordinately low and constant level of C/QPP 
contributions since the inception of the plans. Thus, as total personal saving 
has increased, net public pension saving has relatively declined. In Britain, 
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net pension saving from the public pension system increased by a factor of 
three between 1960 and 1977, from 5.5 to 16.5 per cent of total personal 
saving. This is largely attributable to increasing total National Insurance 
Fund contributions over this period. The Social Security Pensions Act 1975, 
with its provisions for the "contracting-out" of the state earnings-related 
pension plan by approved occupational pension schemes, came into operation 
in April 1978. This largely explains the sharp decline in net public pension 
saving from 16 to 9 per cent of total personal saving recorded after 1978. 
Third, total (private and public) net pension saving represents a significant 
component of total personal saving. In Canada 62 per cent of total personal 
saving is a result of net public and private pension saving; in Britain 46 per 
cent of personal saving is derived from total pension saving. 
The trends outlined here are generally compatible with those 
found by Green for Britain29 and Samur, 
, 
Jarvis and McCracken for 
Canada, 30 with respect to contractual saving (mortgage repayments plus 
the savings portion of trusteed pension plans and life insurance) and private 
pension saving as a proportion of disposable personal income. In Britain 
contractual saving increased from 4.3 to 6.4 per cent of personal disposable 
income betweem 1960 and 1978.31 In Canada, contractual saving 
increased from 4.2 to 4.8 per cent of personal disposable income between 
1966 and 1977. Private pension saving dominants contractual saving, 
accounting for 60 per cent of the total Trusteed pension fund saving rose 
from 2.0 to 3.0 per cent of personal disposable income and is now the second 
largest component of the personal savings rate. 
32 
Net private, public and total pension savings have increased 
significantly over the, past twenty years and now represent a major 
component of total personal savings. It is generally accepted that power 
follows money. Control over and direction of this reserve capital, 
therefore, concentrates enormous economic power in the hands of financial 
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intermediaries and institutional investors, and in particular, private pension 
funds. Savings in the personal sector is channelled as investment through 
financial intermedaries to the corporate sector. It is therefore necessary to 
determine the level of net pension saving as a proportion of gross saving in 
order to ascertain the pension system's impact on investment for the 
economy. 
6.4.2 Pension Saving in Relation to Gross Saving. Financial 
intermediaries and institutional investors such as private pension funds, 
organize, channel and direct money capital into profitable investment. In 
the classical, neo-classical and Marxian circulation and reproduction models, 
savings is equal to investment (S=1) at the macro-economic level. Net 
pension saving as a proportion of gross saving is an indicator of the pension 
system's importance in supplying saving for investment. Table 6.3 reports 
net pension saving as a proportion of gross saving for Canada, Britain and 
the U. S. between 1960 and 1980. 
The following may be noted. First, net pension saving as a 
proportion of gross saving flowing from the private pension system in Britain 
and Canada, where complete information is available, is a significant and 
growing component of gross savings. In 1980 net private pension saving 
accounted for nearly 20 per cent of gross saving in the U. K. and 14 per cent 
in Canada. For comparable time periods, net pension saving in the U. S. as a 
proportion of gross saving was of the same order of magnitude as in 
Canada. In Canada, if net pension saving from unfunded (pay-as-you-go) 
government employee pension plans was included, net private pension saving 
as a proportion of gross saving would be in the order of 20 per cent. 
33 
Between 1960 and 1980 net private pension saving as a percentage of gross 
saving increased in the U. K. by 91 per cent and in Canada by 67 per cent. 
The advanced funding of occupational pension plans, resulting in 
the accumulation of a fund, is the mechanism through which private pension 
-209- 
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saving is organized and subsequently invested. The level of net private 
pension saving as ä percentage of gross saving is a function of both the 
relationship between, private pension contributions and benefit payout 
(numerator) and the level of gross savings (denominator). The increase in 
net private pension saving in Canada and the U. K. as a proportion of gross 
saving is generally explained in terms of greater pension contribution inflow 
in relation to benefit payout ' and gross savings. Increased net private 
pension saving in Canada as a proportion of gross saving is attributable' to 
expanded occupational pension plan coverage and higher absolute employee 
and employer contribution levels. In Britain, despite the absolute' decline in 
occupational pension scheme members after 1967, there was an increase in 
contributions per member as a result of inflated salary levels - and 
preservation (vesting) provisions under the '1975 legislation requiring higher 
employer and employee contributions. 
34 Net private pension saving as a 
proportion of gross saving identifies the pool of money ' capital available to 
the private pension system for investment. These data indicate that saving 
from the private pension system over the past twenty years has become an 
increasingly significant component of gross saving. 
Second, net pension saving from the public (state) pension system, 
while considerably less than that flowing from the private pension system, 
nevertheless represents a modest proportion of gross saving. Net savings 
accumulated through the public pension system, however, does not 
necessarily generate investment to augment capital stock since it is often 
used to finance current government expenditures. In 1980 net public pension 
saving in both the U. K. and Canada was in the order of 5 per cent. In 
Canada, after the introduction of the Canada/Quebec Pension Plans in 1966, 
net public pension saving levelled off. The modest level of net public 
pension saving in Canada, despite the low level of contributions, is explained 
in terms of increasing C/QPP coverage and contributions due to an 
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expanding labour force, and as a result of the Quebec Pension Plan being 
partially funded. These factors have generated a modest reserve fund. In 
Britain, 'the level of net 'saving attributable to"the National Insurance Fund's 
retirement pension is a result of the maturity of the system and a much 
higher level of contributions. 'In the U. S. the social security retirement 
system has been in a dissaving position in recent years due to its chronic 
deficit position, resulting in a drag on net pension saving. 
Third, total (private and public) net pension saving in the U. K. and 
Canada, where complete information is available, has doubled between 1960 
and 1980 and now accounts for 21 per cent of gross saving in the U. K. and 18 
per cent in Canada. This means that nearly one-fifth of all gross investment 
in these countries is supplied through the pension system broadly defined. In 
Canada, if a broader definition of retirement savings were used so as to 
include all public and private occupational pension plans as well as individual 
retirement savings vehicles such as RRSPs, in" the period between 1972 and 
1976, "23 per cent of the capital stock - factories, homes, schools, 
roads,.. -put in place... was financed by 
[retirement] savings., 
35 This 
information confirms that savings undertaken for retirement purposes, and 
channelled through the pension system, play an important, if not vital, role 
in the provision of investment for capitalist economies. 
6.5 The Investment Function I 
Pension funds and other institutional investors in Canada, Britain 
and the U. K. in the post-war period have assumed an increasingly important 
role in supplying the capital resources of these advanced capitalist 
economies. According to the Toronto Stock Exchange, institutional 
investors and pension funds "have vitally influenced macro-economic 
performance. "36 "Private sector pension plans, " the Trust Companies 
Association of Canada asserts, "are a major savings vehicle ... and thus a 
major source for financing ... capital requirements. "37 And prominent 
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investment managers in the U. K. maintain that private pension funds 
"increase the flow of money available for capital investment in the most 
productive and profitable enterprises and thus encourage economic 
growth. "38 
Private pension fund saving is now viewed by the corporate 
community as playing a strategic role in generating current and future 
investment for- the private profit-making sector of the economy. In 
advanced capitalist economies the needs of the private sector require an 
increased interpenetration and interdependence of capital. The modern 
institutional investor and the private pension system have assumed the 
function of socializing investment by being, a conduit for savings. This 
accelerates the general socialization of the capitalist mode of production. 
To assess the economic power of the private pension system and its impact 
on the economy and capital markets requires that pension saving be related 
to the current and projected investment requirements of the corporate 
sector. 
6.5.1 Pension Saving in Relation to Current Investment. In order 
to establish the significance of net saving flowing from the private pension 
system for investment in and by the corporate sector and the economy, two 
indicators have been constructed. The first, outlined in Table 6.4, reports 
net private pension saving as a percentage of gross fixed domestic business 
investment. That is, pension saving is related to the replacement of and 
addition to capital stock. The second and more significant indicator, 
reported in Table 6.5, relates net private pension saving to net private 
domestic investment (capital formation); that is, depreciation (capital 
consumption allowances) in current dollars, on a replacement cost basis, is 
deducted from gross fixed private domestic capital formation to arrive at 
the "net new" addition to capital stock. Therefore, net private pension 
saving as a percentage of net private domestic investment is an indicator of 
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the proportion of new private sector capital formation financed through the 
private pension system. 
Private pension saving as a proportion of gross private domestic 
investment has increased significantly over the past twenty years, 
particularly in the U. K. and Canada. This is reported in Table 6.4 and 
Appendix F. Specifically, net pension saving from the private pension 
system now represents 26 per cent of gross domestic investment in the U. K., 
16 per cent in Canada, and 11 per cent in the U. S. In Britain and Canada 
between 1960 and 1980, private pension saving as a proportion of gross 
private investment has doubled. The variation in the order of magnitude, 
particularly in recent years, is largely explained by the difference in the 
personal savings rate in each of these countries. In the late 1970s, the 
personal saving rate was in the order of 15 per cent in the U. K., 10 per cent 
in Canada, and 5 per cent in the U. S. 
39 The significance of private 
pension saving as a proportion of gross private domestic investment is that a 
diminution of private pension saving would force the business sector to 
secure alternative sources of funding, such as increased foreign investment, 
to meet their finance requirements. Capital would become more expensive 
and corporations would have to either slow their rate of expansion or use 
capital resources more efficiently. 
The full impact and significance of private pension saving for 
business investment becomes evident when related to net private domestic 
investment. This is presented in Table 6.5. Net private domestic 
investment is equal to gross private domestic investment minus depreciation 
(capital consumption) allowances. This is a measure of the addition to or 
new investment generated from that portion of capital stock replaced and 
financed by capital consumption (depreciation) allowances included in gross 
domestic private investment (Table 6.4). Net private pension saving as a 
percentage of net private domestic investment therefore represents that 
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proportion of new business investment financed through the private pension 
system. 
Net private pension saving as a proportion of net investment is 
dramatically greater than as a component of gross investment. As reported 
in Table 6.5, private pension saving is equivalent to 90 per cent of net 
private domestic business investment in the U. K., 41 per cent in the U. S., 
and 27 per cent in Canada. This means on average in excess of 50 per cent 
of all new business investment in these countries is financed by the 
increasing level of personal savings channelled through the private pension 
system. 
The proportion of net business investment financed by the private 
pension system doubled in the U. S. and Canada and tripled in Britain, 
between 1960 and 1980. Net private pension saving in Canada rose from 16 
to 27 per cent of net private investment. In the U. S., net pension saving 
jumped from 20 to 41 per cent of net private investment, while in Britain it 
soared from 30 to 90 per cent of net domestic business capital formation. 
The difference between Canada in one instance, and the case of Britain and 
the U. S. in another, merits some elaboration, particularly the extraordinary 
situation found in the U. K. and U. S. 
The increase in private pension saving as a proportion of net 
private investment is caused by two factors. First, the significant increase 
in net pension saving is a result of accelerating contribution inflow relative 
to net private investment. Pension saving in all of these countries increased 
at a faster rate than net private investment, resulting in a higher ratio of 
pension saving to net investment. Furthermore, while net private 
investment in Canada between 1960 and 1980 increased by a factor of 12, in 
the U. S. net investment declined between 1965 and 1975 by nearly 20 per 
cent. Thus, in the U. S., the dramatic increase in the proportion of business 
investment financed by net private pension saving was due to increased 
pension saving relative to a decline in net investment. 
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Second, and perhaps more important, particularly in the case of 
Britain and the U. S., are those causal relationships which determine the 
level of net private investment. Net private investment is defined as gross 
private investment. minus depreciation (capital consumption) allowances. In 
Britain between 1960 and 1980, depreciation allowances increased from 54 
to 71 per cent of. gross private investment; in the U. S. over the same period 
they increased from 61 to 74 per cent. In Canada, however, capital 
consumption allowances declined from 59 to 42 per cent of gross private 
investment between 1960 and a 
1980. As depreciation allowances increase, 
there is a corresponding reduction in net private investment. Therefore, the 
unusually high level of net private investment generated by the private 
pension system in Britain and the. U. S. is attributable to the relative and 
absolute increase in private pension saving in relation to the depressed level 
of net private investment as a result of increased capital consumption 
allowances. 
While varying between countries, the magnitude of net private 
business investment financed . through the private pension system suggests 
that it is an universal characteristic in these advanced capitalist economies 
and is critical to the investment and capital accumulation requirements of 
the economy and private sector.. The institutional strength associated with 
the private pension system, and the political tenacity of the private pension 
industry, is ultimately related to the enormous pool of savings and assets 
under its control. This is structurally., determined by the private pension 
system being a financial intermediary and, institutional investor, and the 
function it performs in promoting and serving the general interests of all 
organized capital by . satisfying current and future investment 
requirements. w. 
6.5.2 Pension Saving in Relation to Future Investment. Private 
pension saving is perceived by the business community as providing a vital 
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source of investment capital in the medium and long-term for the corporate 
sector. It is therefore necessary to determine the importance of personal 
saving channelled through the private pension system for future private 
sector investment requirements. The perception of this situation within the 
business community has important implications for public policy with 
respect to pension reform. " 
Future investment requirements can be projected on the basis of 
econometric models and forecasts. In turn, estimated private pension 
saving, based on certain demographic assumptions, 1 can be related to 
projected investment requirements. Such an exercise, however, is fraught 
with many difficulties and must' be'viewed with considerable caution. This 
is particularly the case since macro-econometric forecasts in recent years 
have been notoriously inaccurate and have fallen into disrepute. 
Econometric models are constructed on the basis of certain assumptions 
about economic relationships and' behaviour, as well as the external 
environment. Projected investment requirements are based on assumptions 
about savings behaviour, particularly the proportion flowing from the 
personal and corporate sectors. Furthermore, the external environment 
over the past decade has been extremely dynamic. Double digit inflation, 
sharply rising and- falling- 'energy prices, monetary devaluations and a 
protracted international recession with accompanying unemployment, ' have 
all characterized the international economy. In the case of' Canada, which 
is used here for the purpose of illustration, the National Energy Program 
and massive investment in energy related mega-projects was anticipated to 
account for 25 to 40 per cent of all investment over the next twenty years. 
With the advent of the 1981-1982 world oil glut and the pervasive nature of 
the international recession, however, projected investment requirements in 
Canada were revised downwards, although some have argued that these 
capital requirements have only been postponed. For all of these reasons 
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long-run capital investment projections must be used and interpreted with 
care. 
Table,. 6.6 relates estimated net private pension plan saving to 
near, medium and long-term capital investment projections for Canada. 
Based on this information, private pension saving in the near term (1976 to 
1985) will approximate 12 per cent of gross investment. As was indicated in 
Table 6.4, however, net private pension saving has already exceeded these 
projections, increasing from 9 to 16 per cent of gross investment between 
1975 and 1980. If private pension saving is of significance in the short-term 
at the macro-economic, level, it may be even more so in terms of corporate 
financing and the impact upon capital markets. According to a study by the 
economic consulting firm of Wood Gundy Limited, in Canada between 1981 
and 1985,70 to 80 per cent of all new capital required by industry, and 
raised through bond and stock issues, is expected to be furnished by private 
pension funds. 
40 Similarly, in the United States, according to New York 
Stock Exchange estimates, $800 billion or nearly 27 per cent of the 
$3 trillion needed for new capital expenditures between 1975 and 1985 will 
have to be raised externally by corporations. Private pension funds are 
expected to be a major source of this corporate financing. 
The medium and long-term projections are of considerable 
interest. In Canada, over the medium-term between 1981 and 1990, private 
pension saving is projected to be in the order of 11 per cent of gross private 
investment, and 9 per cent in the long-term between 1990 and 2000. While 
this is a modest decline relative to current trends, private pension- saving 
would represent, other factors being equal, 19 per cent of net private 
investment over the medium-term and 16 per cent in the long-term. 
However, should the Canadian economy turn around and begin to recover 
with an accompanying diminuition of inflation and the personal savings rate, 
and a corresponding increase in investment requirements, private pension 
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saving would play an increasingly important role in financing capital 
investment in the medium and long-terms. In Britain and the U. S., where 
private pension saving already has an inordinate impact in the provision of 
net investment, there is little to suggest that this role will diminish 
appreciably in the future unless there is a substantial increase in net 
investment. 
These data suggest that personal saving flowing through the 
private pension system for investment in and by the private sector and 
economy is now, and will continue to be in the future, a major source of 
economic power. The importance of private pension saving to finance the 
future investment ý requirements of the business community has resulted in a 
fundamental transformation of the corporate sector's attitude towards the 
operation of the private pension system under advanced capitalism. 
6.6 Pension Saving and Private Sector Investment Requirements 
What is recent, and highly significant, is the qualitative change in 
attitude within and perception by the business community towards the use of 
private pension fund capital for the explicit purpose of financing the future 
capital requirements of the corporate sector. This change in outlook is the 
fundamental explanation for the private pension system's saving and 
investment role being transformed from a latent to a manifest function. In 
terms of the broad interests of the business community, the primary purpose 
of the private pension system is no longer the provision of retirement 
income, but rather the channelling of investment capital to the corporate 
sector. As a representative of the Business Committee on Pension Policy 
stated, "the private sector pension system is tremendously important to the 
national economy. It is not just a means of disbursing retirement income. It 
is also a primary source of long-term capital" because "it offers the most 
rapidly growing pool of private capital in the country. "41 
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The primary function of the private pension system is now to 
augment and promote capital accumulation in the private sector. A brief 
review of the financial and trade literature clearly identifies the change in 
perception, and emerging consensus, within the business community as to 
the central purpose : of the private pension system under advanced 
capitalism. - The corporate - sector today has few reservations about 
suggesting that the occupational pension fund assets of workers be used to 
finance the investment requirements of the private sector and that pension 
fund investment is vitali for economic growth and the very survival of 
capitalism. 
The business community in Canada, Britain and the U. S. has a 
similar perception of the role now performed by the private pension system 
with 'respect to - supplying- the future investment requirements of the 
corporate sector. The chairman of one of the largest and most influential 
U. S. pension funds explained the decline in economic growth on the basis of 
the "inadequate provision of capital" and observed that "private pensions are 
a powerful source of capital for use - in expanding the country's plant [and] 
equipment', 
42 
while a leading U. S. pension industry trade ° journal carried 
a-feature article significantly entitled "Funds' growth rate staggering; could 
be major asset pool". 
43 In Canada' the president of a major life insurance 
company , suggested that reform ý of the private pension system must 
recognize "the need of the economy for capital. "44 And a vice-president 
of a large Canadian corporation was of the view that "the capital needs of 
the country over the-next several decades will require high and sustained 
levels of pension investment: , 
45 
The need for capital investment in the long-term is viewed as 
being so acute among certain segments-of the corporate community that 
some private sector representatives have suggested that the U. S. social 
security retirement system be fully-funded in order to promote capital 
-223- 
formation. 46 In Canada, spokesmen for the Government of Ontario in 
1977 stated that "Ontario has suggested that we seriously consider fully 
funding the CPP [Canada Pension Plan] and investing those funds in the 
private sector. "47 While Ontario has now seemingly abandoned this 
position, many within the corporate sector have not. The senior 
vice-president of Canada's largest bank, for example, has argued that "there 
will need to be an increase in the relative size of financing going to 
business" and pension reform will need to address "the question of [state] 
pension funds going into private sector investments. " 
48 Financial 
commentators readily identified the relationship between pension reform 
and capital accumulation in that "expansion of the CPP... would reduce 
pension savings invested in the private sector" 
49 
and would "deprive the 
private sector of ... investment capital. "50 
There is complete unanimity between industrial and financial 
capital with respect to the defense and preservation of the private pension 
system's now manifest investment and capital accumulation function. At 
the National Pensions Conference in March 1981 the Canadian 
Manufacturers Association argued that expansion of the CPP would deprive 
private industry of a massive pool of funds needed to raise productivity and 
create jobs. 
51The Toronto Board of Trade maintained that a large 
proportion of all new capital needed by industry in Canada and invested 
through new stock and bond issues would be supplied by private pension 
funds. They argued that "it is vital that these funds should be maintained 
and should grow. They cannot be replaced by public pension funds. "52 As 
suggested by these statements, the private pension system's investment 
function is now viewed as being critical to capital accumulation in the 
private sector and vital to the interests of both financial and industrial 
capital. Access to and control over pension fund capital for investment in 
the private sector therefore is the fundamental explanatory reason for the 
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corporate sector's unalterable opposition to the expansion of the public 
pension system and its staunch defense of the private pension industry. 
6.7 Implications of Saving, Investment and Capital Accumulation Function 
The pension system under advanced capitalism has assumed a 
structurally strategic and pivotal position based on its ability to organize 
and channel savings and investment. The institutional strength and power of 
the private pension industry in the final analysis is directly related to its 
functional control over savings and the direction of investment. Saving and 
investment channelled through the private pension system has been 
transformed from a latent to a manifest function so as to augment capital 
accumulation in the private profit-making sector of the economy. This 
function is now central to the operation of the private pension system under 
advanced capitalism. The details surrounding this situation can be described 
and summarized as follows. 
As a result of a long-run decline in corporate liquidity, 
compounded by inflation, corporations have been forced to seek external 
sources of financing. Personal saving channelled through financial 
intermediaries and institutional investors such as pension funds has been 
substituted for the relative decline in corporate saving for the purpose of 
investment. 
Pension saving is now a major component of personal saving. Net 
total (private and public) pension saving represents 62 per cent of personal 
saving in Canada and 46 per cent of personal saving in the U. K. In Canada 
net private pension saving accounted for 46 per cent of total personal saving 
and 37 per cent of personal saving in the U. K. in 1980. Therefore one-third 
to one-half of all personal savings in these advanced capitalist countries is 
channelled through and controlled by the private pension system and 
industry. 
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Pension saving has assumed an increasingly significant role in 
financing the investment requirements of advanced capitalist economies. In 
the period between 1960 and 1980 total pension saving accounted for an 
average 20 per cent of gross saving in Canada and Britain, having doubled 
over this time period. --, -Pension saving generated through the private pension 
system as a proportion of gross saving increased by 91 per cent in the U. K. 
and in Canada by 67 per cent between 1960 and 1980. 
Private pension saving as a proportion of gross and net private 
investment has in general -doubled over, the past twenty years. Pension 
saving flowing from the private pension system now represents 26 per cent 
of gross investment in the U. S., 16 per cent in Canada, and 11 per cent in 
the U. S. More, significantly, net private pension -saving is equivalent to 90 
per cent of net private domestic business investment in the U. K., 41 per 
cent in the U. S., and 27 per cent in Canada. Therefore in these advanced 
capitalist economies over 50 per cent of all new investment on average is 
financed by the increasing level of personal savings channelled through the 
private pension system. - 
Pension saving, and that flowing from the private pension system 
in particular, is now viewed by the corporate sector as generating an 
important, if not crucial, source of "medium and long-term investment 
capital. In Canada, the private pension system is projected to supply 11 per 
cent of gross private investment over the medium-term and 9 per cent over 
the long-term. The private pension system will therefore generate in the 
order of 19 per cent of net ° private investment in the medium-term 
(1981-1990) and 16 per cent of net investment in the long-term (1990-2000), 
other factors being constant. 
The importance of, pension saving to finance the future 
investment requirements of the economy and corporate sector has resulted 
in a major transformation of the business community's' attitude towards the 
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operation of the private pension system. The private pension system under 
conditions of advanced capitalism is now explicity viewed as a mechanism to 
finance, and a source of investment capital for, the corporate sector. The 
function performed by the private pension system to augment capital 
accumulation in the private sector is the primary structural reason for the 
corporate sector's opposition to an expansion of the public pension system. 
Based on this analysis, a number of broad macro and 
micro-economic and political implications regarding the pension system's 
saving, investment and capital accumulation function can be identified. 
First, at 'a macro-economic level, the pension system's 'control over saving 
and investment result in it occupying a position at the "commanding height' 
of advanced capitalist economies. In capitalist economies control over and 
direction of, investment is the fundamental source of economic power. The 
pension system, as a financial intermediary and institutional investor, has 
thus acquired control over a key economic lever which places it in a pivotal 
structural position to influence the direction of advanced capitalist 
economies. Second, the impact of the pension system on macro-economic 
investment has fundamentally altered the corporate sector's view as to the 
purpose and functioning of the private pension system under advanced 
capitalism. This has public policy implications with respect to the mode of 
pension reform and is discussed in Chapter 7. - 
At a micro-economic level, the saving and investment function 
associated with the private and public pension systems has similar important 
implications. First, the. transformation of the pension system from a latent 
to manifest source of investment capital has resulted in it having an impact 
on corporate and public sector finance. The pension system - at a 
micro-economic level has become an important source of external financing 
and investment capital for the corporate sector, and social capital for the 
welfare state. This is analyzed in the Chapter 7. Second, control over 
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savings and investment is the private pension industry's functional locus of 
power, resulting in a considerable concentration and centralization of 
pension fund capital. The institutional organization of pension fund power is 
examined in Chapter 8. Third, the investment function associated with the 
private pension system under advanced capitalism is an integrative 
mechanism which increasingly facilitates an interpenetration and fusion 
between industrial and financial capital. This is investigated in Chapter 9. 
The pension system's saving, investment and capital accumulation 
function has political implications. First, in terms of the politics of pension 
reform, the continued existence and operation of the private pension 
system, and the investment and capital accumulation function performed by 
it, is of critical importance to the general interests of both industrial and 
financial capital. Subordination of the public pension system effectively 
ensures private sector control over and direction of the increasing 
proportion of saving and investment channelled through and generated by 
the private pension system in the general interests of all organized capital. 
Concurrently, the underdevelopment of the public pension system ensures 
the institutional survival of the private pension industry by protecting its 
market share and profits. Functionally there is a symbiotic relationship, 
that is, a convergence of interests between the private sector's need for 
increased investment capital cycled through the private pension system and 
the private pension industry's imperative for institutional survival. As 
analyzed here, an expanded public pension system would deprive the 
corporate sector of capital investment and would further diminish the 
already marginal role played by the private pension system in the provision 
of retirement income for the elderly described in Chapter 4. The private 
pension industry and corporate sector may be expected to react accordingly 
in terms of protecting their structurally determined vested interests. 
Second, the saving, investment and capital accumulation functions are 
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intrinstic to the operation of both the private and public pension systems. 
This suggests, depending upon political circumstance, that the investment 
function can be used as a mechanism to promote progressive alternative 
economic strategies at the micro-economic level through the occupational 
pension system and at the macro-economic level through the state pension 
system. This subject is elaborated upon in Chapter 10. 
The pension system, based on its control over saving and 
investment, performs a variety of important macro and micro-economic 
functions under advanced capitalism. The pension system has 
institutionalized retirement savings and ' socialized investment. As a 
consequence, the private pension system is now a major economic actor and 
dominates capital markets. 
I 
CHAPTER 7 
THE PENSION SYSTEM AND THE 
INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF CAPITAL MARKETS 
, 
"The, continual re-transformation of surplus-value 
into capital... appears in the... increasing magnitude 
of capital that enters into the process of production. " 
Karl Marx 
"The stock exchange ... as it develops, tends to 
concentrate all production... so that ... [it] becomes 
the most prominent representative of capitalist 
production itself. " 
Frederick Engels 
7.1 Introduction 
The post-World War II period has witnessed the 
institutionalization of _ 
capital markets and. investment through the 
institutional investor in Canada, Britain and the United States. Institutional 
investors, including private pension funds, now dominate capital markets. 
The institutional investor, broadly defined, has increasingly supplanted the 
saving and investment function performed by individuals. The institutional 
investor is the modern day Behemoth. 
The private pension system, as , 
shall be demonstrated, has a 
significant impact on capital markets, the pattern of investment for the 
economy, corporate and public finance, and the ownership of corporate 
securities. The influence of pension funds and institutional investors on 
capital markets is now_ generally acknowledged. The Stock Exchange 
(London) observed that there is a "growing trend towards the domination of 
the stock market by the savings institutions. "' In the United States "most 
experts in the field foresee further institutionalization of equity markets in 
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the years ahead. "2 And in Canada the Toronto Stock Exchange warned 
that "the trend towards institutionalization will result in... concentration of 
market power and a generally less efficient allocative mechanism. "3 For 
example, nearly 46 per cent of the dollar value traded on the Toronto Stock 
Exchange represented institutional, investment in 1977.4 Trust companies, 
life insurance companies and pension funds accounted for nearly 60 per cent 
of all institutional savings. 
5 This indicates the enormous power of the 
savings being accumulated and invested by institutional investors through 
capital markets as well as the institutionalization of retirement savings as a 
source of investment. 
A number of related subjects are analyzed in this chapter. First, 
the increased institutionalization of capital markets under conditions of 
advanced capitalism. - Evidence from the U. S. and U. K. in the post-war 
period indicates a dramatic and continuous absolute and relative increase in 
equity and bond holdings by institutional investors, including pension funds, 
and a corresponding decline by individuals. It is suggested that private 
pension funds as institutional investors now dominate capital markets and 
have an -important 
impact on the direction of capitalist economies as a 
result of " their control over 
investment. Second, there has been a 
corresponding " institutionalization of investment. This is a natural 
concomitant of the control institutional investors now exercise over savings 
and investment previously analyzed in Chapter 6. Institutional investors, 
and private pension funds, in particular, are now a vital source of long-term 
investment capital for the private sector. 
Third, the institutionalization of investment through pension funds 
has affected corporate finance and the locus of control over corporate 
securities. Pension saving and investment channelled to the private sector 
has become an important source of external corporate financing, 
particularly on the downside of the business cycle. The investment 
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channelled through the private pension system has become both a source of 
corporate financing and macro-economic investment. Increased pension 
fund holdings of corporate securities indirectly facilitates the 
interpenetration and interdependence of financial and industrial capital by 
vesting pension funds with a proprietorial interest in the management of 
private sector corporations. 
The fourth, and last, topic dealt with in this chapter is the state 
as an institutional investor. ' The expansion of the capitalist welfare state's 
economic activities, including the augmentation of the retirement income 
system, in the post-war period has resulted in important changes in financial 
intermediation and the structure of capital markets. The state to finance 
its own activities and expenditures has become an increasingly important 
actor in financial markets. The state pension system, particularly in 
Canada, has become a'vital source of public sector finance. The welfare 
state and private sector therefore are competitors in capital markets. As a 
result of this situation, the structurally determined interests of the elderly 
for income security and the welfare state's finance requirements are in 
opposition to the private sector's need for ' investment capital and the 
private pension industry's institutional survival. The institutionalization of 
capital markets and investment under' conditions of advanced capitalism is 
examined with particular reference to pension funds. 
7.2 The Institutionalization of Capital Markets: The Anatomy of Control 
In a capitalist economy control over and direction of investment 
is the primary, source of economic power. The locus of investment 
decision-making and corporate ownerhip in advanced capitalist economies 
now resides in two centers of power: first, a small socio-economic elite of 
individuals and families; and second, a relatively few, but powerful, 
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institutional investors such as banks, insurance companies, pension funds and 
other financial intermediaries. 
The rise of the institutional investor in the post-war period 
represents a new phase in the transition from personal to impersonal 
capitalist ownership. 
6 
, Berle and Means in the 1930s identified three 
stages in the control of large corporations: first, majority control by the 
founders of the corporation, second, minority control by an individual or 
group; and third, internal or "management" control, with the stock widely 
dispersed. 
7 The significant role now played by institutional investors, and 
in particular pension funds, in supplying the investment requirements of the 
corporate sector (and government), and the increasing concentration of 
corporate shareholdings held by institutions, suggest a new and fourth stage 
in the control of the modern corporation. 
Corporate ownership over the past two decades has increasingly 
shifted from the personal to the institutional sector of the economy as a 
result of institutional investment in the corporate sector through the 
securities market. Holdings of corporate equity -- that is, stock or share 
issues - are of particular importance since they confer ownership and voting 
rights. Institutional investors, such as pension funds which accumulate and 
invest pension savings, have therefore become the indirect (registered) 
owners of corporations, while acting on behalf of the beneficial owners 
whom they represent, such as occupational pension plan members. Recent 
trends have witnessed the increasing domination of capital markets by 
institutional investors and the institutionalization of investment. This has 
significant implications for corporate finance and the ownership of 
corporate securities. 
The locus of corporate control and ownership can be determined 
from the distribution of corporate securities . 
(Stocks and bonds) and 
government bonds between and among the various sectors of the economy. 
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The work of Moyle, Prais, Errit, Briston and Dobbins, and Minns in the 
U. K., 8 and the Securities and Exchange Commission, Goldsmith, Tilove 
and Harbrecht in the U. S., 
9 have recorded the increasing proportion of 
share ownership held by institutional investors and pension funds and the 
corresponding decline of personal sector holdings. In the case of Canada, 
where these data have not previously been existent, a long-term time-series 
has been constructed from the national flow accounts in order to ascertain 
the distribution of stock and bond ownership between individual and 
institutional investors. This is presented, in Table 7.1. A transnational 
comparison of institutional and individual stock ownership in the U. K., U. S. 
and'Canada is reported in Table 7.2. 
A bi-modal typology emerges from the information presented in 
Table 7.2, where Britain and the U. S. may be viewed as the ideal type and 
Canada-the anomalous case. In Britain and the U. S. there has been a marked 
long-run decline in corporate shares held by the personal sector and a 
corresponding increase in institutional sector holdings since the early 1960s. 
Individuals have been net sellers of corporate equity, while institutions have 
been the major net buyers. In Britain institutional shareholdings in the past 
twenty years have increased from 30 to 58 per cent of all outstanding 
equity, ' while in the U. S. the proportion of corporate shares owned by 
institutions has increased , 
from 24 to 35 per cent. Institutional investors, 
broadly defined, therefore own 58 per cent of all outstanding corporate 
equity in the U. K. and 35 per cent in the U. S. 
The case of Canada is unique for at least two reasons when 
compared with Britain and the U. S. In the first instance, unlike the U. K. 
and U. S., shareholdings by the personal sector have only marginally declined, 
from 46 to 44 per cent between' 1962 and 1979. Second, in Canada an 
inordinately large proportion of corporate shares, nearly 20 per cent, are 
held through the foreign sector. This is a result of Canada's dependent 
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TABLE 7.1 
DISTRIBUTION OF INDIVIDUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL 
STOCK AND BOND OWNERSHIP BY SECTOR, 
BOOK VALUE, CANADA, SELECTED YEARS, 1962-1979 
Financial Asset 
By Sector 1962 1965 1970 1975 1979 
STOCK OWNERSHIP 
Personal Sectorl 45.7% 46.1% 42.9% 41.4% 44.4% 
Institutional Investors2 7.9 10.5 13.9 17.5 21.8 
Other Private Financial 
Institutions 5.2 6.7 7.3 8.9 7.5 
Trusteed Pension Funds 1.5 2.2 3.8 4.6 4.0 
Life Insurance Cos. 0.7 0.9 1.6 2.1 1.2 
Chartered Banks and 
Near Banks 0.5 0.7 0.0 1.0 8.5 
Public Financial Institutions 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.6 
Monetary Authorities 4 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Social Security Funds 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
NonaFinancial Private Corps. 10.5 10.9 10.4 11.0 11.4 
Public Sector 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.4 
Federal Gov't 0.02 0.02 0.1 0.2 0.03 
Provincial and Local Gov't 0.03 0.03 0.3 0.3 0.1 
Non Financial Gov't Corps. 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 
Foreign Sectors 35.8 32.3 32.3 29.4 21.2 
BOND OWNERSHIP 
Personal Sectorl 33.6% 31.9% 28.0% 26.6% 20.8% 
Institutional Investors 42.3 41.1 44.6 46.1 46.5 
Other Private Financial 
Institutions 3.7 3.4 3.5 3.4 3.9 
Trusteed Pension Funds 8.6 9.2 8.6 9.5 11.4 
Life Insurance Cos. 11.3 10.5 8.1 7.3 6.6 
Chartered Bagks and 
Near Banks 12.1 11.7 11.9 9.8 7.7 
Public Financial Insitutlons 0.4 0.4 2.0 2.9 3.2 
Monetary Authorities 6.2 5.9 5.3 5.1 5.1 
Social Security Funds 0.0 0.0 5.2 8.1 8.6 
Non-Financial Private Corps. ' 3.1 3.1 1.1 0.4 0.3 
Public Sector 7.4 8.1 9.5 8.7 8.9 
Federal Gov't 0.8 0.5 0.8 0.1 0.1 
Provincial and Local Gov't 5.9 6.7 7.7 7.9 8.3 
Non Financial Gov't Corps. 0.7 0.9 1.0 0.7 0.5 
Foreign Sector 13.6 15.7 16.9 18.3 22.7 
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Notes: 1. Including unincorporated businesses and non-profit foundations. 
The limitations of these data do not allow differentiation between 
individuals and unincorporated businesses, Sector I and II of the 
financial flow accounts. The data for Sectors I and II, 
individuals and unincorporated businesses, is derived residually. 
In the case of stock assets (corporation common and preferred 
shares) the figure is estimated by subtracting the estimated 
aggregate of all share assets held by all other sectors, including 
the Foreign Sector, from the estimated aggregate value of all 
shares outstanding (on the liability side) by all sectors. 
2. The financial flow accounts do not break-out equity ownership by 
sector within the institutional investor category. The control 
total" or e value of all shares outstanding is the sum across 
all sectors of category 3520, stocks liability side, which can 
then be compared to share assets (category 2520) held by persons 
and unincorporated businesses (categories I and II). It is not 
possible to derive a frequency distribution of stock ownership by 
sector within the institutional investor category because the 
asset category "corporate claims" (category 2512) includes both 
short and long-term loans and advances from affiliated companies 
plus investment in shares of affiliates and thus is a 'dirty" 
figure. The ay cateogry corporate claims" (category 3512) 
includes short and long-term loans and advances from affiliated 
companies but does not include issues of shares to affiliates. 
The total across alTectors for category 2512 (corporate claims, 
asset side) therefore does not equal the total across all sectors 
for category 2520 (stocks, liability side) by the amount of shares 
in affiliates held as assets and "buried" in category 2512 
(corporate claims, asset side). In order to estimate stock 
ownership by sector within the institutional investor category it 
is necessary to derive s ck portion 'control figures' for each 
type of institutional investor. The methodology used here to 
estimate the stock portion 'control figures" for each sector 
within the institutional investor category is as follows: the 
ratio of category 3512 Total Corporate Claims, liability side to 
category 2512. Total 
t5orporate Claims, asset side represents the 
non-stock proportion. The arithematic inverse, expressed as a 
percentage, represents the stock portion control figure". The 
stock portion control figures are: 60.1% (1962), 59.7% (1965), 
60.1% (1970), 63.5% (1975) and 52.4% (1979). The stock portion 
'control figure' is related to all sub-categories of institutional 
investors in category 2512, corporate claims asset side. The 
stock portion 'control figure" related to category 2512, corporate 
claims asset side, plus category 2520 stocks asset side, is thus 
the "pure' amount oý stock held by each sector within the 
institutional investor category. Figures are rounded. 
3. Near banks, in general, refer to trust companies. 
4. In the national flow accounts the assets held in equities by the 
Quebec Pension Plan are owned and invested by the Caisse de Depot 
and are classified under Sector IX-2, Public Financial 
Institutions, rather than in Sector XII-2, Social Security Funds. 
5. Non-residents holding registered stocks and bonds. Approximately 
40 per cent of foreign sector holdings are direct investment by 
corporations, while an estimated 60 per cent is held as portfolio 
investment by undisclosed non-residents. 
Sources: Derived and calculated from a special request computer print-out, 
based on unpublished national flow accounts data provided by 
Statistics 
Canada 
to the author September S. 1980. The author 
wishes to acknowledge his professional debt and gratitude to Mr 
Randall Geehan, formerly Chief, National Flows and Accounts 
Section, Statistics Canada for discussing various methodological 
considerations. Also Statistics Canada, Financial Flow Accounts, 
fourth quarter, 1979 (Ottawa and Hull: Minister o upp y and 
Services, 1980j, Tables 4-1 and 4-5, pp. 134-145. 
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"branch-plant" economy where major firms are wholly or partially owned 
subsidiaries of American transnational corporations. This has resulted in a 
"thin" capital market, causing a distortion in the sectoral distribution of 
corporate share ownership. While institutional shareholdings in Canada are 
relatively less than in the U. K. and U. S., they nevertheless are substantial, 
having nearly tripled from 8 to 22 per cent of all outstanding equity between 
1962 and 1979. During this period the institutional sector has been a net 
buyer of corporate shares, while the foreign sector, and to a lesser extent 
individuals, have been net sellers. By 1979 institutional holdings of 
corporate equity in Canada were of the same magnitude as those held 
through the foreign sector (Table 7.1). A further indication of the 
institutionalization of capital markets in Canada is the fact that 47 per cent 
of all corporate and government bonds are held by institutional investors, as 
opposed to only 21 per cent owned through the personal sector (Table 7.1). 
Projections of corporate shareholdings by institutional investors, 
while of course tentative, nevertheless are of considerable interest with 
respect to assessing the importance of institutional investors in the future. 
Briston and Dobbins projected the future pattern of U. K., share ownership 
held by combined institutions as increasing from 70 to 85 per cent of 
outstanding equity by the year 2000.10 In the United States, Soldofsky 
and Drucker have estimated that total institutional shareholdings as a 
proportion of the market value of all outstanding stock will increase to 55 
and 66 per cent respectively over the same period. 
" 
Drucker's 
projections, however, have been challenged by some on methodological 
12 
grounds as being too extreme. For Canada, extrapolating on the basis 
of past growth trends would suggest that combined institutional corporate 
shareholdings will increase from 22 to 42 per cent by the end of the century. 
The last two decades have witnessed a basic transformation in the 
configuration of capital markets and the locus of corporate securities in the 
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U. K., U. S. and Canada as the institutional investor has become a force. The 
distribution of corporate shareholdings and investment decision-making 
between and within the personal and institutional sectors, and the growing 
importance of private pension funds, is now considered. 
7.2.1 Personal Sector. Ownership of corporate equity within the 
personal sector is limited to and concentrated among a small elite of 
individuals and families. This issue is of considerable relevance and 
importance since it is this group of shareowners who own and control the 
dominant financial institutions which are responsible for the operation of 
the private pension system. "In terms of power over the economy, " as 
Johnson has argued, "the extreme concentration of share ownership in the 
top I per cent of income earners allows almost total control... because a 
high degree of concentration... permits easy organization of those shares for 
[corporate] decision-making purposes. " 
13 In the U. S. only 18.9 per cent of 
the adult population own corporate shares (1981), compared with 7.0 per 
cent in Canada (1983) and 3.9 per cent in Britain (1981). 
14 
Ownership of 
equity is highly concentrated, as is receipt of dividend income, among the 
upper socio-economic group. In Britain the top 1 per cent of the population 
owned 54 per cent of all equity, while the top 10 per cent held 90 per cent 
of all outstanding corporate shares in 1976.15 Studies of stock ownership 
in the United States indicate that the top 1 and 10 per cent of families and 
unattached individuals in 1971 accounted for 51 and 75 per cent respectively 
of the value of all stockholdings. 
16 A similar pattern emerges in Canada 
where the top I per cent. of income earners owned 42 per cent of all shares 
and the top 10 per cent accounted for 72 per cent of all stock ownership in 
1968.17 Stock and bond ownership in Canada remained constant between 
1954 and 1976 as reported in Table 7.3. But stock ownership, based on a 
recent Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) survey, declined from 8.5 to 7.0 per 
cent of the adult population between 1976 and 1983. 
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TABLE 7.3 
DISTRIBUTION OF STOCK AND BOND OWNERSHIP, 
BY VALUE OF HOLDING, 
CANADA, 1954 AND 1976 
Percentage of Families and Individuals Owning 
l 
Stock Bonds 
Value of Holding 1954 1976 1954 1976 
No Holdings 91.1 91.5 72.8 74.5 
Total With Holdings 8.8 8.6 27.2 25.5 
Less than $1,000 4.1 3.1 16.3 9.1 
1,000 - $4,999 2.6 2.8 7.4 9.3 5,000 - 9,999 0.9 1.0 1.8 2.9 
10,000+ 1.2 1.7 1.7 4.2 
Note: 1. Including corporate and government issues. 
Sources: Retabulated and calculated from the Dominion Bureau of 
Statistics, Incomes Liquid Assets and Indebtedness of 
Non-Farm Families in Canada, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer. 
19M) , Table ,. 41 an ae6, p. 42 and Statistics Canada, Income Apssets and Indebtedness of Families in Canada 
1977 (Ottawa: minister of Supply Services, ,ae 
p6 and special request for update by author September 26, 
1981. 
The diffusion of corporate share' ownership reinforces the power 
of those individuals and families with large' shareholdings. The New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) reported that approximately two-thirds of all 
shareholdings consisted of less than 100 shares and that the median holding 
is well below 100 shares. 
is A similar situation can be inferred from 
Canadian 'data, reported in Table 7.3 for 1976, which indicates that 36 per 
cent of all shareholders (3 per cent of the population) owned less than $1,000 
in stock compared with 19 per cent of all shareholders (1.7 per cent of the 
population) who held $10,000 or more in equity. A case in point is Bell 
Canada, the fourth largest corporation in the country, where 53 per cent of 
stockholders own 100 or less shares, while 10 per cent of investors hold 
1,000 or more shares. 
19' Among that minority of the population owning 
corporate stock, 'there are many small shareholders and a few large ones. 
Ownership of corporate equity, however, increasingly resides ' within the 
institutional sector and among pension funds. 
- 240 - 
7.2.2 Institutional Sector. The ascendency of financial 
intermediaries and institutional investors was discernable as early as 1900. 
This growth has accelerated and become more pronounced since the end of 
World War 11.20 In Britain, according to Prais, total institutional holdings 
of all government and corporate securities (bonds and equity) increased from 
21 
74 to 80 per cent 
. 
between 1957 and 1972. Similarly in Canada, total 
holdings of all outstanding securities by institutional investors increased 
from 50 to 68 per cent between 1962 and 1979 (Table 7.1). 
By way of comparison, while private institutional investors 
(broadly defined) in Canada accounted for nearly 22 per cent of all equity 
ownership in 1979, government (including public financial institutions, public 
enterprises and social security funds) held less than 1 per cent of all shares. 
Private financial intermediaries held roughly 47 per cent of all bond issues, 
whereas government held only - 26 per cent - (Table 7.1). Given present 
arrangements the private institutional investor, clearly dominates capital 
markets. I 
Private pension funds are now the major financial intermediary 
within the institutional sector, having in general experienced the greatest 
growth in assets of any major financial institution in the post-war period. 
Pension funds in Canada, ; for example, now rank as the largest non-bank 
financial intermediary ° in terms of assets. In Britain and the United States, 
private pension -funds, now rank as the - largest institutional holder of 
Corporate equity, while in Canada they have usually ranked second behind 
"other private financial institution' (Table 7.1). Trusteed pension funds in 
Canada hold the largest portfolio of government and corporate bonds (Table 
7.1). Between 1961 and 1977 trusteed and insured pension plans in Canada 
accounted for 45 per cent of the total increase in corporate stocks held by 
financial institutions and for 30 per cent of the increase in bonds. 
22 
Private pension funds are the largest purchaser of corporate 
equity as is indicated in Table 7.4. The acquisition of equity by private 
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TABLE 7.4 
COMPARISON OF GROWTH RATE 
IN THE 
ACQUISITION OF CORPORATE EQUITY 
BY INDIVIDUALS, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND PENSION FUNDS, 
U. K., U. S., AND CANADA, SELECTED YEARS, 1961-1981 
Percentage Change 
Category U. K. U. S. Canada 
Personal Sector 45.8 -16.6 -2.9 
All Institutional 
Investors +90.5 +47.5 +175.9 
Pension Funds +317.2 +180.0 +166.7 
Source: Calculated from Table 7.2, op. cit. 
pension funds is, 3 to 4 times greater than for all other institutional investors 
in Britain and the U. S., while approximating the average for combined 
institutions in Canada. 
The institutionalization of capital markets is signified by such 
indicators as large block trading and common stock activity rates by 
institutions and pension funds. Large block trading activity, an indicator of 
institutional involvement in the equities market, has been increasing for 
nearly twenty years. In the United States, for example, large block trading 
as indicated in Table 7.5, has increased from 3.1 per cent of total New York 
Stock Exchange volume in 1965 to nearly 45 per cent at mid-year 1983. This 
means that nearly, half of the total trading, on the world's largest stock 
exchange is attributable to institutional investors such as pension funds. 
According to the Toronto Stock Exchange, the volume of public trading 
which originates'solely from pension funds is conservatively estimated to be 
in the order of 12 to 15 per'cent. 
23 The increasing volume of large block 
trading activity originating with institutional investors is also reflected by 
the increasing average size of equity transactions. According to The Stock 
Exchange (London), the average size of transactions has increased from f 
1.1 million in 1966 to L 4.0 million in 1976.24 On the NYSE the average 
number of daily large block transactions has increased from 9 in 1965 to 
nearly 1,500 in 1983.25 
- 242 - 
TABLE 7.5 
LARGE BLOCK TRADING 
ON THE 
NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, 
1965 - 1983 
Large Block Tradin91 Percentage of Total 
Year (In 000 shares) NYSE Volume 
1965 48,262 3.1 
1970 450,908 15.4 
1975 778,540 16.6 
1980 1,360,100 (E) 29.0 
1983, Q2 7,200,000 44.6 
Note: 1. A large block is defined as one consisting of 10,000 or more 
shares. - 
Source: Richard J. Briston and Richard Dobbins, The Growth and Impact of 
Institutional Investors. A Report to theReesearc Committee of 
the Institute o ar ered Acc ountants in England and Wales 
(London, 1978), Exhibit 72, p. 207; 1980 and 1983 figures from 
Pensions & Investment Age. October 31,1983, p. 23. 
Common stock activity rates similarly indicate the dominance of 
institutional investors and pension funds in capital markets. Activity rates 
measure portfolio, turnover, that is, equity purchases plus sales as a 
percentage of market value expressed as an annual rate. Contrary to the 
view that "private pension funds have not dominated the stock marketd' 
because "they have- traded their stocks relatively -infrequently", 
26 
a low 
activity rate in fact reflects the dominance, stability and long-term 
investment objectives associated with private pension funds. This is because 
institutional holdings of common stocks have a stabilizing effect in that 
"they have long-term investment objectives and are not subject to panic 
selling in the face of market decline and [are] not harried by short-term 
fluctuations. "27 In general there would appear to be an inverse 
relationship between the investment time horizon and the portfolio activity 1... 
ratio. 
The experience in the United States, for example, indicates that 
in virtually every year the activity rate of private pension funds was below 
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that of other institutional investors and the market between 1966 and 1974. 
Over this time period the activity ratio of private pension funds was on 
average 31 per cent below the market average. 
28 In the U. K., on the 
other hand, between 1967 and 1975 pension fund portfolio turnover was 
generally-equal to or marginally greater than the market average, but 
normally below that of other institutions. 
29 This situation can be 
explained by two considerations. First, the abnormally high activity rate 
among Local Authority pension funds which are notorious for "churning", 
that is, unnecessary portfolio trading to stimulate brokerage 
commissions30 which upwardly biases the average pension activity ratio. 
Second, beginning in 1975, financial intermediaries including pension funds 
began a major restructuring of their portfolio's, reflecting the deteriorating 
economic climate, and shifted from long to short-term investment 
objectives. 
31 
These data generally support the view that under advanced 
capitalism there has been an institutionalization of capital markets, with a 
corresponding concentration and centralization of corporate shareholdings 
between and among a small group of individual shareholders and large 
institutional investors such as private pension funds. As a result of the 
dramatic growth of pension f und assets in the post-war period, the 
investment behaviour of pension funds in securities markets is of 
considerable importance to capitalist economies. 
7.3 The Institutionalization of Investment: Pension Funds and Capital 
Markets 
The institutionalization of investment under advanced capitalism 
is a concomitant- of the domination of capital markets by institutional 
investors. Pension saving, as previously demonstrated, now represents a 
major source of investment for the economy (Chapter 6). Pension savings 
are accumulated-by and channelled through the occupational and state 
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pension systems into investment through securities markets. The impact of 
pension funds on capital markets therefore has serious and far-ranging 
implications for the pattern of investment, corporate and public finance, 
and the nexus of ownership and control within the corporate sector. 
Increasingly, the corporate sector has been appropriating the occupational 
pension system as a source of investment capital to satisfy its finance 
requirements. Similarly, government has increasingly used the state pension 
system as a source of social capital and general revenue. These 
considerations are explored below. 
7.3.1 Pension Saving and the Pattern of Investment. Personal 
saving channelled through the retirement income system is cycled through 
capital markets in the form of investment in corporate and government 
securities as well as other classes of assets. Table 7.6 outlines the various 
components of the retirement income system and the distribution of pension 
savings into various types of investment instruments. 
The private pension system in Canada represented 81 per cent of 
total accumulated pension savings, compared to 19 per cent flowing through 
the public (state) pension system. Of the $137 billion in total accumulated 
pension savings (assets) in 1981,62 per cent ($85 billion) was invested 
through capital markets and the remaining 38 per cent ($52 billion) was 
channelled into non-marketable government securities. The private pension 
system includes both . private and public sector plans. 
Private sector 
occupational pension funds are invested in marketable assets, that is, assets 
that can be bought and sold in the securities market:, stocks, bonds, 
mortgages, real estate and short-term money instruments. While some 
public sector occupational pension funds are similarly invested, there are 
many public employee funds which are wholly or partially invested in 
non-marketable government securities, that is, assets which were not 
purchased in financial markets and were issued to essentially captive public 
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employee pension funds. For the state plans, the assets of the Canada 
Pension Plan, (CPP) are wholly invested in non-marketable provincial and 
federal securities, at or marginally below market interest rates. In 
contrast, the assets of the Quebec Pension Plan (QPP) are all invested in 
marketable securities. 
The pattern of investment identified in Table 7.6 has resulted in 
60 per cent of the accumulated pension savings of the retirement income 
system being- generated by the public sector (state and public employee 
plans, while 53 per cent of the assets (marketable and non-marketable 
government bonds) were used to finance this sector. Conversely, this means 
that 40 per cent of total pension savings were generated through the private 
sector, while 47 per cent of the - retirement income system's assets were 
used to finance the private sector. 
7.3.2 Long vs. Short-Term Investment. The retirement income 
system - state and occupational pension plans - in advanced capitalist 
economies is an important source of funds to meet the long-term investment 
requirements of the economy and of the corporate and public sectors. 
Pension funds generally adopt a long-term investment horizon in structuring 
their portfolio asset mix. This is because pension plan commitments 
(liabilities) tend to be very long-term, with the average employee being 
perhaps 20 to 30 years away from retirement, liquidity requirements are 
virtually non-existent, because new contribution inflow is typically many 
times greater than benefits paid out. Pension funds as financial 
intermediaries and institutional investors, therefore, are the perfect vehicle 
to accumulate and invest savings over the long-term. 
In the United States 63 per cent of all funds raised in the economy 
between 1960 and 1980 were for long-term investment in physical plant and 
equipment as well as for mergers and acquisitions. In this same time period, 
occupational pension funds provided over 11 per cent of the net funds 
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supplied in the economy. This means that private pension funds supplied 
nearly 18 per cent of all long-term investment capital. By 1981 pension 
funds were the second largest non-banking source of funds in the American 
economy. 
32 Similarly in Canada, between 1970 and 1981,64 per cent of 
all non-financial corporation investment was long-term, a significant 
proportion of which was supplied through the private pension system. 
33 
The situation in the U. K. stands in contrast to that in the United 
States and Canada. The investment policies of pension funds have affected 
not only the level, but also the type of capital investment in the U. K. 
Pension funds have reinforced the failure of banks and other financial 
institutions to provide long-term finance. 
34 According to one study, 
the financial intermediaries that are responsible for 
channelling available funds into companies have not 
been prepared to invest long term in British industry. 
This has meant that British industry has needed to 
invest for short-term profits. It has also meant that 
the cost of caa tal in the U. K. is higher than... in' 
other countries. 
British industry has increasingly been forced to rely on short-term 
financing. According to the Grylls Report, short-term bank loans accounted l 
for almost half of total corporate financing in the U. K., compared with less 
than a fifth in Germany and Japan between 1970 and 1978.36 
Pension funds have followed this general pattern and have 
increasingly invested short-term. The Wilson Committee found that pension 
funds held shares for 24 years on average between 1963 and 1967 and for 
only 6 years in the period between 1973 and 1977.37 A recent report of 
the National Association of Pension Funds indicated that pension fund 
managers now consider a "long-term" investment to be of two to five years 
duration. 
38 This short-term investment pattern and increased portfolio 
activity by pension funds, coupled with other economic factors, has further 
depressed the level of capital investment in Britain. The evidence suggests, 
particularly in the U. S. and Canada, that pension funds are a major source of 
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long-term investment for these capitalist economies. This pattern of 
investment is reflected in the asset mix, or portfolio composition of 
occupational pension funds. 
7.3.3 Pension Fund Investment and Portfolio Composition. 
Pension funds are invested so as to maximize the rate of return on 
investment, subject to an acceptable level of risk. Because employer-based 
occupational pension plans are deemed in law to be trusts, they are required 
to act in a "prudent" manner so as to fulfill their fiduciary responsibility to 
plan members. Pension contributions plus investment income are used to 
pay retirement benefits in the case of a defined benefit plan, with the plan 
sponsor, accepting the responsibility for an investment shortfall or, in the 
case of a money purchase plan, an annuity is purchased at retirement. 
The increasing flow of pension saving cycled through the private 
pension system into capital markets takes the form of investment in various 
types of assets held by pension funds. The portfolio composition, or asset 
mix ratio, of a pension fund depends upon a number of considerations. Those 
factors include the level of acceptable risk to maximize the rate of return 
on investment, portfolio diversification to spread risk-taking, the general 
economic climate, the business and equity cycles, the real rate of return on 
and spread between different asset classes, the external financing 
requirements of the corporate sector, government policy affecting the 
supply of equities and bonds, general investment strategy, market timing for 
the acquisition and sale of securities; institutional fundamentals as they 
affect specific securities, statutory regulations concerning "quality" and 
"quantity" tests in respect of portfolio composition and the liquidity 
requirements of the pension fund to pay benefits. 
39 How is pension saving 
channelled through the private pension system invested? 
Table 7.7 reports the portfolio composition of trusteed pension 
plans in Canada, by sector, between 1966 and 1980. A transnational 
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comparison of occupational pension plan asset mix is outlined in Table 7.8. 
A number of trends can be briefly identified. 
TABLE 7.8 
COMPARISON OF PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION 
OF 
ALL TRUSTEED AND NON-INSURED PENSION PLAN ASSETS, 
CANADA, U. S., AND BRITAIN, 1980-1981 
Real Estate 
Country Bondsl Stockt 
and 
Mortgages Other3 
Canada 49.1 20.4 12.3 18.2 
U. S. 31.0 61.3-" n. a. 4 7.7 
Britain 23.7 51.7 8.6 16.0 
Notes: 1. Corporate and government bonds. 
_ 2. Common and preferred shares. 
3. Miscellaneous including mutual funds, foreign securi- 
ties, cash and short-term paper. 
4. Included in the category of Other. 
Sources: Calculated from Christopher Johnson, `Pensions -A Growth Industry" Lloyds Bank Economic Bulletin No. 19 
Pension9Plans 
i, nancial. Statistics51980 (Ottawa: 
Trusteed 
min ster 
ble VI ,, P- 
an erv ces ana a, 1982), Text Ta p. 19 and the Statistical Abstract of the -. United States 1982-83 as g n, .., ), er es 531, p. . 
First, depending upon the business and equity cycles, there has 
been a long-term trend for pension funds, particularly those in the private 
sector, to invest in corporate stock. In the United States, for example, from 
1960 to the peak of the market in the early 1970s, equity holdings of all 
pension funds (non-insured and insured) increased from 25 to 60 per cent of 
portfolio composition. Similarly in Canada, equity holdings of all trusteed 
pension plans (public and private) increased from 7 to 26 per cent of assets 
between 1960 and 1974. With the collapse of the equity market in North 
America in the early 1970s, compounded by stagflation over the next 
decade, pension funds divested themselves of commön stock and accordingly 
restructured their portfolios in response to the economic climate. 
Second, private sector pension plans have in the past held more 
common stock than have public sector pension plans, that is, they have a 
lower debt to equity ratio. For example, at the height of the market cycle 
in the early 1970s, U. S. non-insured pension funds held nearly 75 per cent of 
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their assets in equity, compared with public sector funds which held only 5 
per cent of their funds in common stock. In Canada, over the long-term, 
private sector pension plans have held 2 to 3 times as much equity as have 
public sector plans (Table 7.7). At the peak of the equity cycle, major 
private sector pension plans in Canada held 60 per cent of their assets in 
equity, compared with 15 per cent by public sector plans. 
40 Public sector 
pension plans-in recent years have' fundamentally altered their investment 
strategy, however, and are now investing heavily in equity in an attempt to 
maximize investment performance. Third, as a response to an inflationary 
environment, pension funds in the mid-1970s began to invest in more 
speculative asset classes such as real estate, 'mortgages and money market 
instruments (and works of art in the U. K. ) in an attempt to secure a positive 
rate of return on investment. 
A fourth, and increasingly important consideration, particularly in 
Britain, is the proportion of pension fund investment in foreign securities 
resulting in the exportation of investment capital. In Britain in the period 
prior to the abolition of exchange controls in 1979, pension funds invested 8 
per cent of their new cash flow overseas; after the abolition of exchange 
controls this increased to 24 per cent of cash flow in 1981.41 The 
proportion of U. K. pension fund assets invested overseas increased from 5 to 
13 per cent between 1978 and 1981. This flight of capital effectively 
undermines the long-term financing of domestic U. K. industry. Similarly in 
the United States, there has, been an internationalization of pension fund 
investment to maximize performance at a time when domestic industry 
needs revitalization. 
42 In Canada, 4 per cent' of pension assets are 
currently invested in foreign securities. Federal government guidelines 
formerly set a 10 per cent limit `on 'the amount which could be invested 
overseas. As a result of pressure from the private pension industry this 
restriction was' eliminated by the new Conservative government's 1985 
Budget. 
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The increasing level of personal saving channelled through the 
pension system has resulted in the institutionalization of investment, with a 
corresponding impact on the structure and functioning of capital markets. 
This flow of savings is transformed into the stock of assets, such as equity 
and bonds, held by the pension system as a result of investment through 
securities markets. Pension funds therefore are an important link in capital 
markets between the supply of funds and the demand for investment by the 
corporate sector and social capital by the public sector. The asset holdings 
of the private pension system are a source of funds, that is, cash flow for 
corporate and public sector finance requirements. The full impact of 
pension funds on capital markets must therefore be analyzed and assessed in 
terms of their relationship to corporate and public sector finance. 
7.4 Pension Funds and the Corporate Sector 
The impact of the private pension system on capital markets as it 
relates to the corporate sector has two important dimensions: corporate 
finance and the ownership of corporate securities. One major study 
suggested that "the ownership of industrial shares is undergoing a substantial 
transformation, and one must expect... consequences for financing, 
management and concentration. "43 The private pension system's 
investment function has facilitated this transformation. 
7.4.1 Sources of Corporate Funds. The modern corporation under 
advanced capitalism satisfies its investment, or finance, requirements 
through two mechanisms: first, through internal funding or financing, that 
is, undistributed corporate profits (retained earnings) plus capital 
consumption (depreciation) allowances; and, second, through external 
financing, that is, the sale of corporate securities through capital markets in 
the form of debt and equity issues. 
Sources of external funds may be divided into two broad 
categories: equity and debt. Debt financing is classified into short-and 
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long-term debt instruments such as short-term paper and (bank) loans in the 
case of the former, and bonds and debentures in the latter. Bonds represent 
a long-term' debt obligation by which the corporate borrower promises to 
pay a set rate of interest until the bond matures, at which time the principal 
must be repaid. Corporate bonds, as a debt instrument, do not confer 
ownership or voting rights on the holder, but are a preferred liability or lien 
against property; plant or equipment of the borrower. 
The second form of external funding is equity financing. Equity 
may be raised in two ways: sale of stock (common and preferred shares) and 
retention of earnings. In order to raise capital new equity shares, or "rights" 
issues, are offered for sale by corporations in what is termed the "primary" 
market. Already outstanding, or "ordinary", shares are recyled, that is, 
bought and sold in the "secondary"' market, but do not augment the cash flow 
or capital requirements of the enterprise since these shares were previously 
issued. Common stock or equity shares represent the residual ownership 
(assets minus liabilities) of an incorporated enterprise and confer ownership 
and voting -rights upon the `shareholder in addition to; a' proportion of 
distributed profits in the form of dividends. 'Equity financing, or share 
capital, is by definition long-term financing. With corporations reluctant or 
constrainted from undertaking unlimited borrowing through debt instruments 
such as bonds, equity financing often becomes necessary to satisfy corporate 
finance requirements. The level of internal financing by corporations is an 
alternative to distributing profits and subsequently raising funds by means of 
equity issues. 
The significance and implications of internal financing for 
corporate behaviour under advanced capitalism has been the, subject- of 
considerable controversy, particularly among Marxist scholars, 
44 
as it 
affects the "independence" or "autonomy" of the corporate sector in relation 
to the finance sector and the relative strength and dominance of industrial 
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or financial capital. In the post-World War II period the corporation, and the 
nature of corporate financing in particular, has undergone a fundamental 
qualitative transformation, some have argued, based on the high level of 
internal corporate funding (retained earnings and depreciation allowances). 
The extraordinary level of internal financing. experienced by corporations 
has purportedly severed or reduced their dependence upon the finance sector 
as a source of external funding, or the necessity -of firms raising capital 
through , the securities market. In short, according to this theory, 
corporations are relatively "independent", because 'a significant portion of 
their capital and growth comes through self-financing. This in turn signals a 
new phase in capitalist development. Or does it? 
In the -flush of post-World War II economic expansion and 
prosperity, in the twenty year period from roughly 1950 - to 1970, 
corporations in many advanced capitalist economies- experienced an 
exceptionally high level of internal or self-financing. 
45 In the United 
States, according to Menshikov, internally generated financing averaged 62 
per cent between 1956 and 1960 and 51 per cent in the 1961 to 1965 period. 
Between 1964 and 1968 internal funding by corporations, as determined by 
Fitch and Oppenheimer, declined from 70 to 57 per cent. For Britain, the 
rate of internal funding has averaged about 70 per cent. While the rate fell 
from 77 per cent in . 1950 to 69 per cent in 1965, it subsequently rebounded in 
the 1970s. Thompson's comparative study indicates that in economies with a 
high level of internal funding, a higher proportion of external funds come 
from equity and bonds than from bank loans. Prior to 1970 this was the case 
for both Britain and the U. S.; since that time, however, the situation in the 
U. K. has dramatically changed. In countries such as Japan and France, 
where the rate of internal funding is only 40 to 50 per cent, there is a 
greater reliance on bank loans for external funds. 
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In the period between 1950 and 1970, the level of internal 
corporate funding has varied over time and between countries. This in itself 
mitigates' against constructing a "universal' theory of corporate finance 
under conditions of monopoly capitalism. The evidence based on this short 
historical time period suggests that the availability of internally generated 
funds' was clearly related to the profitability of corporations and the scale 
of investment on the upside of the post-war business cycle. On the downside 
of the business cycle, however, when corporations experience cash flow 
problems, as has been the case since the early 1970s in Canada, Britain and 
the U. S., corporations are forced to borrow from capital markets, with a 
corresponding increase in the level of external financing. 
As postulated here, the level of internal funding, and the 
corresponding reliance on external financing, is in general related to and a 
function of the'business cycle, corporate liquidity and interest rates. This 
becomes strikingly apparent in the period after 1970, when on the downside 
of the business cycle corporations in the United States and Canada 
experienced an increased reliance upon external sources of funds. Britain, 
however, is an a typical case. 
Relating the'level of internal and external corporate financing to 
the business cycle, as shall be demonstrated, indicates that corporations 
have neither escaped nor are "independent" of the inherent cyclical nature 
of capitalism, but rather are bounded by it. On the downside of the business 
cycle, therefore, it may be expected that corporations will increasingly rely 
on external sources of financing, depending on interest rates and the 
strength of the securities market. Within this context, the growth of the 
private pension system's cash flow and asset base, as a result of increased 
pension saving, has served the dual function of generating significant 
investment at the macro-economic level and has supplied a moderate source 
of external financing for corporations on the downside of the business cycle. 
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Table 7.9 outlines on a transnational basis the sources of 
corporate funds and the change in financial position over the past twenty 
years. In the United States internal funding has declined from 73 per cent in 
1960 to 59 per cent in 1980. Total external financing by corporations has 
correspondingly increased from 27 to 41 per cent over this period. The 
increased reliance on external sources of financing by corporations is 
similarly evidenced in Canada. Between 1963 and 1982 internal funding 
declined from 56 to 44 per cent, while external financing increased from 44 
to 56 per cent. 
The capital structure and cash flow position of corporations in 
North America on the downside of the business cycle since the 1970s is 
nearly the opposite of that experienced during the expansionary period 
between 1950 and 1970. Three general trends are noteworthy: first, the 
generally low proportion of new financing that comes from the sale of 
equities (3 to 12 per cent), compounded by the economic climate and the 
collapse of the equity market in the early 1970s; second, the concomitant 
reliance on long-term debt (10 to 16 per cent) with an associated increase in 
the debt to equity ratio; and third, the growth and use of short-term debt, 
particularly bank loans, to offset the rise in interest rates in the bond 
market. These data seriously challenge the contention that the modern 
capitalist corporation, particularly in the U. S. and Canada, is "independent" 
of reliance upon external sources of funds. 
Britain is in the anomalous position of having experienced an 
accelerated rate of internal funding between 1970 and 1976, which was well 
above that recorded during the 1950 to 1970 period. Two trends are of 
particular note. First, the principal source of funds for corporations was 
undistributed income. However, undistributed income was increasingly used 
to finance the maintenance of existing assets through deprectiation 
provisions rather than retained earnings. In turn, real investment was 
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reduced, as `is evidenced by the virtual lack of long-term borrowing to 
finance new investment over this period. The inability of corporations to 
raise equity and debt capital because of high interest rates generated severe 
liquidity 'problems. Second, in response to this situation, corporations 
borrowed 'short-term. Between 1970 and 1976,93 and 45 per cent of total 
debt and external financing' respectively was- short-term. The high level of 
internal funding experienced over this period is explained in terms of 
corporations increasingly -financing their operations out of internal reserves 
as a result of their inability to raise long-term capital in securities markets. 
In the case of the U. S. and Canada, there has been an increased 
reliance upon external financing by corporations during the downturn in the 
business cycle since the early 1970s. It is in the raising of external debt and 
equity financing -for. the corporate -sector that the securities market 
performs one of its principal functions. And it is the private pension system 
which is a major source of funds to the capital market. The demand for 
external funds by corporations must, therefore, be related to the supply of 
funds generated from the private pension system which are used to purchase 
corporate stocks and bonds in securities markets. 
7.4.2. External Funds: Debt and Equity Financing. Pension fund 
purchases of corporate debt instruments and equity offerings are a source of 
external cash flow, or financing, for firms. In order to determine and assess 
the' significance of the private pension system as a source of financing for 
the corporate sector a flow of funds matrix has been constructed for Canada 
relating the supply of and demand for corporate equity and bond issues. 
Long-term debt instruments 
_or_ 
financing on, average accounted 
for 23 per cent of total external financing and 11 per cent of total sources 
of funds for Canadian non-financial corporations in. the period between 1963 
and 1982 (Table 7.9). During the past twenty-five years the private pension 
system has on average held 15 per cent of total assets in corporate bonds. 
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Over this same time period, 25 to 50 per cent of pension fund assets were 
invested in government bonds. In order to determine the impact of the 
private, pension system upon external corporate debt financing, therefore, 
requires that pension fund acquisitions of corporate bonds be related to the 
supply of net new corporate bond offerings in securities markets. 
Table 7.10 reports the value of corporate bonds purchased by 
pension funds as a proportion of net new corporate issues placed in Canada 
between 1966 and 1982. Over this period the private pension system 
purchased nearly 30 per cent of all corporate bonds. Between 1966 and 
TABLE 7.10 
Year 
1966 
. 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982(E) 
VALUE OF BONDS PURCHASED BY 
PRIVATE PENSION FUNDS AS A PERCENTAGE OF NET 
NEW CORPORATE BOND ISSUES PLACED IN CANADA. 1966-1982 
Value of Corporate 
Bonds Purchased by 
Pension Funds 
(Flow`in $ Million) 
143 
212 
95 
133 
130 
.., 323 
254 
300 
381 
726 
348 
455 
519 
338 
668 
632 
448 
, 
Value of Net New 
Corporate Bond Issues 
Placed in Canada 
($ Million) 
712 
1,016 
1,911 
1,097 
1,140 
1,836 
1,516 
1,560 
1,558 
2,219 
1,237 
3,151 
3,169 
1,234 
1,497 
1,893 
295 
Value of Corporate 
Bonds Purchased by 
Pension Funds as 
a% of Net New 
Corporate Issues 
20.1 
20.9 
7.9 
12.1 
11.4 
17.6 
16.8 
19.2 
24.5. 
32.7 
28.1 
14.4 
16.4 
27.4 
44.6 
33.4 
151.9 
1966-1972 Average : 15.3% 
1973-1982 Average : 39.4% 
1966-1982 Average : 
1970-1982 Average : 
29.4% 
33.7% 
Sources: The flow of pension fund investment into bond purchases was 
calculated from Statistics Canada,, Trusteed Pension Plans Financial 
Statistics 1980 (Ottawa: Minister o Supply and Services, var ous 
years ex ale V. Net new corporate bond issues placed in 
Canada from the Bank of Canada, Review, December 1971 and 1981, 
Table 21, and OECD Financial Stacs, Supplement 9D, June 1976, 
Table A 161/04. 
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1972, on the upside of V the business cycle and in a strong equities market, 
pension funds purchased 15 per cent of all corporate bond issues. On the 
downside, of the business cycle, after the collapse of the equity market in 
1972, ' and- the selling of common stock from portfolios, pension fund 
acquisitions of corporate bonds increased from 15 to 40 per cent of the net 
new supply of corporate issues between 1973 and 1982. Pension funds 
therefore supplied ' well in excess of one-third of the total external 
long-term debt financing requirements over this period. 
Equity financing between 1963 and 1982 raised through the 
securities 'market by non-financial' corporations in Canada accounted for 
only 25 per cent of external financing and 12 per cent of total corporate 
cash flow. This reflects long-term trends as well as the collapse of the 
equity market during the 1970s. Pension funds nevertheless generated a 
significant proportion of this equity financing. In'this regard it is necessary 
to differentiate between pension fund acquisitions of corporate equity' in 
primary and secondary markets. " Acquisition of new corporate equities, that 
is, "right' issues in the primary market by pension funds are a source of 
external financing or new investment for corporations. However, the 
trading and purchase of "ordinary" or existent outstanding corporate shares 
by pension funds, that is, acquisitions in the secondary market, do not 
directly increase corporate cash flow or capital formation' since these shares 
were previously issued. 
Whether pension funds purchase equity in the primary or 
secondary market is therefore a matter of considerable importance in 
assessing' the private pension system as a source 'of external funds for the 
corporate sector. Incomplete statistical information and the inability to 
differentiate methodologically between primary and secondary market 
equity acquisitions by pension funds, however, render such an evaluation 
difficult. ' Therefore, indirect proxies must be used in' such a determination. 
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-- In Britain the evidence suggests that occupational pension funds 
play a limited role in supplying financing for corporations through the 
primary equity market. Minns, for example, concluded that "institutional 
shareholders..: have not been the leading source of new capital for industrial 
investment. "46 Technical work by Briston, Tomkins and King generally 
confirms that "institutional shareholders have not figured prominently in 
new issues of' shares to the public. "47 This is explained-in terms of the 
risk-aversive behaviour of institutional investors., Their empirical evidence 
for the period between 1957 and 1969 indicates, . 
however, that pension funds 
did in fact increase their holdings of, primary market issues, but were well 
below the average for combined institutions. 
48 According to the National 
Association of Pension Funds, however, of the-L29317 million raised by 
"right' issues between 1974 and 1977, "pension funds in general (played] a 
major role inýunderwriting these issues. "49 Stock Exchange data indicates 
that between 1970 and 1976 new issues on average accounted for 20 per cent 
of, the addition to real fixed assets, 16 per cent by way of equity and 4 per 
cent by means of loan capital. 
50 But the proportion of new equity capital 
purchased by pension funds is indeterminate. 
In the case of Britain, the limited role played by, pension funds in 
supplying funds to corporations through the primary equity market is clearly 
related to the capital structure of firms with their high level of internal 
funding and low level of equity financing (Table. 7.9). New share issues 
represented only I per cent of the market value of, all U. K. quoted equities 
51 
between 1966 and . 
1976. Pension, funds could not, therefore, purchase 
what was not offered. This effectively has restricted U. K. pension funds to 
trading in the secondary market and has limited their role in supplying new 
equity financing to the corporate sector. 
The case of Canada, where more complete information is 
available,, is of some interest with respect to illustrating the impact of 
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pension fund acquisitions on corporate sector equity financing. On the 
upside of the business cycle, between 1962 and 1974, Grant's research 
indicates that total trusteed pension plan purchases, that is, primary and 
secondary market acquisitions,. amounted to 175 per cent of the net new 
supply of corporate equities. 
52 This suggests that pension funds were not 
only active in the secondary market for ordinary shares, but played a role in 
the acquisiton of new equity issues in the primary market as well. In 
addition, as was indicated in Table 7.1, shareholders in the personal and 
foreign sectors were selling outstanding (ordinary) shares to pension funds. 
This explains the high acquisition rate by pension funds of the net new 
supply of equitites. On the downside of the business cycle, between 1973 to 
1983, and in a weak equity market, total pension fund acquisitions of 
corporate shares declined from 175 to 46 per cent of the net new supply. 
This is reported in Table 7.11. A similar pattern emerges in the United 
States and is outlined in Appendix H. These data generally confirm that 
pension fund acquisitions of corporate shares follow the business cycle, but 
nevertheless represent a moderate source of funds during the current 
economic downturn. 
While it would be preferable to differentiate between primary and 
secondary market pension fund acquisitions of shares to determine the 
impact on corporate financing, such data are not available. 
53 
Knowledgeable estimates by informed sources familar with the securities 
market behaviour of instiutional investors in Canada, however, suggest that 
in recent years pension funds have been responsible for purchasing 30 to 50 
per cent of all new corporate equity issues; 
54 
that is, pension funds have 
purchased 30 to 50 per cent of the net new supply of corporate shares issued 
in the primary market for the purpose of equity financing by corporations. 
This approximation allows us to determine more precisely the extent of 
private pension fund investment as a source of corporate funds in Canada. 
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TABLE 7.11 
VALUE OF TOTAL1 EQUITY SHARES PURCHASED BY 
PRIVATE PENSION FUNDS AS A PERCENTAGE OF NET NEW ISSUES 
AND OF TSE LISTED COMPANIES, CANADA, 1970-1982 
Val ue of Total Value of New Equity Equity Shares Purchased 
Value of Total Financing Raised in by Pension Funds 
Equity Shares Primary Market as a% of 
Purchased be Pension All e Listed 
Funds Issues Companies All New TSE Listed 
Year (Flow in $ Million) ($ Million) ($ Million) Issues Companies 
1970 225 328 141 68.6 159.6 
1971 534 330 136 161.8 392.7 
1972 687 607 405 113.2 169.6 
1973 520 561 195 92.7 266.7 
1974 352 769 283 45.7 124.4 
1975 540 1,241 306 43.5 176.5 
1976 900 1,210 736 74.4 122.3 
1977 204 3,143 1,205 6.5 16.9 
1978 309 6,959 1,476 4.4 20.9 
1979 1,290 4,390 1,514 29.4 85.2 
1980 2,544 4,936 4,229 51.5 60.2 
1981 2,824 6,715 3,589 42.1 78.7 
1982(E) 2,944 4,407 3,494 66.8 84.3 
1973-1982 Average : 45.7% 103.6% 
1970-1982 Average : 66.6% 135.2% 
Notes: 1. Equity shares (common stock) include purchases of new (rights) issues plus 
acquisition of outstanding (ordinary) shares in both the primary and 
secondary markets. It is impossible to "net-out" or differentiale between 
purchases in the primary and secondary markets. 
the 
year over year change 
in the book value of equity assets was used to derive the annual cash flow 
into common stock investment. 
2. Bank of Canada Review. The figures used by the Bank of Canada differ 
somewhat from t istics Canada s as result of methodology. 
Sources: The value of total equity shares purchased was derived from Statistics 
Canada. Trusteed Pension Plans Financial Statistics (Ottawa: Minister of 
Supply and Services, various Yrs). All new equity issue value from the 
Bank of Canada, Review. The value of new equity financing of TSE listed 
companies courtesy-the Toronto Stock Exchange, January 1984. 
7.4.3 Pension Funds and the Financing of Corporations. In order 
to determine the overall impact of the private pension system on corporate 
finance, the sources of funds for the corporate sector (Table 7.9) have been 
related to and cross-tabulated with the proportion of funds supplied by 
pension funds (Tables 7.10 and 7.11) on the upside (1963-1972) and downside 
(1973-1982) of the business cycle. This is reported in Table 7.12. 
In terms of external financing requirements, this analysis suggests 
that, on the downside of the business cycle, the private pension system in 
Canada supplied on average 39 per cent of debt financing and 40 per cent of 
equity financing for corporations between 1973 and 1982. This represents a 
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significant increase over the upside of the business cycle when corporations 
were less dependent upon external sources of financing. In total, pension 
funds on the upside of the business cycle generated over one-fifth of total 
long-term external financing as compared with one-third to one-half of 
long-term external corporate financing on the downside. This is the critical 
indicator in that it reveals the extent to which the corporate sector must 
rely on external' sources of funds to finance long-term investment 
requirements in money markets. 
Related to total external ' sources of financing (long plus 
short-term), pension funds on the upside of the cycle accounted for 13 per 
cent of total external sources of funds, compared with nearly 20 per cent on 
the downside of the business cycle. In aggregate, the proportion of total 
corporate sources of funds generated by the private pension system doubled 
from 5 per cent on the upside to nearly 10 per cent on the downside of the 
business cycle. These are not insignificant sums of money. For corporations 
in the throes of a liquidity crisis on the downside, of the business cycle, the 
infusion of external financing generated by the private pension system may 
well represent the margin for survival. 
The socialization of retirement savings and the 
institutionalization of pension investment in capital markets has therefore 
generated an important source of investment at the macro-economic level 
and has influenced corporate finance. The operation of pension funds in 
capital markets and the pattern of investment have, as well, effectively 
transformed the locus of corporate ownership. 
7.4.4 Pension Funds and the Locus of Corporate Ownership. The 
increasing level of pension saving and cash flow invested through the private 
pension system has, over the course of the past twenty years, altered the 
configuration of control over investment and the' ownership of corporate 
securities. The ownership of corporate securities, stocks and 'bonds, has 
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increasingly shifted from individual to institutional investors, including 
pension funds, as was reported in Tables 7.1 and 7.2. The locus of control 
over corporate securities has become increasingly -concentrated in the 
private pension system. The private pension system now has the largest 
holdings of corporate securities of any major financial institution in 
Canada. As indicated by 'Table 7.13, total portfolio holdings of corporate 
securities (stocks and bonds) by pension funds have increased from nearly 25 
per cent in 1964 to 37 per cent in 1979. The sheer magnitude of corporate 
securities invested in and held by private pension funds results in their now 
being the major actor in capital markets. - 
TABLE 7.13 
HOLDINGS OF CORPORATE SECURITIES' BY MAJOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, 
CANADA, $ BILLION, SELECTED YEARS, 1964-1979 
Institution 1964 1971 1979 
Trusteed Pension Plans $1,540 $4,488' 
524 4 560 Co i 22 I Lif 
$11,651 
972 10 , , mpan nsurance es e , Chartered Banks 491 1,269 7,577 
Fire/Casualty Insurance 337 1,070 2,961 
Trust/Mortgage Companies 347 648 2,902 
Mutual Funds 757 1,411 1,149 
Closed-end Funds 414 700 393 
Finance Companies 74 31 8 
Total $6,6484 $14,177 $37.613 
Total Pension Plan Holdings3: $1,566 $5,019 $13,967 
S of Total Corporate 
Securities Held by 
Pension Plans : 24.2% 35.4% 37.1% 
Notes: 1. Stocks and bonds. 
2. Including group annuities and segregated funds. 
3. Including trusteed pension plans and segregated funds. 
Sources: Calculated from the Bank of Canada, Review (Ottawa: n. p., 
various years) and Statistics CanadaTusteed Pension 
Plans Financial Statistics (Ottawa: Mn ns r of n ustry, 
ra e and ommerce, various years). 
The ownership of corporate shares or equity through the public 
and private pension systems is of particular significance because it confers 
ownership and voting rights upon the shareholder as distinct from bonds 
which are non-voting debt instruments. As examined earlier, an increasing 
proportion of corporate equity in Britain and the U. S., and to a lesser extent 
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in Canada, is now held through the private pension system (Table 7.2). In 
order to assess the private and public pension system's full impact on capital 
markets and the corporate sector requires that the total equity base of the 
retirement income system as a whole be determined and that it be related 
to stock market activity. 
Table 7.14 relates the total equity holdings of the retirement 
income system - public and -private - to the value of Canadian stocks listed 
on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) between 1966 and 1980. To complete 
this analysis required the statistical estimation of Registered Retirement 
Pension Plan (RRSP) assets, and the derivation of the amount of RRSP 
equity investment (Table 7.14, column 3), reported in Appendix I 1-3, to 
arrive at the total value of the equity held by the retirement income 
system. This time-series tentatively suggests that the total value of equity 
owned and controlled through the pension system increased from 4 per cent 
in 1966 to 15 per cent in 1980. 
This measurement, however, is significantly underestimated by 
the value of control blocks. Control blocks are the inactive or untraded 
portion of stock retained by a company when issuing new shares. Total 
equity issued is equal to the control block plus the stock float. In turn, the 
control block is equal to the total equity issued minus the shares actively 
traded, that is, the so-called "stock float". The importance of "netting-out" 
the value of control blocks is that it allows the value of the stock float, or 
actively traded shares, to be determined. Control blocks effectively reduce 
the value of outstanding shares available in the securities market, thereby 
increasing the proportion of the stock float owned by pension funds. 
Appendix J estimates the value of stock listed on the Toronto Stock 
Exchange (TSE) adjusted for control blocks. This is reported in Table 7.14 
(column 10). 
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These data indicate that between 1966 and 1980, the total value 
of pension fund equity holdings as a proportion of Canadian stocks on the 
TSE, - adjusted for control blocks, ranged from 15 to 32 per cent. The 
pension system in Canada over this period on average held 25 per cent of all 
outstanding corporate equity adjusted for control blocks. By way of 
comparison, in the United States in 1981- the pension system held 38 per 
cent of the value of corporate shares adjusted for control blocks. In Britain 
this was in the order of 42 per cent of the value of corporate shares. 
55 
While no one investment, under Canadian legislation can constitute more 
than 10 per cent the total value of an individual pension fund or represent 
more than 30 per cent of a corporation's shares, the pension system, as a 
system, has had a clearly demonstrable affect on the institutionalization of 
capital markets, macro-economic investment, corporate finance, and the 
locus of control over corporate securities. 
There is, however, an increasing structural contradiction between 
the ability of the pension system to satisfy both the investment 
requirements of the private sector and the public sector's need for social 
capital and revenue. A systemic tension exists because the "financing needs 
of the public sector were smaller than those of the private sectoe" while the 
pension system "met, a larger proportion of ... public sector needs 
than... those ' in the private sector. "56 . The increasing capital 
requirements of the corporate sector in the future, therefore, conflict with 
government's need for financing and public capital because the pension 
system is also a source of funds for the capitalist welfare state. 
7.5 Pension Funds and the Public Sector 
The retirement income system has served a dual purpose in 
advanced capitalist societies. Social security programs for the aged have in 
one instance been an important mechanism through which the capitalist 
welfare state has been able to fulfill its legitimation function, that is, 
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maintain social harmony. 
57 However, in the post-World War II period, as 
shall be demonstrated in the case of Canada, the public and private pension 
systems have also become a major source of funds and social capital for the 
state. "It is policy in fact to use the monied' of the state pension system "to 
finance government. "58 The state, particularly in Canada, therefore, has 
acquired an independent vested interest in the operation of the pension 
system, which is not necessarily the same as the private sector's. The 
opposing structural imperatives - the state for financing and social capital, 
and the corporate sector for investment capital - may result in considerable 
political tension having serious implications bor pension reform and the 
economic security of the elderly. 
7.5.1 Pensions and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State. The 
fiscal crisis of the welfare state is but one manifestation of the more 
generalized crisis of modern capitalist economies. 
59 The fiscal crisis of 
the state may be defined as the modern capitalist state 
increasing its expenditures on social overhead, 
complementary investment expenditure, socializing... 
the private costs [and risks) of production and an 
increasing volume of public investment. The state 
budget continuously expands owing to the increased 
degree of economic integration and interdependence. 
This has led to a... situation where govejpment 
expenditures are beginning to outstrip revenues. 
The continuous series of deficit budgets and the ballooning debt at all levels 
of government in Britain, Canada and the U. S. in recent years is 
symptomatic of this situation. 
Within the context of unique Canadian constitutional and fiscal 
transfer arrangements the state retirement income system - the 
Canada/Quebec Pension Plans - have played an important, but neglected, 
role in partially alleviating the effects of the fiscal crisis of the state. 
61 
The private pension system to a lesser extent has performed a similar 
f unction. 
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7.5.2 The Private Pension System and Public Finance. The 
private pension system is a source of funds for the state. In Canada, private 
pension funds purchased 28 per cent of the value of all net new marketable 
government bonds placed in Canada between 1970 and 1982, as indicated in 
Table 7.15. Pension funds were the largest institutional buyer of bonds 
(Table 7.1). Private pension fund holdings of government bonds (all levels) 
have increased from 1 to 4 per cent of total government revenue over this 
period. More significantly, federal government bonds held' by private 
pension funds increased from nearly 2 to 9 per cent of total federal 
government revenue on a consolidated national income accounts basis, 
between 1970 and 1981.62 
TABLE 7.15 
PRIVATE PENSION FUND ACQUISITION 
OF GOVERNMENT BONDS' AS A PERCENTAGE 
OF NET NEW MARKETABLE GOVERNMENT BONDS PLACED IN 
CANADA, 1970-1982 
Value of Net New Value of Bonds 
Value of Government Marketable Government Purchased by Pension 
Bonds Purchased by Bonds Placed in Funds as a% of 
Pension Funds Canada Net New 
Year (Flow in $ Million) ($ Million) Government Bonds 
1970 229: 1,605 14.3 
1971 298 1,934 15.4 
1972 350 1,589 22.0 
1973 413 1,230 35.6 
1974 464 2,348 19.8 
1975 878 3,913 22.4 
1976 1,375 5,789 23.7 
1977 1,988 7,937 25.0 
1978 2,396 7,971 30.1 
1979 3,573 10,516 33.9 
1980 3,588 14,262 25.2 
1981 5,706 9,667 59.0 
1982 4,034 (E) 12,005 36.0 
1970-1982 Average: 27.9% 
Note: 1. Including marketable federal, provincial and municipal bonds. 
exclusive of Canada Savings Bonds (CSBs) and non-marketable 
provincial government bonds held through the CPP which are not 
bought by institutions. 
Sources: The flow of pension fund investment Into government bonds was 
calculated from Statistics Canada, Trusteed Pension Plans Financial 
Statistics (Ottawa: Minister of Supp y and services Canada, various 
years Text Table V. Net new marketable government bonds, 
exclusive of CSBs and CPP, calculated from the Bank of Canada, 
Review, December 1971 and 1981, Table 21 and Table 28. 
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In Britain, private pension funds are second only to life insurance 
companies in terms of institutional holdings of government bonds (gilts). 
Pension funds held 16 per cent of all British government securities in 
1978.63 Pension funds are now sufficiently powerful that a decision to 
hold back from investing ' in these securities can force the government to 
raise interest rates and modify its economic policy. This was demonstrated 
during the so-called "investment" strike in 1977.64 The private pension 
system has thus served as a source of funds for government. Over the past 
twenty years in Canada, however, it has been the state pension system 
which has played an increasingly important economic role. 
7.5.3 The State Pension System: Saving and Investment. Since 
the inception of the Canada and Quebec Pension Plans in 1966, the state 
pension system has been an important actor at the macro-economic level. 
Net public pension saving has accounted for 4.5 to 7.0 per cent of gross 
saving in the economy between 1970 and 1980 (Table 6.3). In turn, net 
public pension saving through the C/QPPs has on average generated 11 per 
cent of all net private domestic investment (including public corporations) 
over this period-127 
The state pension system is as well an important source of 
internal government savings. Table 7.16 indicates that social security 
savings have ranged from 30 to 54 per cent of total government savings. 
The significance of the savings generated through the C/QPPs at the 
macro-economic level is that "if social security savings were not available 
for government financing... the total government deficit would have been 50 
per cent higher in 1978:, 
66 
In addition to influencing savings and investment, the state 
retirement system has helped to moderate the federal government's chronic 
deficit position in recent years. The state pension system has directly 
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TABLE 7.16 
SOCIAL SECURITY SAVINGS 
AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT SAVINGS, 
CANADA, 1968-1978 
Total Social Security Savings 
Social Security Government2 as a% of Total 
Savings Savings Government 
Year ($ Millions)-_ ($ Millions) Savings 
1968 1,003 3,030 33.1 
1969 1,113 4,183 26.6 
1970 1,193 3,327 35.8 
1971 1,278 2,510 50.8 
1972 1,375 2,570 53.5 
1973 1,472 3,832 38.4 
1974 1,780 6,122 29.1 
1975 2,003 -212 100+ 
1976 2,183 -43 100+ 
1977 2,259 -1,703 100+ 
1978 2,383 -4,325 100+ 
Notes: 1. Total C/QPP revenues minus total C/QPP expenditures. 
2. All levels of government. 
Source: Arthur W. Donner and 
C Fi it l i 
Fred Lazar, Th 
k h i 
e Impact of Social Security 
1980 " ng on a nanc ap Mar ets nt e s . Report of the Royal Commission on the Status of Pensions in Ontar o Vol. IXE 
Background es and apere oron o: queen ,s Printer, 1980), 
Table 46, p. 210. 
affected capital markets, public finance and economic development by 
acting as a financial intermediary and institutional investor. 
7.5.4 State as Institutional Investor. The state pension system in 
Canada functions as an institutional investor and is the backbone of 
provincial government financing. The establishment of the Canada/Quebec 
Pension Plans, according to a major study, has "resulted in some of the most 
important changes of the decade in financial intermediation and capital 
market functions in Canada. "67 The federal government through the 
operation of the state retirement, system "has become a principal with a 
force" and has the "same goals as other financial institutions. "68 As a 
financial intermediary and instituitional investor, the state pension system 
is a competitor to the private sector in capital markets. 
The Canada/Quebec Pension Plans have provided both a source of 
operating funds and developmental capital for the federal and provincial 
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governments. Net C/QPP saving (contributions minus benefits) was on 
average equivalent, to 3.0 per cent of total government revenue at all levels 
and 6.5 per cent of federal government revenue between 1970 and 1981.69 
The capital pool, accumulated through the Canada/Quebec 
Pensions Plans is one of the largest in Canada. The surplus in the CPP 
investment fund - that is, those monies left over on a current basis after 
benefits have, been paid - are loaned to the, provinces at a preferential 
interest rate in proportion to the contributions which have flowed from each 
province. This is outlined in Table 7.17. In Canada, there is a close 
relationship between the state pension system and government expenditure 
and capital accumulation. Capital is, the name of the game. Canada's 
sub-central governments - the provinces - have recognized this relationship 
for many years. One provincial offical involved in the negotiation of the 
Canada Pension Plan in 1965 commented that 
TABLE , 7.17 
CANADA PENSION PLAN 
'DISTRIBUTION OF EXCESS FUNDS, 1966 to MARCH 31,1979 
Distribution of - Excess Funds 
Province % (Mil ion) 
Newfoundland 2.0 284.5 
Prince Edward Island 0.4 51.7 
Nova Scotia 3.9,559.8 
New Brunswick 3.0 425.2 
Quebecl 0.5 '74.0 
Ontario 54.6 7,769.4 
Manitoba 5.8 828.2 
Saskatchewan 4.5 637.3 
Alberta 9.8 . 1,399.1 
British Columbia 14.7 1,095.3 
Canada 0.7 95.7 
Total 100.0% $14,226.1 
Note: 1. Quebec has its own pension plan. The amounts available 
to it relate only to federal employees, including Armed 
Forces personnel, who are resident in the province but 
are excluded by legislation from the Quebec Pension Plan. 
Source: Health and Welfare Canada. Canada Pension Plan - Report 
Endin March 31 1979 (Ottawa: ea and welfare Canada, 
191111. Mile , p. 17. 
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the main reason for us was the creation of a large 
fund. It would provide money for development ... and 
give us more liberty in money markets. The fund was 
certainl the main reason for me: it was the 
reason. 
Accordingly, the CPP investment fund has had a substantial impact on 
provincial government financing and economic development. 
The CPP investment fund has become "the backbone of provincial 
debt financing. "71 The CPP supplied nearly 38 per cent of all provincial 
borrowing on average between fiscal 1969-70 and 1978-79.72 This is 
outlined in Table 7.1& Previously the provinces relied heavily on private 
capital markets to supply their borrowing needs, whereas under current 
arrangements they raise a substantial share of their funds through the CPP, 
as does Quebec through the separately managed QPP. The weight of 
evidence suggests that the provinces have substituted CPP and QPP loans 
for other forms of borrowing as a result of lower than market interest rates 
paid by the provinces on funds. 
73 Donner concluded that "the provinces 
and their agencies have relied heavily on [the] CPP and QPP for direct 
finance"74 resulting in higher expenditures and lower taxes for the 
provinces. 
75 
This situation has had a significant impact on provincial 
government financing. In. Ontario, Canada's most populated and 
industrialized province, total non-public sources of borrowing represented 97 
per cent of the provinces total borrowing between 1966-67 and 1977-79. 
According to one report, "the Canada Pension Plan has been the largest 
source of funds, accounting for two-thirds of the accumulated totar'76 of 
Ontario's borrowing. The cumulative financing available to Ontario from 
non-public sources such as the CPP has exceeded Ontario's cumulative cash 
requirements. This has permitted Ontario to limit its public borrowing. In 
British Columbia, over the past thirteen years, public borrowing has 
provided about one-third of the capital requirements of provincial crown 
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corporations. Without CPP funds, nearly two-thirds of these capital 
requirements would have been borrowed in private securities markets. In 
total, it has been estimated that funds borrowed from the CPP have saved 
the provinces nearly 3 per cent on provincial debt charges. 
77 
Depending upon the ' province, in the early and mid-1970s, 
borrowing from the CPP fund was a source of cash flow for current 
operating expenditures or social investment in infrastructure (public 
capital). In 'this 'regard two distinct patterns emerge. In the Atlantic 
provinces borrowing from the'CPP fund has been part of general borrowing 
and has been used for current operating expenditures. In Western Canada, 
British Columbia, Saskatchewan and until recently Manitoba, however, CPP 
borrowings have been used to finance the investment requirements of crown 
corporations, whereas in" Alberta the funds are used to finance 
municipalities. In Ontario, 43 per cent of all investment in infrastructure 
between ' 1972-73 and 1976-77 was financed through the"CPP. 78 At' the 
provincial level in Western Canada, the use of CPP funds to finance the 
capital requirements of 'the crown sector has clearly affected the pattern of 
t. The investment objectives of the Caisse de economic developmen 
79 
Depöt, the investment arm of the Quebec Pension Plan, are explicitly 
related to provincial economic development. " 
Another source of non-public borrowing which must be analyzed in 
conjunction with the CPP is provincial borrowing from internal pension 
funds, that is, public employee pension funds. Based on the data in 'Table 
7.18,7 to 14 per cent of all provincial bonds and debentures were issued to 
their own captive public sector employee pension funds between 1969-70 and 
1978-79. This is government "self-financing" through the pension system. ' In 
Ontario, for `example; between 1966-67 and 1977-78, borrowing from public 
employee pension plans accounted for nearly 32 per cent of total net 
non-public borrowing. 
80 Public employee' pension funds, as with the CPP, 
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have -provided the provinces with an alternative capital market. In 
aggregate, Canada Pension Plan and public employee pension fund holdings 
peaked in fiscal. 1973-74 accounting for 55 per cent of total provincial 
government bond and debenture issues. While this proportion subsequently 
declined to 40 per cent in 1978-79, it nevertheless remains the case that 
non-public borrowing by the provinces from the CPP and public employee 
pension funds continues to be a major source of funds and is the backbone of 
their borrowing capacity and debt structure. 
This evidence suggests that the Canada Pension Plan while in a 
surplus position has. muted the fiscal crisis of the state for Canada's 
provincial governments by providing them with additional "tax room" and a 
source of . social 
investment for economic development. In the future if the 
public pension system was expanded the "funds... made available to 
governments... would have the effect of eliminating the need for provincial 
borrowing for a long time to come and could have an enormous effect on 
provincial budgets and financial power. "81 
The fiscal crisis of the state in Canada has been ameliorated for 
the provincial governments in the past by their, ability to draw on the surplus 
generated from the CPP investment fund. This situation is rapidly coming 
to an end, however, and, in turn, will trigger a chain-reaction of events. 
Based on the existent . total contribution rate of 3.6 per cent of income to 
the CPP (up to the yearly maximum pensionable earnings), cash flow to the 
provinces from the CPP investment fund. will turn negative in 1992.82 
The provinces will then have to begin repaying the interest on the 
outstanding loans. 
83 In the year 2011, when members of the "baby boom" 
begin to retire, the CPP fund will go into a disaccumulation or dissavings 
position. 84. This means that the provinces will have to repay the principal 
and interest on their loans so that the CPP fund can honour its commitment 
to pay benefits. This sequence of events has profound ramifications on 
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public finance for the provinces. More to the point, it sets in motion a 
"domino effect" having repercussions for all levels of government. 
Canada/Quebec Pension Plan financing, that is, the contribution 
level will have to be significantly increased in the near-term just to pay for 
current benefits. To the extent that contribution rates are increased above 
current levels to pay for improved benefits, ' and depending on the method of 
funding and the phase-in of new contribution rates, the cash flow into the 
CPP investment fund and the size of the fund may double. 85 While such 
an expansion of the public pension system' would improve the* economic 
position of the elderly, and the cash flow position of the provinces, it would 
come' at the expense Of the private pension" system. This is because a 
doubling of the income replacement rate- under the C/QPP to improve the 
economic position of the elderly would reduce the savings and investment 
flowing through and under the control of the private pension system by an 
estimated $88 billion or some 31 per cent, with a resultant impact on 
private capital markets. 
86 Thus, the structurally determined interests of 
the elderly for improved retirement income and the financing requirements 
of the provinces conflict with the private sector's need for capital and the 
private pension industry's institutional survival. 
In the most fundamental sense what is at issue is power, control 
over capital, and capital accumulation. "Pension policy" one study 
concluded is "an issue of power, power to control and allocate the capital 
generated through the savings put aside by workers for their old age. "87 
What public policy and the pension reform debate turns on in Canada is the 
structure of the capital market, and who shall control pension savings, 
investment and capital formation: the private sector, the provinces, or the 
federal state. Given that there are five major pension actors - the federal 
government, the provinces, the private sector, the labour movement and the 
elderly - suggests that a number of scenarios " might unfold should 
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federal-provincial negotiations commence to reform Canada's public 
retirement income system. 
Under conditions of advanced capitalism the public and private 
pension systems are integrally related to the capital accumulation process 
and financing arrangements in the private and state sectors. Control of that 
capital by the federal or provincial governments in Canada is one way in 
which they will attempt to grapple with their respective fiscal crisises. At 
the same time, it provides a source of developmental capital for the state, 
should the political will exist. The structurally determined interests of the 
elderly and the state are, however, opposed to those of-the private sector 
and private pension industry. In the final analysis it, is the impact of the 
private pension system on, capital markets and the fiscal implications 
underlying the state pension system which will be the driving forces behind 
pension reform and the form in which it is realized. - 
7.6 The Institutionalization of Capital Markets: Implications 
The pension system now occupies a strategic position and 
performs a series of vital functions In the advanced capitalist economies of 
Britain, Canada and the United States. In the post-war period the pension 
system as a financial intermediary and institutional investor has become a 
dominant force in capital markets. The power and strength of the private 
pension system is based on its ability to channel, accumulate and control 
savings and investment. In turn, under conditions of mature capitalism, 
there has been an increased socialization and institutionalized of retirement 
savings and investment channelled through the pension system, with a 
resultant impact on the operation and configuration of capital markets. The 
associated institutionalization of investment has affected the level, type 
and pattern of investment, with a consequent affect on macro-economic 
investment and corporate and public sector finance. 
The central role now performed by the private pension system in 
generating investment to promote capital accumulation in the private sector 
- 282 - 
and the concomitant impact on financial markets in advanced capitalist 
economies generates, as demonstrated in the case of Canada, a number of 
important structural contradictions having serious implications for pension 
reform. The current pension reform debate in Canada is dominated by a 
series of policy and, political trade-offs. These structurally determined 
trade-offs, based on the opposing interests of the various pension actors, are 
identified and briefly examined below. 
First, there are the opposing interests of the private sector and 
the, elderly.. There is a conflict between the investment and capital 
accumulation requirements of the corporate sector, and the operation of 
capital markets to satisfy them, and the elderly's imperative for economic 
security. Pension funds as a source of capital formation are central to the 
current policy debate because the business community fears that an 
expansion of the public pension system would result in it being deprived of a 
prime source of investment capital. A related fear is, that an expansion of 
the public pension system would result in government domination of capital 
markets. The private pension system, characterized by a series of universal 
limitations as analyzed in Chapter 4,, has proven itself to be an inadequate 
delivery system for retirement income. The elderly's need for adequate 
retirement income, described in Chapter 3, requires an expansion of the 
public pension system. The opposing interests of the private sector and 
elderly have been clearly identified by the business media. One editorial 
argued, for example, that "the disposition of pension assets needs just as 
thorough an airing in the coming discussions as does the question of 
benefits. "88 Therefore, in terms. of public policy formulation and the 
politics of pension reform the alternative becomes. private sector capital 
accumulation through the inadequate private pension system or adequate 
retirement income for the elderly based on an expanded public pension 
system. 
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Second, " there is a tension in capital markets, particularly in 
Canada, between the interests of the private sector and the state: an 
antagonism exists between the corporate sector's requirement for increased 
investment capital through the private pension system and the federal and 
sub-central state's requirements for social capital and operating revenue 
generated through the public pension system. This antagonism manifests 
itself in a number of ways. The Canada/Quebec Pension Plans must be 
refinanced in the near future, requiring increased contributions to maintain 
current benefit levels. As a result of the corporate sector's cost 
minimization behaviour, ' it ' may be expected that the required increase in 
contribution levels will be resisted. More importantly, expansion of the 
public pension system, which would improve the economic situation of the 
elderly, ' and the cash flow position of the provinces, would come at the 
expense of the private sector by shifting' pension savings and investment 
from the private to the government sector, with a consequent reduction in 
the control over , and amount of capital available for the business 
community. In the most fundamental political sense, expansion of the state 
pension system 'represents the shifting of the savings and -investment 
function from the private to the public sector and a more important role for 
government in capital markets. This will be resisted by the private sector, 
not' only for ideological reasons, but also because of its structural 
imperative for investment to augment the capital accumulation process. 
This poses the alternative of either adequate ' 'public' pensions and 
government control over capital formation or inadequate occupational 
pension plans and private sector control over capital. 
From the perspective of political economy, pension reform 
becomes a battleground over the control and direction' of the savings, 
investment and reserve capital generated from the pension system. Within 
this context, a political dynamic might develop, especially in Canada, based 
upon the structurally determined vested interests of the respective pension 
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actors, where there is an alliance between the elderly, organized labour and 
the state against the corporate sector. 
Third, the battle over pension capital will affect the mode of 
pension reform. In terms of public policy formulation there is a close 
inter-relationship between pension plan coverage and the saving and 
investment function performed by the private and public pension systems. 
In order to provide retirement income for the elderly requires that they be 
covered by some type of pension plan. Social security policy as it has 
historically evolved has incorporated a tension between compulsory or 
voluntary coverage. In order to resolve the coverage problem, however, 
clearly requires some type of mandatory or compulsory pension arrangement 
for the labour force. This is turn poses the question: what type of 
mandatory coverage? Within the pension reform debate, and from a public 
policy perspective, the alternative which has emerged is universal coverage 
through the public pension system or a regime of mandatory coverage 
through the employer-based private pension system. 
Within this context the manifest saving and investment function 
underlying the operation of the private and public pension systems assumes 
considerable importance with respect to pension reform and the operation of 
capital markets. The proposals put forward by the Canadian Life and Health 
Insurance Association, the Lazar report's Options II and III, and the 
Government of Ontario's Royal Commission on the Status of Pensions 
recommendation for a provincial universal retirement system (PURS) to 
provide mandatory pension plan coverage through the private pension 
industry would have the effect of creating a captive market for pension 
savings and a private monopoly channelling investment to the private 
sector. Similar proposals were advanced by the President's Commission on 
Pension Policy (1981) and the white paper on the reform of social security in 
the U. K. (1985). The various private pension industry proposals for 
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mandatory private coverage to' stave off expansion of the public pension 
system in Canada would have increased the assets under their control 
by 
nearly 25 per cent, from $52 billion to a conservatively estimated $64 billion 
in 1981.89 This pool of captive pension savings would, of course, be 
cycled through capital markets as investment to the private sector to 
augment capital accumulation and profitable business activity. Conversely, 
an expansion of the public pension system would result in a significant 
increase in the pool of pension capital available to and under the control of 
government for investment. This would result in an increased government 
presence in capital markets and substantial control over investment. 
- Generating increased investment through - either the private or 
public pension systems for the private sector would increase the already 
considerable power exercised by the private pension system in capital 
markets. The battle over pension reform therefore'clearly poses the policy 
alternative of either public or private sector pension reform. The specific 
modality of pension reform, therefore, has serious implications for the locus 
of control over saving, investment, corporate securities and the operation of 
capital markets. 
Fourth, the type of pension reform - public or private sector - has 
implications for investment objectives and strategies. The manifest saving 
and investment function now incorporated into the operation of the private 
pension system has resulted in an increasing fusion between and integration 
of financial and industrial capital. This is a natural consequence of financial 
intermediaries and institutional investors, such as pension funds, investing in 
the corporate sector through the securities market. The private pension 
system now has the largest institutional holdings of corporate securities, 
including equity which bestows ownership and voting rights. This may have 
political implications for transforming control over the corporate sector and 
might suggest progressive, alternative investment strategies by organized 
- 286 - 
labour with respect to the occupational pension system at the enterprise or 
industry level. Alternatively, expansion of the public pension system, 
particualrly in the case of Canada, would generate a surplus (where 
contributions are greater than benefits) resulting in a substantial investment 
fund. The existence of such a fund poses the question for what purpose is it 
being accumulated, that is, what are its investment objectives? Depending 
upon political circumstance, such an investment fund might provide the 
state with a source of developmental capital to pursue alternative economic 
strategies under democratic control. Using the public and private pension 
system's saving and investment function to promote progressive economic 
development strategies and social change in advanced capitalist economies 
is dealt with in Chapter 10. 
Capital is at the heart of the political economy of pensions and 
pension reform. The manifest functions of the private pension system, the 
institutionalization of capital markets, and the formal organization of 
pension fund power are inter-related. This organic relationship is specific to 
a particular institutional framework. The focus must therefore shift from a 
functional to an institutional analysis of pension fund power. 
CHAPTER 8 
THE STRUCTURE OF PENSION FUND POWER 
"Expropriation is accomplished by the action of 
the ... laws of capitalism ... by the centralization of 
capital. " 
Karl Marx 
8.1 Introduction e 
The elements constituting the political economy of pensions 
identified and examined in the preceding chapters have included the 
economic position of the elderly, the economics of the demographic 
transition, the universal limitations of the private pension system, the 
tensions associated with the occupational pension system under conditions of 
collective bargaining and the pension system's saving, investment and 
capital accumulation function. 
It was established that the saving, investment and capital 
accumulation function is now central to the operation of the private pension 
system, with the resultant socialization and institutionalization of 
retirement savings and capital markets under conditions of advanced 
capitalism. The private pension system's economic power is explained in 
terms of its ability to channel investment capital to and augment the 
capital accumulation process in the private sector. A symbiotic relationship 
9^ 
has developed between the investment requirements of the macro-economy 
and corporate sector, supplied through the private pension system, and the 
private pension industry's imperative for survival. This has resulted in a 
corresponding underdevelopment of the public pension system, which 
perpetuates the immiseration and marginalization of the elderly. The 
economic functions inherent to the operation of the private pension system 
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are integrally related, to and manifest themselves through the institutional 
structure, that is, organization of pension fund power. 
The purpose of this chapter is to delineate the formal structure of 
pension fund power and to identify those "laws of motion" which result in an 
increased concentration and centralization of economic power residing in 
the private pension system under conditions of advanced capitalism. A 
number of inter-related topics are examined. First, the power associated 
with the operation of the private pension system is identified as the pool of 
capital, that is, the asset base under the control of the private pension 
industry in advanced capitalist economies. In the post-war period there has 
been an accelerated growth of private pension fund assets, or reserve 
capital, with a resultant concentration of economic power. Second, the 
tendency towards the concentration and centralization of pension fund 
capital is identified as the primary explanatory factor with respect to the 
institutional power of the private pension system. The centralization and 
concentration of pension fund capital is a reflection of these more global 
tendencies in capitalist economies. 
Third, the dramatic growth of private pension fund assets has 
resulted in the concentration and centralization of pension fund capital 
among a relatively few dominant financial institutions or actors such as 
individual trusteed pension plans and trust companies in Canada, and banks 
and life insurance companies in the U. K. and U. S. Fourth, as a consequence, 
the locus of control over pension fund capital resides in the financial sector 
because pension plan trustees generally delegate investment responsibility 
to dominant financial institutions. The private pension system, as a sphere 
or "region" within the finance sector, with formal and informal 
interconnections to it, therefore is organically integrated with financial 
capital. The growth of pension fund assets as the largest pool of capital in 
advanced capitalist economies has accordingly resulted in an increased 
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concentration of economic power under the control of the finance sector in 
the post-war period. 
8.2 Formal Structure of Power: Overview 
Funding agencies such as trust companies, banks and life 
insurance companies, taken together in conjunction with service agencies 
such as actuarial consultants, plan administrators and investment 
counsellors can be described as the private pension industry, constituting the 
formal institutional structure of pension fund power. The notion of "formal 
structure" as used here refers to "that part of ... a group or organization that 
is defined explicitly by rules or expectations. "1 The formal structure of 
pension fund power, is the institutional organization of the private pension 
system as it has developed in law and practice. 
The economic power associated with the formal organization of 
the private pension system is explained in terms of its control over a 
significantly growing pool of pension assets flowing. from increased pension 
saving and investment, the tendency towards the concentration and 
centralization of pension fund capital among a relatively few economic 
actors, and the formal and informal linkages to the broader finance sector 
and industrial capital. The institutional strength of the private pension 
system is related to its now manifest economic functions to promote capital 
accumulation in the private sector. 
8.3 Growth of Pension Fund Capital 
The substantial growth of pension fund assests as a major pool of 
capital in the post-World War II period in Canada, Britain and the U. S. 
indicates the importance of the subject. The growth of pension fund assets, 
both in absolute and relative terms, determines the extent-of their economic 
power. The information presented here suggests that pension funds are one 
of the most rapidly growing and dynamic institutional investors within the 
- 290 - 
finance sector, and one of the largest pools of capital in advanced capitalist 
economies. 
The growth of pension fund assets in Canada, Britain and the U. S. 
in the post-war period has significantly exceeded the growth in assets 
experienced by all financial institutions and non-bank intermediaries in the 
finance sector. As indicated in Table 8.1 pension fund assets have 
experienced an annualized compounded growth rate of 13 per cent in the 
U. S., 15 per cent in Canada and 16 per cent in Britain. This contrasts with a 
growth rate for all financial intermediary assets of 9 per cent in the U. S., 11 
per cent in Canada and 18 per cent in Britain. The rate of growth of pension 
fund assets has significantly exceeded that of the finance sector, 
particularly in the U. S. and Canada. In terms of, absolute growth the assets 
of all financial intermediaries in Canada between 1946 and 1979 increased 
nearly 33, times, while pension'fund assets increased by a factor of 95. 
TABLE 8.1 
COMPARISON OF GROWTH RATES OF PENSION FUNDS 
NON-BANK FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES AND ALL FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES, 
CANADA, U. K.. AND U. S. IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD 
Million S Annualized Compounded 
CANADA 1946 1979 Rate of Growth 
All Financial Intermediariesl 11 850 398,800 
Private Non-bank Intermediaries 4.926 188,600 11.7 
Pension Funds 455 - 43,250 14.8 
I Billion 
BRITAIN 1963 1981 
All Financial Institutionsl -3-. r _3T. 7 17.8 
Non-bank Institutions 9.1 252.0 20.3 
Pension Funds 5.8 85.0 16.1 
Billion 
UNITED STATES 1950 1980 
All Financial Intermediairesl 213b. 6 3761.8 8 9 
Non-bank Finagce 138.8 2,375.5 . 9.9 
Pension Funds 11.7 484.9 13.2 
Notes: 1. Bank plus non-bank financial intermediaries. 
2. Trusteed and insured pension plus segregated funds 'of life companies. 
3. Private, public and Local Authority pension funds, and estimated assets 
of insured pension plans of life companies. 
4. Private insured pension funds and state and local government retirement 
funds. 
w 
Sources: Appendix K 1-3. 
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Pension fund assets have grown at a faster rate than the assets of chartered 
banks and life insurance companies over this period. In the U. S. the assets 
of all financial intermediaries increased 13 times, compared with a 41 fold 
increase-in pension fund assets between 1950 and, 1980. Projections for the 
U. S. suggest that total pension fund assets will exceed those of all non-bank 
savings institutions by 1990.2 
The significant relative and absolute growth in pension fund 
capital is attributable to the moderate growth of occupational pension plan 
coverage (Chapter 4) and the increased proportion of personal saving 
channelled through and invested by the private pension system (Chapter 6). 
Between 1960 and 1980 the annualized compounded rate of growth for total 
private pension assets was 11 per cent in the U. S., 14 per cent in Canada and 
18 per cent in Britain. This is reported in Table 8.2 (using a different but 
more comparable time period than presented in Table 8.1). Pension fund 
assets have doubled every' 6 to 10 years between 1960 and 1980, depending 
upon the country; this asset base is now doubling every 5 years. Pension 
funds have therefore become the growth center within the finance sector 
over the past four decades in advanced capitalist economies. 
TABLE 8.2 
GROWTH OF PENSION FUND ASSETS, 
BRITAIN, CANADA, AND U. S., 1960-1980 
Z Annualized 
Billion National Currency Units Compounded Rate 
Count of Growth 
Britainl 3.32 85.0 17.6 
Canada3 4.8 65.5 13.9 
U. S. 4 90.8 727.1 10.9 
Notes: I. Non-insured and insured pension schemes. Assets of insured schemes 
estimated at one-third of the contribution cash-flow of funded schemes. 
2. Estimated. 
3. Trusteed and insured pension plans plus the segregated funds of life 
insurance companies. 
4. Non-insured and insured pension plans and all government retirement funds. 
Sources: CSO, Financial Statistics (London: HMSO, various years); Statistics 
Canada, Trusteed Pension Plan Financial Statistics (Ottawa: Minister of 
Supply and Services, various years ; Bank o Canada Statistical Summary 
(Ottawa: n. p., various years) and the Statistical Abstract of en 
Fed 
States, 1982-83 (Washington, D. C.: GPO, , res bj/, p. hO. 
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The growth of pension fund assets in the future may be even more 
impressive than in the past. In the case of Canada, for example, according 
to projections by the Economic Council of Canada, given current growth 
rates -and depending on demographic assumptions, the assets of trusteed 
pension plans will increase from 16 per cent of gross national product (GNP) 
in-1981 to 50 to 66 , per cent of GNP by 2031 (Table 8.3). The private 
pension system over the next thirty years will therefore be the major 
repository for the savings of workers and a major source of investment 
capital for the economy. By any standard, the growth of pension fund 
capital in recent decades has been impressive,, if not startling.. This growth 
has concurrently altered the configuration of the finance sector and 
accelerated the concentration of capital among a few major institutions in 
advanced capitalist economies. 
TABLE 8.3 
ESTIMATED BOOK VALUE OF 
TRUSTEED PENSION PLAN ASSETS 
AS A PROPORTION OF GNP, CANADA, 1981-2051° 
Trusteed Pension Plan Assets 
as a Per Cent of GNP 
Under Varying Demographic Growth Rates 
Year Medium Low 
1981 16 16 
1991 25 27 
2001 
435 
38 
2 38 2011 
48 60 2021 
2031 50 66 
2041 50 66 
2051 50 66 
Source: Estimated from the Economic Council of Canada, One in 
Three: Pensions for Canadians to 2030 (Hull: wer 
o Supply and erv ces. Dart -2, p. 54. Figures 
rounded. 
8.4 Concentration of Pension Fund Capital, .,. 
As used by Marx, the term "concentration of capital', refers to 
the process whereby the quantity of capital controlled by individual 
capitalists or capitalist corporations (industrial and financial) increases over 
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time. In this sense the concentration of capital is a natural accompaniment 
of the capital accumulation process. 
3 
The configuration of the finance sector in Britain, Canada and the 
United States, and the distribution of assets within it, is a product of the 
particular historical development of each national capitalism (the social 
formation) and the relationship of the finance sector to the industrialization 
process. 
4 In Canada the locus of economic power in the finance sector 
resides in four private financial intermediaries: chartered banks, trusteed 
pension. funds (individual and corporate), life insurance companies and trust 
companies. These four institutions accounted for nearly 83 per cent of the 
total assets of private financial intermediaries in Canada in 1979 (Table 8.4). 
TABLE 8.4 
ASSETS OF MAJOR 
CANADIAN FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES,. 
BOOK VALUE, 1979 
% Distribution of Assets 
Total Private 
Assets Total Private Non-Bank 
Financial Intermediary ($ Billion) Intermediaries Intermediaries 
Chartered Banks 210.2 52.7 - 
Trusteed Pension Funds 1 
43.22(32.43)-. 10.9 (8.13) 22.9 (17.13) 
Life Insurance Companies 41.4 10.4 21.9 
Trust Companies 33.4 (44.24) 8.4 (11.14) 17.7 (23.44) 
Local and Central Credit Unions 32.5 8.2 17.2 
Construction Loan Companies 14.1 3.5 7.5 
Mortgage Loan Companies 12.3 3.1 6.5 
Property and Casualty Companies 10.4 2.6 5.5 
Investment Companies 1.3 0.3 0.7 
Total Assets: 
All Financial Intermediaires 398.8 
Non-bank Financial Intermediaires 188.6 
Notes: 1. Canadian business only 
2. Including life and accident and sickness policies (f. 3 billion) plus the 
segregated (pension) funds ($5.5 billion) of life firms. 
3. Excluding corporate trusteed pension fund assets under management by 
trust companies. 
4. To place the assets of trust companies on a comparable basis with life 
companies requires that all assets under their control be included, as in 
the case of life insurance company assets (SBA, segregated funds and life 
olicies). Nearly 25 per cent of all trusteed pension fund assets, or 
10.8 billion, are controlled by trust companies and are included here. 
he total asset base of trust companies is therefore larger than that of 
life insurance companies. 
5. Open and closed investment funds and mutual funds. 
Source: Retabulated and calculated from Statistics Canada, Financial Institutions 
Financial Statistics, Fourth Quarter 1979 (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 19791. 
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Private financial intermediaries in Canada had nearly $400 billion 
dollars in assets at their disposal, while non-bank financial intermediaries, 
including pension funds, had assets worth $190 billion under their control in 
1979. The assets of trusteed pension plans (private and public sector) 
represented over $43 billion. To this must be added the $12 billion of assets 
associated with insured pension plans and the segregated funds of life 
insurance companies. The total assets of the entire private pension system 
in Canada were therefore in the order of $54.4 billion in 1979. The assets of 
all private pension plans combined with those of the public pension system 
(C/QPP) now stand at nearly $92 billion, or in excess of 30 per cent of the 
GNP. 
Private pension funds in Canada, historically dwarfed by the 
chartered banks and life insurance companies, are now an independent power 
in financial markets as a result of the growth and concentration of pension 
fund assets. Pension funds today are the second largest institutional 
investor, having for the first time superceded the assets of life insurance 
companies in 1979. Pension funds in Canada are now the largest private 
non-bank financial intermediary accounting for nearly 25 per cent of all 
non-bank assets. Historically "life companies and banks together" were, 
according to Clement, "the nub not only of Canadian finance but of 
Canadian capitalism. "5 Private pension funds must now clearly be 
incorporated into such a formulation under conditions of advanced 
capitalism. 
The growth and concentration of pension fund capital has 
correspondingly affected the configuration of the finance sector in the U. S., 
Britain and Canada in the post-war period. The relative and absolute 
increase in pension fund assets, and their concentration into a new growth 
center, has simultaneously resulted in a redistribution of assets under the 
control of and the economic power exercised by various financial 
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institutions. ' The transfiguration of the finance sector, associated with the 
growth of private pension fund assets, is outlined in Table 8.5 which reports 
pension assets as `a proportion of total and non-bank financial intermediary 
assets. In the U. S. and Canada, pension fund assets have nearly tripled as a 
proportion of total and non-bank financial institution assets in the post=war 
period. 
TABLE 8.5 
PENSION FUND ASSETS 
AS A PERCENTAGE OF ALL FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARY 
AND NON-BANK FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARY ASSETS, 
CANADA, U. S., AND U. K., POST-WAR PERIOD 
Canada U. S. U. K. 
Sector 1946 1979 1950 1980 1963 1981 
All Financial Intermediaries 3.8 10.8 4.1 12.9 19.1 14.6 
Non-bank intermediaries 9.2 22.9 8.4 20.4 27.2 33.7 
Sources: Calculated from Appendix K1-3. 
`' The growth of pension fund capital in recent years has resulted in 
pension funds exhibiting greater economic power and a more prominent 
position within the finance sector. In the immediate post-war period 
pension funds in the the U. S. were the fifth largest financial intermediary, 
and in Britain the third largest. By 1980 pension funds ranked as the third 
largest institutional investor in the U. S. and were the second largest in the 
U. K. Pension funds ranked as the fourth largest 'non-bank financial 
intermediary in the U. S. and were the second largest in Britain after the 
war. ' By 1980' pension funds had become the second and first ranked 
non-bank financial intermediary in the U. S. and Britain respectively. In 
Canada pension funds are now the second largest institutional investor and 
the largest non-bank financial intermediary. The change in the 
configuration of the finance sector in Canada, 'Britain and the U. S. as a 
consequence of' the growth and concentration of pension fund capital, and 
the reallocation of assets between financial institutions in the post-war 
period is reported in Appendix K 1-3. 
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The institutionalization of financial markets and investment in 
advanced capitalist economies is a natural concomitant of the substantial 
growth and considerable concentration of pension fund capital. As a result, 
pension funds have assumed a strategic position within the finance sector 
and the economy. The concentration of pension fund assets has been 
accompanied by the centralization of pension fund capital under the control 
of a few financial institutions. 
8.5 Centralization of Pension Fund Capital 
The centralization of capital, as distinct from the concentration 
of capital, refers to the combining or amalgamation of capitals which are 
already in existence. 
6 This "presupposes a change in the distribution of 
capitar' because as "capital grows in one place to a huge mass in a single 
hand it has in another place been lost by many. ,7 The centraliziation of 
capital in the finance sector, or the "credit system" to use Marx's term, 
operates in a different manner than in the industrial sphere of production. 
As Marx used the term, the "credit system" includes not only banks, but the 
entire financial system of investment houses, security markets, and so 
on. 
8 Under conditions of contemporary capitalism, it is appropriate to 
include the private pension system as part of the "credit system". The 
finance sector becomes a "formidable weapon in the competitive 
struggle"9 and is able to affect "the amalgamation of ... capitals which 
already exist or are in the process of formation. "10 The centralization of 
capital within the finance sector therefore refers to the general process 
whereby fewer capitalists or financial institutions own or control a greater 
quantity of capital. 
The centralization of capital as it relates to the operation of the 
private pension system is relevant in at least three ways. In the first 
instance, "the fact that loaned [or invested] capital yields interest whether 
actually employed as capital or not... lends strength to the idea that this 
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form of [money] capital exists independently. "" That is, the assets and 
investment activities of financial institutions such as pension funds are an 
independent sphere of economic power which augment capital 
accummulation in the industrial sector. Second, the centralization of 
capital reduces competition with a resultant tendency towards monopolistic 
market behaviour. Third, and perhaps most important, the centralization of 
capital leads to the socialization and rationalization of the labour process 
within acapitalist political economy. 
12 
Pension funds are both an integral part of the finance sector and a 
separate "region", or industry, within it. The centralization of pension fund 
capital is an important public policy issue because pension funds are "a force 
making for greater centralization of [economic] decision-making power" 
13 
among a. relatively few financial institutions which control and direct the 
pension savings of workers into investment. "It is power concentrated in 
relatively few hands, " according to Titmuss,. "working, at the apex of a 
handful of . giant -bureaucracies... and accountable, 
in practice, to virtually 
no one. 
14 
8.5.1 The Morphology of Pension Capital. The private pension 
system in the U. K., Canada and. the U. S. in the post-war era has exhibited a 
marked tendency towards the centralization of, pension fund capital. The 
transnational data presented in Table 8.6 indicate that the size of pension 
funds is closely related to the centralization of pension assets. The top 10 
funds in each of these countries account for 25 to 30 per cent of total 
pension fund assets, while the 20 largest pension funds represent nearly 40 
per cent of the total assets of the private pension system. These data 
confirm that there is is both, a concentration and centralization of pension 
capital in a few large pension funds. 
A transnational comparison of the distribution of pension assets 
by funding agency and sector is presented in Table 8.7. The vast majority of 
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TABLE 8.6 
CENTRALIZATION AND CONCENTRATION 
OF PENSION ASSETS IN LARGE PENSION FUNDS, 
U. K., CANADA, AND U. S., 1978-1983 
% of Total Pension Fund Assets Controlled by 
Country Top 10 Funds Top 20 Funds Top 200 Funds 
U. K. 1 30.8 40.3 55.0 
Canada2 24.4 33.2 88.94 
U. S. 3 24.1 42.4 75.2 
Notes: 1.1978. 
2.1980. 
3.1983. 
4. Largest 397 pension funds with 1,000 or more members. 
Sources: Calculated from the National Association of Pension Fund survey and CSO, 
Financial Statistics (London: HMSO, 1980); "Top 200 pension funds/ 
sponsors , "Pens -Tons Investment Age, January 23,1984, pp. 16-17; "Canada's Top Pension Funds , Benefits Canada, Vol. 6 (September/ 
October 1982), p. 45 and Statist cs Cana a, Trusteed Pension Plan Financ 
Statistics 1980 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services. . ex Table , p. . 
occupational pension plan assets are in non-insured (trusteed) plans 
administered by bank trust departments in the U. S. and merchant banks in 
Britain. In Canada most pension fund assets are administered under 
individual and corporate trust arrangements. 
In Canada the organization of the private pension industry and the 
locus of control over pension fund capital is concentrated and centralized in 
three institutions: the individual trusteed (non-insured) pension fund, the 
trust company or corporate trustee, and the segregated (pension) funds of 
life insurance companies. "The trusteed arrangement, " according to 
Statistics Canada, "represents the major repository for pension funds. " 
Within the category of "trusteed" pension plans it is necessary to 
differentiate between an individual trustee (a natural person or persons 
acting on behalf of a corporate entity) and corporate trustee arrangements 
administered under the auspices of a trust company. 
16 Table 8.8 
indicates that trusteed pension plans (individual and corporate) account for 
77 per cent of all pension fund assets (excluding occupational pensions paid 
from government consolidated revenue). The majority of pension assets in 
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TABLE 8.8 
PENSION FUND ASSETS, 
BY FUNDING AGENCY, BOOK VALUE, CANADA, 1979 
Funding Agency 
Trusteed 
Individual trustee 
Corporate trustee/trust companies 
Other 
Insurance Companies 
Government Annuities 
Total 
Value 
Pension Fund 
of 
Assets 
Million % of Total 
43,203 77.1 
26,371 47.1 
13,764 24.6 
3,068 5.5 
12,239 21.8 
585 1.1 
56,027 100.0 
Source: Calculated fron Statistics Canada, Trusteed Pension Plans Financial 
Statistics 1979 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, Text 
ae, p. and Text Table III, p. 9. 
Canada are held by individual trustees, rather than by trust companies 
(corporate trustees). Specifically, 47 per cent of total pension fund assets 
were held by individual trustees, 25 per cent by trust companies and 22 per 
cent held through life insurance companies. Each of these pension fund 
arrangements in Canada exhibits a significant concentration and 
centralization of pension capital as a result of their being under the control 
of a dominant financial institution. These arrangements are examined in 
greater detail here. 
8.5.2 Individual Trusteed Pension Funds. Large individual 
trusteed pension funds -have witnessed a marked increase in the 
concentration and centralization of pension fund assets under their control. 
Over the past two decades the level of average assets per large individual 
trusteed pension fund in Canada have increased by a factor of 4 in current 
dollars and have nearly doubled in constant dollars (Table 8.9). This reflects 
the considerable growth of pension fund assets in the post-war period and 
the distribution and concentration of pension plan coverage by sector and 
industry (Chapter 4). 
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The distribution of pension fund assets clearly indicates the high 
degree of concentration and centralization of capital held by the largest 
funds and, in particular, individual trusteed pension funds. This suggests 
that a: considerable amount of independent power resides with large 
individual trusteed pension funds. This economic power is closely related to 
and reinforced by the type of pension fund investment management. The 
investment management of large or individual trusteed pension funds is 
generally handled internally, that is, managed in-house by the plan sponsor. 
It is the small and medium sized pension funds which are managed externally 
by various financial institutions. Large, internally managed pension funds 
are therefore under the direct control of the corporate plan sponsor. 
The centralization of pension assets by type of investment 
management for Canada's largest pension funds is reported in Table 8.10. 
This, information indicates that Canada's ten largest pension funds are 
wholly or largely managed in-house. Specifically, 92 per cent of the total 
assets of the ten top pension funds in Canada are self-managed, including 
such major private and public sector corporations as CN Railways, Bell 
Canada, General Motors and Ontario Hydro. In Britain, nearly 80 per cent 
TABLE 8.10 
LARGEST CANADIAN PENSION FUNDS. 
BY TYPE OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, MARKET VALUE, 1980 
Assets Type of , Pension Fund (ä Million) Fund management 
1. Ontario Municipal 1 
Employees Retirement System 2.508 90% in-house 
2. Canadian National Railways - 
2.500 94% in-house 
3. Canadian Pacific 1.350 87% in-house 
4. Bell Canada 1.300 In-house 
5. ; Hospitals of Ontario 
Pension Fund 1,100 In-house 
6. Ontario Hydro 1,100 In-house 
7. Air Canada 833 85% in-house 
8. General Motors of Canada 810 85% in-house 
9. Imperial Oil 588 65% in-house 
10. Hydro Quebec 542 In-house 
Notes: 1. Including $1.3 billion in non-marketable securities. 
Source: Retabulated from C'nnaada's 
pTop 
20 Pension Funds", Benefits Canada, Vol. 6 
(September/October 
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of the total assets of the ten largest pension funds are managed in-house, 
including the Post Office, ICI and the Imperial Group (Table 8.11). In the 
United States in recent years there has been an accelerating trend towards 
in-house investment management, particularly among the largest corporate 
pension funds including General Electric, DuPont, U. S. Steel and 
Exxon. 17 The largest self-managed funds are equally distributed between 
the private and public sectors. 
TABLE 8.11 
LARGEST U. K. PENSION FUNDS, 
BY TYPE OF FUND MANAGEMENT, BOOK VALUE, 1980 
Pension Fund 
1. Post Office 
2. National Coal Board 
3. British Rail 
4. Electricity Supply 
5. British Steel 
6. ICI 
7. Barclays Bank 
8. British Gas 
9. Imperial Group 
10. BP 
Capital Value Type of (em) Fund Management 
2,600 (1,9501) 75% in-house 
2,100 
1,800 (4501) 
In-house 
25% in-house 
1,500 In-house 
1.000 In-house 
950 In-house 
700 External 
655 In-house 
639 In-house 
627 In-house 
Note: 1. Assets internally managed. 
Sources: 'Pension Funds and their Advisers 1980 Department of Employment Gazette 
and the National Association of Pension Funds. 
The concentration and,, centralization of pension assets in 
self-managed funds suggests that the largest pension funds are managed in 
accordance with the "profit ` center theory" of pension - fund 
management. 
Is The pension fund is "one of the most important ... assets 
in the company, " according to. one fund manager, and, "should receive the 
same intensity of consideration that any other aspect of the business 
should. " 
19 Large individual trusteed pension plans which are internally 
managed therefore are an integral part of corporate profit maximization 
behaviour. This results in the further, centralization of economic 
decision-making and concentration of power in the corporate sector. 
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8.5.3 Trust Companies (Corporate Trustees). The idea of the 
trust was British in origin and was subsequently introduced into the United 
States and the British Commonwealth, including Canada, in the early 
nineteenth century. The concept of the corporate trustee as it has evolved, 
however, is essentially a North American innovation. 
20 
The superiority of trust- companies over individual trustees or 
executors is a result of their large volume of business, financial expertise, 
and their permanent corporate status. According to Neufeld 
the unique contribution to the [Canadian] financial 
system of ... trust companies is their provision of 
executor, administrator and trust services. They are 
unique among the financial institutions in this respect 
because banks, life insurance companies and loan 
companies are not permitted to act in a fiduciary 
capacity ... The decisive change occurred when the 
trust companies were " permitted to accept 
funds... Trust companies borrowing and lending 
activities [are] little differen !.. [than] the savings 
business of the chartered banks. 
The business activities of Canadian trust companies fall into two distinct 
categories - financial intermediary or "banking" and fiduciary functions. 
When a trust company is acting in a "banking" capacity it is a principal in 
the transaction, such as taking deposits from the public. The fiduciary 
(custodial) or trustee functions are unique to trust companies in Canada. In 
their fiduciary capacity, trust companies serve as administrators of estates, 
trusts and agencies. In the role of administrator, trust companies do not 
obtain ownership of the assets under their administration but, rather, act 
with vary degrees of authority as the trustee, or custodian of the assets 
under administration. The trust document defines the powers and discretion 
22 
of the trust manager. "The trust company, " according to Baum; 'is 
peculiar to Canada. It functions as a corporate fiduciary, administering 
trusts of all kinds, including funds for investment", such as pension 
funds. 23 The custodial or trustee function coupled with deposit-taking 
make Canadian trust companies near-banks. 
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Funds controlled by trust companies in Canada are divided into 
three categories: company funds, guaranteed trust accounts, and estate, 
trust and agency (ETA) accounts. Company ('own") funds or assets are the 
basic capitilization of the trust company. Monies on deposit are the 
guaranteed funds and are secured by company funds. All other funds 
administered by a trust company may be characterized as estate, trust or 
agency accounts (ETAS). Accordingly, 
money managed by a trust company is divided in 
separate, accounts or trusts. Many of these are set for 
a specific client. For example, the assets of an estate 
are usually managed as a separate account or trust. 
Similarly, 24 a large pension fund may be so 
managed. 
Small accounts or pension plans are placed in pooled funds, while large ones 
are separately managed and given special attention. In recent years, as 
shall be demonstrated, pension funds have become the most important 
source of funds to be administered by trust companies. 
The institutional arrangements with respect to exercising trust 
functions is quite different in the United States and Britain as compared 
with Canada. "Canadian tradition [and legislation] is firmly opposed to a 
bank being in the trust or fiduciary business because of possible conflicts of 
interest. "25 Trustees hold huge portfolios and "have enormous powers to 
choose what companies to invest in, how to vote their shares, and whether 
to help finance companies by loaning money or buying new (stock] 
issues.. 
26 If trust companies also did the banking for these same 
companies, it would give them even more economic power. In Britain and 
the United States the trustee function for pension plans is performed by 
banks and individual trustees. 
In order to determine the concentration and centralization of 
trust company assets and the associated economic and social power within 
the unique structure of the Canadian financial system, it is necessary to 
ascertain the total assets under their control as distinct from corporate 
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assets ("company funds"). While trust companies argue that the corpus of 
the trust is not theirs and that they have no proprietary interest in such 
assets, Baum concluded that 
this rationale complicates measuring the size and 
power of trust companies... When the strength of a 
bank, life insurance company, or mutual fund is 
considered, the deposits on hand, the sum of the 
policies written, or the net asset value, rather than 
capitalization, is the measure of institutional 
strength... In view of this, discounting the important 
of estate, trust, and agency funds is improper, for they 
assume the same importance as bank deposits [or] 
insurance polices. The [ETA] funds give thecorporate 
fiduciaries considerable investment powers. 
Total assets under the control of trust companies, therefore, is the relevant 
measure of their institutional strength and power. 
In Canada the assets, including pension funds, administered and 
managed by trust companies are highly concentrated and centralized among 
a few firms. This is reported in Table 8.12. The two largest trust 
companies account for nearly 50 per cent of total assets and the top five 
companies control nearly 80 per cent of the total assets of all trust 
companies. 
Trust companies administering corporate trustee arrangements 
for pension plans now represent nearly 25 per cent of the total assets of the 
private pension system (Table 8.8). Of particular importance to trust 
companies are their Estate, Trust and Agency (ETA) accounts or funds, 
which include monies administered under individual and corporate custodial 
and trustee arrangements, including pension funds. Two trust companies 
account for 54 per cent of all ETAs, while the top five companies control 
nearly 85 per cent of total ETA account assets, including pension funds 
(Table 8.12). 
Pension fund - assets under administration have become an 
increasingly important component of ETA accounts and the overall asset 
structure of trust companies. Table 8.13 indicates that for the four largest 
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trust companies in Canada, pension fund assets represent on average nearly 
60 per cent of total ETA accounts. More significantly, pension funds now 
represent nearly 50 per cent of the total assets controlled by major trust 
companies. Pension funds are therefore vital to the economic survival of 
one of Canada's major financial institutions. - 
8.5.4 Life Insurance Segregated Funds. Life insurance companies 
have historically been Canada's second largest financial institution, behind 
the chartered banks, and have exerted considerable influence on capital 
markets. 
25 The structure of the life insurance industry is characterized 
by significant market concentration and is dominated by the five largest 
companies. 
The centralization and concentration of pension 
, 
fund assets 
evidenced by individual trusteed pension funds and the pension funds 
managed by trust companies (corporate trustees) is similarly exhibited by 
the insured pension plans and segregated funds administered by life 
insurance companies. Pension plans using this funding medium tend to be 
the smaller ones and in total account for only 13 per cent of all occupational 
pension plan members. As a result of competition from trusteed pension 
arrangements, the pension assets held by the life insurance industry in 
Canada have declined from 46 to 22 per cent of total pension fund assets 
between 1962 and 1980.26 
Insurance companies offer four basic underwriting agencies for 
the purpose of occupational pension plans: the individual annuity contract, 
group annuity contracts, deposit administration and segregated funds. 
27 
Segregated pension funds, that is, monies which are separated from the 
general fund of life insurance companies, were established after World War 
II in order to circumvent the statutory restrictions placed on insurance 
company equity investment so as to make them competitive with trust 
companies for pension business. Segregated funds are now the largest 
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funding medium sponsored by life insurance companies with respect to 
occupational pension plans and account for one-third of all insured pension 
plan members. 
28 
Table 8.14 indicates the concentration and centralization of life 
insurance company' segregated pension fund assets. The four largest funds 
account for over 50 per cent of all segregated pension fund assets. The top 
ten segregated pension funds held'nearly 85 per cent of the total pension 
assets controlled by insurance companies having segregated funds. 
TABLE 8.14 
CONCENTRATION AND CENTRALIZATION OF 
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 
SEGREGATED PENSION FUNDS, 
MARKET VALUE, MILLION $. CANADA, 1978 
Company 
Sun Life 
Standard Life 
Confederation Life 
Canada Life 
Great-West Life 
Manufacturers Life 
North American Life 
Mutual Life 
Excelsior Life 
Imperial, Life 
Assets of 
% of 
Total Funds 
14.9 
13.4 
11.3 
11.2 
7.6 
7.5 
6.8 
4.4 
4.2 
2.7 
Segregated 
Pension Funds1 
687.337,117 
613,362,296 
516,446,925 
512,979,308 
350,785,970 
344,115,760 
313,786,607 
203,551,675 
190,825,336 
125,704,476 
Total: Top 10 companies 3,858,895,470 
Total: All Segregated Funds2 4,591,317,532 
84.1 
100.0 
Notes: 1. Assets held in Canada. 
2. There are 383 federally registered life companies operativg in Canada: 
146 Canadian, 35 British and 202 foreign, however, only 67 have 
segregated funds. 
Source: Retabulated and calculated from the Report of the Superintendant of 
Insurance for Canada 1978 'Annual Statements =e insurance Can anies a 
Fraternal Benefit Societies , vol. III unsro upp y an Services, , pp. $bA- A and 
Table II (2), pp. 20c-22c. 
The information presented here indicates that the private pension 
system and the component parts of the private pension industry in Canada 
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individual trusteed pension funds, trust companies (corporate trustees) and 
life insurance company segregated funds - are characterized by a significant 
concentration and centralization of pension capital among a few large 
pension funds and dominant financial institutions. The institutional strength 
and economic power of the private pension system is a consequence of the 
significant growth in pension fund assets as a concomitant of the control 
over pension saving and investment by institutional investors, and is 
reinforced by' the accelerated tendency towards the concentration and 
centralization' of 'pension capital under the control of dominant financial 
institutions. The structure and economic power of the private pension 
system, as an organic component of the broader finance sector, is reinforced 
by and a 'reflection of the more general ' propensity towards the 
centralization and concentration of financial capital. 
8.6 Concentration and Centralization of Pension and Financial Capital 
The tendency towards the concentration and centralization of 
pension fund capital parallels and corresponds to similar tendencies within 
the industrial and finance sectors of a capitalist economy. Each of the 
financial intermediaries and institutional investors within the broader 
finance sector in Canada (Table 8.4) is marked by a concentration and 
centralization of assets. 
The concentration and centralization of finance sector assets in 
Canada by type of financial institution is reported in Table 8.15. This 
information indicates the extent to which there is a concentration of 
financial capital and the centralization of economic decision-making by a 
relatively few institutions within the finance sector. Within each financial 
sector the five largest institutions control the mamoth proportion of assets. 
What is significant is that the concentration and centralization of 
pension fund capital in Canada corresponds to the centralization and 
concentration of capital in general within the finance sector. This is a 
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TABLE 8.15 
SUMMARY TABLE OF 
CONCENTRATION AND CENTRALIZATION 
OF FINANCE SECTOR ASSETS, 
BY MAJOR FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARY, 
CANADA, 1978-1982 
Percentage of Total Assets 
No. of Top Controlled Within Each 
Financial Sector Ranking Financial Sector or by 
and Institution Institutions/Funds Funding Agency 
Chartered Banks 5 91 
Trust Companies 5 67 
Life Insurance Companies 5 59 2 
Pension Funds 
Individual Trusteesl 
20 
10 
33 
24 
Corporate Trustees 5 74 
Segregated Funds 5 58 
Notes: 1. Internally managed pension funds. 
2. Including segregated funds. 
Sources: Calculated from Walter Stewart, Towers of Gold-Feet of Cla : The Canadian 
Banks (Toronto: Totem Books, 196z), Appendix ae1, p. Z/U; epor 
orthe Superintendent of Insurance for Canada, Abstract of Statements of 
Insurance Companies in Canada Vol. I (Hull: Minister o Supply and 
erv ces, 191511 ,. 44G-45G; Reimort of the Su erintendent of Insurance for Canada for the year-ended Decceem ehr 3TT984. rus and Loan Companies 
u Minister of Supply and erv ces, ; and Tables 8.6,8.11,8.12 
and 8.13, op. cit. 
consequence of each major financial institution, with the exception of 
individually trusteed pension funds, sponsoring a funding agency or medium 
for the adminstration and management of pension fund assets. For example, 
while the 5 largest trust companies control nearly 70 per cent of total assets 
within that financial sector, the 5 top trust companies administer 
approximately 75 per cent of the total assets of corporate trusteed pension 
funds. Similarly, the top 5 insurance companies control nearly 60 per cent 
of the total assets of the life insurance industry, while the 5 largest 
insurance company segregated pension funds account for 60 per cent of total 
segregated fund assets. 
A similar situation prevails in the United States and Britain. In 
the U. K., for example, the financial system is characterized by a 
considerable concentration and centralization of capital. Merchant banks 
control two-thirds of contractual savings, such as pension savings, and about 
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20, nationally based institutions in turn control 70 per cent of this 
amount. 
32 Specifically, 10 banks and 2 brokers each controlled pension 
assets worth £500 million or more. 
33 
These trends have a number of implications. First, because the 
concentration and centralization, of pension fund assets by funding agency 
mirrors the more general tendency towards the centralization and 
concentration of financial capital and, in turn, corresponds to the 
organization of the finance sector, it suggests that pension capital should be 
viewed as being an integral-part of financial capital under conditions of 
advanced capitalism. Consequently, pension capital and the private pension 
"industry" is subordinated to and under the "strategic control" of related 
dominant financial institutions., Second, the absolute and relative growth of 
pension funds assets in the post-war period has increased - the concentration 
of capital and economic power vested-in the finance sector. This has clear 
implications with respect to economic policy. Third, the growth of pension 
fund assets,. poses the fundamental issue of ownership and control over 
pension capital. 
8.7 The Control and Investment of Pension Capital 
Pension funds are the "registered" owners of the assets held on 
behalf of "beneficial" owners, that is, pension plan members. As such, 
pension fund trustees have no proprietary interst in the assets of the plan, 
but rather are responsible for the administration of the pension plan and the 
"prudent" investment of the fund. In Canada trusteed pension funds are 
administered by corporate trustees (trust companies) or individual trustees. 
Traditionally, the trust company or the individual trustee assumed all the 
fiduciary (custodial) responsibilities, including the investment of the funds; 
that is, the trustee was responsible for the daily administration of the 
pension plan and the investment management of the fund. In recent years, 
however, these arrangements have undergone a significant change. Many 
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pension plan sponsors, usually to maximize the return on investment, and yet 
to ensure the security of the funds, have separated pension plan 
administration from investment management. 
34 
II It is necessary in this regard to differentiate between the daily 
administration of the pension plan and the investment management of the 
pension fund. The fundamental distinction between pension plan 
administration and pension fund investment management explains why the 
locus of control over pension fund capital generally resides with dominant 
financial institutions, regardless of the formal ownership of assets, and 
reinforces the concentration and centralization of capital within the finance 
sector. The investment management of pension fund assets by major 
financial institutions further suggests that while the private pension industry 
is an integral part of the finance sector it is subordinated to the general 
interests of financial capital., That is, pension capital is under the broad 
strategic control of dominant financial institutions and their investment 
maximization behaviour. 
The ultimate criterion with respect to determining whether 
pension funds exercise ownership or control over the assets held by them 
turns on who is responsible for the investment of the funds. In this regard 
individual and corporate (trust company) trustees may in one instance be 
responsible for both the daily administration of the pension plan and' the 
investment management of the fund. Alternatively, trustees may be 
responsible for the administration of the plan but may choose to delegate, 
that is, sub-contract, the investment management of the pension fund to an 
outside agency or financial institution. In the case of individual trusteed 
pension plans, as a result of their large size and concentration of assets 
(Table 8.9), plan, administration and fund management are both usually 
retained in-house by the plan sponsor. Similarly, corporate trustees may, 
depending upon circumstance, be responsible for both plan administration 
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and fund management. Increasingly in the case of corporate trustees, 
however, the trust company is retained by the plan sponsor to act solely in a 
custodial capacity, that is, to carry out plan administration, while the 
fiduciary responsibility for the investment of the pension fund is delegated 
to one or more financial institutions or independent investment managers 
engaged in this type of activity. 
The classification of pension funds by type of funding 
arrangements therefore does not necessarily indicate where or how the fund 
is managed in terms of investment decision-making, that is, the institutional 
locus of control over pension capital. While some employers retain in-house 
(internal) investment managers on staff, others use the services of external 
investment counsellors or various other financial institutions to direct the 
investment of the pension fund. It is therefore necessary to determine and 
identify the locus of control over pension fund investment management by 
type of institution and the extent of decision-making which resides with 
those institutions with respect to investment policy. In the final analysis it 
is the investment management of pension fund assets which determines the 
control over pension capital. This is the crucial determinant with respect to 
exercising economic power. 
Table, 8.16 indicates that in Canada, Britain and the U. S. 
two-thirds of total pension assets are externally managed and one-third are 
internally managed. This means that two-thirds of total pension fund assets 
are managed, that is, controlled by dominant financial institutions such as 
banks, trust companies, life insurance companies, and to a lesser extent 
investment counsellors. The one-third of , total pension assets internally 
managed are those of the large individual trusteed pension plans. 
The distribution of externally managed pension fund assets by 
type of investment manager is reported in Table 8.17. The investment 
management and control over pension assets primarily resides with trust 
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TABLE 8.16 
CONTROL OF PENSION ASSETS 
BY TYPE OF FUND MANAGEMENT, 
U. K., U. S., AND CANADA, 1975-1980 
1 
Country 
U. K. 2 
U. S. 3 
Canada4 
Percentage Distribution 
of Assets by Type of Fund Management 
Internally Managed Externally Managed 
33 67 
33 67 
33 67 
Note: 1. Distributed among different types of investment managers including trust 
companies, life insurance companies, investment counsellors, and banks in 
the U. K. and U. S. Figures rounded. 
2.1975. 
3.1983. 
4.1980. The data for Canada is not totally comparable with the U. K. and 
U. S. as a result of incomplete information. In the case of Canada the 
figures cited here represent the internally managed assets of the top 20 
funds, rather than as a proportion of all funds, as In the U. S. and U. K. 
Sources: For the U. K. Richard Minns, Pension Funds and British Capitalism (London: 
Heinemann, 1980), p. 41: for the calculated rom The Top 1000 
Funds", Pensions 3 Investment Age. Special Profiles Issue, January 23, 
1984, p. 73Z and for Cana Tai. Table 8.6, op. cit. 
TABLE 8.17 
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION 
OF EXTERNALLY MANAGED PENSION FUND ASSETS 
BY TYPE OF INVESTMENT MANAGER, 
U. S.. U. K., AND CANADA, 1978-1983 
Type of 
Investment Manager U. S. U. K. 2 Canada3 
Banks 36.0 49.2 - 
Trust Companies - - 38.6 
Insurance Companies 36.0 33.3 -28.8 
Investment Counsellors 28.0 15.5 32.6 
Other - 2.0 - 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
2.1978. 
3.1981. 
Sources: For the U. S., Pensions & Investment Age, October 31,1983, Graph, p. 47. 
Canadian data from -Directoryof Fension Fund Investment Services: 
Top 40 Money Managers', Benefits Canada, Vol. 5 (November/December 1981), 
p. 24. For Britain, reta ua and calculated from Richard Minns, 
Pension Funds and British Capitalism (London: Heinemann, 1980), Table 
Minns T. 3 p. 31: in s survey excludes insurance companies which are 
included here. The distribution of assets has been recalculated. 
Notes: 1.1983, figures rounded. 
companies in Canada and the merchant banks in Britain, and to a lesser 
extent life insurance companies and investment counsellors. In the case of 
- 317 - 
Canada nearly 60 per cent of externally managed pension fund assets are 
controlled by 10 money managers, including the 4 top trust companies, 3 
major life insurance companies, and 2 independent fund managers. 
35 In 
the United States, bank trust departments in conjunction with life insurance 
companies control 72 per cent of externally managed pension fund assets. 
The merchant banks in Britain are responsible for the investment 
management of nearly 50 per cent of externally managed pension funds. 
While banking institutions and life insurance companies manage 
and control nearly three-quarters of total pension assets on average in the 
U. K., Canada and the U. S., the distribution or "re-sectoring" of pension 
capital between major financial institutions has undergone considerable 
alteration in recent years. In the United States, for example, bank trust 
department control has declined from 75 to 36 per cent of externally 
managed pension fund assets between the late 1950s and 1981.36 The 
share of the market controlled by life insurance companies and independent 
fund managers has correspondingly increased. A similar pattern has 
emerged in Canada where there has been a diminution of pension assets 
under the control of life insurers and an increase in the proportion managed 
by trust companies and investment counsellors. This "re-sectoring" has 
resulted in monopolistic competition and polycentric nodes of control over 
pension capital within the finance sector. 
The major financial institutions which manage and control pension 
fund assets have considerable discretion as to investment policy, subject to 
law and practice. The pension plan trust agreement establishes the latitude 
or discretion with which the plan sponsor allows the trustee (individual or 
corporate) to carry out investment policy. In most cases plan sponsors 
give the trustee complete discretion in the investment 
of the fund, while others specify the classes of 
investment to be purchased and permit the trustee to 
select specific assets to be bought and sold within the 
prescribed classes. In extreme cases the trust 
agreement may stipulate that the trustee shall 
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buy and spl only those investments selected by the 
employer. 
In short, a pension plan sponsor may allow the fund manager "full discretion" 
or put them "under direction' with respect to investment policy. In the 
United States and Canada 75 to 80 per cent of pension assets are at the "full 
discretion" of the investment manager. Pension fund managers in the U. K. 
have similar latitude. 
38 
The main point is that pension fund investment managers have 
significant discretion or control over the funds they manage. This means 
that the investment of pension funds depends to a considerable extent on the 
policies and vested interests of financial institutions such as banks and life 
insurance companies in the U. S. and U. K., and trust 'companies in Canada. 
This has clear implications with respect to control over saving, direction of 
investment, economic growth and ownership of corporate securities. 
The concentration, centralization and control over pension capital 
by major financial institutions, and the discretion vested with investment 
managers, has resulted in a corresponding tendency with respect to the 
control over corporate shares, that is, the common stock or equity of 
companies managed by these same financial Institutions through pension 
funds (Table 7.2). Minns' research indicates that in Britain there is a 
substantial divergence between the ownership and control of company shares 
by financial institutions. Table 8.18 contrasts the proportion of corporate 
shares owed and controlled by different sectors. The most significant 
difference between, the ownership and control of corporate shares' is 
evidenced by banks. Banks owed less than I per cent of all shares, but 
controlled nearly 18 per cent of corporate ý equity. " Banks, insurance 
companies and stockbrokers together owned 17 per cent of corporate equity, 
but in -fact controlled 41 per cent of company shares. - In Britain, merchant 
banks were the large institutional' controllers, while pension funds were the 
largest institutional owners. Significantly, while pension funds owned'nearly 
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TABLE 8.18 
OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL OF COMPANY SHARES, 
BRITAIN, 1975 
Sector 
Pensions 
Banks 
Insurance Companies 
Investment and Unit Trusts 
Stockbrokers 
Pension Funds 
Overseas Sector 
Public Sector 
Industrial and Commercial Cos. 
Non-profit Organizations 
Percentage 
uwnersnip control 
37.5 29.9 
0.7 17.6 
15.9 17.1 
14.1 11.1 
0.4 6.3 
16.8 5.6 
5.6 5.6 
3.6 3.6 
3.0 3.0 
2.3 0.2 
Source: Retabulated from Richard Minns, Pension Funds and British Capitalism (London: Heinemann, 1980), Table 7.8, p. 41. 
17, per cent of company shares, in fact, they controlled only 6 per cent as a 
result of delegating investment management to financial instutitions. 
39 
While studies of this important subject do not exist for Canada 
and the United States, similar conclusions can be inferred. In the United 
States, for example, in the late 1950s only 14 per cent of pension funds held 
80, per cent of pension fund equity investment. 
40 More recent data 
indicates that the top 10 pension fund money managers in the U. S. in 1982 
control 45 per cent of fund shares and the top 20 fund managers control 76 
per cent of total pension fund equity investment. 
41 Those money 
managers include such major financial institutions as J. P. Morgan & Co. 
Inc., Bankers Trust N. Y. Corp., Mellon National Corp., Prudential Insurance 
Co., Chemical New York Corp., and Manufacturers Hanover Co. 
In conclusion, while pension funds are the formal, or registered, 
owners of corporate shares, control over these shares, and control over 
pension capital more generally, resides with and is located in dominant 
financial institutions as a result of the delegation of investment 
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management to those financial intermediaries. This analysis of the 
institutional framework surrounding the private pension system suggests 
that the growth, concentration and centralization of pension capital under 
the control of financial institutions has resulted in a "large gain in economic 
power for the financial community"42 in the post-war period. 
8.8 The Structure of Pension Fund Power: Implications 
The characteristics associated with the formal structure of 
pension fund power can be summarized as follows. Pension funds are now one 
of the largest pools of capital in advanced capitalist economies. The growth 
of pension fund assets, in absolute and relative terms, has significantly 
exceeded the asset growth experienced by other financial institutions and 
non-bank intermediaries, particularly in Canada and the U. S. Pension fund 
assets in Canada, for example, increased by a factor of 95, compared with 
the assets of all financial intermediaries which increased 33 times between 
1946 and 1979. 
Pension funds have become the growth center within the financial 
sector in capitalist economies and are now doubling their assets on average 
every five years. Pension funds have tripled as a proportion of total and 
non-bank financial intermediary assets in the U. S. and Canada in the 
post-war period. In Canada, private pension fund assets are projected to 
increase from 16 per cent of GNP in 1981 to 50 to 66 per cent of GNP by 
2031. 
A consequence of the growth of pension capital in the post-war 
period has been a transfiguration of the finance sector and a "re-sectoring" 
of pension assets between financial institutions. Pension funds in general 
have become the second largest institutional investor and the largest 
non-bank financial intermediary in the U. S., Canada and Britain. The 
private pension system has thus assumed a strategic position with respect to 
the finance sector and capital markets in advanced capitalist economies. 
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There is a substantial, concentration and centralization of pension 
fund capital. " The locus of control over pension fund capital 
in Canada 
resides in three institutions: large individual trusteed (non-insured) pension 
funds, the trust company or corporte trustee, and the segregated pension 
funds of life insurance companies. Each of these pension arrangements, in 
turn, is characterized by a marked tendency towards the concentration and 
centralization of pension capital. In these three countries the 10 largest 
pension funds account for 25 to 30 per cent of total pension assets, while the 
top 20 funds represent., nearly 40 per, cent of the assets of the private 
pension system. The assets managed by large individual trusteed pension 
funds have increased 4 fold in current dollars and by a factor of 2 in 
constant dollars. between 1960 and 1979.. The largest individual trusteed 
pension, funds are, managed in-house so as to complement corporate profit 
maximization behaviour. Trust companies, within the unique Canadian 
financial system, are the, major corporate trustee for pension plans. Pension 
funds have become the most important, source of funds administered by trust 
companies.. Pension funds represent on average nearly 60 per cent of total 
ETA accounts and nearly 50 per cent of the total assets controlled by the 
four largest trust companies and are thus vital to their, operation. The two 
largest trust, companies account. for nearly 50 per cent of total assets and 
the top five control 80 per cent of all trust company assets. The segregated 
pension funds of life insurance companies are similarly concentrated and 
centralized. The four largest funds account for over 50 per cent of all 
segregated pension assets, and the top ten segregated funds represent nearly 
85 per cent of total pension assets controlled by life insurance companies. 
The structure and economic power associated with the private 
pension. system mirrors the organization of the finance sector and the 
general tendency towards the concentration and centralization of financial 
capital in Canada, Britain, and the U. S. This is a result of each type of 
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financial institution sponsoring a funding agency for the administration and 
management of pension fund assets. In Canada, for example, the top five 
trust companies control 67 per cent of total assets within that financial 
sector, while the same firms control nearly 75 per cent of corporate 
trusteed pension plan assets. Five life insurance companies control nearly 
60 per cent of total life insurance assets and a similar proportion of 
segregated pension fund assets. 
The locus of strategic control over pension fund capital resides 
within the finance sector among a relatively few financial institutions. This 
is a result of pension fund investment management generally being 
delegated to financial institutions by plan sponsors. In Britain, Canada and 
the U. S. two-thirds of total occupational pension fund assets are externally 
managed. In Canada, 60 per cent of externally managed funds are 
controlled by 10 money managers, including 4 trust companies and 3 life 
insurers. In the U. S. bank trust departments and life insurance companies 
are responsible for the investment of 72 per 'cent of externally managed 
funds. Merchant banks in Britain control 50 per cent of externally managed 
pension assets. 
The major financial institutions which manage and control pension 
funds have considerable discretion and latitude with respect to investment 
policy. In the U. S. and Canada 75 to 80 per cent of pension fund assets are 
managed at the "full discretion" of the investment manager. This suggests 
that the -investment of pension funds depends upon the broad policies and 
imperatives of financial institutions operating within a capitalist economy. 
Control over pension capital by dominant financial institutions has 
resulted in a corresponding tendency with respect to the control of 
corporate shares. There is an important difference between the ownership 
and ° control- of company shares as a result of investment management 
through, financial institutions. In Britain, for example, ' while banks and 
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insurance companies owned less than 1 per cent of shares they controlled 18 
per cent of corporate equity. Pension funds on the other hand owned nearly 
17 per cent of corporate shares, but only controlled 6 per cent. Thus, 
pension funds were the largest institutional owners and merchant banks the 
major institutional controllers of company shares. This has important policy 
and political implications. 
A number of broad thematic implications can be drawn with 
respect to the structure of pension fund power. First, there is a tremendous 
concentration of private economic power and decision-making vested in the 
private pension system as a result of the control over and investment of the 
expanding pool of pension capital. Second, pension capital under 
contemporary capitalism is organically related to financial capital. Pension 
capital is a growth center within the finance sector. The concentration and 
centralization of pension and financial capital mutually reinforce one 
another, thereby strengthening the insitutional power of the finance sector 
and the private pension industry. This in turn strengthens private sector 
control over and direction of pension capital. Third, the role played by the 
private pension system in terms of organizing and channelling the increasing 
flow of pension saving and investment places the private pension industry in 
a pivotal position with respect to the finance sector, capital markets, 
industrial corporations, and the economy. 
Fourth, the concentration and centralization of pension capital 
under the control of dominant financial institutions results in their having an 
important vested interested in the continued existence of the private 
pension system and industry. Within the framework of a capitalist economy 
pension capital, as an organic part of financial capital, concurrently serves 
the specific interests of the financial institutions controlling it and the 
general interests of the corporate sector and economy with respect to 
investment and capital accumulation. Fifth, it may be anticipated that as a 
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result of the strategic role played by the private pension system in capitalist 
economies, and the vested interest of the pension industry and financial 
institutions, that they will be the primary political obstacle to the reform of 
the public and private pension systems. Sixth, the universal limitations and 
inadequacies of occupational pension plans are ultimately based on the 
institutional strength and economic power of the private pension system. 
This explains the underdevelopment of the public pension system and the 
immiseration of the elderly. Under advanced capitalism the continued 
existence of the private pension system in the final analysis is related to the 
systemic imperatives of dominant financial and industrial corporations, 
rather than the elderly's requirement for adequate retirement income. 
Under conditions of mature capitalism the pension system's 
investment function, and the control of corporate shares by financial 
institituions through pension arrangements, has increasingly facilitated the 
interpenetration and interdependence of industrial and financial capital. 
The pension system's investment function, intrinstic to the operation of the 
private pension system and the institutional structure of power, has 
therefore become a mechanism promoting the integration of the finance and 
industrial sectors into an unified nexus of corporate power. 
CHAPTER 9 
THE PENSION SYSTEM 
AND THE 
NEXUS OF CORPORATE POWER 
"The [financial] system transforms itself into an 
immense social mechanism for the centralization of 
capitals. " 
Karl Marx 
9.1 Introduction 
It has been established that the formal structure of pension fund 
power is the institutional expression of the concentration and centralization 
of pension fund- capital underlying the operation of the private pension 
system. Pension capital is organically related to financial capital and the 
organization of the broader finance sector.. The focus of this chapter is the 
connection between financial and industrial capital and the way in which the 
pension system's investment function has served as a mechanism to forge 
this link. The pension system's investment function has increasingly 
facilitated the interpenetration, that is, - the integration or fusion of 
industrial and financial capital under advanced capitalism. The pension 
system is linked to the finance and industrial sectors through a complex 
series of formal and informal mechanisms and arrangements resulting in an 
unified nexus of corporate power. 
Several related topics are examined. First, the formal linkages 
between the private pension system and the broader finance and industrial 
sectors are identified and traced in detail through interlocking corporate 
directorships and direct equity investment resulting in an integrated 
structure of corporate power, with particular reference to the configuration 
of control in Canada. Second, the various ways in which the pension 
- 326 - 
system's investment function acts as an integrative mechanism promoting 
the -amalgamation, or fusion, of industrial and financial capital are 
delineated. Pension fund investment through the capital market in the 
industrial sector is one mechanism by which the coalscence of financial and 
industrial capital is facilitated and accelerated, with a corresponding series 
of formal and informal intra-and-intersectoral linkages, resulting in a 
greater concentration `and centralization of economic power in the 
corporate sector. 
Third, - as a result of this interpenetration, pension funds as 
institutional investors, -with their concentration of corporate shareholdings, 
are changing their traditional role as passive investors and are -becoming 
increasingly more assertive, with respect to intervening in corporate affairs 
so as to protect and maximize their investment. It is suggested that there is 
a maturing systemic integration and. functional convergence between the 
finance and industrial sectors. This has implications with respect to the 
locus of control over the industrial sector, and possible alternative economic 
strategies. - -Fourth, a series, of mutually reinforcing mechanisms- which 
maintain private sector control over pension capital and the operation of the 
private pension system are identified and examined. The political behaviour 
of financial institutions, -formal and informale linkages- between the 
corporate, political and bureaucratic elites, and the dominant market 
ideology all serve to complement the formal economic structure of pension 
fund power and effectively incorporate it into the broader network of 
corporate power under advanced capitalism. 
9.2 Theoretical Background - 
To establish the importance of the pension system's investment 
function as a mechanism which promotes the interdependence of the 
finanance and industrial sectors under advanced capitalism requires 
conceptual clarity and consistency because many of : the terms commonly 
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associated with this relationship have been misinterpreted and obscure the 
underlying process. The lack of consistency with respect to terminology has 
resulted in analytic confusion and vulgar treatments of the relationship 
between financial and industrial capital. 
"Finance capital' is the term often used in the Marxist literature 
to describe the close -interrelationship between financial and industrial 
capital. 
' The term - "finance capital" has its origin in the work of 
Hilferding2 (1910) and forms the basis of Lenin's analysis (1917) of finance 
capital and imperialism. 
3 Hilferding's formulation specified that "bank 
capital, - i. e., capital in money form, which is actually transformed into 
industrial capital... [is] 'finance capital'. Finance capital ýis controlled by 
banks and. employed by industrialists. "4 Building on this approach, Lenin 
subsequently argued that a "handful of monopolists subordinate to their will 
all the operations, both commercial and industrial's resulting in "the ever 
growing merger, or,... coalescence, of bank and industiral capital. "6 
Lenin referred to "finance capita! ' as "the merging or coalescence of banks 
with industry- such is... finance capital and such is the content of this 
term. "? In this regard Lenin noted that there is a "close connection 
between the banks and industry"8 so that a 
union... is established between the banks and the 
largest industrial and commercial enterprises, the 
merging of one with another through the acquisition of 
shares, through the appointment of bank directors 
to... (Boards of Directors) of idustrial and 
commercial interprises, and vice versa. 
Hilferding and Lenin therefore viewed finance capital as the integration or 
interpenetration, that is, the fusion or coalescence of financial and 
industrial capital as a result of interlocking directorships and direct equity 
investment between sectors of the economy. "Finance capitar', by 
definition, then, is the fusion of financial and industrial capital. 
In recent years, however, some vulgar analyses have confused the 
concept of finance capital. 
10 The term "finance capital' has been 
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mechanically equated with "financial oligarchy" by some so that financial 
institutions effectively dominate the industrial sector. This 
conceptualization lends, itself to a conspiracy theory. More importantly, 
such a view is contrary to Hilferding's and Lenin's formulation of the subject 
which clearly stresses that finance capital as the fusion of financial and 
industrial capital is, a symbiotic, rather than a parasitic, process because 
"only industrial capital... contains productive capital, and this creates value 
and surplus value in which banking and commercial capital share. " 
I 
Consequently, while banking capital may dominate, "it is at the same time 
dependent on industrial capital. " 
12 Whether financial or industrial capital 
dominates at a particular time is clearly historically specific and is related 
to the economic development of each national capitalist economy. 
Further confusion has resulted because while conceptually relying 
on the Hilferding-Lenin formulation, some have used different terms to 
describe it. Mandel, for example, described "monopoly capitalism" as that 
phase where "banking-capital increasingly merges with industrial capital 
into finance capital' so that "a few very large financial groups dominate the 
economy of each capitalist country. " 
13 In a similar vein Aaronovitch has 
argued that the "fusion of banking and industrial capital means that the 
spheres... have become increasingly integrated ... by way of ... coalitions 
and ... partly by way of financial organizations entering industry and 
industrial firms becoming financiers., 
14 
Aaronovitch makes the 
interesting and useful analytic distinction between "fusion" as direct equity 
investment and "linkages" as interlocking directorates. Baran and Sweezy 
use the term "monopoly capital' as referring to industrial capital's relative 
"autonomy" or "independence" in relation to the finance sector as a result of 
the high level of internal funding experienced by corporations. 
The position adopted here is that the combination, or coalescence, 
of financial, industrial and commercial capital is "finance capital". 
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Following Aaronovitch the analytic distinction is made between fusion as 
equity investment, that is, shareholdings between the finance and industrial 
sectors and linkages which represent interlocking directorships. Therefore 
the nexus of corporate power, incorporating the private pension system, 
under conditions of, advanced capitalism is the "fusion" of financial 
institutions and industry "expressed in the system of effective possession, 
the mode of investment funding, and ... an extensive network of 
communication. " 
15 This formulation incorporates both the formal and 
informal elements of the nexus of corporate power and permits a broader 
examination of the fusion and linkages within the finance sector and those 
between financial and industrial capital. 
9.3 Pension Funds and the Systemic Interpenetration of Capital 
The fusion of financial and industrial capital results in a complex 
interlocking network and concentration of corporate power and influence in 
advanced capitalist economies. The main patterns are traced in the case of 
Canada through direct and -indirect interlocking directorships, - holding 
company arrangements and direct portfolio (equity) investment between 
financial institutions and industrial corporations. What emerges is a pattern 
of intercorporate ownership, cross-directorships, and intersectoral 
investment reinforced by a series of common social relations, shared 
ideology, and formal and informal linkages and mobility between the 
business, political and bureaucratic elites. This is the nexus of corporate 
power. And power, as one commentator observed 
is what counts... power means the ability to get your 
own way, to shape events. 
The pivotal people, [are] the power brokers who 
carry the proxies for the great law firms and financial 
institutions... The next group in this category would 
probably be the invisible n49n who manage the 
country's private pension plans. 
A complex constellation of power and control is associated with the private 
pension system under advanced capitalism. Pension capital, under the 
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domination of financial institutions, is an organic part of financial capital, 
and is increasingly integrated with the industrial sector. 
9.3.1 Historical Backg round. Canadian capitalism is 
characterized by a bifurcated model of economic development. Financial 
capital historically was and remains the indigenous bastion of Canadian 
capitalism. As early as 1911 the Webbs observed the "remarkable 
development of banking" in Canada-17 The industrial sector since the 
1920s, however, has been dominated by American transnational 
corporations, resulting in an externally controlled "branch p lant! ' economy. 
Only recently has the finance sector become interested in promoting 
domestic industrial activity. 
Historically there has been a close working relationship between 
dominant financial institutions within the finance sector in Canada. Of 
particular importance is the close traditional relationship between banks and 
trust companies: Royal Trust and the Bank of Montreal, Montreal Trust 
(now Montreal Trustco) and the Royal Bank, and National Trust and the 
Canadian Bank of Commerce (now the Canadian Imperial Bank of 
is, I Until recently the linkage between banks and trust 
companies was characterized by an extremely 
high density of formal 
interlocking directorships. Similarly in the past there has been a close 
19 
relationship between life insurance companies, banks and trust companies. 
There has been as well a close interrelationship between the 
finance and industrial sectors in Canada. Numerous studies have 
demonstrated the central role played by major banks and insurance 
companies in the concentration of economic power in Canada. 
20 Porter, 
for example, shows that directors of the top banks held nearly a quarter of 
the top industrial directorships, and that over half of the top banking 
directorships were held by directors of major industrial corporations. 
Insurance company directors held 14 per cent of top industrial directorships, 
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while over half, of insurance company directorhsips were held by industrial 
directors and almost half by bank directors. Dominant industrial directors 
held 58 per cent of bank directorships and the same proportion of insurance 
company directorships. 
21 
The interconnections between the Royal Bank, Bank of Montreal 
and the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce and the industrial sector are 
of particular importance. These three banks held two-thirds of all 
directorships of dominant manufacturing corporations and 60 per cent of the 
directorships of Canadian insurance companies ih. the late 1950s. Life 
insurance companies, in particular Sun-Life, Mutual Life and Confederation 
Life, represented nearly 60 per cent of directorships in leading industrial 
corporations .. held by insurance companies. 
The largest of these 
interpenetrating networks, representing the major actors in the finance and 
industrial sectors, was the group consisting of the Bank of Montreal, Royal 
Trust, Sun Life, CPR, and the Steel Company of Canada. 22 
Historically, "the development, from personal to impersonal 
possession is associated with an integration and interdependence between 
the finance and industrial sectors of, the economy. " 
23 The -. development 
from entrepreneurial, to finance capital in Britain, Canada and the U. S., 
however, has occurred at different rates and followed separate routes. 24 
What is of significance and interest in recent years in the advanced 
capitalists economies of Britain, Canada and the U. S. is the reorganization 
and rationalization of the finance sector and a change in the modality of 
interpenetration between financial institutions. As a starting point it is 
therefore necessary to place those institutions responsible for the control 
and investment of pension funds within the context of the broader finance 
sector. 
9.3.2. Financial Capital: Reorganization and Rationalization. 
The finance sector in Canada is in the process of fluid and dynamic change. 
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these changes are taking three forms. First, the finance sector has been 
undergoing "a major reorganization since at least 1980. Specifically, the 
hard core of formal interlocking directorships between financial institutions 
has been removed so that traditional relationships are not as close as in the 
past. Second, the interconnection between financial institutions is 
increasingly intermediated through holding companies based on the fusion of 
capital, that is, 'direct equity participation, rather than through formal 
interlocking directorships, resulting in vertical integration within the 
finance sector and horizontal linkages to the industrial sector. Third, recent 
years have witnessed the increased integration of financial services, that is, 
the creation of financial conglomerates or "supermarkets", including pension 
arrangements. This will increase the concentration and centralization of 
economic power within the finance sector, as well as accelerating the 
interpenetration and interdependence between the finance and industrial 
sectors. 
Economic power is concentrated among a few dominant 
institutions within the finance sector (Table 8.4). These same financial 
intermediaries control the investment of the rapidly growing pool of pension 
capital (Tables 8.1 and 8.2). Control over the direction of pension capital is 
secured through formal and informal connections between dominant 
financial institutions, and a series of social relations within the finance 
sector. 
"Within the finance sector, " according to Clement, "the banks and 
insurance companies, along with the trust and mortgage companies... have 
the most extensive interlocks. "25 One of the most important 
relationships has been between banks and trust companies. Trust companies 
are the major corporate trustee for pension funds and hold 25 per cent of 
total pension fund assets. According to the Royal Commission on Banking 
and Finance, "each of the banks has a close relationship with at least one 
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trust company, some of them loose working relations of long standing and 
others ownership affiliations. "26 In the past some dominant banks have 
been major partners in trust companies, having both an equity position and 
interlocking directorships. 27 Thus, while banks do not have fiduciary 
powers, according to Neufeld, "they put themselves into a position where 
they would. *. have an ° incentive to provide assistance in trust matters to 
customers by directing [them] to particular trust companies. "28 
According to one official government study, "one half to three quarters of 
the trust business of larger corporations went to bank-affiliated trust 
companies". 
29 
- In this regard McNulty concluded with respect to the 
United States that, "it'does appear that prior connections which the funding 
agency may have - with the client... often 'provide[s] the push which 
turns... pension business to -a particular funding agency. "30 The 
traditional close relationship between banks and trust companies in Canada 
effectively tightens the control which dominant financial institutions have 
over pension capital. ° 
Similarly there has been a close relationship between banks and 
insurance companies and, in turn, insurance companies and trust companies. 
Insurance company segregated funds are the third largest funding medium 
for pension funds, representing 22 per cent of total pension assets. 
Granger's study found that in 1979 sixty-three directors of* the five largest 
banks sat on the boards of the 16 largest life insurance companies. 
31 For 
example, Sun Life, the largest insurance company in Canada, had 13 of its 
20 directors sitting on bank boards: 4 at the Royal Bank, the largest and 
most influential bank, and 3 directors on the board of Royal Trust, the major 
trust company. 
32 At that time Sun Life also held large blocks of stock in 
two major banks. 
33 To complete the circuit, 18 insurance companies had 
70 interlocks with 20 trust companies. 
34 
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Banks as well have working relationships with large investment 
dealers and brokerage firms. 
35 Brokerage firms and investment dealers 
trade securities on behalf of and undertake private placements to 
institutional investors such as pension funds. According to Newman, the 
Royal Bank was closely associated with Wood Gundy, the most powerful 
investment firm in the country; Dominion Securities reportedly had a link 
with the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC), the second largest 
bank and A. E. Ames and Co. did most of the floor trading for the Bank of 
36 Montreal, 
, 
the third largest bank. Since that time, however, there has 
been a considerable "shakeout" in the securities industry with Dominion 
Securities merging with Ames, and subsequently with Pitfield, MacKay and 
Ross. 37 More speculatively, although there are no studies on the subject, 
the close traditional relationship between banks and trust companies 
suggests that trust companies, as corporate trustee's for pension funds, may, 
direct their trading activity to bank associated brokerage firms. 
Formal interlocking directorships have been the traditional 
mechanism within the Canadian finance sector to centralize and 
concentrate economic power, including pension capital, among major 
financial institutions. Interlocking directorships have served as _, a 
mechanism to co-ordinate business activity, as required, and to collect and 
disseminate information. However, over the past twenty years, as a matter 
of public policy an attempt has been made to promote "intermodal 
competition" between financial institutions in Canada. 
38 
A number of important legislative changes have been introduced 
which have substantively altered the character and density of interlocks 
within the finance sector. Specifically, the Bank Act 1967 forbid formal 
interlocking directorships between banks and trust companies; concurrently, 
banks were forced to reduce their equity holdings in trust companies to no 
more than 10 per cent of outstanding voting stock. In addition, Canadian 
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insurance law was amended so as to prohibit life insurers from directly 
owning trust companies, mutual'funds and investment companies. The use 
of holding company arrangements, however, allows them to expand into 
these fields. Significantly, the current legislation still permits interlocks 
between banks and insurance companies and between trust companies and 
life insurers. Furthermore, the legislation allows equity investment of up to 
10 per cent of outstanding shares between financial institutions: banks and 
trust companies in one another, and life insurance and trust companies in 
banks; virtually all life insurance companies in Canada are mutualized and 
do not have outstanding shares. Thus, while formal interlocks between 
certain financial institutions are now prohibited by law, direct equity 
participation between financial institutions remains. 
"Legislative enactment, " however, "may not be able to achieve 
the desired separation" between financial institutions because "banks have 
too great an interest in trust company operations. "38 The indirect 
interlock, or the "friend of a friend", for example, is a means to circumvent 
the Bank Act restriction on bank-trust company, interlocks. A case in point 
is when Power Corporation subsidary Laurentide Financial Corporation Ltd. 
merged with the Provincial Bank in 1979. Mr Paul Desmarais and several 
other Power Corporation directors were on the board of Montreal Trust 
Company (now Montreal Trustco) which is 50 per cent owned by Power 
Corporation. As a result they had to resign from the newly merged 
organization. Mr Desmarais was quoted as saying, "maybe we'll ask someone 
already on the board to look after our interests... or we could have someone 
represent us who wasn't directly related to Power. "39 
There are indications that the character of linkages and fusion 
within the finance sector in Canada have undergone a' fundamental 
transformation within recent years. The earlier studies of the subject quite 
correctly emphasized formal interlocking directorships as the co-ordinating 
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mechanism facilitating the centralization and concentration of 
financial 
capital. 
40 It would appear, however, that direct equity investment and 
holding company arrangements in recent years have increasingly supplanted 
interlocking directorships as the means to integrate and co-ordinate 
financial capital. Stewart, for example, reported that major banks had 6 
linkages to the top 5 life insurance companies in 1980.41 By 1983, 
however, an analysis of annual reports indicates that dominant banks had 
only 3 links to 2 of the top life insurers. Similarly, there were only 2 
insurance company interlocks among the top 5 trust companies. 
42 
Bank-trust company interlocks are now prohibited by law. This information 
suggests that there has been a diminution of traditional interlocks, even 
where permitted by legislation, as the mechanism to centralize and 
concentrate capital within the finance sector. 
Correspondingly there has been an increasing reliance upon direct 
equity investment and holding company arrangements to promote the 
interpenetration and amalgamation of financial capital in Canada. The 
shareholdings between major financial institutions, specifically life and trust 
company investment in banks, is reported in Table 9.1. Table 9.2 outlines 
significant ownership of trust company shares by life insurance companies 
and holding companies. In this regard it should be noted that while the 
Ontario Securities Act designates a shareholding of 20 per cent or more as a 
"control block" and 10 per cent as an "insider" or "significant' shareholder 
position, the Bank Act 1980 implicitly deems holdings of 1/2 of 1 per cent to 
constitute a significant shareholder position. 
43 Trust and life insurance 
companies as administrators and investment managers for pension funds 
therefore have an important equity position in the banking sector, as 
indicated by Table 9.1, further integrating the capital under the control of 
financial institutions. Moreover, a recent amendment to the Bank Act 
accelerates the co-mingling of financial capital by permitting the 
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occupational pension plans of banks to buy shares of other banks. 
44 Trust 
company shares held by other financial institutions similarly integrates 
financial capital (Table 9.2). 
TABLE 9.2 
SIGNIFICANT SHARE OWNERSHIP 
OF 
TRUST COMPANIES 
BY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, CANADA, 1983 
Trust Companyl Major Shareholder 
Royal Trustco 47% Trilon Financial 
Corp. (holding company) 
Canada Trustco 23% Manufacturers Life 
Montreal Trustco 40% Investors Group; 
10% Power Financial 
Canada Permanent 100% Canada Permanent 
Mortgage Company 
National Trust -. Widely-held 
Corporate Affiliation 
To Edper Investments 
(Bronfman family 
trust) through Brascan 
To Canada Trust Mort- 
gage Company 
To Power Corporation 
Note: 1. Ranked by assets. 
Sources: The Financial Post 500 (June 1983); Lawrence Welsh, 'Trilon Plans to 
Intensify Financial rvices', The Financial Post November 12,1983. 
Sonita Horvitch, "Canada Trustco aýys uo nancial Furor", The 
Financial Post, December 24,1983 and Robert Giddens, "Power Corp . 
studying SUM into an Operating Company", The Globe and Mail, May 4, 
1984. 
A significant and emerging trend accelerating the concentration 
of financial capital is the creation of financial conglomerates or "financial 
supermarkets"; that is, the creation of formally integrated and rationalized 
financial services including credit cards, consumer loans, mortgages, 
investment services, insurance, annuities and pensions, based on the 
elimination of traditional barriers between financial institutions. This trend 
is now clearly evidenced in Britain, Canada and the U. S. 
45 In the United 
States, for example, stock brokers such as Merrill Lynch, Bache and Dean 
Witter are now involved in non-securities businesses such as insurance 
brokerage. The subsequent purchase of Bache by Prudential Life, American 
Express Company's merger with Shearson and the expansion of retailers such 
as Sears Roebuck and J. C. Penney into financial service companies are 
- 339 - 
transforming the character and organization of the finance sector. 
Similarly, in Canada there has been a "dramatic change in the role of 
financial' institutions" where many "banks, life insurance, and trust 
companies have become financial conglomerates. "46 The ruling of the 
Ontario Securities Commission allowing banks to act as stöckbrokers (1983), 
the passage of Bill 75 by the Quebec National Assembly to promote 
"financial supermarket d' (June' 1983), the merger of Dominion Securities- 
Ames-Pitfieid MacKay Ross (1983-1984), 47 the recent merger of National 
Trust and Victoria and Grey into the third largest trust company (July 1984), 
Brascan's creation of a new financial group in addition to Trilon (August 
1984), 48 Manulife's aquisition" of Dominion Life (early 1985), and the 
impending merger between Canada Trustco and Canada Permanent (late 
1985) are all indications of the accelerating trend towards the integration, 
rationalization and consolidation of financial capital. 
As the distinction between banks, trust companies, investment 
dealers, and life insurers has become increasingly blurred in Canada, a 
functionally integrated financial system is emerging. 'Holding company 
arrangements are pivotal to the creation of financial conglomerates and the 
amalgamation of financial capital in Canada, including pension fund assets. 
Two cases are of particular interest with respect to the use of holding 
company arrangements and direct equity investment to create financial 
conglomerates to centralize and concentrate financial capital: Power 
Corporation and Edper Investments Limited. 
Power Corporation, the largest diversified holding company in 
Canada on a consolidated asset basis, owns and controls Montreal Trustco 
and Great-West Life through its subsidiaries Power Financial and the 
Investors Group, using a combination of direct equity participation and 
interlocking directorships. Montreal Trustco and Great-West are the third 
largest trust company and life insurer respectively. Montreal Trustco has 
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the, third largest pool of corporate trusteed pension fund assets under 
administration, while Great-West manages the assets of the fifth largest 
segregated pension fund in the insurance industry (Tables 8.13 and 8.14). 
The creation by Edper Investments, one of two privately held 
Bronf man family trusts, of Trilon Financial Corporation through its Brascan 
subsidary is a recent example of the formation of a financial conglomerate 
using direct equity participation through holding company arrangements. 
Trilon Financial Corporation was formed in 1982 to explicitly integrate and 
co-ordinate financial services, 
49 
with a resultant impact on the 
organization of the finance sector. Trilon owns London Life, the fourth 
ranked life insurer, and has a controlling equity position in Royal. Trustco, 
the largest trust company, in the country. Royal Trustco controls the largest 
volume of pension assets under administration of any trust company (Table 
&13). In addition, Trilon has a substantial equity position in the fifth ranked 
Toronto-Dominion (TD) bank. In turn, the Toronto-Dominion bank pension 
fund has a 15 per cent interest in Trilon Financial. Reinforcing this control 
are interlocks from Brascan, owned by Edper Investments and the holding 
company for Trilon, to Royal Trustco and the T-D bank. 
The foregoing suggests that the finance sector in Canada is in the 
process of a significant transformation and reorganization. Whatever the 
final configuration, it is evident that there will be a considerable expansion 
of the concentration of economic power under its control. The rapidly 
growing pool of centralized and concentrated pension capital, controlled by 
a few financial institutions, enhances this power and accelerates the natural 
tendency towards the amalgamation of capital within the finance. sector. 
The finance sector, in turn, has become increasingly integrated with 
industrial capital. . 
9.3.3 The Integration of' Financial and Industrial Capital. Under 
advanced capitalism there is an increased interpenetration and 
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interdependence, that is fusion, between financial and industrial capital. 
The amalgamation of financial capital is paralleled by a similar process in 
the industrial sphere and between the two sectors. This has effectively 
resulted in the integration, or "fusion", of the finance and industrial sectors, 
with the resultant unification and strengthening of capital in general. 
The close relationship between the finance and industrial sectors 
in Germany, Japan, France, Britain and the United States is well 
documented. 50 In the U. K., for example, "the separation of banking and 
industry, " according to Prais, is "being... slowly replaced by an association 
between the new financial institutions and industry... bringing the British 
system closer ý to that of the Continent. "51 Studies of the subject with 
respect to Canada in the early 1960s indicated that top banks held nearly a 
quarter of the major industrial directorships; conversely, over half of the top 
banking directorships were held by directors of leading industrial 
corporations. 'Top insurance company directorships were equally shared by 
top industrial and bank directors. In turn, top industrial directors held 
nearly 60 per cent of bank and insurance directorships. 
52 Clement using 
1972 data reported a density ratio for interlocks, that is, the proportion of 
potential to 'actual -interlocks, of . 62 between finance and 
manufacturing. 
53 Granger, for example, noted that the directors of the 
Royal Bank and Bank of Montreal, the first and third largest banks 
respectively, sat on 110 of the 250 largest non-financial corporations in 
Canada in 1979.54 The "concentration of power in six financial 
corporations, " according to Johnson, "is made even more impressive when 
one remembers these corporate directors meet together on the boards of 
directors of their innumerable smaller interests. "55 Thus there are a 
series of interconnected corporate networks unifying the finance and 
industrial sectors in Canada into "fused" capital. 
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Figure 9-1, constructed from various sources, identifies and 
reports, selected equity linkages and interlocks between and among major 
corporations in the finance and industrial sectors in Canada in 1983-1984. 
This presents the various interconnections within the transfigured finance 
sector in relation to the manufacturing sector. Equity linkages and 
interlocks were traced within the finance sector as well as to and from the 
industrial sector. Only those industrial corporations with equity exposure or 
which satisfy the significant shareholder criterion are included, thereby 
excluding many important U. S. subsidiaries and privately held corporations. 
Interlocks from the finance to the industrial sector were limited to major 
corporations, or to those which were previously established, due to the 
plethora of linkages. Figure 9-1 therefore represents the interdependent 
nexus of power between major industrial corporations and financial 
institutions, including those which control pension capital. 
Based on this information three centers of power can be 
identified. First, the dominant characteristic is first-tier linkages between 
the industrial, commercial and financial sectors, and among financial 
institutions where allowed. The Royal Bank, the largest and most powerful 
financial institution in Canada, for 'example, has at least 40 interlocks to 
key industrial corporations throughout the economyS6 (these are not 
reported in Figure 9-1). Sun Life, Canada's major life insurance company 
has 1 director on the Royal Bank's board (compared with 4 in 1979) and I on 
Royal Trustco's, the largest trust company. Royal Trustco and Sun Life are 
the major corporate trustee and segregated fund managers respectively for 
pension fund assets (Tables 8.13 and 8.14). Olympia and York, the largest 
commercial real estate developer has 2 representatives on Royal Trustco's 
board of directors. Power Corporation, the largest holding company on a 
consolidated balance sheet basis, with 195 companies under its control has a 
12 per cent equity interest in Canadian Pacific (CP), the largest industrial 
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based conglomerate which controls some 130 corporations. Mr Paul 
Desmarais, Chairman-and CEO of Power Corporation, was recently elected 
a director of CP Enterprises, 
57 the second ranked holding company, which 
is 70 per cent owned by Canadian Pacific, thus interlocking the first and 
second ranked, holding companies. In turn, Canadian Pacific interlocks with 
Sun Life, thereby connecting the top ranked industrial conglomerate with 
the major life insurance company. What clearly emerges are a series of 
horizontal linkages between the dominant economic actors in the finance 
and industrial sectors of the Canadian economy. 
Second, in addition to primary linkages, there are a series of 
intense subordinate interconnections and groupings within and between the 
various sectors at different tiers. At the first-tier within the finance 
sector, for example, there is a close working relationship between the two 
major banks and - brokerage firms. 
58 Top ranked Royal Trustco has a 
series of equity links with the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC) 
and the Bank of Nova Scotia, the second and fourth ranked banks 
respectively. The Bank of Nova Scotia is interlocked with Canada Life, and 
London Life with Royal Trustco. Mutual Life, the sixth ranked insurer is 
also interlocked to Royal Trustco. At the second-tier, Manufacturer's Life 
has a 23 per cent (non-voting) interest in Canada Trustco. In addition, Sun 
Life and Edper Investments (through Brascan) have connections with the 
fifth ranked Toronto-Dominion (TD) bank. 
The sectoral integration between and among dominant financial 
and industrial corporations is also evidenced by first and third-tier linkages. 
For example, Canadian Pacific, Royal Trustco and Sun Life, the top 
institutions within their respective sectors, are all interconnected with the 
Bank of Montreal, the third ranked bank. Trizec Corporation, the second 
largest. commercial realtor, owned jointly by Olympia and York and Edper 
Investments, is interlocked to Royal Trustco and London Life. The 
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interconnecting chaining of industrial, financial and commerical networks is 
endless. This evidence indicates that in addition to important horizontal 
" linkages between the 'finance and industrial sectors that there are deep 
vertical interconnections within the finance sector. 
Third, holding company arrangements have increasingly become 
the interface between the industrial and finance sectors in Canada. Holding 
companies have effectively served to fuse financial and industrial capital 
into finance capital. Three constellations, or groupings, are of particular 
significance. It is useful to differentiate for analytical purposes between 
what might be termed industrial based conglomerates and commercial based 
holding companies. An example of the former is Canadian Pacific (CP), 
which owns and controls 130 corporations, including CP Enterprises which 
acts as a holding company and, in turn, controls innumerable firms in key 
sectors. CP as previously established has linkages to and from Sun Life, 
Power Corporation and the Bank of Montreal The CP pension fund is the 
third largest in Canada `(1980). Edper Investments Limited and Power 
Corporation are examples of commercial based holding companies which are 
extensively interconnected A to other sectors. The Edper Investments 
complex encompasses 110 companies including a controlling interest in the 
diversified industrial based Brascan holding company and the recently 
created Trilon Financial Corporation, Trilon is the holding' company for 
Royal Trustco and London Life. In addition, Edper is interlocked to the 
Bank of Montreal and has a significant equity interest in the 
Toronto-Dominion bank. Power Corporation controls some 195 companies, 
including Montreal Trustco and Great-West Life; in addition, it formerly 
owned Imperial Life (until, forced to divest in 1977) and' the Laurentide 
Group (now the Laurentian Group)59 The current president of ' Imperial 
Life (1984), owned by the Laurentian Group, however, was formerly a senior 
executive with Power Corporation. 
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These three conglomerates - CP, Edper and Power Corporation - 
therefore own and/or control over 435 corporations throughout the economy 
and directly or indirectly have under their "strategic control" some $27.9 
billion or 43 per cent of total pension assets in Canada through dominant 
interconnected corporations (1980). 
60" These data lend support to Porter's 
claim that the nucleii of economic power in Canada are the large holding 
and investment companies. 
6-1 Despite the contention that the different 
funding agencies for pension plans sponsored by financial institutions - trust 
and life companies - purportedly compete with each other, there are marked 
"tendencies towards segmentation of the market". 
62 Segmented or 
differentiated markets are a classic characteristic associated with 
monopolistic competition and oligopolistic market structure 
63 
In general, what appears are horizontal linkages between financial 
sectors, where permitted, and vertical integration between tiers as a result 
of direct equity investment through holding companies which interface and 
horizontally link the finance and industrial sectors. This has resulted in the 
increased amalgamation and growth of capital within and between the 
financial and industrial spheres. The interdependence of-the finance and 
industrial sectors through interpenetrating corporate networks has 
significantly unified and fused capital. This may signify the transition to 
"spheres of influence" and "interest group' as the dominant form of 
business organization in Canada, as is the case in some other capitalist 
economies. 64 The increased fusion of financial and industrial capital in 
Canada is, by any other name, monopoly capitalism. What is new is the role 
of pension funds as a: mechanism to facilitate and promote the 
interpenetration and interdependence of capital between the finance and 
industrial sectors under advanced capitalism. This results in strengthening 
private sector control over pension capital. 
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9.4 Pension System Investment Function as an Integrative Mechanism 
The pension system investment function is a vital link between 
the finance and industrial sectors. Under advanced capitalism investment 
by institutional investors, such as pension funds, has effectively resulted in 
socialization of the industrial sector. This is a natural consequence of 
investment by pension funds, and other institutional investors, in corporate 
securities and in particular equity shares of major corporations. 
In Britain, Canada and the U. S., institutional investors in general, 
and pension funds in particular, are now the dominant force in the securities 
market and have the largest holdings of corporate shares (Tables 7.2 and 
7.13). The investment function underlying the operation of the pension 
system therefore facilitates the interpenetration and interdependence of 
financial and industrial capital. The penetration of the industrial sector by 
pension funds through the securities market, suggests that they might 
exercise potential control over the industrial sector. - This has implications 
with respect to strategies for social change and is dealt with in Chapter 10. 
"Through the acquisition of stock in corporations, " Harbrecht 
argued, "financial' organizations have begun to gather to themselves 
the ... rights of control that have always been attached to shares of stock' 
placing "institutions in a position of control in the most 
influential... corporations. "65 In the United States in the mid-1950s bank 
trustee shareholdings of individual corporations through pension funds 
ranged from 1/2 to 7 per cent of outstanding issues. 
66 Institutional share 
ownership is now considerably greater. Based on 1981 survey data, for 
example, institutions owned 89 per cent of AMP Inc., 80 per cent of Mattel 
Inc., 79 per cent of Lockheed Corp., 77 per cent of Motorola Inc., 77 per 
cent of Nalco Chemical Co. and 71 per cent of Texas Instruments. 67 
Consequently, the growth of bank control over companies in the U. S. has 
increased as a result of their concentrated pension fund shareholdings. 
68 
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The concentration of corporate shareholdings among institutional 
investors and pension funds is similarly evidenced in Britain and Canada. In 
Britain, according to Minns, 30 financial institutions control over 20 per 
cent of the share capital'in 36 of the 50 largest corporations, 25 per cent in 
30 companies, over 30 percent in 17 firms and over 35 per cent in three 
companies. 
69' Recent years have witnessed 'an increased rate of 
penetration of large-scale industrial enterprises by the financial institutions 
responsible for the administration of pension funds. 
7° In Canada some 
publicly traded -companies have 30 -to -40 per cent or more of their 
outstanding common shares held by 7 or- 8 pension funds. 
71 ' Private 
placements of securities, and 'the "thin" equity market in Canada, have 
compounded this concentration, by placing - large blocks of shares under 
institutional control. Significantly, some major corporate pension funds, and 
in one instance a consortium of funds, have directly bought into' energy 
companies, as well as having acquired direct ownership of real estate. 
72 
Pension funds under the control of dominant financial institutions therefore 
promote the integration of the industrial, commercial and' finance sectors, 
with a corresponding concentration and centralization of capital. The 
following identifies and examines some of the specific mechanisms which 
facilitate this process. ý° " 
9.4.1 Blue Chip Investment and Intersectoral Integration. 
Pension fund investment in the common shares of well-established 
companies with good earnings records and long-time dividend payments, that 
is, blue-chip corporations, promotes intersectoral fusion. This investment 
behaviour is largely attributable to pension funds being risk-aversive so as to 
satisfy the obligation of pension trustees to act in a "prudent" manner to 
protect the interests of plan members. In order to fulfill the fiduciary 
requirements of law and practice, pension funds must simultaneously 
maximize investment return and minimize risk through portfolio 
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diversification, and are restricted to investing in only those securities which 
meet certain "quality" tests, such as the payment of dividends over a long 
period of time. 
An practice this effectively restricts pension fund investment to 
the shares of dominant, stable, and profitable firms in the oligopolistic 
sectors of the economy. The limited universe of publicly traded corporate 
shares satisfying these requirements has-resulted in pension fund 
shareholdings being concentrated, among a.. relatively few major companies. 
The concentration of. blue-chip shareholdings by pension funds, in turn, 
reinforces the penetration of major industrial corporations by financial 
institutions and the interdependence between the two sectors. 
The concentration of pension fund investment in a relatively small 
0 
number of dominant industrial corporations is well documented. In the 
United States it is popular! to refer. to the "nifty-fifty", that is, the 50 most 
commonly held stocks. ' These include such corporate giants as IBM, Exxon, 
AT & T, GE, GM, Xerox and so on. The fact that pension fund holdings are 
generally, limited to the top 50 to 100 corporations out of the 1,550 
companies listed on the NYSE in 1983 is an indication of this concentrated 
share ownership. 
73, 
. In Canada, pension fund shareholdings are 
concentrated in 20 of the 872 listed companies, accounting for nearly 50 per 
cent of the value of the TSE Composite Index. 
74 And in Britain, 68 per 
cent of pension fund. investment is concentrated in the largest companies 
worth. k. 130 million or more. 
75 
The integration and interdependence of financial and industrial 
capital is facilitated through the pension system investment function under 
advanced capitalism by placing concentrated corporate shareholdings under 
the control of financial institutions. Concurrently, the pension system 
promotes the , 
financing of mergers and take-overs, thereby further 
amalgamating units of capital within and between sectors. 
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9.4.2 Corporate Finance and the Amalgamation of Capital. The 
pension system's investment function accelerates the concentration and 
centralization of capital by supplying firms with liquidity for 
inter-and-intrasectoral corporate acquisitions, mergers and take-overs. 
That is, quite literally, the amalgamation of capital units. The late 1960s 
and 1970s witnessed an unprecedented number of mergers among industrial, 
commercial and financial corporations in North America and Britain. The 
pension system has directly and indirectly generated a significant proportion 
of the required cash for these activities. 
The role of the pension system as a source of long-term 
investment capital and external financing for the corporate sector was 
examined-in Chapter 7. The external financing 'raised by corporations in 
securities markets, and increasingly supplied through the pension system, 
however, is used not only for the purpose of satisfying corporate investment 
requirements,, but also for "intercorporate investment" and an "increase in 
financial asset'. An increasing proportion of corporate funds and external 
financing is used to promote corporate growth through mergers and 
take-overs, that is, a concentration or amalgamation of capital, rather than 
through internal growth. 
In the United States the proportion of corporate funds used to 
finance mergers and take-overs ("increase in, financial assetd') rose from 9 
to 20 per cent between 1960 and 1981.76 A similar trend was evidenced 
in Canada with respect to "intercorporate investment" between 1978 and 
1981.77 Significantly, intercorporate investment, `including resources for 
mergers and take-overs, was equivalent to 70 per cent of all long-term 
private non-financial business borrowing raised in securities markets in 
Canada in 1981.78 In Britain, 10 per cent of external finance, that is 
issues of shares and debentures, was explicitly used for acquisitions by 
industrial and commercial' companies between 1949 and 1953, and 
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subsequently increased to 73 per cent of issue value in the 1969 - 1973 
period. 
79 Therefore a significant proportion of external financing, and 
funds generated through the pension system including primary market 
acquisitions, promote the amalgamation of capital. 
Pension funds, especially in Britain and the United States, have 
been used with increasing frequency as a weapon in corporate take-overs, as 
well as a means to augment the liquidity position of firms. Pension funds 
therefore directly accelerate the centralization and concentration of 
capital, that is, the amalgamation of capital into larger units of production 
and promote inter-and-intrasectoral fusion. Table 9.3 is a partial survey of 
reported instances where pension funds have been used to promote corporate 
take-overs or improve the cash position of firms in Britain, the U. S. and 
Canada between 1950 and 1982. 
Pension funds by tendering their shares have been used as part of 
a corporate strategy to promote or block take-over bids, in addition to 
generating liquidity through self-investment ("self-dealing") and 
spinoff/terminations for mergers. In Britain, Sprey Investments' use of the 
Imperial Chemical, Unilever and Barclay pension funds for offensive 
take-over bids, and the notorious manipulation by Slater Walker of pension 
funds for the same purpose, in addition to the recent rash of "dawn raids" 
and "sudden death" take-overs, are but some of the better known examples 
of how pension funds have been used to promote the amalgamation of 
capital. In the United States pension fund shares were used, for example, by 
Martin Marietta in the take-over of the Bendix Corporation and by Tactron 
Inc. in the take-over of KDI Corporation. 
Alternatively, pension funds have been used defensively to block 
take-over bids. In Canada, Royal Trustco bought its own shares through the 
company pension fund to help thwart a take-over bid by the Campeau 
Corporation in 1980. Similarly in the U. S., Grumman Aircraft tendered its 
Date 
1965-71 
1967 
1973-74 
1974 
1976 
1977 
1977 
1978 
1978 
1978 
1978 
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TABLE 9.3 
USE OF PENSION FUNDS TO PROMOTE 
CORPORATE TAKE-OVERS AND LIQUIDITY POSITION, 
SELECTED EXAMPLES, U. K., U. S., AND CANADA, 1950-1982 
BRITAIN 
Company 
Sprey Investments 
London Co-operative 
Society 
Slater Walker 
Activity 
Use of Imperial Chemical, 
Unilever and Barclay 
pension funds for 
take-over bids of various 
companies. 
Self investment - favour- 
able loan from pension 
fund to LCS. 
Use of Leyland and 
Standard Triumph pension 
funds for take-overs, 
companies then stripped 
of assets. 
Brooke Bond Liebig 
J. Lyons 
J. Sainsbury 
Arthur Guiness 
Eurotherm International 
Lucas Industries 
McKechnie Brothers 
Ricardo and Company, 
Engineers 
Self investment - favourable terms on loan 
to Welfare Insurance, 
formerly a subsidiary of 
Brooke Bond. 
Self investment - 
property subsidiary sold 
s 1.7 m of assets to 
Lyons Pension Trust to 
improve liquidity, 
position of parent firm. 
Self investment, - company 
a tenant of its own 
pension fund, accounting 
for 25% of fund assets. 
Self investment - pension fund deposited ß 100,000 
at call with company. 
Self investment - loan from pension fund to 
company representing 68% 
of total fund assets. 
Self investment - over 
26% of pension fund 
invested in parent firm, 
accounting for 13% of 
total Lucas equity. 
Self investment - take-over of Fredrick W. 
Evans and investment of 15% of Evans pension fund 
assets in McKechnie 
shares. 
Nearly 25% of pension 
fund assets invested in 
parent firm; used as 
defense against take-over 
bids. 
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Date Company 
1980-81 Over 40 "dawn raids" and 
"sudden death" take-overs 
UNITED STATES 
Date Company 
1950 to date Various state and local 
gov't retirement systems 
1981 Grumman Aircraft 
1982 A&P, J. P. Stevens, Stroh 
Brewery, Celanese and Reyolds 
Metal, AMAX and Occidental 
Petroleum 
1982 Bendix Corp=Martin Marietta 
Corp = Allied Corp. 
1982 U. S. Steel - Marathon 011 Co. 
1982 Tactron Inc. - KDI Corp. 
CANADA 
Date Company 
1964 Canadian Pacific 
1963 to 1980 Ontario Municipal Employees 
Retirement System 
Early 19809 Tuplrbo ourcLtdes. - Merland 
1980 Royal Trustco 
Activity 
Including offensive bids 
for Amalgamated Power 
Engineering and Eagle 
Star Insurance; to block 
bids at Revertex 
Chemicals and British 
Sugar. 
Activity 
Self investment and bond 
swaps. 
Use of pension fund 
assets by Grumman to 
block take-over bid by 
LTV. 
Over 200 spin off/ 
terminations to acquire 
excess cash and reduce 
merger debts. 
During take-over, 
Citibank as trustee for 
Bendix Corp., tendered 
Bendix shares to Martin 
Marietta through ESOP. 
Active opposition by 
pension funds and 
investment managers to 
U. S. Steel take-over of 
Marathon Oil Co. 
Active use of pension 
funds in Tactron 
take-over of KDI. 
Activity 
Acquisition of 18% of 
Central Del Rio's 
outstanding shares 
through CPR pension trust. 
Self investment - 98% of 
assets in non-marketable 
bonds of Gov't of Ontario. 
Pension Investment 
Association of Canada 
(PIAC) organized 
opposition to take-over 
bid. 
Used company pension fund 
to buy its own shares to 
assist in thwarting 
take-over bid by Campeau 
Corp. 
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Sources: For Britain. Richard Speigelberg, The Cit : Power Without Accountabilit 
(London: Blond & Bri ggs, 1973), pp. JS-bd; car nns, ae over e 
City (London: Pluto Press, 1982), p. 19; Jerry Coakley and Laurence 
Aarris, The City of Capital (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publisher Limited, 
1983), p. -T6; 2W Billion of Pension Funds In Need of Regulation", The 
Economist, November 4,1978, pp. 109-115. For the U. S., "Daniel 
Jay Baum 
awn 'NedB'. Stiles, The Silent Partners: Institutional Investors and 
Corporate Control yracuse: Syracuse University Press, pp. 69-80; 
0o and o er: LTV Drops Its Grumman Bid", Fortune, December 14,1981, 
vanr 
Sa31, hgal 
l983Who 
Owns Corporate Americaýensions & Investment 
ýpý. ýe_ý 
; OPPavan g, pp. 66-67; Companies Strike Rich By Tapp ng 
xcess Pension Funds", Business Week, November 14,1983, p. 28; John 
Howley, "Occidental's Diversification Strategy", Economic Notes, Vol. 52 
(March 1984), p. 11 and Robert Tilove, Public Eo ee Pension 'Funds (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1976 or Canada C. P. R. ns 
Pension Fund", Labor Facts, Vol. XVI (March 1965), p. 13 and Eric Evans, 
"Pension Funds aFa porate Waves", The Financial Post, June 25,1983. 
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own shares through the company pension fund to block a take-over bid by 
LTV in 1981. ' Pension funds actively opposed the take-over bid by U. S. Steel 
of the Marathon Oil Company a year later. The use of occupational pension 
funds for -corporate take-overs in recent years has become so pronounced 
that the U. S. Federal 'Department of Labour "is taking a hard line on 
corporations 'using plans in acquiring `other companies, or where the fund 
owns company stock forbidding-tendering... in hostile takeover bids. "80 
Pensions funds have also been used to generate additional internal 
cash flow for the plan sponsor through self-investment or "self-dealing'. 
That is, where an occupational pension 'fund has significant shareholdings of 
the plan sponsor. Sainsbury, Guiness' and Lucas Industries in Britain, and 
public employee pension funds in North America, are prime examples of this 
questionable ' 'practice. Invariably some of this internally generated 
self-investment is substituted for the external financing raised for 
intercorporate investment and acquisitions. 
An extremely recent and dubious American practice to generate 
corporate cash flow which indirectly promotes mergers is the 
"spinoff/termination", or excess asset recapture. A spinoff/termination is 
the termination of a defined benefit pension plan by a company, which in 
turn buys annuities to cover pension obligations, and claims the excess cash. 
Alternatively, ' some large companies set up a new pension plan for active 
employees while spinning off retirees and excess assets into a separate plan, 
which is then terminated so that excess assets can be recaptured by the 
corporate sponsor. 
81 The past two years have witnessed a rash of over 
100 spinoff/terminations in the U. S., including such major firms as A&P, 
J. P. Stevens, United Airlines, Texaco, and_ Celanese and Reynolds Metals. 
Nearly $2.0 billion is estimated to have been recaptured by U. S. 
corporations through spinoff/terminations. 
82 This practice is now 
emerging in Britain. While the primary purpose of a spinoff/ termination is 
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to enhance the cash position of the corporate plan sponsor, the excess cash 
recaptured is known to have been used for merger related purposes. 
Occidental Petroleum is a well documented case in point. Occidental 
Petroleum, the ninth largest energy-based conglomerate in the U. S., 
purchased the Cities Service Company to expand its domestic oil reserves. 
Occidental terminated Cities' pension. plan, which freed $400 million. The 
excess cash from the terminated pension plan was then used by Occidental 
to reduce the merger debts associated with the take-over of Cities 
83.. Service. 
The private pension system has been transformed by corporations 
into a source of external and internal financing to satisfy investment 
requirements and to promote corporate acquisitions, thereby accelerating 
the more general tendency towards the centralization and concentration of 
capital in capitalist economies. The pension system's investment function 
under advanced capitalism directly and indirectly promotes the integration 
and amalgamation of industrial and financial capital into an unified nexus of 
corporate power through systemic and operational mechanisms. The organic 
unity between the industrial and finance sectors may become even more 
pronounced and overt in the future as the pension system's investment 
function effectively promotes a functional convergence between these 
sectors as institutional investors become more directly involved in corporate 
aff airs. 
9.5 Pension Fund Influence on Corporate Affairs: Functional Convergence 
Pension funds as institutional investors are increasingly 
abandoning their traditional role as neutral shareholders and are being 
compelled to fuse their custodianship role with an active involvement in the 
management of the corporations in which they invest so as to protect the 
interests of beneficial owners, that is, pension plan members whom they 
represent. Pension funds, and other institutional investors, have not only 
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institutionalized investment and capital markets, they have increasingly 
facilitated the fusion of financial and industrial capital by influencing 
corporate behaviour through their concentrated shareholdings. This 
tendency is propelled, as shall be outlined, by a basic underlying structural 
dynamic. ' 
The influence of financial institutions on industrial corporations, 
Hilferding 'observed as early as 1910, increasingly results in "the 
banker... being transformed into an industrial capitalist. "84 A U. S. 
Senate committee report in 1955 recognized that, "continuation of the rapid 
increase in-stock buying by' institutional purchasers may result in financial 
institutions having a dominant influence over the managerial policies of 
industrial enterprise. "85 Harbrecht has argued that 
the logic inherent in the objectives of the pension 
trust... has led ... trustees to invest to an increasing 
extent in corporate stock to obtain... maximum 
investment yields ... The possible control of 
corporations that may result from this... is of great 
significancegr the structure of ownership and control 
of property. 
In brief, there is a considerable potential for institutional investors and 
pension funds to exercise control and influence in key sectors of advanced 
capitalists economies through their concentrated corporate shareholdings. 
This underlying logic poses many important and interesting issues 
with respect to public policy, investment objectives, pension reform, and 
political strategy regarding the public and private pension systems. In the 
most fundamental sense the issue that be- must assessed is' whether 
institutional investors, and in particular pension funds, have ' in fact 
exercised the power associated with share ownership? Or are we witnessing 
a transition from silent to actual involvement in and control over corporate 
affairs? Put another way, are institutional investors transforming their 
ownership of corporate shareholdings into direct control? '' Ancillary 
questions and . issues must be addressed as well. For example, have pension 
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funds and institutional investors intervened in the past in corporate affairs? 
If so, how often, in what ways, and under what circumstances? Is there a 
discernable trend towards more institutional involvement in corporate 
decision-making? ' If so, why? There are significant political implications to 
these issues. 
Pension funds have traditionally adhered to l- convention referred 
to as the "Wall Street rule". That is, pension funds, and other institutional 
investors, would either abstain from' voting their shares, or would support 
the incumbent management in a proxy fight. If institutional investors were, 
for some reason, displeased with management or its policies they would, in 
accordance with this convention, "vote" by selling their shares, rather than 
actively opposing management policy or attempting to influence it. 
There are a` number of premises underlying the operation of the 
Wall Street rule. ''In the first instance, it is based on the legal requirement 
of fiduciary responsibility. That is, pension fund investment managers must 
act in the best interests of plan members so as to maximize investment' 
return subject to reasonable risk. Second, it follows from `this' that 
institutional shareholdings in industrial corporations are ý primarily 
investments, to be bought and sold, ' solely on the basis of investment 
criteria. Third, to the extent that investment criteria are satisfied and the 
interests of plan members protected, institutional investors do not involve 
themselves in corporate affairs. Alternatively, should the investment 
performance of a firm be unsatisfactory, or management policies deemed 
contrary to the interests' of plan members as it affects investment criteria, 
a pension fund trustee is obliged to divest the shares from the' portfolio so as 
to satisfy, his fiduciary responsibility. Fourth, it is argued, institutional 
investorssdo not, or should not, become involved in corporate affairs because- 
their area of expertise is investment policy, not corporate management. 
For all of these reasons it has been suggested that institutional investors' 
- 360 - 
have played an essentially neutral or passive role with respect to involving 
themselves in or influencing corporate management and . have limited 
themselves solely to acting as rational and prudent investors on behalf of 
pension plan members. 
The . Wall Street rule as the dominant view of institutional investor 
behaviour has assumed the role of a conventional wisdom, thereby masking a 
considerably more complex reality. In recent years dispute has arisen as to 
whether institutional investors actually wield the power inherent in their 
shareholdings, - that is, whether they are active-interventionist or 
passive-non-interventionist investors. 
87 Baum and Stiles, Fitch and 
Oppenheimer, and Chevalier argue, -based on various institutional and 
structural considerations, that institutional investors are "locked-in" to their 
corporate, investments and that the volume of their shareholdings will 
compell them to, abandon their neutrality. Contrary to this Herman, 
O'Connor, Perry, Allen and Blumberg, for example, argue that intervention 
by institutional investors is rare. The fact that there is now a vigorous 
debate in the U. K., Canada and the U. S. between "hawk" and "dove" pension 
fund investment managers as to whether institutional investors should play a 
more aggressive -interventionist role ("hawks") or adhere to passive 
non-intervention ("doves"), in itself suggests that the traditional 
institutional -framework -is the process of undergoing a fundamental 
transformation. 
The -extent and details surrounding pension. fund, and other 
institutional investor, intervention in corporate of fairs is rarely a matter of 
public record. Such intervention can only be documented in a fragmentary 
way because these are matters which are done in private. "Intervention by 
professional investors in the management of ... companies, " Spiegelberg has 
suggested, "is comparable to an iceberg. Only a, small part of it is 
visible... If the top of the iceberg has loomed larger, the iceberg... must 
have expanded. "88 
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Table 9.4 is a partial survey of recorded interventions by 
institutional investors in corporate affairs in Britain, the United States and 
Canada between 1949 and 1982. Three trends are discernable. First, 
intervention by institutional investors, as indicated by these selected 
examples, can be detected in one form or another as early as the late 1940s 
in the U. S. and the mid-1960s in Britain and Canada. Second, this 
information suggests that where pension funds and institutional investors 
have intervened they have done so with respect to the most fundamental 
issues related to corporate policy and decision-making - mergers and 
take-overs, management reorganization, corporate structure, product 
diversification, payment of dividends, level of retained earnings, corporate 
capital structure (debt to equity or "gearing" ratio), executive 
compensation, and institutional representation on board of directors. 
Intervention by institutional investors regarding such matters goes to the 
heart of corporate . management. Third, the reported incidence of 
institutional intervention in corporate affairs since the early 1980s would 
appear to have significantly increased. This information suggests that there 
is an underlying dynamic compelling intervention by institutional investors 
in corporate management to defend . their investments. 
Institutional intervention has and does take a variety of forms. In 
Britain, Spiegelberg reported how one pension fund manager in the early 
1970s "kicked out directors of one company, presented boardroom 
changes... in the case of another, and forced another company to sell off 
some of its assets", in addition to refraining from putting another firm into 
liquidation. 89 The view of the Wilson Report was that covert institutional 
intervention in corporate management was increasing in the U. K. 90 In 
the United States a Congressional report on commercial bank trust 
activities concluded that trustee banks influence "the behaviour of large 
segments of ... U. S. industry. "91 
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TABLE 9.4 
INTERVENTION IN CORPORATE AFFAIRS 
BY INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, 
SELECTED EXAMPLES, U. K., U. S., AND CANADA, 1949-1982 
BRITAIN 
Date Company Activity 
1965-71 Sprey Investments Use of Imperial Chemical, 
Unilever and Barclays 
pension funds for 
take-over bids of various 
companies. 
Early 1970s Vickers Engineering Management reorganization 
forced by Prudential Life 
Insurance Co. 
Early 1970s Rank Organization Institutional opposition 
successfully blocks entry into brewery business and 
take-over of Watney Mann. 
Early 1970s Hill Samuel sition l oppo Instit ti 
u ona t 
Metropolitan Estate and 
Property Corp. 
1973-74 Slater Walker. Use of Leyland and 
Standard Triumph pension 
funds for corporate 
take-overs. 
1980-81 Over 40, "dawn raids' and Including offensive bids 
"sudden death" take-overs for Amalgamated Power 
Enginnering and Eagle 
Star Insurance; defensive 
bids at Revertex 
Chemicals and British 
Sugar. 
1982 Turner and Newell; Management restructuring 
Rank Organization forced by Prudential Life 
Assurance. 
1982 F. W. Woolworth (UK) Institutional investors 
and pension funds sell 
off real estate and 
implement management 
reorganization. 
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UNITED STATES 
Date Company 
1949 Montgomery Ward 
1954 New York Central Railroad 
Mid-1950s Unidentified 
Late 1950s Unidentified 
1958 Massachusetts Investors 
Growth Stock Fund 
1959 Bethlehem Steel 
1981 Grumman Aircraft 
1982 Bendix Corp. - Martin Marietta Corp. - Allied Corp. 
1982 Trans World Corp. 
Activity 
Avery-Wolfson proxy fight. 
NY Central in disfavor 
with institutional 
investors because it 
curtailed dividend. 
Ensuing Young-White 
controversy. 
Pressure from life 
insurance companies on 
industrial corporations 
to increase level of 
retained earnings in 
order to provide 
additional security for 
loans. 
Pressure from 
institutional investors 
with respect to bank 
mergers and capital 
structure of corporations. 
Voted against management 
recommendation. 
Successful pressure from 
institutional investors 
to reduce level of 
executive compensation. 
Use of pension fund 
shares by Grumman to 
block take-over bid by 
LTV. 
During proxy fight 
Citibank as trustee for 
Bendix Corp. tendered 
Bendix shares to Martin 
Marietta through ESOP. 
Active support of 
management by pension 
fund managers Morgan 
Guaranty Trust and 
Forstmann-Leff during 
proxy fight. 
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Date 
1982 
1982 
Company 
U. S. Steel - Marathon Oil Co. 
Tactron Inc. - KDI Corp. 
CANADA 
Date Company 
1980 Domtar Inc. and Gas 
Metropolitain 
Early 1980s 
Early 1980s 
Turbo Resources - Merland 
Explorations Ltd. 
Hiram Walker Resources Ltd. 
Early 1980s Consolidated-Bathurst 
Early 1980s Unidentified privately 
held companies 
Activity 
Active opposition by 
pension funds and 
investment firms to 
take-over by U. S. Steel. 
Active involvement by two 
union pension funds in 
take-over by Tactron Inc. 
Sources: Table 9.3, op.. cit. 
Activity 
The Caisse de Depot, the 
investment arm of the 
Quebec Pension Plan, as a 
major shareholder has 
representation on the 
board of directors. 
Pension Investment 
Association of Canada 
(PIAC) organized 
opposition to take-over 
Pension Investment 
Association of Canada 
(PIAC) co-ordinated 
voting against a proxy 
resolution proposed by 
management. 
Institutions, including 
the Dominion Bridge 
pension fund, go to court 
to prevent "squeeze=out' 
of Domglas Inc. minority 
sharehol ders. 
Various forms of 
intervention,, including 
corporate restructuring, 
in which pension funds 
have a direct interest. 
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In Canada a similar trend towards, institutional investor and 
pension fund intervention in corporate affairs is now emerging. In testimony 
to the 1979 Committee on Mutual Funds, for example, one large fund boldly 
stated that -"we 
intend to support any move by another corporation to 
acquire [XYZI and thereby recoup part of the capital loss... as a result of 
management ... incompetence. "92 . More recently, according to , one 
authorative business source, "the attitude of [pension] funds towards their 
role as shareholders is changing. There are strong indicators that a growing 
number of , 
fund managers are considering becoming more vocal 
shareholders'93 and are already closely involved in corporate affairs. One 
Canadian pension fund manager, .: for example, indicated that there are 
instances where a "company, itself, realizing how. much money we have 
invested In [it]... will [voluntarily] take the first- step by giving , us 
information" for investment purposes. 94 The vice-president of Inco 
Investment : Management 
Services, which manages one, of the major 
industrial pension funds in Canada, while acknowledging-that he doesn't like 
crossing the line between investment to corporate manager, has stated, that 
he will make "suggestion' and "if the company has good managers, they'll 
listen. "95 Carmend Normand, director general of the Caisse de Depöt, 
the investment arm of the Quebec Pension Plan (QPP), and the fourth 
largest financial institution in Canada, has vigorously argued against the 
Wall Street rule and for more pension fund intervention stating that, 
rather than ý sell the stock when a company has a 
problem, we prefer to try to help to solve it and keep 
the investment. - In the long run, its better that way. 
You don't need to control the company, you just 
nee .. some representation... and express your 
views. 
The private and public pension systems in recent years are therefore 
seemingly adopting a more interventionist approach to involvement in the 
corporate sector through the pension system's investment function. 
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A structural dynamic propells institutional investors and pension 
funds towards increased involvement in corporate management, generating a 
functional convergence between the finance and industrial sectors. At a 
systemic level pension funds occupy a strategic position in advanced 
capitalist economies. In - the case of Canada ý total pension fund 
shareholdings, adjusted for control blocks, accounted for 32 per cent of all 
shares in =1977 and an average 25 per cent of all equity between 1966 and 
1980 (Chapter 7.4.4). In Britain pension funds hold an estimated 42 per cent 
of all outstanding shares, adjusted for control blocks, and in the United 
States in the order of 38 per cent. Based on the legal convention that 20 per 
cent of shares constitutes a "control" position, it is evident that the pension 
system holds a "dominant" position in relation to the corporate sector. The 
institutionalization of Canadian capital markets is indicated by a Montreal 
Stock Exchange study which found that only 22 of Canada's 400 largest 
corporations were widely-held, compared with 187 companies which involved 
foreign control blocks, and 162 firms which were controlled by domestic 
residents or-legal entities such as pension funds. 
97 The concentration of 
corporate share ownership in individual pension funds, as previously 
discussed, is indicated by the fact that in Canada the 20 most commonly 
held corporate stocks in pension fund portfolios account for nearly 50 per 
cent of the TSE Composite Index; pension fund "trading lists' in the U. S. 
encompass only 50 to 100 major corporations. 
The concentration of -corporate shareholdings in pension funds 
generates a convergence of interest between dominant financial institutions 
and major industrial corporations. Pension funds effectively become 
"locked-in" to the relatively narrow range of leading corporate investments, 
limiting the extent of portfolio diversification, available to them to satisfy 
their fiduciary responsibility. As the demand by pension funds for equity 
investment has increased, the limited supply of "blue-chip" shares - 
has 
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resulted in a corresponding concentration of corporate shareholdings among 
institutional investors. This concentration of shareholdings and lack of 
portfolio diversification, in turn, increasingly generates pressures which 
force institutional investors to intervene, in various ways, in corporate 
affairs. Pension funds as a result of their fiduciary responsibility on behalf 
of plan members, and the dominant financial institutions which are 
responsible for the investment management of two-thirds of total pension 
fund assets (Table 8.16), have effectively acquired a significant proprietary 
interest in the operation of the corporations in which they have invested. 
As one pension fund manager put it, the "need for diversification... is going 
to ... force ... funds to become more expert in a lot of areas. They will 
become more critical of how their investments are being operated. "98 
The concentration of shareholdings and lack of portfolio diversification 
therefore increasingly forces pension funds to "stand and fight... to oppose 
managements whose actions [are] inimical to shareholder interest' because 
if "institutional shareholders don't like... management, to whom will 
they ... sell... shares, and at what price? "99 
The logic is such that pension funds are increasingly compelled to 
intervene in corporate affairs in order to protect and maximize their 
investment. The deteriorating economic climate undoubtedly compounds 
these underlying structural pressures. As pension funds act "in defense of 
their investments" they may "take the next step (and] go on the 
offensive" 
100 
and become more directly involved in corporate 
management. Traditionally institutional investors and pension funds have 
relied upon covert intervention where possible, and have only directly 
intervened in corporate affairs if necessary so as to maintain "strategic 
control". 
101 The available evidence clearly suggests, however, that 
pension funds in recent years have exhibited an increased propensity to 
intervene directly in corporate management, as required in various ways, 
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with respect to both strategic and operational activities (Table 9.4). The 
evolution or transformation from passive to active investment management 
may therefore be viewed as a "natural result of the increased economic 
activity of [pension] funds. "102 The increased involvement by pension 
funds in corporate management witnessed in recent years may signify a 
functional convergence between the finance and industrial sectors and a new 
phase in the evolution of the -modern capitalist corporation and the 
organization of capital. 
Under advanced capitalism the impact of pension funds on capital 
markets as they affect large block trading, the price of securities, the 
external finance requirements of corporations, and the concentration of 
corporate shareholdings are all factors which generate forces creating a 
systemic integration and functional convergence between the industrial and 
finance sectors resulting in a general fusion of capital. The nexus of 
corporate power, incorporating the private pension system, is the concrete 
manifestation of the symbiotic relationship between the finance and 
industrial sectors. The pension system, through various mechanisms, has 
accelerated and promoted the fusion of financial and industrial capital into 
a nexus of corporate power. Private control over pension capital and the 
operation of the private pension system, with the resultant concentration of 
economic power, is maintained by a series of mutually reinforcing 
socio-economic arrangements. 
9.6 Private Control and the Operation of the Pension System - 
The formal structure of pension fund power and the fusion of 
financial and industrial capital into an interlocking network of corporate 
power are reinforced by social structure, politics, ideology, and a series of 
formal and informal linkages between elite groups. Private sector control 
over pension capital is maintained through these reinforcing structures and 
mechanisms. 
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9.6.1 Social Structure and Control. Those who own or control 
Canada's dominant financial institutions, and have strategic control over 
pension capital; as part of the network of corporate power, are a small, 
exclusive, tightly connected group. Only "nine super-rich families or 
individual' in Canada hold a "majority, plurality or more than 20 per cent 
[of shares]... or almost half of the value of the [TSE] 300 index" through 
their direct or indirect corporate and institutional shareholdings (Table 
6.9). 103 These include Mr Paul Desmarais who heads the Power 
Corporation complex including Montreal Trustco and Great-West Life, with 
links to CP Enterprises, and the Bronfrnan family constellation through 
Edper Investments which controls Brascan, Trilon Financial Corporation and 
Royal Trustco, with links to London Life, the Toronto-Dominion Bank and 
the Bank of Montreal (Figure 9-1). The economic power associated with the 
private pension system, and the finance sector more generally, resides with 
a small elite who own or control dominant financial institutions. 
In Canada the financial and industrial elites are linked together in 
a complex pattern of corporate, social and family relationships. In general 
they share a similar ideology and social background, attend private schools, 
inter-marry, belong to the same clubs, have shared values and attitudes, and 
travel in the same social circles. 
104 Throughout this network, according 
to Porter, runs a thin, but nevertheless perceptible, thread of kinship. 
105 
A case in point is former Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, John 
Turner, who married Geills McCrae Kilgour, daughter of David Kilgour, 
former president of the Great-West Life Insurance Company. 106 In brief, 
"being male, attending Upper Canada College, living in Rosedale and having 
a wealthy father [opens] the doors to the boardroom. "107 A similar 
pattern emerges in Britain and the U. S. Major financial institutions in the 
U. K. are "run by people who are part of the power elite ... with their own 
educational system, recruitment, traditions, relations and links to 
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government. "108 Research by Whitley and Lisle-Williams indicates that 
the financial elite in Britain is more socially homogeneous than is the 
industrial elite. 
109 "With increasing economic concentration" in these 
advanced capitalist economies "the [social] structure has become 
increasingly closed: 1110 The social cohesiveness resulting from the 
informal relationships among the corporate elite reinforces the formal 
structure of economic power because there is, as a senior vice-president of 
a financial conglomerate noted in an interview, an "exchange of knowledge 
based on personal relationships, not business relationships. " 111 
9.6.2 Politics and Control. The socio-economic interests of the 
elite that controls financial institutions and the private pension system is 
expressed through corporate political behaviour. Financial and industrial 
corporations are major supporters of mainstream political parties in Canada, 
Britain, and the United States. These parties ordinarily adhere to a 
capitalist ideology and generally promote economic policies favourable to 
the corporate community. The political behaviour of the corporate sector 
will of course depend upon the concrete particularities of each country's 
political structure and traditions. The sectoral Interests of the private 
pension industry are promoted and protected by the political activities of 
dominant financial institutions which act on behalf of the general interests 
of all finance capital. 
In Canada, corporations are major financial contributors to the 
federal Liberal and Conservative parties. 
112 Major financial institutions, 
including trust companies and life insurers which administer and manage 
pension funds, contributed nearly $1.8 million dollars to both political 
parties in the period between 1977 and 1980 (Table 9.5). Banks were the 
largest contributors, equally endowing the Conservative and Liberals. Trust 
companies contributed more to the Conservatives, while life insurance 
companies favoured the Liberals. 
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TABLE 9.5 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
BY MAJOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
TO 
CANADIAN POLITICAL PARTIES, 1977-1980 
BANKS 
Bank Liberals Conservatives NDP 
Royal Bank $150,000 $150,000 
Can. Imperial Bank of Commerce 150,375 151,747 - 
Bank of Montreal 151,500 150,000 - 
Bank of Nova Scotia. 144,000 140,099 - 
Toronto Dominion 140,000 140,000 - 
Sub=total $735,875 $731,846 - 
TRUST COMPANIES 
Trust Com an Liberals Conservatives NDP 
Royal Trustco 1 
$ 28,685 $ 23,266 
Canada Trustco l 
1.078 16,200 - 
Montreal Trustco - 8,925 10,268 - 
Canada Permanent 31,028 800 - 
National Trust 15,056 15,056 - 
Sub-total $ 84,772 $ 65,590 - 
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES 
Life any Liberals Conservatives NDP 
Sun Life - -- 
Manufacturers Life 20,696 19,000 - 
Great West Life - 20,476 - 
London Life 27,500 28,295 - 
Canada Life 14,000 14,000 - 
Sub-total $ 62,196 $ 81,771 - 
GRAND TOTAL $882,843 $879,207 - 
Note: 1. Name change. 
Source: Calculated the 
. 
Chief 
various aOfficer, 
Registered Party Fiscal Period 
What is of interest, based on this information, is the fact that 
total contributions from the finance sector were nearly evenly distributed 
between the federal Conservatives and Liberals. While individual 
corporations may have a political preference, it is clear that the finance 
sector as a whole feels equally comfortable with either political party, since 
both represent and promote the same business interests. A 1983 survey 
indicates that both industrial and financial corporations "over time, give 
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equally to both major parties. " 113 This seeming "neurality" suggests that 
in Canada the corporate sector as a whole expects equal consideration and 
treatment from either political party, regardless of which is in power. 
The political behaviour of British corporations stands in marked 
contrast to that exhibited in Canada. Corporate donations to political 
parties in Britain, a far more overtly class conscious and polarized society 
than Canada, is ideologically less oblique. Simply, there is massive political 
support by the corporate sector for the Conservative Party. Between 54 to 
80 per cent of all corporate political donations were directed to the 
Conservative Party between 1977 and 1983. Nearly 70 per cent of banking, 
insurance, and finance sector political contributions went to the 
Conservative Party, accounting for 26 to 35 per cent of all corporate 
donations to the Tories between 1974 and 1983.114 These contributions 
come from such major financial and banking concerns as Consolidated 
Goldfields, Wills Faber, Hambros, and the Hill Samuel Group. Political 
contributions from banks and insurance companies,. that is, major pension 
fund managers, are greater than their size on the stock market. In Britain 
there is no pretense of ideological or political neutrality by the corporate 
sector. and financial institutions in defense of their interests. 
9.6.3 Influence and Control. The corporate, political and 
bureaucratic elites are a network of small groupings interlocked by a high 
degree of cross-membership, based on formal and informal linkages, who 
share a similar world view. "A confraternity of power develops" between 
the political, bureaucratic and corporate elites, according to Porter, "and 
this in turn is reinforced by kinship ... class" and ideology. 
l 15 The 
interests of financial capital and the private pension industry are 
strengthened through political and bureaucratic linkages as well as mobility 
between the private sector and government. 
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9.6.3.1' Private Sector-Political Links. Political representatives 
in Canada, Britain and the United States at the national level have generally 
come from high socio-economic status backgrounds. 116 Britain is an 
interesting case in point under the current Conservative government. 
Conservative MPs in 1979 were, not unexpectedly, primarily drawn from the 
business world: 23 per cent had a management and, executive background, 
while 17 per cent were lawyers. Significantly, another 18 per cent of Tory 
MPs had occupations broadly associated with the private pension industry: 
management 'consultants (5 per cent), merchant bankers (5 per cent), 
insurance brokers and underwriters (3 per cent), stockbrokers (3 per cent) 
and accountants (2 per cent). 
117 Overall, 339 Conservative MPs held 475 
corporate directorships, including 44 who are members of Lloyds, , the 
insurance brokers. In addition, Conservative MPs held 42 consultancies with 
29 of the top 300 industrial firms, including 15 consultancies and 8 
directorships with life companies, banks and pension funds. ll8 
Similar linkages between the private sector and government exist 
in Canada. For example, when John Turner reentered public life after a 
nine year hiatus to become Prime Minister (June-September 1984) he held at 
least ten corporate directorships, including Canadian Pacific Ltd., Crown 
Life, Credit Foncier and the Canadian Investment Fund Ltd. The new 
Conservative Prime Minister, Mr Brian Mulhroney (September 1984), in 
addition to being President and Director of the Iron Ore Co. of Canada and 
the Quebec North Shore and Labrador Railway, sat on at least eight 
corporate board of directors, including the Canadian Imperial Bank of 
Commerce. 119 Mobility from the private sector to goverment serves the 
general interests of the business community, including the finance sector, as 
does mobility from active politics to the private sector. 
9.6.3.2 Political-Private Sector Links. In Canada there is 
considerable mobility from the political elite to financial institutions 
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related to the operation of the private pension industry. 
120 At the 
federal level, for example, when former Liberal Prime Minister Lester 
Pearson retired he took a position on the board of directors of Crown Life 
Insurance Company (1972), as did former Minister of Finance John Turner 
after he left Cabinet in February 1976. Mr Louis Raminsky, former head of 
the Bank of Canada, was listed as a director of Canada Trust (1978). 
According ' to reliable sources "more - than half of Canada's 
senators [spent] - part of their time acting on boards of directors" in 
1977.121 For example, Mr Salter Hayden, chairman of the influential 
Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce for 27 years was an 
honorary director of the Bank of Nova Scotia, while two other senators on 
the same committee were also directors of trust companies. As well, 
Senator Hays was on the -board of' Canada Permanent. Other 
political-finance industry linkages include Senator Louis Beaubien who is on 
the boards of five insurance companies and one trust company, Senator 
Hartland MacDougall who was a vice-president and director of the Bank of 
Montreal, and Senator Paul Desruisseaux who served as a director of the 
Royal Bank. An analysis of 1983 trust company annual reports indicates 
that Senators Riel and Belfour are on Royal Trustco's board, while Senator 
Lewis is on the board of Canada Permanent. 
Linkages and mobility between Canada's provincial governments 
and the finance sector are similarly impressive. John Roberts, former 
Conservative Premier of Ontario, retired to 13 seats on various boards of 
directors, including Power Corporation, Metropolitan Life and the Canadian 
Imperial Bank of Commerce. 122 The Honourable Jean Lesage, former 
Liberal Premier of Quebec, became a member of Montreal Trust's board of 
directors. The Honourable E. C. Manning, former Premier of Alberta was a 
director of the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce and Manufacturers 
Life. Robert Stanfield, former Premier of Nova Scotia and Leader of the 
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federal Conservative Party is currently listed on the board of Canada Life 
(1983). What is of some interest, based on Olsen's data, is that while over 50 
per cent of provincial Cabinet Ministers had pre-political occupations 
related to business, only 2 per cent had backgrounds connected with the 
insurance industry. This, compares with Orren's study which found that 
nearly 20 per cent of Illinois state representatives and senators between 
1961 and -1968 were associated with the insurance business. 
123 This 
suggests that financial capital in Canada works through federal political and 
bureaucratic structures to protect its interests. Political contributions by 
financial ; institutions to federal political parties and mobility between the 
finance sector and the political apparatus therefore reinforce the influence 
and economic power of the corporate network. Bureaucratic linkages to and 
from the finance sector strengthen this relationship. 
9.6.3.3 Bureaucratic-Finance Sector Links. Porter has argued 
that the link which bypasses the political process is more effective for the 
business community. 
124 This suggests that the ideal connection between 
the private pension industry and the state may be through the bureaucracy 
at various levels. This is because government "bureaucrats, like the 
specialists of the business world, " Olsen observed, "seem to share a common 
ideology concerning their right to rule. " 
125 Any number of studies have 
demonstrated the relationship and affinity between the corporte elite and 
senior bureaucrats as it generally affects government decision-making and 
the formulation of public policy. Little data, however, exist with specific 
reference to bureaucratic-pension industry links. Therefore only selected 
and isolated examples can be cited. 
With respect to Britain, Titmuss argued as early as 1959 that "the 
great insurance corporations and pensions... will recruit to their 
inter-locking directorates and consultant ranks... from the universities [and] 
the civil service. " 
126 The private pension industry recruited senior 
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bureaucrats from the Ministries of Pensions and National Insurance as well 
as from Inland Revenue. One senior government official became the 
executive chairman of the Society of Pension Consultants which was formed 
to present the views of the pension industry to government. This mobility 
between the state bureaucracy and the private pension industry could only 
exist if similar-views were shared with respect to the operation of the 
private pension system. 
In Canada, at the federal level, two interesting examples may be 
cited. The former federal Superintendent of Insurance, Richard Humphry's, 
worked for the Great-West Life Insurance Company in 1939, and went to the 
Department of Finance (1940) before assuming the Superintendent's 
position. In addition, he was past-President of the Canadian Institute of 
Actuaries. Mrs Beryl Plumptre was the wife of A. F. W. Plumptre, a high 
ranking member of the Ottawa bureaucratic elite. 
127 She subsequently 
went on to a number of important appointments in government. Mrs 
Plumptre is listed as being on the board of directors for Canada Permanent 
(1979) and Canada Life (1983). At the provincial level the Superintendents 
of Pensions, that is, those who are responsible for the regulation and 
monitoring of the private pension industry generally have a private sector 
background and orientation. Linkages and mobility between the financial, 
political and bureaucratic elites complements the formal structure of 
corporate and pension fund power. This is reinforced by the dominant 
market ideology. 
9.6.4 Ideology and Economic Control. Ideology plays an 
important role in the formulation of social security policy (Chapter 3.3) and 
is a boundary affecting the control and operation of the private pension 
system within the broader framework of a capitalist economy. At a global 
level ideology serves to legitimize prevailing social and economic structures 
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and their functioning in order to maintain social cohesiveness and 
stability. 
128 
In a capitalist society the market ethos is the dominant ideology 
which governs socio-economic arrangements. The market ethos as the 
dominant value system is, to use Gramsci's term, an "ethico-cultural 
hegemony". Hegemony is 
a socio-political situation ... in which the philosophy 
and practice of a society fuse or are in equilibrium; an 
order in which a certain way of life and thought is 
dominant ... 
(and] is diffused throughout society in all 
its institutional [forms]... with its... taste, morality, 
customs, religious and political principles, and all 
social relations... An element of dirton and control, 
not necessarily conscious, is implied. 
A society's 'stability and equilibrium is a reflection of the penetration and 
internalization of hegemonic social values by classes and individuals. 
"The ruling ideas" or ideology "of each age", Marx and Engels 
suggested, have "been the ideas of its ruling class. " 130 The global 
properties associated with and incorporated into the hegemonic market 
ideology of a capitalist economy include the private ownership of the means 
of production, private control and direction of investment, the sanctity of 
contract, and production for profit, rather than for use. The corporate elite 
that own and control dominant financial institutions, including strategic 
control over pension capital, share a similar world view or ideology. They 
have shared "habits of thought and action, common sets of values [and] 
beliefs' and "hold assumptions so deeply that they communicate through 
raised eyebrows and shared silences' because "they think the same way 
naturally. "131 Those within the "higher circles" have "little need to 
'conspire' and "have few conflicts of interest because their broad interests 
seldom conflict. "132 The assumption and outlook shared by the corporate 
elite, according to Alfred Powis, president of Noranda Mines, is "the same 
attitude toward profit". 133 
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The market ethos explicitly and implicitly governs the operation 
of ý the private pension system. It follows that the primary purpose of 
private pension industry at a micro-economic level is to be profitable, 
rather than satisfying the elderly's need for retirement income. The private 
pension industry, controlled by dominant financial institutions, is big 
business. As one study concluded 
when a bank says that its objective is to maxmize the 
return on investment of its pension fund assets, what 
it... means is to maximize ... 
[the) objective of making 
money for the bank itself ... The fact is that the banks 
are not the instrument serving the fund. Rather the 
[pension] fund is the instrument serving the banks. 
134 
The private pension industry is a profitable business. In Canada, for 
example, fees and commissions to the top five trust companies for managing 
trusteed pension arrangements accounted for an average 35 per cent of 
pre-tax income in 1983, ranging from 15 to 64 per cent of net income before 
taxes, depending upon the company. 
135 
The market ethos as the dominant Ideology legitimizes the 
existence and operation of the private pension system. Central to the 
contemporary regulatory framework for the private pension industry are the 
legal concepts of "fiduciary responsibility" and the "prudent man" rule as 
previously elaborated upon. 
136 The purpose of these requirements are to 
ensure the safety of pension fund assets and plan benefits. As such, the 
notions of "fiduciary responsibility" and the "prudent mar? ' rule serve 
critically important ideological and economic functions. 
Ideologically these requirements legitimize the impression that 
pension funds are managed safely in the interests of plan beneficiaries. As 
one study concluded, however, "Safety is a pseudo policy. Preservation of 
revenue and profitability are [the] genuine ones. In practice the goal of 
safety ... has served as a protection and ... mystification 
for the status 
quo. " 
137 In reality, then, these notions serve to ideologically obscure the 
universal limitations of the private pension system, described in Chapter 4, 
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and the investment and capital accumulation function performed under 
conditions of contemporary capitalism described in Chapter 6. 
In terms of economic function these legal stipulations on the 
operation of the private pension system serve to maintain the pattern of 
pension fund investment in major industrial corporations, and the 
corresponding -concentration of shareholdings, with the resultant fusion of 
industrial and financial capital into the corporate nexus of power. This has 
effectively resulted in "legislated capitalism"138 and has secured private 
sector control over pension capital. Thus, fiduciary responsibility and the 
prudent man rule, intended to protect the interests of pension plan members 
and beneficiaries, have become a way in which to ideologically legitimize 
the structure'of pension fund power and the operation of the private pension 
system in the interests of the corporate sector and financial elite. 
The private pension system as the fastest growing pool of capital 
in advanced capitalist economies is organically related to the finance 
sector. The pension system's investment function as an integrative 
mechanism facilitates the fusion of industrial and financial capital, 
increasingly resulting in a systemic integration and functional convergence 
between the two sectors. Politics, ideology, social background and various 
formal and informal linkages between the financial, political and 
bureaucratic elites all complement and reinforce the formal structure of 
pension fund power described in Chapter 8 and integrate it into the broader 
nexus of corporate power under advanced capitalism. 
9.7 The Pension System and the Nexus of Corporate Power: Implications 
There are a number of broad social policy and political 
implications which result from the relationship between the private pension 
system and the nexus of corporate power. First, the structure of pension 
fund power, described in Chapter 8, and its integration into the corporate 
network under conditions of advanced capitalism, represents a considerable 
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concentration and centralization of private economic power. The power of 
the private pension system and industry, based on its now manifest 
investment and capial accumulation function, described in Chapter 6, is 
grounded in the fundamental socio-economic structures of a capitalist 
political, economy. In the final analysis the institutional strength and 
economic power of the private pension system rests on the private control 
and direction of capital and investment in the interests of the corporate 
sector. "The, organized concentration of control over the 'economic 
surplus! ", Titmuss argued, "represents a primary source of power in our 
society. " 
139 
By_ serving the broad intesjs of organized capital at the 
macro-and-micro-economic levels the private pension industry ensures its 
own survival because the corporate sector needs the private pension system 
to, organize and channel investment capital. The private pension industry is 
a profitable business. The inadequacies of the private pension system, 
described in Chapter 4, exist because reform of the private pension system 
would result in increased labour costs to the industrial sector and a 
relatively less profitable private pension industry. Private pension reform 
neither serves the interests of either the finance or industrial sectors. 
Conversely, expansion of the public pension system is a direct threat to the 
existence of the private pension industry, the level of capital investment 
flowing through the private pension system to the corporate sector, and 
would represent a fundamental challenge to private sector control over and 
direction of investment and capital accumulation. 
This suggests that there will be a dual political response from the 
corporate sector with respect to pension reform. In the first instance, as 
suggested by Bottomore, 
the evident division of the elite into divergent interest 
groups at one level does not preclude the existence at 
another level of important common interests... which 
tend to produce a uniformity of oult4 ok and action on 
fundamental issues of social policy. 
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And "it is over the subject of pensions, " according to Baum, "that disparate 
interests converge. 
141 This is because the private pension system is 
structually and ideologically related to investment, capital accumulation 
and profit levels, thereby affecting the general interests of the corporate 
sector and the specific interests of the pension industry. This suggests that 
the private sector will be the major obstacle to pension reform. The private 
sector if forced by circumstance to choose between either private or public 
pension reform may be expected to make the necessary minimal 
accomodations to keep the private pension system intact so as to forestall 
expansion of the public pension system. 
142 
Second, reform of the pension system is a political issue. It is a 
political issue because if pension reform is to be successful the institutional 
power of the private pension industry must be confronted by the main 
parties of interest - the elderly, workers and unions. To the extent that the 
private pension industry continues to operate on the basis of market criteria 
suggests that it will remain a "capitalist trap" 
143 for the majority of 
workers and elderly, as evidenced by the current limitations of the private 
pension system and the low income of the elderly (Chapters 2 and 4). 
.. Third, the role of 
institutional investors in general, and the 
private pension system in particular cannot be ignored. Their activities 
affect everyone and influence the direction of advanced capitalist 
ecomonies. Leaving that type of economic power in private hands without 
public control and accountability is the hallmark of what Titmuss called "the 
irresponsible society". 
144 The institutional strength of the pension 
system and its relationship to the industrial sector is in fact its weakness. 
This is because the investment function intrinsically related to the operation 
of the occupational and state pension systems render them vulnerable to 
alternative economic strategies to promote social change. 
The pension system in general has resulted in the socialization of 
savings and investment. The occupational pension system's investment 
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function has, in turn, facilitated the interpenetration and interdependence 
of the finance and industrial sectors. Consequently, the private pension 
system in advanced capitalist economies now occupies a position of 
potential strategic control in relation to the industrial sector as a result of 
its concentrated corporate shareholdings. There are already indications that 
pension funds are becoming more assertive in exercising their proprietorial 
rights through their shareholdings and are increasingly intervening in 
corporate affairs (section 9.5). At a micro-economic or sectoral level this 
may provide unions with an opportunity to develop various strategies with 
respect to the co-management of pension funds (Chapter 5.5), industrial 
democracy, and alternative strategies for the economic reorganization of 
industry. The investment function associated with the operation of the 
state retirement income system could similarly be used to satisfy a 
mutiplicity of socio-economic objectives. An expanded public pension 
system would be able to generate an adequate retirement income for the 
elderly and, depending upon the level of funding, could serve as a 
countervailing force to the power of private institutional investors by 
accumulating an investment fund at the macro-economic level for 
alternative economic strategies. 
The investment function underlying the operation of the public 
and private pension systems is an unique mechanism with which to socialize 
key sectors of advanced capitalist economies as a result of the pension 
system's interpenetration of the industrial sector. The pension system's 
investment in and concentrated shareholdings of dominant corporations 
place it in a strategic position to exercise control over the industrial sector, 
investment and capital formation. Keynes clearly foresaw the need for "a 
somewhat comprehensive socialization of investment" 
145 to maintain 
aggregate demand, employment and economic growth within the existent 
capitalist framework. Alternatively, pension funds as Titmuss suggested, 
- 383 - 
are "a power, a potential power to affect many important aspects of our 
economic life" and might be utilized to develop "forms of public ownership, 
public responsibility, and public accountability. " 
146 Whether this 
potential is realized will depend upon the politics of pension reform and the 
use of pension funds to promote progressive strategies for social change. 
:ý 
CHAPTER 10 
CONCLUSIONS: 
THE PENSION SYSTEM 
AND 
STRATEGIES FOR SOCIAL CHANGE 
"The . masses of capital amalgamated by 
centralization.., become new and powerful levers of 
social accumulation. " 
Karl Marx 
"Marxism is a guide to action not a dogma. " 
Frederick Engels 
10.1 Introduction 
This study has suggested that the political economy of pensions, 
and the interaction of its constituent elements, has an internal dynamic 
generating a series of structural conflicts or contradictions which may 
potentially result in the politicization of the pension issue. The pension 
issue affects the vital interests of capital, labour, the elderly and the state 
with respect to capital accumulation, the industrial relations system, 
private and public sector finance, and the economic security of workers and 
the increasing proportion of the aged. The pension issue identifies and 
impacts upon the most fundamental economic and power relationships In 
capitalist economies, suggesting that it may be turned into an ideologically 
defined political issue in the future. Within this context, the pension system 
- public and private - may be used as an instrument to promote progressive 
strategies for social change. 
The purpose of this chapter is to report, analyze and assess 
directed or alternative investment strategies based on the operation of the 
state and occupational pension systems as they might affect and be related 
to strategies for social change in the future. An analytic or typological 
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distinction is made between macro-strategies pursued through the state 
pension system and micro-strategies based on the occupational pension 
system. -These strategies are a natural concomitant of the operation of the 
pension system as a result of its strategic position in advanced capitalist 
economies. Directed investment strategies based on the pension system are 
progressive at this historical juncture, it is suggested, because they are an 
attack on organized capital at the macro-and-micro-economic levels and 
challenge private control over the direction of investment and capital 
formation. It is suggested that the pension system is one means by which to 
establish public control and accountability over investment, the industrial 
sector and capital accumulation. 
Strategies for social change based on the operation of the pension 
system are, in turn, examined from a Marxist perspective and related to the 
transition from capitalism to socialism. It is argued that the use of the 
state and occupational pension systems to advance alternative investment 
strategies is consistent with and corresponds to one model of social 
transition envisioned by Marx, that is, the "pattern of competing systems" 
and "encroaching control" based on the socialization of the economic 
surplus. From a political perspective, directed investment strategies 
through the state pension system may identify issues related to state power 
and public control over investment and economic planning, whereas social 
investment strategies based on the occupational pension system may raise 
issues related to industrial democracy. Strategies for social change based 
on the pension system may therefore be incorporated into a broader socialist 
program. The politicization of the pension issue, and pension reform 
formulated as a radical demand, may ultimately stretch the limits of 
economism and welfarism, thereby facilitating the transition to socialism. 
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10.2 The Funding Debate and Directed Investment Strategies 
The funding debate and alternative investment strategies have 
been recurring themes in twentieth century social security history 
1 
and 
assume a contemporary relevance because the pension system now occupies 
a strategic position within advanced capitalist economies. The investment 
function underlying the operation of the pension system affects savings, 
investment, capital accumulation and the control of corporate 
shareholdings. This suggests that the pension system may be used to 
promote the public interest and strategies for social change. An expanded 
state pension system, with a high level of advanced funding, as shall be 
demonstrated, would serve a multiplicity of purposes and promote the public 
interest by providing adequate retirement income for the future elderly, 
reduce potential intergenerational and sectoral tensions, serve as a 
"countervailing" force to the private economic power of institutional 
investors, generate an investment fund for capital formation under public 
control and might, depending upon political circumstances, result in the 
socialization of key sectors of advanced market economies. 
The funding or financing of the state social security retirement 
system is closely related to such macro-economic considerations as the 
necessary level of contributions required to support the benefit structure, 
taxation, the impact on capital markets, ownership of corporate securities, 
the size of investment fund accumulated and overall investment strategy. It 
must be emphasized that the method of funding a national retirement 
income system is a separate and distinct issue from how the investment fund 
is used. The method of social security financing is important, however, in 
that it determines the size of the fund being accumulated for investment 
purposes. To the extent that a social security investment fund is 
accumulated in turn poses the question of investment strategy and the 
purpose for which the fund is accumulated. Thus the method of social 
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security financing, fund size and investment objectives are inter-related 
issues. 
The way in which a national retirement income system is financed 
is related to directed investment strategies because the method of funding 
will affect the size of the fund accumulated for investment purposes. On 
this subject the International Labour Organization was to state that the 
allocations to technical reserves and/or contingency 
funds are ... 
[the] difference between receipts and 
expenditure, if the figures... are relatively high this 
may indicate the degree to which the (state pension) 
system contributes to national savings and the capital 
formation of the country - depending, of course, on 
how the amounts concerned are utilized, for instance 
whether they are spent by the State ... to meet current 
expenditure or whether t ey are in fact -pra-c-ed in 
nroductive investments in the interest of the national 
Because "funding and investment go hand in hand in pension planning", 3 
the method of funding is an important determinant with respect to 
generating an investment fund (where contributions exceed benefits) in 
order to pursue an alternative or directed investment strategy to satisfy 
socially productive objectives through the state pension system. 
The method of funding, or financing, public and private pension 
plan arrangements is related to the security of benefits, the level and 
stability of contributions, intergenerational transfers or equity, and the need 
for capital. Funding methods differ considerably between public 
arrangements and employer-based occupational pension plans. Occupational 
pension plans are usually fully funded in advance so as to guarantee the 
payment of benefits to plan members. Advanced funding ensures that If a 
plan were terminated it would be able to meet its commitment to 
beneficiaries and plan members for all accrued (earned) benefits. The state 
pension system, however, does not necessarily have to be funded on the 
same basis as employer-sponsored plans since government, in theory, exists 
"in perpetuity" and is the ultimate guarantor of benefits based on Its 
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"unlimited" taxing powers. While some have suggested that "trust funds are 
unnecessary for a government pension plan, and are established on the basis 
of a false analogy with private plans! ', 
4 
others have argued that "there is 
an extra element of danger that the generation facing the [pension] bill 
may ... resist paying it" and the "future ability to pay is by no means certain 
or unlimited. "5 
The advantages and disadvantages of funding a national 
retirement income system are compared in Table 10.1. Despite traditional 
welfare state adherence to PAYGO financing, where "tomorrow's young will 
in turn pay for tomorrows old", 
6 it is now increasingly recognized that 
pension promises "cannot absolutely bind successor governments! 17 as a 
result of current economic, political and demographic realities. Thus a 
degree of funding may be required to protect state pension entitlements. 
Funding refers to any systematic schedule of contributions based 
on long-term pension commitments. There are three alternative methods of 
funding state pension arrangements, each with their respective advantages 
and disadvantages-8 These funding arrangements represent a continuum 
with respect to formal actuarial standards. 
9 Pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) 
funding refers 'to retirement benefits which are financed from current 
contributions so that contributions are equal to benefits. This results in 
each generation paying for the cohort which precedes it. For a national 
pension system operated on a PAYGO basis, a contribution rate would be set 
each year (or for a number of years) based on expected earnings and benefit 
levels in that year (or those years). Pension systems financed on a PAYGO 
basis, while unaffected by inflation, are unfavorably influenced by 
demographic shifts and recessionary conditions. Most, but not all, welfare 
state national retirement income systems since World WarII have operated 
on a PAYGO basis. 
'0 
Alternatively, national retirement income systems may be 
advanced or pre-funded, that is where each generation pays for the value of 
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TABLE 10.1 
THE FUNDING DEBATE 
The Case Against Funding 
A national retirement income program 
should be considered a transfer 
between generations, rather than a 
savings plan. 
Intergenerational equity can not be 
established simply by funding pension 
plans, but must be placed within the 
total legacy passing from one 
generation to another. 
If society wishes to increase saving, 
considerations of social equity 
suggest that the basis for deferring 
consumption should be more selective 
and progressive than would be 
appropriate for pension financing 
This would depend on the progressivity 
of the contribution structure. 
. Although 
large funds may be 
accumulated through pension 
arrangements, saving on such a scale 
and in such a form may be 
inappropriate. By restraining 
consumption at a time when demand is 
weak may result in diminishing 
investment and economic growth during 
a period when there is already 
capacity underutilization. 
A large fund may pose investment 
problems. A large fund may result in 
a concentration of financial power 
under government control that might 
squeeze-out private investment. 
PAYGO results in the lowest short-run 
contribution level. 
A fund or reserves are not necessary 
because government exists "in 
perpetuity" and has infinite resources 
based on its taxing power. 
The Case For Funding 
Funding leads to relatively stable 
contributions since each generation 
"pays its own way". PAYGO rates, 
which varying with changes in the 
proportion of elderly, are likely to 
be unfair between generations. 
Funding would eliminate the 
regressivity associated with current 
contribution rates, under which 
high-income earners receive a larger 
wealth transfer from the next 
generation of workers than do 
low-income earners. 
Funding insures that the pension 
"contract" between the contributor and 
the government of the day is 
honoured. There is no guarantee that 
future governments will honour pension 
promises made by previous governments 
unless paid for. A number of Western 
European countries and the U. S., which 
are funded on a PAYGO basis, have 
experienced financial difficulty and 
have allowed their benefits to be 
eroded in various ways. 
Funding promotes intergenerational 
equity, in as much as each generation 
is required to forgo consumption 
equivalent to the estimated value of 
the pensions it has promised itself. 
From a financial perspective, a 
separate fund exists to pay benefits, 
so that future generations will not be 
required to meet any part of the cost 
of paying pensions to earlier 
generations. Economically, the fund 
helps to ensure that no decline in the 
rate of saving per worker, and hence 
in the accumulation of capital stock 
per worker, occurs because of pension 
promises. 
PAYGO funding. or a low degree of 
partial funding. encourages demands 
for increased benefits since it under- 
values the true cost of pension 
benefits so they are perceived of as "free goods". 
Funding provides a source of capital 
accumulation which could be used to 
finance industrial revitalization and 
an industrial strategy. 
. An 
investment fund under public 
control could serve as a 
countervailing force to private 
institutional investors. 
Source: Adapted from the Report of the Task Force on Retirement Income Policy. The Retirement Income System in Canada: Problems and Alternative Policies 75T 
KeTorin ur. 
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its own benefits. Two advanced funding methods exist: full-cost (partial) 
funding and full-funding. Full-cost or partial funding is that contribution 
rate which generates sufficient contributions and interest during a "typical" 
person's working years to pay for expected retirement benefits excluding the 
unfunded liability. The full-cost contribution rate will create a moderate 
investment fund during the time contribution levels exceed those required 
for benefit payments. Full-funding is that contribution rate which will 
provide sufficient assets to cover the value of accrued benefits under the 
plan plus the unfunded liability. Pension systems based on full-funding are 
immune to demographic shifts because each generation pays for the value of 
its own benefits, but are sensitive to inflation. The full-funding contribution 
rate will generate a significant fund through contributions and interest 
thereon. 
The contribution rate required to support the national pension 
system is determined by the degree of funding, level of benefits, and the 
underlying demographics. Each of the funding methods discussed above - 
PAYGO, full-cost and full-funding - entails a progressively higher 
contribution rate. Under the "baby boom" demographic scenario, discussed 
in Chapter 3, the full-funding contribution rate is usually higher than the 
full-cost rate due to the need to service the unfunded liability. In the 
short-term the full-cost rate may be higher than the PAYGO rate, but the 
PAYGO contribution rate associated with welfare state pension 
arrangements will exceed the full-cost rate in the long-run. A comparison 
of PAYGO and full-funding financing methods is outlined in Table 10.2. 
Figures 10-1 and 10-2 graphically present the short and long-term cost 
implications of these funding methods under alternative demographic 
scenarios. I 1 
The extent to which the contribution rate is set above the PAYGO 
rate, as well as the speed with which contribution levels are increased, will 
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TABLE 10.2 
COMPARISON 
OF 
PAYGO AND FULL-FUNDING FINANCING METHODS1 
FOR THE STATE PENSION SYSTEM 
UNDER "BABY BOOM' DEMOGRAPHIC SCENARIO 
Criteria PAYGO Full-Funding 
Security of Benefits Note Table 10.1 
Level of Contributions 
Short-run 
Long-run 
Stability of Contributions 
Short-run 
Long-run 
Intergenerational 
Transfers 
Fund Size and 
Capital Accumulation 
Phase-in of Contributions 
and Fund Size 
Short Phase-in 
Long Phase=in 
Note Table 10.1 
Less than full-funding rate Greater than PAYGO rate 
Greater than full-funding rate Less than PAYGO rate 
Increasing over time Level over time 
Increasing over time Level over time 
Large intergenerational Intergenerational 
subsidies and transfers subsidies and transfers 
minimized or eliminated 
No investment fund 
accumulated since 
contributions equal 
benefits 
Significant investment 
fund generated since 
contributions plus 
investment earnings 
exceed benefit payout 
until maturity. 
Creates a small fund in 
short-run by that amount 
in excess of required PAYGO 
rate; but PAYGO < FF rate. 
No fund created over 
long-term because 
contributions equal 
benefits (C   B) 
Maximizes fund size in 
short-run by movin9 
immediately to full - 
funding rate; because 
FF > PAYGO rate 
results in larger fund 
than in PAYGO case with 
short phase-in. 
Size of fund over long- 
term reduced, but a 
large fund still created 
because FF > PAYGO 
rate until maturity. 
1. The full-cost (partial) funding method would be an intermediate case. 
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determine the size of the investment fund. The magnitude of the 
investment fund therefore is a function of the contribution level which, in 
turn, is related to the method of funding. The more rapidly the new 
contribution rates are phased-in to finance improved benefits, the larger the 
size of the investment fund. A long phase-in period for contributions would 
minimize the size of an investment fund, whereas a short phase-in would 
result in a rapid build up of a reserve for investment. By way of example, a 
PAYGO system with a long phase-in would result in virtually no investment 
fund, whereas a full-cost or fully-funded system with a fast phase-in would 
generate a significant fund until benefits are paid at maturity. Figure 10-3 
graphically reports the relationship between funding method, contribution 
phase-in and fund size. 
The advantages associated with the advanced funding of a 
national retirement income system, outlined in Tables 10.1 and 10.2, have 
lead some progressive governments to the conclusion that, if 
a major confrontation between generations... is to be 
reduced ... there is an immediate need to set in place 
mechanisms to ensure that the active work force, and 
employers on their behalf, save more for their own 
retirement in order to provide more adequate 
retirement incomes for themselves in the future... In 
this way workers will be providing part of the 
investment capital required, so that ... they ... receive 
a portion of their retirement income by way of an 
accumulated return on their investment rather than 
from tax supported programs... this should contain the 
potential tax burden on future generations. 12 
Some form of advanced funding of the state pension system, therefore, 
provides a way in which to simultaneously improve retirement income for 
the future elderly, reduce intergenerational tensions, and generate an 
investment fund under public control which could potentially serve as a 
countervailing force to the economic power of private institutional 
investors. It remains to be determined for what purpose an investment fund 
accumulated through the state retirement income system might be used so 
as to promote the public interest and progressive political strategies. In this 
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regard it, is useful to differentiate between micro-and-macro directed 
investment strategies. 
10.3 Macro-Directed Investment Strategies 
Directed investment strategies based on the operation of the 
national retirement income system are a mechanism through which to 
pursue alternative ("directed", "selective", "targeted" or "social') economic 
strategies at a macro-economic level to meet broader social policy 
objectives. The size of the investment fund will, as previously discussed, 
depend upon the method and level of funding of the state pension system. 
To the extent that any investment fund is accumulated through the public 
pension system is to pose the question for what purpose such a fund exists - 
that is, what are its investment objectives and strategy? 
National social security arrangements have been described as a 
"social intervention which was brought into being to perform a specific 
function in a specific economic and social environment. " 
13 Accordingly, 
there "is no single best method of financing since this will depend upon the 
economic, institutional and cultural context of the social security program" 
and "no program and financing arrangement [can] be considered permanent 
since the context is always changing. " 
14 As the economic and 
institutional context changes may, therefore, result in the evolution and 
modification of social security and pension arrangements from single to 
multiple objective programs. 
This was recognized by the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) 
, as early as 
1939 when it recommended that social security 
"investments be made with regard to their social and economic utility. " 15 
In recent years there has been increasing recognition in both industrialized 
and less developed countries that social security programs can not be viewed 
separately or in isolation from broader economic policies and objectives 
because income security arrangements are not only an effect of social 
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development, but may also exert an influence on the direction of the 
economic development process. 
16 The state social security system, 
depending upon the level of funding and investment objectives, may 
therefore become an instrument to satisfy a multiplicity of broader 
socio-economic goals, while at the same time fulfilling its primary objective 
of generating retirement income. 
Table 10.3 reports existent arrangements and various proposals 
for macro-economic directed investment strategies based on the state 
pension system or related modalities. 
17 What these different national 
arrangements have in common is an attempt to promote economic 
development in the public interest through the national social security 
system and to prepare for the demographic transition. In some countries 
such as 
Sweden, Switzerland, and West Germany - whose 
[social security] systems are the most developed and 
mature In the world - was the concern for problems of 
long-term financing in anticipation of mount- 
ing... [pension] costs. Two general approaches to the 
problems were adopted by these countries. Sweden 
and Switzerland elected to build up large reserves for 
future contingencies. Germany, however, retained the 
pay-as-you go principle and supplemented it with a 
limited reserve fund. 18 
The alternative funding methods employed in these countries have resulted 
in different investment objectives being pursued, depending upon national 
circumstance. Because "the significance of... an expanded public 
retirement income system would... in part depend on the method of 
financing ... as well as... the 
investment policy", 
19 it is desirable to 
briefly review the investment objectives of those pension systems which are 
of special relevance to this study. 
The case of Sweden is of particular interest because it represents 
one model of social democratic development which has evolved an advanced 
social security system. The surplus of the state pension system is invested 
in three bond funds and one equity fund. The investment objectives of these 
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TABLE 10.3 
MARCO LEVEL 
DIRECTED INVESTMENT STRATEGIES, 
STATE PENSION SYSTEM 
COUNTRY CURRENT ARRANGEMENTS 
Sweden Part of the surplus of the state pension fund is invested in the 
private sector through three bond funds and one equity fund. The 
investment objectives for these funds were defined to include 
housing, municipalities, small business and government. The new 
equity fund was created to supply risk capital for employment 
generating areas of the economy and industrial revitalization. The 
equity fund now represents nearly 3 per cent of the capital market. 
The funds have a tripartite administrative structure. 
The passage of the 1983 law for wagexearner funds was designed to 
transfer profits and company shares to workers and unions. This is a 
modification of the Meidner proposal which was endorsed by the 
Swedish Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) in 1976. The funds' 
income will be from a new tax on corporate profits and a special 
payroll tax. There are five regional funds. Each of the funds has a 
9 person board. At least five of the members must be employees. The 
funds are used for loans to start new enterprises or to buy shares in 
existing companies. Unions are limited to a maximum of 20 per cent 
of the voting shares. The funds are required to earn at least a3 
per cent return on investment, with the interest going to the 
national pension fund. The objective is to strengthen employee 
influence at the workplace through ownership in Swedish 
corporations. Despite the wage-earner funds' operation at the firm- 
and industry level. it may viewed as a macro-level strategy because 
of its impact on the ownership and control of industry. 
Canada/Quebec The Quebec Pension Plan (QPP) is separately administered and managed 
from the Canada Pension Plan (CPP). It is an actively managed fund 
through its investment arm, the Caisse de Dep6t, which is now the 
fourth largest financial Institution in Canada. The investment 
objectives of the QPP are explicitly related to provincial economic 
development. The Caisse invests exclusively in Canadian Securities; 
30 per cent of the QPP fund may be placed in equity investment. The 
Caisse is a major shareholder in the financial and industrial sectors 
having a4 to 7 per cent equity position in the top 5 banks, a9 per 
cent investment in the Royal Trust Company, a 23 per cent equity 
holding in Dbmtar Inc., a 27 per cent share of Provigo, and a 56 per 
cent interest in Gaz Metro. The Caisse has invested in over 100 
private placements within the province, some of these being 
classified as venture financing. The investment pattern of the 
Caisse is affected by the financing requirements of the province. 
The real average annual rate of return on investment to the QPP was 
on average 1.3 percentage points greater than the CPP and was 
comparable to that earned by private pension funds between 1966 and 
1979. 
Singapore In the order of 70 per cent of total housing stock has been built by 
the government's two housing corporations. This has been 
accomplished through a reinvestment arrangement between the Central 
Provident Fund (CPF), the compulsory contributory retirement 
insurance scheme, and the public housing corporations. Thirty-seven 
per cent of the country's wage bill is forced saving which is 
directed towards social investment. 
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TABLE 10.3 (CONT. ) 
COUNTRY GOVERNMENT PROPOSALS 
Province of A 1982 proposal to establish a "coherent and consistent" investment 
Saskatchewan policy through a Canadian Public Investment Fund (CPIF) to satisfy 
(Canada) public investment needs. Joint federal and provincial government 
participation on an equity basis in "projects of national 
significance" through the CPIF for energy, transportation, industrial 
and social projects. 
France A 1982 proposal advanced by France's socialist government to 
introduce jointly managed funds, similar to the Meidner proposal in 
Sweden. to promote industrial investment. 
LABOUR PROPOSALS 
Canada The Canadian Union of Public Employees (COPE), the largest union in 
the country, endorsed a policy advocating that the Canada Pension 
Plan (CPP) Investment Fund be used to promote an industrial strategy 
and repatriate key sectors of the economy from U. S. transnational 
corporations (1977). 
The Canadian Labour Congress (CLC), the national labour 
confederation, endorsed a policy advocating that the CPP Investment 
Fund maximize its investment performance and be used to promote an 
industry strategy (1978). 
The United Steel workers (Canadian region) endorsed a policy 
advocating that the CPP Investment Fund be used to promote a leading 
edge' resource development strategy, coupled with national economic 
planning (1979). 
Britain The Trades Union Congress (TUC). based on a 1979 Congress resolution, 
recommended to the (Wilson) Committee to Review the Functioning of 
Financial Institutions (1980) the creation of an independent 
investment fund to promote industrial revitalization by providing new 
long=term venture capital. This investment fund is based on the 
operation of the occupational (private) pension system. with 5 per 
cent of all new contributions (cash flow) being placed with and 
invested by the independent fund. The overall direction of the 
investment fund would be cojordinated and integrated with the 
National Investment Board (NIB), and for that reason may be viewed as 
a macro=strategy. 
Sources: For Sweden Staffon Sonning, 'The Employee FUnd Issue Moves Toward and 
Decision % Current Sweden No. 309 (October 1983), p. 1-10 and Claes-Goran 
Kjellander mp oyee areholder Funds Introduced'. Current Sweden No. 326 
(October 1384), p. 4=5. An explicit statement reqar ng e operation and 
investment objectives of the Quebec Pension Plan (QPP) through the Caisse de 
Dep6t is outlined in the Quebec Deposit and Investment Fund, Annual Report. 
1966 and the 1982 Annual Rte. For Singapore note 'Singapore Survey 
oT1he Sovereign n cippaaTlty",, The Economist December 29 1979, pp. 5-24. 
The French proposal for wage=earner funds is reviewed in 'the Employ ee Funds 
Debate', European Industrial Relations Review No. 117 (October 1983), pp. 
17-18. or labour union proposals note text citations. 
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funds include housing, municipalities, small business and government. The 
equity fund was established to supply risk capital for employment generating 
areas of the economy and industrial revitalization. The Swedish state social 
security system therefore has been able to maintain its commitment to 
provide retirement income and, in addition, has become a source of capital 
formation for the private and public sectors. 
The passage of the 1983 law establishing wage-earner funds in 
Sweden represented a new and ambitious initiative to transfer power to 
trade unions and expand economic democracy. Because the investment 
function associated with the operation of employee investment funds is 
similar to that of other institutional investors, such as pension funds, they 
are treated here as being in the same category. The proposal for employee 
investment funds grew out of the deliberations of the Swedish Confederation 
of Trade Unions (LO) in 1971. This resulted in the Meidner proposal (1975 
and 1976) for collective capital formation through wage-earner funds under 
trade union controL20 
Employee-investment funds, as a collective instrument, were 
conceived of as a method of accelerating capital accumulation, extending 
the democratic ownership of industry, redistributing the proportion of 
capital owned by workers, and expanding employee influence over economic 
decision-making. This was to be achieved by requiring corporations above a 
certain size to reissue or direct their equity shares to the firm's 
wage-earners' fund proportionate to their gross profit. 
21 Share issues 
would be restricted to employee investment funds which would each year 
receive an issue of shares without other investors having a similar 
entitlement. The wage-earners' fund would utilize part of the dividends that 
accrue from their aggregate holdings to purchase new (rights) issues in order 
to obtain new investment capital for the firm. This would allow for the 
gradual transfer of economic power from private capital to democratically 
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elected collectivities, resulting in the socialization of industry over a thirty 
year period. Much of this thrust, however, was blunted when the 1983 
legislation limited trade union shareholdings to 20 per cent of a company's 
voting shares, although -the effectiveness of this strategy would depend on 
the diffusion of a firm's shares. 
From the perspective of progressive politics, because employee 
investment funds have the effect of transferring "profits to trade union 
control rather than ... socialising the capital stock directly ... they [are] a 
gradualist strategy that may render them politically feasible in a 
non-revolutionary situation. "22 The advantages of employee investment 
funds are that they undertake capital accumulation and economic 
development, while initiating industrial democracy by enabling labour to 
acquire increasing influence through the shareholdings which they 
acquire. 
23 The investment function inherent to the operation of the state 
pension system offers a similar potential. 
The Canada/Quebec Pension Plans (C/QPP) are the product of 
what has come to be regarded as the "Canadian compromise", 
24 having 
provided the federal state with an important source of political power and 
legitimacy, 25 and the provinces with developmental capital or operating 
revenues as discussed in Chapter 7. It was a compromise between Ontario, 
which did not want a public pension system, and Quebec, which wanted a 
significantly expanded public retirement income system under provincial 
control. Ontario took the position that government had no role In the 
management of large pools of capital. Conversely, Quebec, then 
experiencing the "Quiet Revolution" of the 1960s, advocated a pension 
system under public control which would generate a large investment fund 
to promote provincial economic development. At that time, both the 
federal and Ontario governments wanted the Canada and Quebec Pension 
Plans on a'pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) basis; Quebec wanted a pension plan with 
- 402 - 
a' high level of funding, intending to use the investment fund as a tool for 
economic'modernization. Subsequently, the Canada Pension Plan (CPP) was 
put on a PAYGO basis (generating a modest surplus until the early 1990s as 
a result of the underlying demographics), while the Quebec Pension Plan 
(QPP) was placed on a partially funded basis. 
The Caisse de Depöt, the investment arm of the Quebec Pension 
Plan, was viewed from its inception as an instrument for economic 
development. The Caisse, Mr Jean Lesage, the former Premier of Quebec, 
said when implementing the plan "is destined to become the most important 
and powerful financial instrument Quebec has had so far ... [It] must not be 
envisaged as an investment fund like others, but as a growth instrument, a 
more powerful lever than we have possessed" and must coordinate its 
operations with "the general economic policy of the state. "26 The Caisse 
de Depöt has been able to successfully satisfy Its fiduciary or trustee 
responsibility to provide pension benefits and, at the same time, has 
promoted economic development. The 1982 Annual Report of the Caisse 
described this situation by noting that 
the investment policy of [the] Caisse hinges on two 
major elements. First, it essentially bound by criteria 
of security and return; secondly, its action is directed 
towards the support of Quebec economic 
development. For [theCaisse these requirements are 
absolutely compatible. 
The Caisse de Depöt as an actively managed investment fund under public 
sector control has acquired, even by private sector standards, a reputation 
for aggressive and competent investment management. The real average 
annual rate of return earned by the Caisse de Depot between 1966 and 1979 
was 1.3 per cent, compared with 1.4 per cent for all trusteed (private and 
public sector) pension funds and 0 per cent for the Canada Pension 
Plan. 28 This information suggests that there is no inherent reason why an 
actively managed investment fund accumulated through the public pension 
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system cannot provide retirement benefits, generate social capital, and earn 
a competitive rate of return on investment. 
The Caisse de Depot is now the fourth largest financial institution 
in Canada and a major actor in capital markets. 
29 The Caisse invests 
exclusively in Canadian securities and is permitted to invest up to 30 per 
cent of its assets in equity, although it never in fact has exceeded 25 per 
cent of its portfolio. The Caisse is a major shareholder in the finance and 
industrial sectors. The Caisse was used to assist in the provincial take-over 
of the asbestos industry (through Brascan), maintains a4 to 7 per cent 
equity position in the top 5 banks and a9 per cent holding in the Royal Trust 
Company. In addition, the Caisse owns 23 per cent of Domtar Inc. (a paper 
company), a 27 per cent share of Provigo (a supermarket chain), a 56 per 
cent interest in Gaz Metropolitan and has a major shareholding in Reitmans 
(a retail distributor). The Caisse has invested in over 100 private 
placements in the province, some of those being venture financing. The 
Caisse de Depot has conducted itself as an activist shareholder and has 
insisted on representation on the board of directors of its major corporate 
investments. The Caisse's clout in financial markets is now so considerable 
that the former Liberal government attempted to restrict its investment in 
the transportation sector in order to prevent a takeover of the Canadian 
Pacific Railway (Bill 5-31). 30 
Building upon the potential associated with the state pension 
system's investment function, a number of national labour confederations 
and their affiliates have recommended pursuing macro-economic directed 
investment strategies in order to promote progressive social change. In 
Canada, for example, the Canadian Union of Public Employees 
recommended (1977) that the CPP Investment Fund be used to promote an 
industrial strategy and repatriate key sectors of the Canadian economy from 
American transnational corporations. It proposed that 
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the public money accumulated through the... funded 
Canada Pension Plan and public employee pension 
funds, instead of being used to finance the investment 
requirements of the private corporate sector, should 
instead be used in the public interest to: 
1. Repatriate the Canadian economy by using the 
Canada Pension Plan and public employee 
pension funds as an active investment vehicle to 
co-ordinate and direct an industrial strategy 
by... buying the outstanding equity interest of 
foreign owned or controlled corporations in 
Canada. 
2. Pursue an industrial strategy at both the federal 
and Provincial levels by using the. - funded CPP 
and public employee pension fund assets to 
invest directly in new physical plant and 
equipment the manufacturing sector and the 
petroleum and natural gas sector through federal 
and Provincial crown corporations. 
3. In this latter case, a competitive market rate of 
return should be guaranteed to the CPP and 
public employee pension plans to preserve the 
integrity of the fund for member beneficiaries 
and in order to meet the outstanding fiduciary 
responsibility. 31 
Towards this end CUPS recommended a targeted or directed investment 
strategy aimed at the dominant foreign and domestic corporations In key 
sectors of the economy based on their equity exposure in financial markets. 
The Canadian 'Labour Congress (CLC) subsequently endorsed a 
policy (1978) advocating that the CPP Investment Fund maximize its 
investment performance and be used to promote an industrial strategy. The 
United Steel Workers (Canadian region) recommended (1979) the 
establishment of an agency such as the Caisse de Depot et Placement in 
Quebec for the Canada Pension Plan, "capable of receiving pension fund 
monies for social impact and economic development" in order to "facilitate 
the aims of our industrial strategy"32 by acquiring "substantial equity 
participation... in each of the key sectors. "33 
The Trades Union Congress (TUC) in Britain, on the basis of a 
1979 convention resolution, 
34 
recommended to the Wilson Committee to 
Review the Functioning of Financial Institutions the creation of an 
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independent investment fund to promote industrial revitalization. 
35 This 
proposal was based on the operation of the occupational pension system, 
with ,5 per cent of all new contributions 
(cash flow) being deposited and 
invested, by the investment fund. The activities of the investment fund 
would be co-ordinated and integrated with broader macro-economic planning 
agencies such as the National Investment Board. The TUC proposal may be 
placed within the framework of the alternative economic strategy 
advocated by the left-wing of the Labour Party. In Britain, according to 
Minns, , 
nationalizing; 30 of the major financial institutions 
would result in the state controlling between 20 to 40 
per cent of the shares in nearly three-quarters of the 
top 50 companies. 
The nationalization of financial institutions 
would provide substantial control over the shares of 
major companies. The management of these 
shareholdings could be the responsibility of a planning 
-and investment agency, or... the shareholdings could 
be co-ordinated by a central ministry. 36 
The macro-level investment fund accumulated through the occupational 
pension system envisioned by the TUC proposal would therefore be used as a 
means of directly acquiring an equity position in key sectors of the economy 
to facilitate a fundamental economic transformation. The occupational 
pension system would thus complement broader macro-economic policies. 
Macro-economic directed investment strategies undertaken 
through the state pension system may promote progressive social change by 
increasing the social utility and marginal efficiency of capital in the public 
interest. The various current and proposed directed investment strategies 
based on the -operation of the state pension system outlined here, while 
reflecting specific historical and national conditions, nevertheless have 
three characteristics in common. First, most of these arrangements are 
predicated upon the existing institutional apparatus of the state social 
security system. 
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Second, macro-economic directed investment strategies 
effectively transform the state pension system into a multiple objective 
program. The social security system becomes an instrument at the 
macro-economic level to affect savings, investment, capital accumulation, 
the ownership and control of the finance and industrial sectors, economic 
development and planning in the public interest, as well as generating 
retirement income. 
Third, the various alternative or macro-directed investment 
strategies related to an actively managed social security investment fund 
are based on the savings and investment function associated with the 
operation of institutional investors. That is, the investment function 
intrinsic to the operation of the pension system is turned on its head and 
used against the corporate sector. The pension. system's investment function 
provides the link between the finance and industrial sectors of the economy 
as discussed in Chapters 7 and 9. It follows that the Investment function 
underlying the operation of the state pension system in advanced market 
economies may, depending upon political circumstance and investment 
strategy, be used to socialize the "commanding heights' of the economy 
through capital markets as a result of the interpenetration and 
interdependence of the finance and industrial sectors. The immense 
financial resources, that is the savings of workers, organized and 
accumulated through a public pension system with a high level of funding, 
may therefore promote social change and economic accountability in the 
public interest. Micro-directed investment strategies based on the 
occupational pension system may serve a similar purpose. 
10.4 Micro-Directed Investment Strategies 
The regulatory framework of the occupational pension system has 
generally focused on investment practices and portfolio composition rather 
than on investment objectives. Little attempt has been made to relate 
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investment practices with investment objectives in terms of their social 
utility. The employer-sponsored occupational pension system, however, can 
be put under direction to achieve broader socio-economic objectives. Social 
or ý selective investment strategies pursued through the private pension 
system would result, as Harbrecht put it, in employees as beneficial owners 
of pension capital having "some share in the direction and control 
of ... pension trusts... A voice in investment policy would allow employees 
to... direct fund investment into channels beneficial to them. "37 
Social investment objectives through the occupational pension 
system have been broadly defined to include such goals as community 
development projects, industrial revitalization and employment generation, 
retention of capital within a geographic region, restriction of Investment in 
anti-union firms or those which trade with South Africa, and investment In 
low-cost housing and social services. Directing the considerable assets of 
the private pension towards socially desirable goals has been referred to as 
"pension clout" and may be viewed as a form of shareholder activism. Social 
investing refers to the investment of occupational pension plan assets in 
projects which are regarded as socially desirable, but which may result in 
either a lower rate of return, or higher risk for an equivalent return. Micro- 
directed investment strategies through the private pension system use the 
social utility of investment, rather than market indicators, as the relevant 
measurement criterion. Current social investment strategies based on the 
occupational pension system are reported in Table 10.4 for various countries. 
Investment fund managers and labour organizations have 
traditionally subscribed to the view that "pension funds are designed to 
serve but a single major purpose : to help meet the need for an assured 
income after a person's working life is over. "38 Despite the recent 
controversy surrounding social investment, 
39 
particularly in the U. S. and 
to a lesser extent Britain, and its advocacy by some labour confederations 
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TABLE 10.4 
MICRO LEVEL 
DIRECTED INVESTMENT STRATEGIES, 
OCCUPATIONAL PENSION SYSTEM 
COUNTRY CURRENT ARRANGEMENTS 
Britain A number of unions, notably the Postal Workers and the National Union 
of Mine workers. have used their respective occupational pension fund 
for job creation purposes. The Postal Worker fund, the largest 
non-government fund in Europe, sets aside in the order of 2 per cent 
for investment in small business. The NUM seeks investment 
opportunities in mining communities. 
United States The State of Wisconsin Investment Board (SWIB), the agency 
responsible for the investment of public employee pension funds has. 
since 1921. followed a social or targeted investment policy in an 
attempt to keep money within the state. 
The American Federation of Labour-Congress of Industrial Organization 
(AFL-CIO), at its 1979 convention, endorsed a "gray belt" strategy 
for industrial revitalization and social investment through 
occupational pension plans. The objectives of this strategy are 
employment creation, social projects (such as housing), and the 
advancement of workers' interests through investment activities which 
might affect corporate policy, such as withholding pension fund 
investment from anti-union firms or those which invest in South 
Africa. Not withstanding these objectives the policy noted that 
social "investment should not interfere with the primary 
responsibilities of pension fund trustees" to provide and secure 
pension benefits. 
Major industrial unions, such as the UAW, USW and INI, have endorsed 
social investment policies, as have major public employee unions and 
the construction trades. 
Canada The Quebec Federation of Labour (FTQ) in 1983 introduced an employee 
investment fund. in some ways modelled on the Swedish Meidner 
proposal, in conjunction with the Government of Quebec. The purpose 
of this Solidarity Fund' is to promote investment in 
small-and-medium business (PME) in Quebec to create, maintain and 
save jobs; in addition, the fund is to be used for venture capital 
investments. The fund is financed through individual share 
subscriptions to workers and controlled by the FTQ. It is estimated 
that the fund will have $200 million of assets within 5 years. 
Denmark The ATP, the mandated occupational pension plan, is used for venture 
capital to promote industrial development and for home mortgages. It 
is now permitted to invest up to 20 per cent of Its assets in the 
equity market. The PKA, the occupational pension plan sponsored by 
the labour confederation is used for equity investment "to strengthen 
the economy". 
France Through the pay-as-you-go financed occupational pension system 
negotiated by the labour and employer confederations (the regime 
complimentaries), and recognized in law, there is a1 per cent 
greater than required employer contribution to a 'social action 
fund'. This is primarily used for housing and other facilities for 
the elderly. 
Israel As a result of the labour confederation having direct responsibility 
for the administration of major occupational pension funds, has 
resulted in their being used for various social and developmental 
purposes such as co-ops. 
Sources: These data are drawn from the American Federation of Labor-Congress of 
Industrial OrganizationsInvestment of Union Pension Funds (Washington, 
O. C.: AFL-CIO. circa 19901. pp. 5.3-74; rn an andy Barber, The 
North Will Rise Again : Pensions, Politics and Power in the 1980s (Boston : 
13EMN-17 3,1978) dnu DoR Smart, inves'emenT. :A Wisconsin 
Case Study (Madison : Wisconsin Centre for Public Policy, 1979T_. 
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and their affiliates, 
40 
the use of occupational pension fund assets for 
alternative investment strategies is hardly a new idea, although views on the 
subject have widely varied. 
In the United States, John L. Lewis, former head of the United 
Mine Workers (UMW), in the late 1940s invested millions of dollars from the 
welfare fund in a major coal company. While this did little to maximize 
investment return to provide adequate pensions, it did subsidize coal exports 
and buoy employment. Such policies have been denounced by some as "trade 
union capitalism", 
41 
while others such as Ted Hill, former chairman of the 
Trades Union Congress (TUC) in Britain, denounced his colleagues in 1962 
for investing in industrial shares and recommended that it "would be wise to 
leave the Stock Exchange to the wolves. "42 Nevertheless, as early as 
1956 a group of prominent U. S. labour leaders testified before a Senate 
subcommittee that unions were interested in having pension funds invested 
in projects which would benefit their members through investment income 
or which would be of social advantage, such as low-cost mortgages and 
housing. The United Auto Workers (UAW) in 1959 urged the Ford Motor 
Company to use their workers' pension funds to invest in housing and other 
community projects. 
43 By 1979, Lane Kirkland, the new president of the 
AFL-CIO, would state on the subject that 
there are areas of risk and ambiguity in switching to a 
consideration of the social overtones of investment 
policy. Whatever we do must conform to the 
overriding concern that the investments be safe and 
that the return be adequate to satisfy the funds 
obligations. 44 
If the AFL-CIO has its way, however, "money power - that traditional 
mainstay of the bosses - will be directed away from Investments in 
'anti-union' corporations... into enterprises that ... [are] friendly to the 
interests and goals of workers. "45 As Lloyd McBride, the late president 
of the United Steel Workers put' it, "we can no longer tolerate this situation 
of using worker-produced capital against ourselves. "46 
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Subsequently a number of influential AFL-CIO affiliates including 
the United Auto Workers (UAW), United Steel Workers (USW), International 
Association of Machinists (IAM), major public employee unions and the 
construction . trades 
have all endorsed, with certain important 
qualifications, a social investment policy for occupational pension funds. A 
Pyrrhic victory was scored by the UAW on the issue with the Chrysler 
Corporation in the 1979 round of negotiations. As a result of the union 
foregoing one year of contributions to the pension fund ($200 million), 
Chrysler agreed to introduce social investment criteria into the 
management of the fund and, as well, divested the portfolio of five stocks in 
companies involved in South Africa. Money directed to socially useful 
investments include low-and-middle income housing, day-care and 
community projects. 
47 
In Britain, Titmuss as early as 1959 argued that "there can be 
little doubt that what is needed is the direction of [the] increasing flow of 
savings into ... domestic areas of public squalor. "48 The Labour 
government's proposals in its 1976 white paper on occupational pension plans 
would have given workers, through their unions, much greater involvement 
in pension fund investment management. The government of the day must 
have realized that with greater union participation, pension fund investment 
policy would have been influenced by social and political considerations. 
Renewed interested by British unions in occupational pension plans in the 
1970s witnessed a corresponding interest in the direction of pension fund 
investment. Some major TUC affiliates, the General and Municipal Workers' 
Union (GMWU), for example, called for a "comprehensive investigation into 
the question of using [occupational] pension fund resources for social 
purpose5'49 and related this to the "public ownership of (the] pension and 
life assurance industry as part of a wider plan for the financial sector of the 
economy"50 in order to give "priority to... the national industrial 
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strategy. " Other unions such as the postal workers and the National Union 
of Miners (NUM) have pursued social investment policies such as venture 
financing and housing. The "route by which [British] trade unions are going 
to extend their functions ... in corporate affairs, " one commentator 
suggested, "is through- pension funds... Equipped with the Trojan Horses of 
pension funds, organized labour can not be kept for long outside the citadels 
of corporate power. 1"51 
In summary, micro-directed investment strategies based on the 
occupational pension system, as a form of shareholder activism, are an 
attempt to mobilize the pension capital of workers so as to serve their broad 
socio-economic interests. Central to such an approach are three 
characteristics. First, reformulating the investment goals of the private 
pension system is an attempt to transform it into a multiple objective 
program to generate both retirement income and social capital at the 
enterprise or community level. Second, the social utility of Investment to 
promote the interests of workers is used as the relevant measurement 
criterion, rather than performance indicators which rely on market criteria. 
Third, and this perhaps should be emphasized, social investment strategies 
related to the occupational pension system at the plant or sectoral level 
have absolutely nothing in common with the various theories of "people's 
capitalism", including Drucker's recent notion of "pension fund 
socialism". 
52 Micro-directed investment strategies, unlike these 
"theories", are predicated on the economics of collective action. Directed 
investment strategies at the macro-and-micro levels must be assessed In 
terms of their feasibility. 
10.5 Assessment of Alternatives 
Directed investment strategies are a means by which to mobilize 
and channel the enormous resources of the pension system - public and 
private - towards socially productive and useful purposes in the public 
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interest and are a way in which to promote public control and 
accountability. From a social policy perspective, macro-and-micro 
alternative directed investment strategies must first be assessed in terms of 
their -technical feasibility, however, before relating them to broader 
political strategies for social change. These technical considerations may 
be analyzed in terms of a series of evaluation criteria. These are elaborated 
upon here. 
10.5.1 Investment Objectives. Central to the concept of 
alternative directed investment strategies based on the pension system is 
the ability to channel investment to socially useful or productive areas of 
economic activity. The alternative investment objectives followed through 
the state and occupational pension systems, as evidenced by current 
practice and proposals (Tables 10.3 and 10.4), are considerably different. In 
this regard it is necessary to clarify the investment objectives associated 
with such strategies. 
Investment objectives based on the state pension system may be 
formulated to achieve a number of goals at the macro-economic level. 
These might include investment to promote economic development and 
diversification, investment in the crown corporation sector, reduction in 
government non-public borrowing requirements, reduction In government 
external borrowing requirements, investment in the private sector for 
take-overs and a control interest in dominant industrial and financial 
corporations, passive investment recycled through the private sector, 
venture capital financing, and bail-out operations. Social investment 
strategies predicated on the occupational pension system on the other hand, 
have generally concerned themselves with employment generation, 
industrial revitalization, and the provision of social services at the plant, 
sectoral or community level. These ostensible economic development goals 
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are commonly formulated in terms of community development models, 
rather than as national economic objectives or strategies. 
At issue is whether specific investment objectives correspond to 
the means to bring about their realization. This subject is relevant with 
respect to both 'macro-and-micro-level directed investment strategies. 
Regarding the state pension system, it has been argued by some government 
and private sector representatives that the public pension system "is 
designed to provide a source of retirement income" and "if a new goal is 
added - i. e., the manipulation of the economy through the fund on the basis 
that more wealth can be created - we encounter a conflict of 
objectives. "53 Furthermore, if the state pension system "is to be put on a 
funded basis, it is important that the investment policy of the fund... be 
free of political interference" because "social objectives should be pursued 
through political, not fiduciary, means. "54 
Contrary to this view three arguments may be advanced. First, in 
advanced market economies there is a high level of "unsatisfied demand" (to 
use the Keynesian term), resulting in public needs and private wants. To 
diminish these considerable disparities and inequities, it may be argued, will 
require more state intervention and economic planning In the public 
interest. ss Second, by channelling the resources of the state pension 
system into productive (although not necessarily profitable) investment will 
generate economic growth and capital accumulation to strengthen the 
economy so as to support an expanded public pension system. 
Macro-directed investment policies through the state pension system 
therefore complement and are entirely compatible with the retirement 
income objective of the national social security system. Third, assuming 
that any social institution or policy is free of "political interference", or is 
"neutral', is itself a political statement. "Neutrality" within this context Is 
merely an ideological cloak for maintaining current social arrangements. 
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The private sector maintains that the public pension system should "be free 
of political inference" in order to maintain its control over pension capital 
and the direction of investment as discussed in Chapter 9. 
An important issue differentiating the types of directed 
investment strategies pursued is based on the distinction between productive 
investment and capital formation (plant and infrastructure) at the 
macro-economic level and investment in bail-out operations, venture 
financing, and the provision of social services at the micro-level. It must be 
recognized that there is a thin, but real, line between using pension funds 
for economic development and, what are in effect, bail-out operations. 
Despite the social merits of such undertakings, such as employment 
protection in the case of a bail-out operation, or a high rate of return with 
venture financing, it may be argued, that investment by workers in such 
endeavors through the occupational pension system is inappropriate given 
the high risk or the potentiality of an investment shortfall being Inflicted 
upon the fund. To the extent that such types of investment are deemed 
desirable at a micro-level, more conventional methods of financing exist to 
avoid jeopardizing the retirement savings of workers. The investment 
objectives of a national social security fund are related to and impact upon 
the macro-economic levers of power, whereas micro-level strategies are 
related to the workplace or community. As a result, investment objectives 
affect other important technical considerations. 
10.5.2 Pooling and Risk. Investment objectives are related to the 
level of acceptable risk. This is of particular relevance when assessing the 
propriety of macro-and-micro directed investment strategies based on the 
pension system. In this regard three fundamental principles associated with 
the operation of a national social security system are of particular 
importance : compulsory enrollment, the pooling of risk over the population, 
and the resultant cross-subsidies between covered groups. Compulsory 
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enrollment in a national social security program results in the pooling or 
spreading of risk over the entire covered population. Any risk attached to a 
directed investment strategy through the state pension system, therefore, is 
spread over the entire labour force rather than just one segment of it, as 
would be the case with the occupational pension system. 
Micro-level social investment strategies have a number of 
pernicious distributional effects as a result of voluntary, limited and 
selective occupational coverage. First, limited occupational pension plan 
coverage mitigates against spreading investment risk based on the pooling 
principle. Put another way, particular segments of the labour force, i. e., 
those covered by an employer-sponsored pension plan, are subjected to 
higher risk-taking than would otherwise be the case if a similar investment 
strategy were followed through the state social security system. Second, 
because of limited coverage and pooling through the occupational pension 
system the nature of the risk incurred is different. Specifically, alternative 
investment strategies based on the private pension system result in 
individual plan members becoming risk-takers, whereas there is a social risk 
associated with the operation of the national retirement income system. 
Third, social investment strategies based on the occupational pension system 
are an externalized risk and cost of production to individual firms - that is, 
specific groups of workers effectively subsidize their employer, 
56 
or 
government, depending on the type of investment. 
Risk-taking associated with directed investment strategies, 
therefore, varies according to the type of institutional arrangement. The 
nature of risk-taking associated with micro-directed investment strategies 
suggests, however, that such an approach may exacerbate sectoral tensions 
between groups within the labour force, whereas alternative investment 
strategies based on the state pension system would represent a socialized or 
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pooled risk. The level of risk, in turn, is related to the way in which pension 
assets are invested. 
10.5.3 Portfolio Composition. Investment objectives and the 
corresponding level of risk determine asset mix or portfolio composition. 
The ability of alternative investment strategies at either the 
macro-or-micro level to promote the public interest and economic 
accountability will depend on the type of investment. In order for directed 
investment strategies at the macro-level to be successful in terms of 
affecting economic policy and social change will require that the social 
security investment fund have a substantial equity portfolio in the private 
sector so as to exert control over the "commanding heights" of the 
economy. Alternatively, such an investment fund might be used for direct 
investment in the public sector or placed in non-marketable government 
bonds of crown corporations at a guaranteed or competitive rate of return. 
The private sector is aware of this attempt at "socialism through 
the back door'. As one source put it, "the potential effect of such massive 
government intervention in the market causes shuddere' because of "the 
prospect of ultimate government control of private industry through the 
CPP: '57 The prospect of cycling the same massive funds from an 
expanded CPP to the private sector, however, is greeted with jubilation, as 
evidenced by the Government of Ontario's proposal for the full-funding of 
the CPP. 
58 In order to forestall government intervention in the private 
sector, ' and to remove "political interference", it has been suggested by 
some business representatives that these monies be invested in debt 
instruments such as corporate bonds. Thus, workers would effectively 
underwrite the private sector, while being denied the proprietary rights 
associated with equity ownership. It was for this reason that the Canadian 
Council on Social Development suggested that "it would be wise to approach 
with caution the prospect of [increasing] the funds available [to the private 
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pension system] without ... establishing some controls on their usage in the 
national interest. "59 
Social investment objectives at a micro-level may take a number 
of different forms. To the extent that occupational pension funds follow a 
social investment strategy based on their equity holdings suggests, however, 
that they will resemble other shareholder activists in attempting to 
influence corporate behaviour. Whether such a strategy is viable will 
depend on the amount and concentration of such shareholdings in a pension 
fund's portfolio. A formal difficulty with respect to an occupational pension 
fund exerting control over corporate behaviour, however, is that such 
shareholdings are ordinarily limited to 30 per cent of the value of the fund 
or 10 per cent of a firm's outstanding shares. This may, depending upon the 
diffusion of outstanding shares, effectively limit an individual occupational 
pension fund's ability to pursue an alternative investment strategy or affect 
corporate behaviour. Whether an alternative investment policy would be 
viable through the occupational pension system without doing injury to the 
retirement income objective remains to be determined. 
10.5.4 Fiduciary Responsibility. The issue of social Investment 
through occupational pension plans is strewn with contradictions and 
problems. These must be confronted. A formal obstacle to unions pursuing 
a social investment strategy are the fiduciary obligations placed upon 
pension fund managers and trustees, explicitly and implicitly contained In 
the relevant legislation, requiring them to act "solely in the interest of the 
participants and beneficiaries' and to act in a "prudent" manner. 
While the legal notions of "fiduciary responsibility" and "prudent 
man" serve as an elaborate ideological artifice to legitimize the operation 
of the employer-sponsored pension system to maintain private sector control 
over pension capital (Chapter 9), they nevertheless fulfill an important 
purpose. That purpose is two-fold : first, to guarantee an adequate rate of 
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return, subject to risk level, to ensure pension benefits to plan members; and 
second, especially in the case of a defined benefit pension, where the plan 
sponsor is responsible for any short-fall in investment earnings, these 
strictures result in minimizing the cost of the program. The issue in large 
part turns on what is meant by "prudent', as well as, "prudent" for "whom"? 
Many of the proposals for alternative investment strategies have 
suggested that occupational pension plans invest their assets in the plan 
sponsor or- community in order to protect or generate employment; 
alternatively, some proposals have advocated investing in low-cost 
mortgages or housing, as well as social services such as day-care or nursing 
homes. Some advocates have gone so far as to suggest that it is imprudent 
not to take into account the social consequences of pension fund investment 
(a"social audit"), or to fail to function as a shareholder activist. 60 
While such proposals may have the effect of improving the social 
utility of investment, by satisfying the needs of the active labour force in 
the short-term, it is highly questionable whether this will preserve the 
integrity of the pension fund in the long-run. Furthermore, the interests of 
pensioners may be jeopardized by alternative investment strategies ignoring 
portfolio diversification, less than arms-length investments, or earning a 
lower rate of return than might otherwise have been the case, thus 
endangering accrued pension benefits. It may even be argued that such 
micro-social investment strategies are counterproductive in terms of 
advancing the interests of the active labour force. This is because a 
short-fall in investment earnings, particularly in the case of a defined 
benefit pension plan, necessitates additional contributions from the plan 
sponsor which, within a total compensation costing framework, may result in 
lower wages. For these reasons social investment strategies through the 
medium of the employer-sponsored occupational pension system should be 
approached with extreme caution. 
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Experience to date suggests that the co-management of pension 
funds has had little affect on investment practices because of the 
constraints imposed by fiduciary responsibility. In Britain, the Economist 
Intelligence Unit, for example, reports that "whenever trade union 
representatives become [trustees] they are just as keen, if not more so, to 
act in a capitalist fashion. "61 One study in the United States noted that 
union trustees "become more concerned with the business aspects of the 
pension fund than with the economic impact. "62 Another study concluded 
that, , 
while pension funds can be divested and redirected 
into firms and projects adhering to community-defined 
goals, or used to influence the direction of corporate 
activities through stock-voting rights,... retirement 
systems are ... inextricably tied to the capitalist 
system ... Pension funds are limited to achieving 
desired social and economic goals only within 
activities that provide "adequate' investment 
income. 63 
Thus, occupational "pension funds may simply evolve into new alternative 
investment opportunities rather than worker control over... assets: "64 
The issue of fiduciary responsibility, as that term Is ordinarily 
understood, has little relevance to macro-economic directed strategies. 
This is because the state is the ultimate guarantor of social security 
benefits. Government therefore is in a position to provide a guaranteed or 
competitive rate of return to an actively managed social security 
investment fund in order to preserve the security of retirement benefits. 
10.5.5 Market Impact and Economic Planning. In order for 
alternative directed investment strategies to be effective they must 
maximize their impact or "clout" in capital markets. In the case of 
macro-investment strategies based on the state pension system, a necessary 
prerequisite to fulfill this condition is a high level of funding (full-cost or 
full-funding) as discussed in section 10.2.2. A high level of funding is 
required to accumulate an investment fund in order to maximize the impact 
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on capital markets, serve as a countervailing for6e to private institutional 
investors, and pursue alternative investment strategies. 
Compulsory enrollment associated with a national social security 
program serves as a natural conduit to mobilize savings for investment 
purposes. Conversely, the voluntary nature of the occupational pension 
system mitigates against it fulfilling a similar role, despite the advanced 
funding of benefits. This problem might be overcome, depending upon 
institutional arrangements, as in the case of the Trades Union Congress 
proposal, which channels a proportion of the contributions of the private 
pension, system to a national investment agency. The considerable 
centralization and concentration of private pension fund assets, under the 
control of a few dominant financial institutions, may effectively serve a 
similar purpose, should those institutions be put under public control. 
.. -- The ability to centralize pension fund assets in order to allocate 
them to alternative investment objectives is an important consideration if 
the pension system - public or private - is to be co-ordinated and integrated 
with broader economic planning structures to serve the public interest. 
National social-, security systems readily lend themselves to such an 
arrangement, while the private pension system might be adapted to such a 
purpose. 
10.5.6 Draw Down of Benefits. While the national social security 
system and occupational pension funds may be utilized as a source of 
investment and developmental capital to promote progressive economic 
policies, they must continue to fulfill their primary function of providing 
retirement income. In this regard, it is necessary to identify a potential 
problem associated with macro-and-micro directed investment policies 
which may result in a conflict between the social investment and retirement 
income objectives being incorporated into one institutional apparatus. The 
conflict between these two program objectives will not become apparent 
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until the "baby boom" generation draws down benefits from the pension 
system at the demographic peak. The dilemma, in brief, is how are pension 
benefits to be paid from assets which are locked into non-marketable or 
illiquid social investments? This is an issue which has been too often 
ignored., It must be resolved or it must be concluded that social investment 
through the pension system - public or private - is not compatible with the 
retirement income objective. 
Three distinct cases may be identified : first, where social 
investment- is channelled through the state pension system; second, where 
social investment is cycled through an occupational pension plan; and third, 
occupational pension funds with conventional portfolios. In the case of a 
national social security system which pursues a directed investment strategy 
this is likely to take two forms : first, shareholdings in private sector 
enterprises; and second, direct investment in public sector crown 
corporations. In either instance, pension benefits could not be paid at the 
demographic peak unless the assets of the investment fund could be 
liquified. One hypothetical answer might envision selling back the assets - 
stock or an entire firm - to the private sector in order to cover pension 
obligations. Politically, however, this would result in a situation little 
different from that which existed prior to a directed investment strategy 
being implemented. The second, and more viable course, would be to 
"roll-over" the value of the outstanding pension obligations into marketable 
or non-marketable government bonds in order to cover pension benefits. 
The ability of occupational pension funds following a social 
investment policy to honour pension obligations is considerably more 
difficult. The ability to pay pension benefits would in large part depend 
upon the amount and type of social investment. The basic problem 
confronting an occupational pension plan with social investments is that it 
may be locked into illiquid assets having no market value. This might be the 
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situation if a pension fund were to overly invest in its parent firm, as part of 
a bail-out operation, or in social services, such as day-care or nursing 
homes. To the extent that an occupational pension fund were locked into 
non-marketable assets, or earned a reduced rate of return, as a result of 
certain types of investment such as low-cost mortgages or housing, might 
result in it being unable to honour its commitment to pay pension benefits. 
There may be no way in which occupational pension plans following a social 
investment policy can extricate themselves from this quandary. 
The third situation is the advanced funded occupational pension 
plan with a conventional portfolio. The assets of that portfolio (stocks, 
bonds and so on) cover the outstanding pension obligations (liabilities). As 
the "baby boom" begins to retire around the year 2011, occupational pension 
funds will go into a disaccumulation (dissaving) position to cover the draw 
down of pension benefits. Effectively this means that private pension plans 
as major shareholders of corporate equity will become net sellers of 
securities. This in turn will have a concomitant impact on capital markets, 
albeit over a twenty year period, and may be expected to exert down 
pressure on the price of securities when divested. Little, if any, attention 
has been paid to this issue in the technical literature, or its implications for 
the private pension system's ability to fulfill its commitments. It is 
necessary for macro-and-micro social investment strategies to be 
compatible with the retirement income objective of the pension system in 
order for them to be technically feasible. Other design features affect their 
political viability: - 
10.5.7 Contribution Structure and Fiscal Impact. Macro- 
and-micro social investment strategies must be distributionally and fiscally 
equitable for them to be politically acceptable - that is, these policies must 
not place an undue burden on those who can least afford it. The Economic 
Council of Canada has argued, for example, that 
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the required increase in the contribution rate [for a 
fully-funded CPP] would fall more heavily on those 
with lower earnings because it is a payroll tax. To ask 
this group for increased contributions to improve their 
pension benefits is one thing; to ask them to bear the 
brunt of programs to reduce foreign ownership 
of... industry or accelerate economic growth... is 
quite another... We [question] the fairness of achieving 
this alternative objective through a method that bears 
most heavily on lower-income groups. 65 
Considerations of fiscal equity might therefore serve as an impediment to 
implementing macro-social investment policies through the pension system. 
From a public policy perspective, however, such a formulation is 
incomplete and confuses "ends' with "means". The source of this 
regressivity is the existing contribution structure in most national social 
security systems in North America and Western Europe, as is well 
established, not macro-alternative investment policies as such. While such 
strategies might compound the problem, the source of this fiscal 
regressivity lies in the design of the contribution structure. In order to 
overcome this technical problem, and to introduce macro-directed 
investment policies on a fiscally equitable basis, would therefore require the 
implementation of a progressive contribution structure to nullify any 
negative effects on lower-income earners. A progressive contribution 
structure, based on the pooling principle underlying a national social 
security system, would also have the effect of promoting other vertically 
redistributive policies. 
Unintended and anomalous distributional and fiscal inequities 
might possibly result from the implementation of micro-social investment 
strategies through the occupational pension system. This is a result of the 
current regressive and inequitable distribution of revenue loss and tax 
expenditure (lost interest to government) associated with the operation of 
the private pension system, involving a considerable fiscal cross-subsidy 
from low to high income groups. The cost of the private pension system was 
f 1,400 to f 2,900 million in the U. K. (1983), compared with $28.4 
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billion in the U. S. (1982) and an estimated $6.1 billion in Canada (1980). The 
current fiscal framework governing the private pension system is highly 
regressive and results in those without pension plan coverage supporting 
those with coverage. The fiscal subsidization of the private pension system 
ultimately serves to limit the expansion of the public pension system by 
depriving it of revenue. 
Implementing micro-social investment policies would compound 
this situation in at least two ways. First, as a consequence of the fiscal 
cross-subsidy, those in the labour force without pension coverage would 
continue underwriting occupational pension plan members through the tax 
system. While some of the advantages of social investment policies, such as 
employment 
3 
generation, would undoubtedly affect everyone, other 
programs, such as low-cost housing, would only benefit plan members. 
Second, to the extent that a social investment policy results in an 
investment shortfall requiring additional employer contributions (as in the 
case of a defined 
benefit plan), would result in this increased business 
expenditure being written-off through the tax system and subsized by all tax 
payers to support those occupational pension plan members having a social 
investment policy. 
In summary, social investment policies at a micro-level would be 
subsidized by all tax payers, including those without pension plan coverage, 
while the benefits would be unevenly distributed. To facilitate the 
introduction of macro-directed investment strategies through the state 
pension system on an equitable, (would require a progressive contribution 
structure. This is a technical adjustment. To eliminate the fiscal and 
distributional inequities underlying the operation of the private pension 
system would require nothing less than a revolution in the income tax 
system. 
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10.5.8 Summary of Assessment. The technical assessment of 
macro-and-micro alternative -investment strategies 
based on the pension 
system is summarized in Table 10.5. This evaluation suggests that 
macro-alternative investment strategies through an actively managed social 
security investment fund are generally more viable and feasible than are 
micro-social investment policies based on the occupational pension system. 
Macro-directed investment strategies are assessed as being superior in 
terms, of 5.. evaluation criteria, neutral in 1 category, and inferior in 
another. Micro-social investment strategies are assessed as being inferior 
with respect to 6 evaluation criteria and neutral in I category. 
TABLE 10.5 
ASSESSMENT OF PENSION SYSTEM 
MACRO-AND-MICRO ALTERNATIVE DIRECTED INVESTMENT STRATEGIES 
BY EVALUATION CRITERIA 
Assessment of Strategies 
Evaluation Criteria Macro Level Micro Level 
Investment Objectives +- 
'Pooling and Risk + 
Portfolio Composition +- 
Fiduciary Responsibility + 
Market Impact and 
Economic Planning2 00 
Draw Down of 
Benefits +- 
Contribution Structure; -- 
and Fiscal Impact 
'Notes: 1. Comparative ranking where + indicates a superior assessment, 0a neutral position, and - an inferior evaluation. 
2. Depending upon the level of funding for the national social 
security system and institutional arrangements for the 
occupational pension system. 
3. Assuming no change to current arrangements. 
A significant implication of this analysis is that the feasibility of 
directed social investment strategies based on the operation of the pension 
system will, in the final analysis, depend upon political, rather than 
technical, considerations and circumstances. Such strategies must, 
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however, be viewed as being progressive at this time given the balance of 
political forces in that they promote the public interest by improving 
pension arrangements for the increasing proportion of the elderly, serve to 
limit the economic power of institutional investors, accelerate capital 
accumulation, and offer the possibility of socializing key sectors of market 
economies. Alternative directed investment strategies based on the pension 
system, therefore, are one way in which to expand public control and 
accountability over economic decision-making in the public interest. 
10.6 The Political Economy of Pensions and the Coming Pension Crisis: 
Summary of Findings 
This study has traced the complex series of linkages between the 
experience of old age, the pension system and broader socio-economic 
structures in Canada, Britain and the United States. Those interactive 
factors affecting the formulation and direction of public policy towards 
pensions and aging over the next three to five decades have been identified 
and analyzed as to their possible implications. The coming pension crisis in 
these advanced capitalist countries is a consequence of the interaction 
between and among a series of conjunctural factors which converge in the 
future - the inadequate 
level of retirement income of the elderly, the 
increasing proportion of the elderly in the population and the costs 
associated with an aging population, the universal and specific limitations of 
the private pension system, the underdevelopment of the public pension 
system, and the corporate sector's appropriation of pension capital as a 
source of investment - based on the conflicting structurally determined 
interests of the elderly, labour, capital and government. The information 
presented in this study strongly suggests that there is an impending pension 
crisis in Canada, Britain and the United States. Other analytic approaches 
to the pension issue emphasize different causes for and solutions to the 
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pension crisis, 
66 but generally corroborate the central conclusion to this 
Marxist study. 
The logic associated with the pension issue inevitably leads from 
the current economic and social position of the elderly, to the inadequacies 
of the private and public pension systems, to the symbiotic relationship 
between the pension system and the finance and industrial sectors, to the 
private control and direction of capital, and to possible consideration of 
alternative investment strategies based on the pension system. The pension 
crisis examined in this study is in the final analysis systemic in origin, as are 
the limits to reform. The pension crisis, and reform of the pension system, 
is a potentially volatile political issue because it affects the structurally 
determined interests of all major groups and institutions in a capitalist 
political economy : workers, unions, the finance and industrial sectors, the 
state, and -the increasing proportion of the elderly. These conflicting 
systemic interests. converge in the future. The factors underlying the 
impending pension crisis identified in this study are essentially long-term in 
nature. This suggests that pensions will be a long-term Issue of public 
policy. The structural pressures propelling the pension systems in these 
countries towards a crisis will intensify in the future, however, the severity 
and form which the pension crisis manifests will undoubtedly vary according 
to national conditions. 
The-protracted struggle for pension reform, and the impending 
pension crisis, pose a series of inter-related public policy and political issues 
about control over investment, capital accumulation, the relationship 
between investment and economic growth, the social utility of investment, 
distributional and fiscal equity, the role-typing of the elderly, and how we 
are to qualitatively live the last 15 to 20 years of our lives. The pension 
issue transverses and links the personal experience of old age with structural 
issues. For workers and the elderly, the battle for pension reform will not 
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be fought out with the decisiveness of a Waterloo or Stalingrad but, rather, 
will be the next Thirty Years' War. As with Marx's analysis of the 
legislative struggle to reduce the length of the working day, 
67 there is 
much political capital to be gained by mobilizing around the concrete 
demand for pension reform and relating it to broader issues of political 
economy. 
Because aging and pensions policy is "a topic that has not 
clearly... been politicized' 
68 in the past, it is necessary for progressives 
to turn the pension crisis and reform of the pension system into an 
ideologically defined issue and draw the linkages between the personal, the 
pension system and the broader structures of economic and political power 
in capitalist societies. The political economy of pensions and the history of 
aging is that conjuncture where the personal and the structural meet. We 
all grow old. ' What is socially determined is individually experienced. How, 
then, as individuals are we to confront our own old age? Philosopher and 
novelist Simone de Beauvoir put it well when she suggested that, 
there is only one solution if old age is not to be an 
absurd parody of our former life, and that is to go on 
pursuing ends that give our existence a meanin& - 
devotion to individuals, to groups, or to causes, social, 
politicaL69 
Old age as part of the human condition may yet become a meaningful 
experience for individuals, however, this will ultimately require collective 
action on the pension issue in order to affect power, politics and social 
change. As Lange was to suggest, however, for "the economist who is called 
upon to advise a. socialist government ... there exists only one economic 
policy which he can commend ... as likely to lead to success. This is a policy 
of revolutionary courage. "7° Within this context, the political economy 
of pensions and strategies for social change may be examined with regard to 
the transition from capitalism to socialism. 
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10.7 Pensions and the Transition to Socialism: A Theoretical Perspective 
"Capital, " Marx and Engels argued, "is social power. "71 
Pensions are pure capital. Because "the growth of social capital is effected 
by the growth of many individual capitals, "72 such as pension funds, 
suggests that "the masses of capital amalgamated... by 
centralisation... become new and powerful levels of social 
accumulation. " 
73 For Marx, the financial system in advanced capitalist 
economies plays an: important role in accelerating and facilitating the 
transition. to socialism because of the increasingly social nature of 
production. Pension funds, as part of the broader financial system, and 
because of their strategic position within advanced capitalist economies, 
may therefore potentially "constitute the form of transition to a new mode 
of production. "74 
Within this framework the role of the pension system in promoting 
progressive strategies for social change must be examined from a critical 
perspective. It is suggested that under the specific historical conditions of 
advanced capitalism, strategies for social change based on the state and 
occupational pension systems may be incorporated into a broader 
transitional program for socialism by fulfilling a number of important 
economic and political objectives. Directed investment strategies pursued 
through the national social security system accelerate the accumulation and 
socialization of capital and identify the issue of state power, alternatively, 
social investment strategies based on the occupational pension system may 
raise the issue of workers control and shop floor democracy. Thus the 
concrete struggle for pension reform may result in the politicization of the 
pension issue and serve as a direct link to broader issues of power and 
politics in advanced capitalist economies. The pension issue therefore 
becomes a means of stretching the limits of economism and welfarism under 
contemporary circumstances. Strategies for social change associated with 
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the operation of the pension system, as shall be demonstrated, correspond to 
the Marxist theory of "encroaching control', based on the socialization of 
capital, and more contemporary theories of radical or militant reformism. 
Such strategies, as one mode of transition from capitalist to socialism, must 
therefore be examined in terms of their historical specificity and the 
relationship between reform and revolution. 
Marxist political theory is "for the most part the product of 
historical episodes and specific circumstances, "75 according to Miliband, 
and has resulted in "contradictory interpretations-. tensions, contradictions, 
and unresolved problems. "76 Marx and Engels in their theoretical and 
practical-. work were cognizant that political strategies, programs and 
tactics had to be adapted to changing circumstances and that "these 
measures= will of course be different in different countriee'. 
» 
Subsequently, Lenin argued that it was necessary for socialists to work out 
an independent application of Marxist theory depending upon concrete 
historical and national conditions. In an early article he emphasized that 
we do not regard Marx's theory ... as completed and 
inviolable; on the contrary,... it has only laid the 
foundation... We think that an independent elaboration 
of Marx's theory is especially essential...; for this 
theory provides only general guiding principles, which, 
in particular, are applied in England differently than in 
France in France differently than in Germany, and in 
Germany differently than in Russia. 78 
In a rarely noted speech to the Fourth Congress of the Communist 
International in 1922, Lenin acknowledged that "the methods and content 
of ... activities" were 
"too Russian, [and] reflects Russian experience 
... foreigners ... cannot 
be content with hanging it in a corner like an icon 
and praying to it. Nothing will be achieved that way. "79 The experience 
of the Soviet revolution demonstrated, according to Lenin in another 
address, "that things have turned out differently from what Marx and Engels 
expected. "80 The general conclusion is that, "to the extent that historical 
conditions change, policies correct at one time become incorrect at 
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another. In discussing tactics, the decisive comparison is not with past 
tactics but with present facts. "8' 
To ignore the issue of historical specificity is to reject historical 
materialism and the dialectical relationship between theory and practice. 
As Engels concluded, "if conditions have changed in the case of war between 
nations, this is no- less true'in the case of the class struggle. "82 And if 
conditions change in terms of the class war, so too must the weapons. 
Strategies for social change associated with the pension system must 
therefore be understood within the context of the relationship between 
reform and revolution because the struggle for social reforms may play an 
important role in promoting a socialist transformation of society. In this 
regard it is necessary to-differentiate between "reforms" as a means to an 
end, and "reformism" as an end in itself. From an historical perspective 
it is clearly the case that the struggle for reforms in 
a... democratic regime was never taken by classical 
Marxism to be incompatible with the advancement of 
revoluntary aims and purposes. On the contrary such a 
struggle is an intrinsic part of the Marxist 
tradition. 83 
"The real issue, " Miliband has argued, "is the perspective from which 
reforms are viewed, what they are expected to achieve, and what else than 
reforms is being. pursued. "84 From a Marxist perspective the Issue is not 
reform or revolution but, rather, reform and revolution. Depending upon 
how particular reforms are formulated may therefore result in their 
promoting socialist policies. 
Marx and Engels, and Lenin at a later date, were to stress the 
complexities of the transition from capitalism to socialism. In terms of 
economic analysis and political strategies it may be argued that the Marx of 
Volume I of Capital is considerably different from that found in Volume III; 
and the Engels that appears in Anti-During is different from that which 
subsequently emerges in his late correspondence. In these later works the 
emphasis and focus shifts to problems related to socialist revolution in 
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developed capitalist societies. Marx and Engels had no formal theory of the 
. state and party; 
85 
similarly, they advanced no coherent theory or 
blueprint with respect to the transition to socialism in advanced capitalist 
countries. While their early economic analysis emphasized the 
"immiseration' or "breakdown theory", based on the inherent contradictions 
of capitalism, they later seemingly postulated an alternative mode of 
transition based on the gradual socialization of capital. 
It is necessary in this regard to differentiate between the 
"socialization" of capital, as an economic process intrinsic to capitalism, 
from "socialism", as a system of political power based on the interests of 
the working class. For Marx, the shift from individual to corporate 
enterprise, with the accompanying integration, concentration, centralization 
and interdependence of capital was a concomitant of the increasingly social 
nature of production - that is, the socialization of productive forces. This 
process generates new and higher forms of collective economic activity 
which ultimately results in the "transcendence of the capitalist mode of 
production within the capitalist mode of production. "86 Marx emphasized 
that 
no social order ever disappears before all productive 
forces... have been developed; and new, higher 
relations of production never appear before the 
material conditions of their existence have matured In 
the womb of the old society. 87 
"At a certain level of development, " however, "a new mode of production 
grows within and develops out of the old mode of production. "88 Thus, 
Moore concludes, Marx was suggesting that the "economic transition from 
capitalism to socialism can start before the working class attains state 
power. "89 Pension funds, which represent a pool of collective labour 
power, or "living labour' (to use Marx's term), have systemically increased 
the socialization of savings and investment in advanced market economies. 
Pension funds, as the fastest growing pool of capital in capitalist economies, 
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have become a mechanism for the accumulation of social capital and may 
therefore accelerate and facilitate the transition to socialist forms of 
economic organization. 
In this respect a parallel may drawn with Marx's concept of the 
"political economy of labouc". 
90 In the Communist Manifesto it was 
suggested that t 
the proletariat will use its political supremacy to 
wrest, by degree all capital from the bourgeoisie, to 
centralize all instruments of production in the hands 
of the state... and to increase the total... productive 
forces as rapidly as possible. 91 
Marx subsequently elaborated upon this theme in his 1864 Inaugural Address 
to the First International. For the first time, according to Harrison, 
Marx accepted that the proletariat might establish its 
own forms of property and principles of productive 
organization within the capitalist mode of 
production ... Consequently, the working class 
might ... seek to secure, extend, fortify and generalize 
these achievements. Its advance is now measured not 
merely by the perfection of its party organization, but 
by the inroads which it can make on the existing mode 
of production. 74 
Such a- formulation clearly signals a shift in emphasis with respect to 
strategies regarding the transition from capitalism to socialism. While Marx 
was generally pessimistic regarding a peaceful transition to socialism, he 
nevertheless viewed it as a possibility, at least in some countries, noting 
that "heed must be paid to the institutions, customs and traditions of various 
countries, and we do not deny that there are countries, such as America and 
England,... Holland, where... workers may attain their [socialist) goal by 
peaceful means. "93 Thus--there may be different strategies or roads 
leading to socialism, depending upon specific historical and national 
conditions. 
"Instead of a single model of the transition from capitalism to 
socialism, " according to Moore, "the tradition of competing systems 
presents a large family of models. "94 The. process of "encroaching 
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control" by workers on the existing capitalist mode of production, as one 
strategy or model of transition to socialism, is a recurrent theme in Marxist 
political theory including Marx, Bernstein, the Guild Socialists, Lenin, 
Trotsky and Gramsci. 
95 "Integral to any theory of encroaching control is 
the conception of social revolution as a process rather than as an act, " 
according to Hyman, and "while such theories need not exclude the 
perspective 'of a 'classic' revoluntary climax, they emphasis the 
possibility ... of inroads within capitalism as a basis for 
[an] eventual 
transition to socialism. "96 Such a strategy envisions or results in "dual 
power"97 or "dual sovereignty", 
98 
- that is, a shared sphere of economic 
and political power between labour and capital. Consequently, there may be 
a transitional period characterized by a "coexistence of different 
and... contradictory forms" " of economic organization and a "juxta- position 
of collectivist... and private property. "99 
Dual sovereignty or power is a characteristic often associated 
with a pre-revolutionary' situation. 
100 "While the concept of dual power 
is' customarily used in analysis of the control of the state, " according to 
Hyman, it is also of "relevance ... in the context of the control of production 
within the factory. , 
lot Dual power which may evolve out of "encroaching 
control" has a dialectical character which manifests itself at both the state 
and shop floor levels. It is within this framework that macro-and-micro 
alternative investment policies based on the pension system are of relevance 
and may be incorporated into broader political strategies for social change 
because macro alternative investment strategies are a "top down" approach 
at the state level, whereas micro-social investment strategies represent a 
"bottom up" initiative from the shop floor. These strategies, as a totality, 
therefore constitute a dual attack upon capital at different levels of power 
with respect to the private control and direction of investment. Within the 
historically specific non-revolutionary context which currently 
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characterizes advanced capitalist countries, alternative directed 
investments strategies may become one way in which to promote 
accelerated capital accumulation and economic development, the gradual 
socialization of investment and key sectors of advanced market economies, 
and the democratization of the workplace. 
At a macro-economic level, alternative directed investment 
strategies correspond to the theories proposed by the Austro-Marxists and 
Tsuru. The leading economic theorists of Austro-Marxism102- Hilferding, 
Renner and Bauer - suggested that the transition to socialism was possible 
based on the "socialisation of circulation", that is the 'finance sector, 
through the conscious, ' planned organization of the sphere of circulation. 
"Socialization effected by finance capital, " according to Hilderding, "has 
made it enormously easier to overcome capitalism" because "finance capital 
has' brought the " most important branches of production under Its 
control. " 
103 The socialization of the economy by finance capital has been 
reinforced by the expanded role of the modern capitalist state. 
104 "State 
penetration of the economy, " according to Renner, has increasingly resulted 
in ! 'direct state' management of the economy. 
"05 Thus the state under 
historically specific political circumstances might play an active and 
progressive role by placing the "commanding heights" of the economy under 
public control by socializing finance capital. 
The transition from capitalism to socialism envisioned by the 
Austro-Marxists would therefore take the form of an 
extension of the welfare functions of the state and of 
the rational organization of the economy under a 
regime of public ownership; although the 
transition... still has to be accomplished by a 
working-class party through political struggles. 106 
According to Renner this may offer a means to achieve a gradual and 
peaceful transition to socialism. 
107 Bauer referred to this as the "slow 
108 
revolution". This approach may be viewed as the intellectual 
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progenitor of what has become known as the Swedish theory of "functional 
socialism", 
109 
or the "third way", which proposes that the regulation of an 
economic institution's functions, rather than formal ownership as such, is 
the critical determinant with respect to establishing public control and 
accountability. Regulation of the pension system's investment function and 
directed investment strategies in the public interest correspond to such a 
formulation. 
While some have criticized the theory of "socialisation of 
circulation" on the grounds that it emphasizes the sphere of circulation over 
production in capitalist economies, 
110 it may be argued that under 
conditions of monopoly - capitalism, characterized by an extreme 
interpenetration and interdependence of industrial and financial capital, and 
the increasing importance of the finance sector in regulating capitalist 
economies, 
111 that this distinction is no longer critical in terms of 
formulating political strategies. 
112 The systemic and functional fusion of 
financial and Industrial capital, discussed in Chapter 9, suggests that 
regulation of the state pension system's investment function to promote 
alternative investment strategies in the public interest may offer the 
opportunity, under specific political conditions, of "socialising circulation" 
and key sectors of the economy from the "top down". 
<A similar strategy was advanced by Tsuru, a Japanese Marxist 
economist, who argued that in some capitalist countries 
the strategy of the transition into socialism can 
effectively be developed with focus upon the form of (economic] surplus, utilizing all... occassions to mak e 
the issue clear and weakening the hold which private 
capital has on the surplus, gradually shifting It into a 
socially-controlled fund... The transition of capitalism 
to socialism certainly does not have to involve the 
sudden and overall shift of ownership from private hands to public. Surplus is a flow in contrast to the 
means of production which is a stock... For the 
purpose of gradual transformation of capitalism into 
socialism it will be strategically easier in many cases 
to think in terns of the flow and to take measures 
connected with the forum of the flow. 113 
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The pension system has increasingly organized and socialized the flow of 
savings and investment at a macro-economic level in advanced capitalist 
economies, thereby becoming a potential instrument for the accumulation 
and direction of capital under public . control at the state level. 
Macro-alternative investment policies through the state pension system may 
therefore serve as a focal point for the global struggle over the economic 
surplus, rather than isolated local demands based on the occupational 
pension system. 
-- Keynes argued in this regard that only the "State... is in a position 
to calculate... the general social advantage" and will be "taking an even 
greater responsibility for directly organizing investment" because 
"investment- cannot safely be left in private hands. "' 
14 To organize 
investment for the "general social advantage", it may be argued, will require 
that it be put under public control. And while Engels cautioned that "state 
ownership of productive forces is not the solution of [class] conflict;... it 
provides the formal means, the levers, of that solution. "115 As suggested 
here, the state pension system with a high level of funding and a directed 
investment strategy, may assume the role of a macro-economic lever 
facilitating progressive social change in a non-revolutionary situation. 
While the "results of capitalist socialization are variegated expressions of 
the historical process from capitalism to socialism, " they may also represent 
"the development - of objective and subjective preconditions for a 
revolutionary transition to socialism. " 
116 
Macro-level directed investment strategies are an important link 
relating pension reform to broader political struggles. As Bernstein noted, 
the "task . of social -democracy is to fight for all reforms in the State 
which... raise the working classes and transform the State in the direction 
of democracy. "117 The concrete demand for pension reform, including an 
expansion of the state pension system and a macro-directed investment 
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policy in the public interest, serve to establish the relationship between the 
"struggle against forms of relations of the state" with the "demand that 
social needs be met. 
"l 18 Linking the struggle for pension reform to 
broader issues of political economy, therefore, has the effect of focusing 
political attention on the nature of state and class power in modern 
capitalist societies. 
Micro-social investment strategies through the occupational 
pension system similarly have the potential of identifying important 
economic and " political issues at the point of production, that is at the 
factory level. Such strategies effectively serve to focus on, and call into 
question, fundamental management prerogatives such as corporate control 
over investment decision-making as it affects the solvency of the firm and 
the security of occupational pension plan benefits. For workers and unions 
to protect the, security - of pension benefits may force them to become 
directly involved in corporate affairs as was discussed in Chapter 5. 
Micro-social investment strategies, intended to serve the interests of 
workers at an industrial and community level, despite their technical 
limitations, - may nevertheless become an important political link between 
the employer-sponsored occupational pension system and the broader 
struggle for shop floor democracy. 
The struggle for pension reform and the control of pension capital 
may, as a concomitant of the pension crisis, ` result in the politicization of 
the pension issue. This in turn may transcend the constraints of trade union 
economism and welfare statism by stretching the limits of reform. "The 
capitalist system, " Miliband has argued, "produces mystification as to the 
real nature of its 'relations of production'. "' 
19 Limiting pension reform 
to the issue of benefit adequacy, as important as this may be, perpetuates 
and reinforces this ideological obscurification because it fails to establish 
the systemic relationship between the pension crisis and the broader 
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structures of political and economic power in capitalist regimes. 
Broadening the focus and thrust of pension reform to include 
macro-and-micro alternative investment strategies may penetrate this. 
ideological veil, and stretch the limits of economism and welfarism, by 
challenging fundamental economic and power relationships in advanced 
capitalist economies. 
"The economic struggle, " Lenin forcefully argued, "serves as the 
basis for the ... development of the class struggle against the whole 
capitalist system. " 
120 Reforms which stretch the limits of the capitalist 
system serve as a means of promoting social change. Pension reform, 
formulated to include alternative directed investment strategies, therefore 
becomes a "radical reform" 
121 
which may be incorporated into a broader 
strategy of "militant reformism". 
122 Gorz has suggested that radical 
reforms are those "which... prepare [workers] to assume the leadership of 
society" and "establish certain limiting mechanisms... which restrict or 
dislocate the power of capital. " 
123 In a non-revolutionary situation, 
alternative directed investment strategies based on the pension system, it 
may be argued, represent such an initiative. 
124 The politicization of the 
pension issue as a result of the conflicting structural interests of the pension 
actors, and formulating pension reform strategies as a radical demand, may 
in turn ultimately reveal the systemic origins of the pension crisis. To 
recognize the constraints imposed by broader social structures is "to point 
to the limits of reform... and... make possible a strategy of change which 
attacks the mode of production that imposes the constraints. " 
125 
Relating the political economy of pensions to the coming pension crisis and 
to strategies for social change may therefore promote, and ultimately 
facilitate, a socialist transformation of society. 
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FOOTNOTES 
CHAPTER 1 
1. The historiography on the evolution of the state social security system 
is voluminous. The following identifies the most important work done 
on social security history for the countries under study. For Britain, 
Maurice Bruce, The Coming of the Welfare State (London: B. T. Batsford 
Ltd., reprinted, 1979); Bentley i ert, e Evolution of National 
Insurance in Great Britain: The Origins of the Welfare State (London: 
Michael Joseph, and his British Social Policy, 1914-1939 (London: 
B. T. Batsford Ltd., reprinted, 1973) and Doreen Collins' neglected 
article, "The Introduction of Old Age Pensions in Great Britain", 
Historical Journal VIII, 2 (1965), pp. 246- 259. A re-examination of 
British social security and welfare history was initiated by Arthur 
Marwick, "The Labour Party and the Welfare State in Britain, 
1900 - 1948", American Historical Review, Vol. LXXIII, No. 2 (1967), pp. 
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CHAPTER 10 
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APPENDIX C 
GLOSSARY OF PENSION PLAN TERMS 
For the benefit of the reader unfamiliar with the technical terms 
used in this study the glossaries prepared by Statistics Canada, the U. K. 
Government Actuary and the U. S. National Commission on Social Security 
have been edited and reproduced. 
CANADIAN PENSION TERMS 
Definition of a Pension Plan 
A pension plan is a formal arrangement entered into by an employer for 
providing retiring employees with a regular income for life in consideration 
of past services. The arrangement establishes a formula for determining 
pension benefits and the conditions an employee must meet to become 
entitled to such benefits. r 
Contributory Plan 
Under a contributory plan the, employees as well as the employer are 
required to make contributions. 
Non-contributory Plan 
Under a non-contributory plan the entire cost of pension benefits is borne by 
the employer and employees are not required to make contributions. 
Funding Agency - 
A funding agency is an organization or a group of individuals that receives 
and accumulates pension plan contributions to be used for the payment of 
benefits under the plan. 
Sources: Statistics Canada (74-401), Pension Plans in Canada,, -1974 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1976), pp. 128-135; 
Government Actuary, Occupational Pension Schemes, 1975 - Fifth Survey (London: HMSO, 1978 , pp. 104 - 108 and the U. S. National Commission on Social Security, Social Security in 
America's Future: Final Report of the National Commission on 
Social Security (Washington, D. C.: GPO, 19809 pp. 365 -. 
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Insured Plans 
Insured plans may be underwritten by a variety of individual and group 
contracts' with an insurance company or with the Government Annuities 
Branch. Contracts with an insurance company may range from the fully 
insured arrangement whereby the pension benefits are guaranteed by the 
insurer, to the deposit administration or segregated fund arrangements 
whereby the adequacy of the fund to meet the cost of the pension benefits is 
not guaranteed. All contracts with the Government Annuities Branch are 
the fully insured type. 
Trusteed Plans' 
Trusteed plans are covered by agreements either with personal trustees or 
with trust companies. Under the trust approach there is no guarantee that 
the funds on hand will meet the cost of accrued pension benefits which is 
the basic difference between the fully insured and trusteed approaches. 
VESTING 
Vesting on Termination of Employment 
Vesting' is the employee's right to all or part of the employer contributions 
paid on his behalf, on termination of employment before retirement, usually 
in the form of a deferred pension payable at normal retirement age. Vesting 
on termination of employment may be divided into three types, as follows: 
a) Immediate full - The employer contributions are fully and unconditionally 
vested in the employee when paid. 
b) Deferred full-, The employer contributions are fully vested in the 
employee after he fulfills certain specified conditions such as age, service, 
participation or a combination of these. 
c) Deferred graduated -A proportion of employer contributions are vested 
in the employee after he has fulfilled specified minimun requirements with 
the proportion increasing as additional requirements are`fulfilled until full 
(100%) vesting is reached. 
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Vesting Conditions 
The conditions under which vested rights are granted to employees on 
termination of employment are specified in the plan. These conditions may 
be: 
(a) A minimum number of years of service with the employer. 
(b) A minumum number of years of participation in the plan. 
(c) Attainment of a certain age. 
(d) Some combination of the above conditions. 
Plans Subject to Legislation 
Some provinces have enacted legislation regulating the operation of private 
plans. The legislation requires plans to provide for the locked-in vesting of 
employer contributions paid in respect of service after the qualification 
date set out in the legislation where a member has completed at least 10 
years of service (service or participation in the case of multi-employer 
plans) and has attained age 45, not-withstanding any other vesting 
conditions. In addition, similar federal legislation applies to pension plans 
covering employees employed in any work, business or undertaking, that is 
within the legislative authority of the Parliment of Canada. 
The qualification of the various acts are as follows: 
Act Qualification date 
Ontario - The Pension Benefits Act January 1,1965 
Quebec - The Supplemental Pension Plans Act January 1,1966 
Alberta - The Pension Benefits Act January 1,1967 
Saskatchewan - The Pension Benefits Act January 1,1969 
Federal - The Pension Benefits Standards Act October 1,1967 
Locked-in Vesting- 
Employer contributions vested under the legislation described above cannot 
be forfeited or refunded in cash but must remain "locked-in" to provide a 
deferred pension. 
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Vesting on Death Before Retirement 
Vesting on-death before retirement is the right of the beneficiary or estate 
of the deceased member to all or part of the employer contributions paid on 
behalf of the member, generally in the form of a cash refund. 
Disposition of Employee Contributions on Termination of Employment 
Most contributory' plans permit the employee to withdraw his contributions, 
with or without 'interest, in a single lump sum upon termination of 
employment before retirement, subject to the restrictions of any applicable 
pension legislation. ' Usually the employee's right to withdraw his 
contributions is conditional upon the forfeiture of any employer 
contributions' that may be vested in him. Under plans which do not permit 
refunds, the employee contributions remain locked-in to provide a deferred 
pension commencing at normal retirement age. 
Retirement Ages' 
Normal Retirement Age 
Normal retirement age is the earliest age at which a member may retire as 
a right and receive immediately his full accrued pension without reduction, 
although it is not necessarily the age at which he leaves the service of the 
employer. Some plans provide a "floating normal retirement age" under 
which retirement may take place within a range of ages. For example, 
under the federal Superannuation Act retirement may take place between 
ages 60 and 65, at the employee's opinion, with no reduction in the accrued 
pension because of age. While, f ederal public servants may retire at age 60, 
in actual practice most retire at later ages with the majority at age 65. For 
purposes of this report, the earliest age in the range of ages permissible 
under the "floating normal retirement" provision was taken to be the normal 
retirement age. Some plans provide for optional normal retirement ages 
based on some combination of age and minimum service requirements. For 
example a plan might provide for normal retirement at age 65 with the 
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option of retirement at age 60 with full accrued unreduced benefits on 
completion of 25 years of service. 
Early Retirement Age 
Early retirement age is an age before normal retirement at which 
retirement on a reduced pension is possible at the employee's option, at the 
employer's request or with mutual consent. Usually early retirement is 
subject to the attainment of a specific age and the, completion of a 
minimum period of service. 
Disability Retirement Age 
Disablilty retirement age is the age at which an emplyee who becomes 
totally and permanently disabled, as defined. by the plan, may retire before 
normal retirement age with an immediate pension benefit. 
Post-retirement Adjustment 
A post-retirement adjustment is the automatic increase in a retired 
employee's pension in accordance with a formula specified by the plan. 
Death Benefit After Retirement 
The benefits, if any, that are payable to the beneficiary of a retired 
employee who dies after becoming entitled to pension payments under the 
plan. 
Widow's Pension 
Widow's pension is a pension that is automatically payable, as a right under a 
plan, to the widow of a member who dies, and is in the form of life annuity. 
Death Benefits Before Retirement 
The benefits, if any, that are payable to the beneficiary of an employee who 
dies before he becomes entitled to a retirement pension under the plan. 
Types of Plans 
Pension plans may be divided into the following broad categories according 
to the formula for determining pension benefits: 
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Unit Benefit 
Under the unit benefit formula the member earns a unit of pension equal to 
a percentage of his earnings for each year of participation in the plan. The 
percentage used varies from plan to plan with the most commonly used 
running from 1% to 2%. The various types of unit benefit plans are 
dependent upon the salary base specified in the formula and are as follows: 
Final earnings - The unit of pension for each year of service is a 
fixed percentage of the employee's earnings at the time of retirement. 
Final average earnings - The unit of pension for each year of 
service is a fixed percentage of the employee's average earnings during a 
specified period immediately preceding retirement. For example, the unit 
of pension might be 1% of his average earnings for the five years just before 
retirement. 
Average best earnings - The unit of pension for each year of 
service is a fixed percentage of the employee's average earnings during a 
specified period of best earnings. For example, the unit of pension might be 
1% of the average of his five highest years of earnings in the 10 year period 
just before retirement. 
Career average earnings - Each year the employee earns a unit of 
pension equal to a percentage of his earnings in that year, e. g., a pension of 
2% of earnings for each year of service. The benefit formula may be 
expressed as a fixed percentage of average earnings over the entire period 
of the member's participation in the plan, for each year of service, or 
expressed as a percentage of the employee's total contributions. 
Level percentage of earnings - The pension benefit at retirement 
is equal to a specified percentage of the employee's earnings at date of 
entry' into the plan. The pension benefit may also be expressed as a fixed 
dollar amount related to the employee's earnings at a specified time. 
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Money' Purchase 
A money purchase plan defines the contribution rates, generally expressed 
as a percentage of the employee's earnings, and the contributions together 
with interest are applied to provide whatever pension benefits can be 
purchased. 
Profit Sharing 
A profit sharing pension 'plan is essentially a money purchase plan except 
that employer contributions are related to ' profits. While the employer 
contributions are not fixed by formula, usually a minimum annual 
contribution, such as 1% of covered payroll, is required whether or not a 
profit was earned. 
Flat Benefit 
Under a flat benefit plan the pension benefit is usually expressed as a fixed 
dollar amount independent of earnings for each year of service. For 
example, the benefit might be $6.00 per month for each year of service. In 
some plans the pension benefit is simply a fixed dollar amount independent 
of service and earnings, e. g., $100.00 per month. 
Composite T' 
Ina composite plan the pension benefit is based on some combination of the 
above categories. The most common is a combination of "money purchase" 
and "unit benefit". 
Other 
Includes plans which had different benefit formulae for different classes of 
employees or for males and females. - Also included were plans which had a 
different benefit formula for the portion of earnings below and above a 
specified amount. - Some plans provide more than öne 'formula within the 
same broad category, e. g., career average and final"earnings. 
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Integration 
Integrated plans are defined as plans that provide either for a lower level of 
contributions and/or benefits on earnings up to the "Year's Maximum 
Pensionable Earning' (YMPE) as defined in the C/QPP, or that provide for 
pensions to be offset by all or part of the C/QPP benefits. 
Methods of Integration 
Benefit step-rate - The benefit formula is reduced on earnings up 
to the YMPE with the full benefit formula applicable to earnings in excess 
of the YMPE. 
Example: 
Under -a unit benefit plan with a 2% formula for each year of 
service the member's pension would be calculated on the full 2% basis with 
the resultant pension would be calculated on the full 2% basis with the 
resultant pension being reduced by the pension payable under the CPP or 
QPP at the time the member retires. ' -I- 
Ineligible 'earnings - The contribution and benefit formulae remain 
the same but the earnings base on which contribution and benefit rates are 
applied is reduced by all or part of the YMPE. 
Exam le: ' 
Under a money purchase plan requiring a contribution of 5% of 
the employee's earnings to be made by both the member and the employer, 
earnings might be defined as that part of the member's earnings that 
exceeds the YMPE. The same technique might be used for unit benefit plans 
or any other type of plan where contributions and/or benefits are related to 
earnings. -'"' 
Contribution step rate - Employee and employer contributions are 
reduced by the exact or approximate amount of the contribution required to 
be paid to the CPP or QPP. 
0 
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Example: 
A money purchase plan requiring a contribution of 5% of the 
employee's earnings to be made by both the member and the employer might 
provide for a contribution of 3.2% on earnings up to the YMPE and 5% on 
excess earnings. 
Other - Includes the following: 
(a) Plans which provide for integration in respect of employee contributions 
only. 
(b) Plans which -provide different benefit rates for different classes of 
employees. - 
(c) Plans which provide some combination of benefit formulae 
U. K. PENSION TERMS 
Accured pension .. 
The amount of the prospective pension of a member on his future retirement 
which can be regarded as provided in respect of his pensionable service to 
date, rather than by future service. 
Allocation of pension 
The giving up, of part of a pension in return for a contingent pension to a 
widow or dependant of the pensioner. 
Average-salary scheme 
A scheme in which the pension depends on earnings in each year a member 
has been in the scheme. 
Census of Employment 
Annual count of the numbers of employees in the UK. See under 'Employee'. 
Closed scheme 
A scheme which is no longer. open to new entrants but which still has 
employees contributing to it or pensions being paid from it. Sometimes 
arises when members do not wish to leave their present scheme in order to 
join a new scheme with different provisions. 
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Commutation of a pension 
The giving up of at least part of a person's pension in return for an 
immediate lump sum. 
Deferred pension 
A pension the payment of which is deferred beyond the normal retirement 
age. -- 
Deposit Administration scheme - 
A scheme somewhat, similiar to a Managed Fund Scheme but in which 
pensions are purchased from the insurance company out of the assets held 
for the scheme at the time of retirement of members. 
Final average salary 
The average earnings over a short period (often one to three years) up to or 
near the termination of membership. 
Final-salary scheme 
A scheme in which the pension depends on the length of pensionable service 
of the member and his final average salary. 
Flat-rate scheme 
A scheme in which the pension is a certain fixed amount - eg F. 5a year - for 
each year's membership, irrespective of earnings. 
Guaranteed pension 
A pension which is guaranteed payable for a certain period even if the 
pensioner dies before the end of the period. 
Insurance invested 
Funds in respect of pension schemes that are invested by insurance 
companies. 
Insurance scheme 
A scheme in which all contributions are paid to, an insurance company to 
invest. There are various forms of contract for this. , 
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Insured scheme 
A scheme under which the benefits promised in the rules in respect of the 
employee's service to date are secured for each member under a policy with 
an insurance company. 
Integrated scheme 
A scheme in which the benefits are specifically designed to take into 
account the national insurance benefits the members will receive. 
Life Assurance' scheme 
A scheme only providing benefits on the death of members. 
Life Office 
An insurance company conducting life assurance business. 
Managed Fund scheme 
A scheme the resources of which have been handed over to an outside 
agency, such as an insurance company, for investment management. 
Manual employees 
Employees not in managerial, professional, administrative, selling or office 
employment. 
Manual scheme 
A pension scheme for manual employees only, or for some similar group such 
as employees who are paid weekly rather than monthly. 
Members of a pension scheme 
Often taken as 'active members', including only persons currently employed 
who are' contributing or who will be entitled -to benefits in respect of their 
current employment, but may include past employeis 'who are or will be 
entitled to benefit. 
Money Purchase scheme 
A scheme in which the benefits payable to a member are directly related to 
the contributions paid by him and in respect of him but depend on the age at 
which they were paid. 
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N on-contributory scheme 
A scheme in which no contributions are required from members, except 
possibly for some optional benefits. In this report the term also includes 
schemes in which the only contributions required are for widows' benefits. 
Non-insurance scheme 
A scheme in which no contributions are paid to an insurance company. 
Notionally funded , 
The,, schemes for teachers, for the National Health Service and for the 
Atomic Energy. Authority which have no actual investments but which for 
the purpose =of assessing contribution rates are deemed to have purchased 
investments and to receive an income from them. Treated as unfunded for 
the purpose of this survey, as if income exactly balanced outgo. 
Occupational pension scheme 
A formal arrangement under which an employer contributes to or meets the 
cost of providing pensions to a group of his employees on their retirement on 
account of age. In this survey the term is extended to cover lump sum 
benefit schemes, i. e. those providing a lump sum on retirement which the 
employee is free to convert into a pension if he so desires. 
Part-insurance scheme 
A scheme in which some, but not all, of the contributions are paid to an 
insurance company which then provides part of the benefits under, the 
scheme. ,-- 
Preserved pension . 
A pension the right to which is preserved-until retirement age is reached 
although the members has left the employment in respect of which the 
pension is payable. 
Privately invested (or self invested) 
Funds in respect of pension schemes which are invested other than through 
insurance companies. 
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Private Sector 
Employment by firms or individuals whose operations are not subject to 
government, control. Includes some largely independent non-profit making 
bodies such as universities. 
Public Sector 
Employment by the government or local government or public bodies subject 
to some ministerial control, although this control may not extend to pension 
arrangements. 
Public Service schemes 
The schemes for the main groups of public servants, such as Civil Servants, 
HM Forces, employees of the National Health Service, teacher, police and 
firemen and some others. A formal definition is given in the Social Security 
Pensions Act, 1975, Section 66. 
Self-administered scheme 
A scheme which is operated without recourse to an insurance company, 
except possibiliy for insurance of death benefits. 
Top Hat scheme 
A scheme which provides retirement benefits to directors and senior 
managers only. 
Transfer payments 
Payments made from one pension scheme to another whenever the pension 
rights of one or more members are transferred, usually on the employee 
changing his employment. 
Trustees of a pension fund 
Under most schemes in the private sector the body of persons whose 
responsibility it is to make fund investments and to ensure that the fund is 
fairly used for all persons entitled to benefit. 
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Unfunded, or pay-as-you-go, scheme 
A scheme such as for most public service schemes in which no fund is built 
up to provide in advance for pensions (except possibly a 'notional fund' for 
the purpose of assessing contribution rates which is not represetned by 
actual investments). 
U. S. PENSION TERMS 
Actuarial reduction 
The reduction in a Social Security benefit when taken before age 65. The 
reduction is permanent and is designed to provide, on the average, the same 
value (taking 
into account interest) of total lifetime benefits as would have 
been payable if the benefits had started at age 65. At age 62, the benefit 
for a worker is reduced by 20 percent. 
Aged beneficiary 
A person getting benefits based on age (rather than based on, say, disability 
or on caring fora child'beneficiary). In general, "aged' as used in this sense 
means age 62 or older in the case of a worker or spouse (or dependent 
parent) or age 60 or older in the case of a widow(er). 
Allowance 
The granting of an application for disability benefits. 
Annual exempt amount 
Amount of earnings a beneficiary can have in a year and still receive all of 
his or her benefits for that year. For beneficiaries under age 65, the amount 
is $4,080 for 1981 and will be automatically adjusted, based on increases in 
general earnings levels in the future. For beneficiaries age 65 or older, the 
amount is'$5,500 in 1981 and $6,000 in 1982, with automatic adjustments as 
wages rise thereafter (also see earnings test). 
Assets test (Sometimes called means test) 
A financial standard used to limit eligibility for certain government 
programs. In Supplemental Security Income, for example, eligibility is 
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limited to persons with $1,500 or less in assets ($2,250 for couples); some 
assets are not counted in making this determination, such as the value of a 
home. 
Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME) 
The earnings used to determine the Primary Insurance Amount, on which 
benefits for a worker and family will be based. Earnings for each year after 
1950 are updated (indexed) to the indexing year (the second year before the 
year the worker becomes 62 or, if earlier, becomes disabled or dies) to take 
account of the. increase in average wages since the year they were earned. 
Earnings for the indexing year and subsequent years are used at their actual 
values. xThen, the highest years of indexed earnings for a specified number 
of years are selected and averaged to yield the AIME. 
Cash benefits 
Benefits such as Social Security retirement benefits, survivor benefits, 
disability benefits, unemployment compensation, Supplemental Security 
Income, and Aid to Families with Dependent Children, aimed at replacing 
prior income or earning power and,, paid directly to the beneficiary (instead 
of to those rendering services to the beneficiary). 
Child-care year 
A year of low earnings due to the responsibility of caring for a child under a 
certain age. 
Cohort --I _ý 
A group of persons which shares a common characteristic, such as persons 
who reach 62 in a certain calendar year or persons who become disabled in a 
certain calendar year. 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
An index, published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor, 
which measures average changes in prices of goods and services. Two CPI's 
are published--a CPI for All Urban Consumers and a revised CPI for Urban 
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Wage Earners and Clerical Workers. The Social Security Act provides for 
automatic increases in benefits based on increases in the latter CPI. 
Coordinated plan 
A" pension plan that is combined with Social Security in order to give the 
beneficiaries an agreed-upon level and/or type of benefits. Many State and 
local government pension plans are coordinated with Social Security. 
Coverage 
The inclusion of 'workers 'Under a social insurance system, such as Social 
Security, for the purposes of benefits and taxes. 
Coverage agreement 
Voluntary arrangements between the Federal government and State and 
local governments, nonprofit organizations or American companies whose 
foreign subsidiaries employ U. S. citizens, with regard to the coverage of 
their employees under Social Security and Medicare Hospital Insurance. 
Covered employment 
All work covered by law under Social Security' and Medicare Hospital 
Insurance (see'noncovered employment). 
Covered earnings 
Earnings that, are subject to the payroll tax and are credited for benefit 
purposes. 
Delayed-retirement credit, 
An -increase in benefits for a worker who delays retirement beyond age 65. 
The credit is measured in terms of the number of months after age 65 and 
up to age 72 for which the worker was eligible for, but did not receive, 
retirement benefits. The ' credit is 1/4 of 1 percent per month of the 
worker's Primary Insurance Amount for workers reaching age 62'after 1978. 
Dropout year 
A year of low earnings which can be disregarded in computing a 
beneficiary's average earnings for Social Security purposes. 
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Dual entitlement 
Entitlement to a benefit as a spouse or survivor, as well as to a benefit 
based on one's own earnings. In such cases, the spouse or survivor benefit is 
payable only to the extent that it exceeds the person's benefit as a worker. 
Earned income disregard 
An amount of, wage or salary income that does not count in determining 
eligibility for benefits under the Supplemental Security Income program's 
income test. The current figure is $65 per month, plus one-half of all other 
earnings (see also general income disregard). - 
Earnings base 
The maximum amount of l annual covered earnings on which employees, 
employers, and self-employed people pay Social Security and Hospital 
Insurance taxes and which can be counted in figuring Social Security benefit 
amounts. The base is $29,700 for 1981. 
Earnings credits 
Amounts of covered earnings from -work appearing on the Social Security 
Administration's records that are, used , to determine an individual's 
entitlement to Social Security and Medicare Hospital Insurance benefits and 
to compute the amount of the OASDI benefit. 
Earnings record 
A record kept by the Social Security Administration of each worker's 
covered wages and self-employment income, by year, which is used as the 
basis for computing Social Security eligibility and benefits. 
Earnings test 
The provision that requires a person's Social Security benefits to be reduced 
by $1 for each $2 of earnings over the annual exempt amount (see annual 
exempt amount). The test-is not applied once a beneficiary reaches 72 (70 
beginning in 1982). -- 
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Eligibility 
The state of meeting all of the requirements for a particular Social Security 
benefit except filing and approval of an application. 
Entitlement 
The state of meeting all of the requirements for a particular Social Security 
benefit, including the filing and approval of an application. 
General income disregard - 
An amount, of income accruing to the beneficiary from any source that is 
not counted in computing the monthly payment under the Supplemental 
Security Income program. 
Income test (sometimes called means test) 
The requirement in public assistance programs that makes people eligble for 
payments or medical-care expense reimbursement only if their incomes 
(and, sometimes, assets) are less than a specified amount. 
Indexing 
Updating data for past periods to some recent date by the application of a 
formula. In Social Security, a- number of components are updated by 
indexing, ', including earnings used in the benefit computation, benefits paid 
to persons on the roll, the base 'to which the payroll tax is applicable, and 
the exempt amount under the earnings test (see Average Indexed Monthly 
Earnings). 
Individual Retirement Account 
A plan providing retirement benefits for employees who do' not 'have an 
employer-sponsored pension plan. ---' 
Insured status 
A requirement for entitlement to Social Security retirement, disability, and 
survivor benefits. A person is insured if he or she has the required number 
of quarters of coverage; based on his or her earnings credits (see earnings 
credits and quarters of coverage). 
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Currently insured: Six quarters of coverage during the 13-quarter 
period ending with the quarter of the worker's death or, if earlier, 
the quarter in which the worker became entitled to a disabled 
worker's benefit. 
Fully insured: One quarter of coverage for each calendar year 
elapsing after 1950 (or, if later, after the year a worker reaches 
21) and up to the year the worker reaches 62, or dies, or is 
disabled, whichever occurs earlier. The minimum requirement is 
6 quarters of coverage; the maximum requirement is 40 quarters 
of coverage. 
Insured in event of disability: A worker is insured in event of 
disability if he or she is fully insured and has at least 20 quarters 
of coverage during the 40-quarter period ending with the quarter 
of disablement. (A person disabled because of blindness needs 
only fully insured status). Workers disabled before age 31 have an 
alternative requirement which is less stringent. 
In order to establish eligibility for retirement and survivor benefits, a 
worker only needs to be fully insured. However, lump-sum death benefits 
and survivor benefits to children and widows or widowers with young 
children in their care may be paid even if the worker is only currently 
insured. 
Integration 
As used in connection with private pension plans, the development of the 
provisions of the plan so that, in combination with Social Security, the 
combined 'benefit will constitute approximately the same percentage of 
salary for persons with the same length of service, regardless of salary level. 
Maintenance of effort 
A requirement in connection with public assistance programs that, after a 
Federal program is -introduced or is liberalized, the state must continue to 
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expend funds or, to provide services at the same level (or higher) as it had 
done previously. 
Maturity 
The time when young workers who entered the system when the Social 
Security program first covered most of the population (the early 1950's) will 
have been receiving benefits for many years, thus making the full cost of 
Social Security apparent. 
Maximum family benefit 
The maximum monthly amount that can be paid on a worker's earnings 
record. Whenever the amount of benefits payable on an earnings record 
exceeds the maximum, each family or survivor benefit is proportionately 
reduced to bring the total within the maximum. (Benefits for divorced 
spouses and surviving divorced spouses are excluded from this limit). 
Medical standards for disability 
Physical condition and medical history standards used in determining 
whether an applicant is disabled, for purposes of establishing a "period of 
disability. " A medical impairment is one that results from anatomical, 
physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by 
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. 
Medically needy 
Persons whose assets or income are too high to qualify for Supplemental 
Security Income or Aid to Families with Dependent Children but who would 
qualify for it if permitted to spend-down to Medicaid eligibility levels by 
documenting incurred medical expenses (see spend-down provision). Some 
States include such persons in their Medicaid programs. 
Medicare 
The health insurance portion of the Social Security Act (Title XVIII), which 
provides Hospital Insurance in its Part A and Supplementary Medical 
Insurance in its Part B. 
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Minimum benefit, regular 
The lowest benefit payable (before any reductions or deductions) to a retired 
or a disabled worker, or to the sole survivor of a worker. The minimum 
benefit is frozen at $122 for new beneficiaries. However, after a person 
begins to get benefits based on the minimum (or reaches age 65, if earlier), 
his or her benefit will be increased for cost-of-living increases. 
Noncoordinated government pension plan 
A Federal, State, or local government retirement program not integrated 
with Social Security--i. e., without an offset or reduction for the receipt of 
Social Security benefits. 
Noncovered employment 
All paid work not covered by law 'under Social Security or Medicare Hospital 
Insurance (primarily most Federal civilian employment, '"some State and local 
government employment, and some employment for nonprofit organizations). 
Normal retirement age 
The age at which, when the retirement benefit is initially claimed, it is not 
subject to an actuarial reduction or increase (under present law, age 65). 
(See actuarial reduction) 
Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) 
Title II of the Social Security Act, the cash benefits portion of the program. 
Past-service credits 
As used in connection with private pension plans, the counting of service 
rendered' to the employer before the plan became effective in the 
determination of benefit eligibility and amounts. 
Portability 
A worker's ability to "take pension credits earned on one job to another job in 
a different company, industry, or area of the country. 
Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) 
The amount on which all monthly OASDI benefits are based. A worker's PIA 
is derived from Average Indexed Monthly " Earnings by " applying it in a 
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weighted benefit formula. Such formula for persons reaching age 62 in 1981 
(or dying or becoming disabled before age 62 in 1981) is 90 percent of the 
first $211 of AIME, plus 32 percent of the next $1,063 of AIME, plus 15 
percent of AIME in excess of $1,274. For subsequent years' cohorts, the 
dollar figures are changed to reflect the relative changes in nationwide 
average wages. A worker's disability benefit or old-age benefit at age 65 is 
equal to 100 percent of PIA. Other benefits are various percentages of the 
worker's PIA. (See weighted benefit and cohort) 
Quarters of coverage 
The meausre used to determine if a person has enough earnings credits to be 
insured for Social' Security benefits (see earnings credits and insured 
status). In general, for years before 1978, a wage earner acquired one 
quarter of coverage for each calendar quarter in which he or she was paid 
$50 or more in covered wages. A self-employed person acquired 4 quarters 
of coverage for each year in which net income from' self-employment was 
$400 or more; - Beginning in 1978, a worker acquires I quarter of coverge (up 
to 'a maximum of 4) for each $250 of earnings paid in a year, the dollar 
measure is automatically increased each year to take account of increases 
in average wages (in 1979, $260; in 1980, $290; and in 1981, $310). 
Replacement rate 
The worker's benefit (or the family benefit) as a' percentage of prior 
earnings. If a worker earned $500 a month before retirement and receives a 
benefit of $350, his or her replacement rate is 70 percent. Generally, it is 
the relationship between the benefit payable for the first month of 
entitlement and gross "taxable earnings for the year before entitlement. 
However, in some, contexts, - it may be the relationship between the benefit 
and (1) net earnings from-the prior year or (2) average indexed earnings. 
Special minimum benefit 
A benefit based on the number of years a person has worked under Social 
Security rather than on his or her average earnings. This benefit is designed 
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to help those who have worked for long periods at low wages and is paid only 
if it is higher than the worker's benefit based on the regular benefit 
formula. It, is based on a flat amount (currently, $14.50) per "year of 
coverage" in excess of 10 years, but not over 30 years. A "year of coverage" 
is one with earnings of at least 25 percent of the earnings base for the year 
(but, for 1979 and after, the earnings base which would have resulted if the 
1978 base had been automatically adjusted, and not subjected to ad hoc 
increases in 1979-81; such hypothetical base for 1981 is $22,200). 
State supplementation 
The payments to SSI recipients by States in addition to the Federal 
payments (done either on= a voluntary basis or, as for some recipients, 
mandatorily). 
Substantial gainful activity (SGA) 
Remunerative work that is substantial, as determined by the amount of 
money earned. If a disabled'person engages in SGA, his or her benefits are 
denied or terminated. SGA involves the performance of significant physical 
or mental duties, or both, which are productive in nature and may entail 
either full-time or part-time work. 
Survivor 
An immediate relative of an insured worker (a wife, child, or parent) who 
lives longer than the worker and thus receives a portion of the benefits, 
either immediately or upon reaching a prescribed age, that would have been 
paid the worker if he or she were retired or disabled. 
Taxable payroll 
Total earnings that are subject of OASDI and HI taxes, adjusted to reflect 
the lower tax rates on self-employment, tips, and multiple-employer excess 
wages. The long-range cost of the program or of changes therein is usually 
expressed as a percentage of average taxable pyroll and is comparable to 
the combined employer/employee tax rate scheduled in the law. Taxable 
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payroll is estimted at $1.13 trillion for 1980 and $1.26 trillion for 1981. One 
percent of taxable payroll in 1980 was $11.3 billion. 
Trial work period 
A period of time during which a disability beneficiary continues to receive 
full benefits even thoough working. This is done to permit beneficiaries to 
work long enough to test their ability to work without losing benefits. 
Vesting 
The establishment of eligibility for, or the right to the eventual receipt of, 
benefits under a pension pain. 
Wage indexing 
See Average Indexed Monthly Earnings. 
Weighted benefit 
One which replaces a larger percentage of preretirement earnings for people. 
with lower earnings than it does for people with higher earnings. This is 
done in the Social Security program. 
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APPENDIX H 
VALUE OF TOTAL NET PENSION FUND 
ACQUISITION OF EQUITIES AS A PERCENTAGE OF NEW 
CORPORATE EQUITIES PUBLICLY OFFERED FOR SALE, 
UNITED STATES, 1970-1981 
Value of Total 
Net Pension 
Fund Acquisiton 
of Equities, 
Year (Flow in $ Million) 
19701 1.494 
19751 -532 
1976 21,100 
1977 -7,800 
1978 6,000 
1979 15.800 
1980 52,100 
1981 -8.700 
Net Pension 
Fund Equity 
New Corporate Acquisitions 
Equities Publicly as a% of 
Offered for Sale New Corporate 
($ Million) Equity Sales 
6,849 21.8 
7,179 (-7.4) 
8,296 254.3 
7,857 (-99.3) 
7,760 77.3 
8,581 184.1 
18,718 278.3 
24,716 (-35.2) 
1970-1981 Average: 163.2% 
Note: 1. Annualized. 
2. Primary and secondary market purchases. 
Source: Net pension fund flow into corporate equities derived from the U. S. 
Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 
1982-83 (Washington, D. ..,. Series , new ate equities offered for sale, Series 858, p. 518. 
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APPENDIX I-1 
ESTIMATED 
REGISTERED RETIREMENT SAVINGS PLAN (RRSP) 
ASSETS IN CANADA, 1960-1990 
Estimated Assets 
Year ($ Billion) 
19611 $0.98 
1962 0.16 
1963 0.21 
1964 0.27 
1965 0.34 
1966 0.44 
1967 0.56 
1968 0.72 
1969 0.93 
1970 1.2 
1971 1.5 
1972 1.9 
1973 2.5 
1974 3.2 
1975 4.2 
1976 5.3 
1977 6.9 
1978 8.8 
1979 11.3 
1980 14.5 
1981 18.6 
19822 20.5 
1983 23.3 
1984 26.1 
1985 28.9 
1986 31.7 
1987 34.6 
1988 37.4 
1989 40.2 
1990 43.0 
Notes: I. Assets between 1960 and 1982 are estimated using an exponential 
regression equation based on actual assets between 1977 and 1981 
as reported to the author by the Financial Institutions Section, 
Business Finance Division, Statistics Canada. Earlier work by the 
Task Force on Retirement Income Policy, The Retirement Income 
System in Canada, Vol. 1 (Hull: Canadian g 
Centre, , p. 74 and Harry Weitz, 
"Contributors and 
Contributions to Registered Retirement Savings Plans in Ontario", 
Re rt of the Royal Commission in the Status of Pensions in 
nro, o oron o: Queen -s Printer, .p used vie withdrawal rate" method so that gross RRSP contributions 
minus an arbitrary withdrawal rate assumption were equated to RRSP 
assets. 
2. After 1982 the system is assumed to be at maturity and assets are 
therefore estimated on the basis of a straight-line fit. 
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APPENDIX 1-2 
COMPARISON OF ACTUAL 
AND 
ESTIMATED RRSP ASSETS, 
CANADA, 1977-1981 
$ Billion 
Year Actual Estimatedl 
1977 $6.4 $6.9 
1978 9.3 8.8 
1979 11.9 11.3 
1980 14.5 14.5 
1981 17.9 18.6 
Differential 
+7.8% 
-5.4 
-5.0 
0.0 
+3.9 
Note: 1. Estimated on the basis of an exponential regression equation as 
. 
reported In Appendix 1-1. 
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APPENDIX 1-3 
ESTIMATED REGISTERED RETIREMENT SAVINGS PLAN ASSETS 
INVESTED IN EQUITY, BILLION DOLLARS, 
CANADA, 1960-1980 
Estimated Percentage RRSP Assets 
Year RRSP Assets X Invested in Equity1 Invested in Equity 
1960 $0.98 8% $0.078 
1961 0.13 8 0.610 
1962 0.16 8 0.013 
1963 0.21 8 0.017 
1964 0.27 8 0.022 
1965 0.34 8 0.027 
1966 0.44 8 0.035 
1967 0.56 8 0.045 
1968 0.72 8 0.058 
1969 0.93 8 0.074 
1970 1.2 8 0.096 
1971 1.5 8 0.120 
1972 1.9 8 0.152 
1973 2.5 8 0.200 
1974 3.2 8 0.256 
1975 4.2 8 0.336 
1976 5.3 8 0.424 
1977 6.9 7 0.483 
1978 8.8 6 0.528 
1979 11.3 5 0.565 
1980 14.5 4 0.580 
Note: 1. Between 1960 and 1976 it was assumed that RRSP equity investment 
was one-third of that for trusteed pension plans. This assumption 
is based on a study carried out and reported by the Trust Companies 
Association of Canada, Submission to the Royal Commission on the 
Status of Pensions in Ontario (loronzo, may , 11510 , 1111-24 ana studies ys anada for 1981 and 1982. According to 
these studies equity investment by RRSPs declined from 7 per cent 
in 1977 to 2 per cent In 1982. The bulk of funds are invested in 
mortgages. RRSP assets now represent nearly 40 per cent of total 
trusteed pension plan assets. Earlier studies erroneously assumed 
that RRSP asset mix was similar to that for trusteed pension plans. 
Sources: For RRSP assets, Appendix I-1, op. cit. and Statistics Canada, 
Trusteed Pension Plans Financial Statistics (Ottawa: Minister of 
Supply and Services, various years). 
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APPENDIX J 
VALUE OF STOCK LISTED 
ON TORONTO STOCK EXCHANGE, 
ADJUSTED FOR CONTROL BLOCKS, 1966-1980 
Value of TSE 
Value of TSE Control Stocks, Adjusted 
Stocks Blocks for Control Blocks 
Year ($ Billion) X (In Per Cent) _ ($ Billion) 
1966 $35.4 30% $10.4 
1970 46.5 50 23.3 
1971 50.3 50 25.2 
1972 64.5 50 32.3 
1973 62.5 50 31.3 
1974 44.2 50 22.1 
1975 51.6 50 25.8 
1976 56.9 50 28.5 
1977 62.4 50 31.2 
1978 79.4 70 55.6 
1979 112.6 70 78.8 
1980 139.4 70 97.6 
Sources: Calculated from estimates for control blocks from the Bank of Nova 
Scotia, The Stock Market in Canada: Post War Forces of Supply and 
Demand . Monthly Review, October 1960, p. 1 and estimates by Dr O. M. Petrovici, I'erce tage or Pension Plan Stocks (Mkt Value) vs. 
Canadian QMV5 oc s Listed on ISE. aper NO. prepared or the 
RocK xc an e. , p. ,4 and 7. 
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APPENDIX K-1 
ASSETS OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES, 
CANADA, 1946 AND 1979 
$ Million 
Financial Intermediary 1946 1979 
Chartered Banks 6,924 210,200 
Private Non-bank Intermediaries 4,926 188,600 
Trusteed Pension Funds 455 43,200 132,4001) 
Life Insurance Companies 3,066 41,400 
Trust Companies 305 33,400 (44,2003) 
Local and Central Credit Unions 188 32,500 
Construction Loan Companies 124 14,100 
Mortgage Loan Companies 288 12,300 
Property and Casualty Companies 352 10,400 
Investment Companies 148 1,300 
Total 11,850 398,800 
Note: 1. Excluding corporate trusteed pension fund assets under management 
by trust companies. 
2. ' Canadian business only. Including life insurance and accident and 
sickness policies ($2.3 billion) plus the segregated (pension) 
funds ($5.5 billion) of life firms. 
3. To place the assets of trust companies on a comparable basis with 
life companies requires that all assets under their control be 
included as in the case of life insurance company assets (S A A, 
segregated funds and life policies). Nearly 25 per cent of all 
trusteed pension fund assets, or $10.8 billion, are controlled by 
trust companies and are included here. The total asset base of 
trust companies is therefore greater than that of life insurance 
companies. 
Sources: Retabulated and calculated from E. P. Neufeld, The Financial System 
of Canada: Its Growth and Development (TorontO: a an ., 
1972) ana upoaatea Tor 1979 firrom bzazlszics Canada, Financial 
Institutions, Financial Statistics, Fourth Quarter 1919'tuttawa: 
Statistics Canaaa, 19110). 
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APPENDIX K-2 
ASSETS OF FINANCIAL 
AND NONFINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, U. S., 1950 AND 1980 
Billion 
Sector 1950 1980 
Commercial banking 147.8 1,386.3 
Nonbank Finance 138.8 2,375.5 
Savings and 1? an associations 16.9 629.8 
Pension funds 11.7 484.9 
Life insurance 62.6 469.8 
Finance companies 9.3 198.6 
Other insurance 12.6 180.1 
Mutual savings banks 22.4 171.5 
Money market funds n. a. 74.4 
Credit unions n. a. 69.2 
Investment companies 3.3 63.7 
Security brokers and dealers n. a. 33.5 
Total 286.6 3,761.8 
Note: 1. Private non-insured and insured pension funds plus government 
(state and local) retirement funds. 
Source: Retabulated and calculated from the U. S. Department of Commerce, 
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1970 and 1982-83 
as ng n. .., vari ous years), se ries 639, p. 437 and Series 813, p. 500. 
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APPENDIX K-3 
ASSETS OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, 
BRITAIN, 1962 AND 1980 
2 Billion 
Institution 1963 1980 
Banksl 9.1 331.7 
Non-bank Finance 21.3 252.0 
Pension funds 5.8 2 (4.33) 85.0 2 (63.83) 
Life Companies 7.4 4 (5.93) 74.3 4 (53.13) 
Building Societies 4.0 62.8 
Unit and Investment Trusts 3.1 16.1 
Other 1.0 13.8 
Total 30.4 583.7 
Note: 1. Including London clearing banks, Scottish and Northern Ireland 
banks and other deposit banks. 
2. Including private, public and local authority pension funds plus 
estimated insured pension assets of life companies. 
3. Excluding insured pension assets of life companies. 
4. Including insured pension assets. 
Source: Retabulated and calculated from Central Statistics Office, 
Financial Statistics, 1963 and 1981 (London: HMSO, various years). 
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